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mbedtls/docs/architecture/tls13-support.md
Ronald Cron 6b14c69277 Improve documentation 
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TLS 1.3 support
===============
Overview
--------
Mbed TLS provides a minimum viable implementation of the TLS 1.3 protocol
defined in the "MVP definition" section below. The TLS 1.3 support enablement
is controlled by the MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 configuration option.
The development of the TLS 1.3 protocol is based on the TLS 1.3 prototype
located at https://github.com/hannestschofenig/mbedtls. The prototype is
itself based on a version of the development branch that we aim to keep as
recent as possible (ideally the head) by merging regularly commits of the
development branch into the prototype. The section "Prototype upstreaming
status" below describes what remains to be upstreamed.
MVP definition
--------------
- Overview
- The TLS 1.3 MVP implements only the client side of the protocol.
- The TLS 1.3 MVP supports ECDHE key establishment.
- The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support DHE key establishment.
- The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support pre-shared keys, including any form of
session resumption. This implies that it does not support sending early
data (0-RTT data).
- The TLS 1.3 MVP supports the authentication of the server by the client
but does not support authentication of the client by the server. In terms
of TLS 1.3 authentication messages, this means that the TLS 1.3 MVP
supports the processing of the Certificate and CertificateVerify messages
but not of the CertificateRequest message.
- The TLS 1.3 MVP does not support the handling of server HelloRetryRequest
message. In practice, this means that the handshake will fail if the MVP
does not provide in its ClientHello the shared secret associated to the
group selected by the server for key establishement. For more information,
see the comment associated to the `key_share` extension below.
- If the TLS 1.3 MVP receives a HelloRetryRequest or a CertificateRequest
message, it aborts the handshake with an handshake_failure closure alert
and the `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()` returns in error with the
`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE` error code.
- Supported cipher suites: depends on the library configuration. Potentially
all of them:
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 and TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256.
- Supported ClientHello extensions:
| Extension | MVP | Prototype (1) |
| ---------------------------- | ------- | ------------- |
| server_name | YES | YES |
| max_fragment_length | no | YES |
| status_request | no | no |
| supported_groups | YES | YES |
| signature_algorithms | YES | YES |
| use_srtp | no | no |
| heartbeat | no | no |
| apln | no | YES |
| signed_certificate_timestamp | no | no |
| client_certificate_type | no | no |
| server_certificate_type | no | no |
| padding | no | no |
| key_share | YES (2) | YES |
| pre_shared_key | no | YES |
| psk_key_exchange_modes | no | YES |
| early_data | no | YES |
| cookie | no | YES |
| supported_versions | YES (3) | YES |
| certificate_authorities | no | no |
| post_handshake_auth | no | no |
| signature_algorithms_cert | no | no |
(1) This is just for comparison.
(2) The MVP sends only one shared secret corresponding to the configured
preferred group. This could end up with connection failure if the
server does not support our preferred curve, as the MVP does not implement
HelloRetryRequest. The preferred group is the group of the first curve in
the list of allowed curves as defined by the configuration. The allowed
curves are by default ordered as follows: `x25519`, `secp256r1`,
`secp384r1` and finally `secp521r1`. Note that, in the absence of an
application profile standard specifying otherwise, section 9.1 of the
specification rather promotes curve `secp256r1` to be supported over
curve `x25519`. The MVP would, however, rather keep the preference order
currently promoted by Mbed TLS as this applies to TLS 1.2 as well, and
changing the order only for TLS1.3 would be potentially difficult.
In the unlikely event a server does not support curve `x25519` but does
support curve `secp256r1`, curve `secp256r1` can be set as the preferred
curve through the `mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()` API.
(3) The MVP proposes only TLS 1.3 and does not support version negotiation.
Out-of-protocol fallback is supported though if the Mbed TLS library
has been built to support both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2: just set the
maximum of the minor version of the SSL configuration to
MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 (`mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version()` API) and
re-initiate a server handshake.
- Supported groups: depends on the library configuration.
Potentially all ECDHE groups but x448:
secp256r1, x25519, secp384r1 and secp521r1.
Finite field groups (DHE) are not supported.
- Supported signature algorithms (both for certificates and CertificateVerify):
depends on the library configuration.
Potentially:
rsa_pkcs1_sha256, rsa_pss_rsae_sha256, ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 and ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512.
Note that in absence of an application profile standard specifying otherwise
the three first ones in the list above are mandatory (see section 9.1 of the
specification).
- Supported versions:
- TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 but version negotiation is not supported.
- TLS 1.3 cannot be enabled in the build (MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3
configuration option) without TLS 1.2 (MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 configuration
option).
- TLS 1.2 can be enabled in the build independently of TLS 1.3.
- If both TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 are enabled at build time, only one of them can
be configured at runtime via `mbedtls_ssl_conf_{min,max}_version`. Otherwise,
`mbedtls_ssl_setup` will raise `MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG` error.
