read from the temp file didn't match the file length reported by ftello(),
the wrong variable's value was printed, and so the message made no sense.
Clean up a couple other coding infelicities while at it.
padded encryption scheme. Formerly it would try to access res[(unsigned) -1],
which resulted in core dumps on 64-bit machines, and was certainly trouble
waiting to happen on 32-bit machines (though in at least the known case
it was harmless because that byte would be overwritten after return).
Per report from Ken Colson; fix by Marko Kreen.
byte after the last full byte of the bit array, regardless of whether that
byte was part of the valid data or not. Found by buildfarm testing.
Thanks to Stefan Kaltenbrunner for nailing down the cause.
log_min_error_statement is active and there is some problem in logging the
current query string; for example, that it's too long to include in the log
message without running out of memory. This problem has existed since the
log_min_error_statement feature was introduced. No doubt the reason it
wasn't detected long ago is that 8.2 is the first release that defaults
log_min_error_statement to less than PANIC level.
Per report from Bill Moran.
when handed an invalidly-encoded pattern. The previous coding could get
into an infinite loop if pg_mb2wchar_with_len() returned a zero-length
string after we'd tested for nonempty pattern; which is exactly what it
will do if the string consists only of an incomplete multibyte character.
This led to either an out-of-memory error or a backend crash depending
on platform. Per report from Wiktor Wodecki.
been broken since forever, but was not noticed because people seldom look
at raw parse trees. AFAIK, no impact on users except that debug_print_parse
might fail; but patch it all the way back anyway. Per report from Jeff Ross.
to prevent possible escalation of privilege. Provide new SECURITY
DEFINER functions with old behavior, but initially REVOKE ALL
from public for these functions. Per list discussion and design
proposed by Tom Lane.
This is a Linux kernel bug that apparently exists in every extant kernel
version: sometimes shmctl() will fail with EIDRM when EINVAL is correct.
We were assuming that EIDRM indicates a possible conflict with pre-existing
backends, and refusing to start the postmaster when this happens. Fortunately,
there does not seem to be any case where Linux can legitimately return EIDRM
(it doesn't track shmem segments in a way that would allow that), so we can
get away with just assuming that EIDRM means EINVAL on this platform.
Per reports from Michael Fuhr and Jon Lapham --- it's a bit surprising
we have not seen more reports, actually.
overruns (neither of which seem likely to be exploitable as security holes,
fortunately, since the provoker can't control the data written). One of
these is due to choosing to stomp on the output of a called function, which
is bad news in any case; make it treat the called functions' results as
read-only. Avoid some unnecessary palloc/pfree traffic too; it's not
really helpful to free small temporary objects, and again this is presuming
more than it ought to about the nature of the results of called functions.
Per report from Patrick Welche and additional code-reading by Imad.
create table foo (bar int default null default 3);
due to not thinking about the special-case handling of DEFAULT NULL.
Problem noticed while investigating bug #3396.
wrong data when dumping a bufferload that crosses a component-file boundary.
This probably has not been seen in the wild because (a) component files are
normally 1GB apiece and (b) non-block-aligned buffer usage is relatively
rare. But it's fairly easy to reproduce a problem if one reduces RELSEG_SIZE
in a test build. Kudos to Kurt Harriman for spotting the bug.
is in progress on the same hashtable. This seems the least invasive way to
fix the recently-recognized problem that a split could cause the scan to
visit entries twice or (with much lower probability) miss them entirely.
The only field-reported problem caused by this is the "failed to re-find
shared lock object" PANIC in COMMIT PREPARED reported by Michel Dorochevsky,
which was caused by multiply visited entries. However, it seems certain
that mdsync() is vulnerable to missing required fsync's due to missed
entries, and I am fearful that RelationCacheInitializePhase2() might be at
risk as well. Because of that and the generalized hazard presented by this
bug, back-patch all the supported branches.
Along the way, fix pg_prepared_statement() and pg_cursor() to not assume
that the hashtables they are examining will stay static between calls.
This is risky regardless of the newly noted dynahash problem, because
hash_seq_search() has never promised to cope with deletion of table entries
other than the just-returned one. There may be no bug here because the only
supported way to call these functions is via ExecMakeTableFunctionResult()
which will cycle them to completion before doing anything very interesting,
but it seems best to get rid of the assumption. This affects 8.2 and HEAD
only, since those functions weren't there earlier.
This is needed to allow a security-definer function to set a truly secure
value of search_path. Without it, a malicious user can use temporary objects
to execute code with the privileges of the security-definer function. Even
pushing the temp schema to the back of the search path is not quite good
enough, because a function or operator at the back of the path might still
capture control from one nearer the front due to having a more exact datatype
match. Hence, disable searching the temp schema altogether for functions and
operators.
Security: CVE-2007-2138
did not expect that a DEAD tuple could follow a RECENTLY_DEAD tuple in an
update chain, but because the OldestXmin rule for determining deadness is a
simplification of reality, it is possible for this situation to occur
(implying that the RECENTLY_DEAD tuple is in fact dead to all observers,
but this patch does not attempt to exploit that). The code would follow a
chain forward all the way, but then stop before a DEAD tuple when backing
up, meaning that not all of the chain got moved. This could lead to copying
the chain multiple times (resulting in duplicate copies of the live tuple at
its end), or leaving dangling index entries behind (which, aside from
generating warnings from later vacuums, creates a risk of wrong query
results or bogus duplicate-key errors once the heap slot the index entry
points to is repopulated).
The fix is to recheck HeapTupleSatisfiesVacuum while following a chain
forward, and to stop if a DEAD tuple is reached. Each contiguous group
of RECENTLY_DEAD tuples will therefore be copied as a separate chain.
The patch also adds a couple of extra sanity checks to verify correct
behavior.
Per report and test case from Pavan Deolasee.
likely that anyone wanting to run the regression tests in the future will
have up-to-date system timezone files, so this is more likely to work than
the old contents.
get away with not (re)initializing a local variable if the variable is marked
"isconst" and not "isnull". Unfortunately it makes this decision after having
already freed the old value, meaning that something like
for i in 1..10 loop
declare c constant text := 'hi there';
leads to subsequent accesses to freed memory, and hence probably crashes.
(In particular, this is why Asif Ali Rehman's bug leads to crash and not
just an unexpectedly-NULL value for SQLERRM: SQLERRM is marked CONSTANT
and so triggers this error.)
The whole thing seems wrong on its face anyway: CONSTANT means that you can't
change the variable inside the block, not that the initializer expression is
guaranteed not to change value across successive block entries. Hence,
remove the "optimization" instead of trying to fix it.
DECLARE section needs to know about it. Formerly, everyplace besides DECLARE
that created variables needed to do "plpgsql_add_initdatums(NULL)" to prevent
those variables from being sucked up as part of a subsequent DECLARE block.
This is obviously error-prone, and in fact the SQLSTATE/SQLERRM patch had
failed to do it for those two variables, leading to the bug recently exhibited
by Asif Ali Rehman: a DECLARE within an exception handler tried to reinitialize
SQLERRM.
Although the SQLSTATE/SQLERRM patch isn't in any pre-8.1 branches, and so
I can't point to a demonstrable failure there, it seems wise to back-patch
this into the older branches anyway, just to keep the logic similar to HEAD.
we should check that the function code returns the claimed result datatype
every time we parse the function for execution. Formerly, for simple
scalar result types we assumed the creation-time check was sufficient, but
this fails if the function selects from a table that's been redefined since
then, and even more obviously fails if check_function_bodies had been OFF.
This is a significant security hole: not only can one trivially crash the
backend, but with appropriate misuse of pass-by-reference datatypes it is
possible to read out arbitrary locations in the server process's memory,
which could allow retrieving database content the user should not be able
to see. Our thanks to Jeff Trout for the initial report.
Security: CVE-2007-0555
exactly at the point where we need to insert a new item, the calculation used
the wrong size for the "high key" of the new left page. This could lead to
choosing an unworkable split, resulting in "PANIC: failed to add item to the
left sibling" (or "right sibling") failure. Although this bug has been there
a long time, it's very difficult to trigger a failure before 8.2, since there
was generally a lot of free space on both sides of a chosen split. In 8.2,
where the user-selected fill factor determines how much free space the code
tries to leave, an unworkable split is much more likely. Report by Joe
Conway, diagnosis and fix by Heikki Linnakangas.
page about the maximum UTF8 sequence length we support (4 bytes since 8.1,
3 before that). pg_utf2wchar_with_len never got updated to support 4-byte
characters at all, and in any case had a buffer-overrun risk in that it
could produce multiple pg_wchars from what mblen claims to be just one UTF8
character. The only reason we don't have a major security hole is that most
callers allocate worst-case output buffers; the sole exception in released
versions appears to be pre-8.2 iwchareq() (ie, ILIKE), which can be crashed
due to zeroing out its return address --- but AFAICS that can't be exploited
for anything more than a crash, due to inability to control what gets written
there. Per report from James Russell and Michael Fuhr.
Pre-8.1 the risk is much less, but I still think pg_utf2wchar_with_len's
behavior given an incomplete final character risks buffer overrun, so
back-patch that logic change anyway.
This patch also makes sure that UTF8 sequences exceeding the supported
length (whichever it is) are consistently treated as error cases, rather
than being treated like a valid shorter sequence in some places.
Call srandom() instead of srand().
pgbench calls random() later, so it should have called srandom().
On most platforms except Windows srandom() is actually identical
to srand(), so the bug only bites Windows users.
per bug report from Akio Ishida.
form '^(foo)$'. Before, these could never be optimized into indexscans.
The recent changes to make psql and pg_dump generate such patterns (for \d
commands and -t and related switches, respectively) therefore represented
a big performance hit for people with large pg_class catalogs, as seen in
recent gripe from Erik Jones. While at it, be more paranoid about
case-sensitivity checking in multibyte encodings, and fix some other
corner cases in which a regex might be interpreted too liberally.