- Compatibility with existing SSL/TLS build options:
The TLS 1.3 MVP is compatible with all TLS 1.2 configuration options in the
sense that when enabling the TLS 1.3 MVP in the library there is no need to
modify the configuration for TLS 1.2. The MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO configuration
option is an exception though, the TLS 1.3 MVP is not compatible with it.
Mbed TLS SSL/TLS related features are not supported or not applicable to the
TLS 1.3 MVP:
| Mbed TLS configuration option | Support |
| ---------------------------------------- | ------- |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALL_ALERT_MESSAGES | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_EXPORT_KEYS | no (1) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION | no |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE | no |
| MBEDTLS_ECDH_VARIANT_EVEREST_ENABLED | no |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED | n/a (2) |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED | n/a |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED | n/a |
| | |
| MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO | no |
(1) Some support has already been upstreamed but it is incomplete.
(2) Key exchange configuration options for TLS 1.3 will likely to be
organized around the notion of key exchange mode along the line
of the MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE/PSK/PSK_EPHEMERAL/EPHEMERAL
runtime configuration macros.
- Quality considerations
- Standard Mbed TLS review bar
- Interoperability testing with OpenSSL and GnuTLS. Test with all the
cipher suites and signature algorithms supported by OpenSSL/GnuTLS server.
- Negative testing against OpenSSL/GnuTLS servers with which the
handshake fails due to incompatibility with the capabilities of the
MVP: TLS 1.2 or 1.1 server, server sending an HelloRetryRequest message in
response to the MVP ClientHello, server sending a CertificateRequest
message ...
Prototype upstreaming status
----------------------------
The following summarizes which parts of the TLS 1.3 prototype remain to be
upstreamed:
- Ephemeral only handshake on client side: client authentication,
HelloRetryRequest support, version negotiation.
- Ephemeral only handshake server side.
- Pre-shared keys, session resumption and 0-RTT data (both client and server
side).
- New TLS Message Processing Stack (MPS)
The TLS 1.3 prototype is developed alongside a rewrite of the TLS messaging layer,
encompassing low-level details such as record parsing, handshake reassembly, and
DTLS retransmission state machine.
MPS has the following components:
- Layer 1 (Datagram handling)
- Layer 2 (Record handling)
- Layer 3 (Message handling)
- Layer 4 (Retransmission State Machine)
- Reader (Abstracted pointer arithmetic and reassembly logic for incoming data)
- Writer (Abstracted pointer arithmetic and fragmentation logic for outgoing data)
Of those components, the following have been upstreamed
as part of `MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3`:
- Reader ([`library/mps_reader.h`](../../library/mps_reader.h))
Coding rules checklist for TLS 1.3
----------------------------------
The following coding rules are aimed to be a checklist for TLS 1.3 upstreaming
work to reduce review rounds and the number of comments in each round. They
come along (do NOT replace) the project coding rules
(https://tls.mbed.org/kb/development/mbedtls-coding-standards). They have been
established and discussed following the review of #4882 that was the
PR upstreaming the first part of TLS 1.3 ClientHello writing code.
TLS 1.3 specific coding rules:
- TLS 1.3 specific C modules, headers, static functions names are prefixed
with `ssl_tls13_`. The same applies to structures and types that are
internal to C modules.
- TLS 1.3 specific exported functions, structures and types are
prefixed with `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_`.
- Use TLS1_3 in TLS 1.3 specific macros.
- The names of macros and variables related to a field or structure in the
TLS 1.3 specification should contain as far as possible the field name as
it is in the specification. If the field name is "too long" and we prefer
to introduce some kind of abbreviation of it, use the same abbreviation
everywhere in the code.
Example 1: #define CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32, macro for the length of the
`random` field of the ClientHello message.
Example 2 (consistent abbreviation): `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_sig_alg_ext()`
and `MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG`, `sig_alg` standing for
`signature_algorithms`.
- Regarding vectors that are represented by a length followed by their value
in the data exchanged between servers and clients:
- Use `<vector name>_len` for the name of a variable used to compute the
length in bytes of the vector, where <vector name> is the name of the
vector as defined in the TLS 1.3 specification.
- Use `p_<vector_name>_len` for the name of a variable intended to hold
the address of the first byte of the vector length.
- Use `<vector_name>` for the name of a variable intended to hold the
address of the first byte of the vector value.
- Use `<vector_name>_end` for the name of a variable intended to hold
the address of the first byte past the vector value.
Those idioms should lower the risk of mis-using one of the address in place
of another one which could potentially lead to some nasty issues.
Example: `cipher_suites` vector of ClientHello in
`ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites()`
```
size_t cipher_suites_len;
unsigned char *p_cipher_suites_len;
unsigned char *cipher_suites;
```
- Where applicable, use:
- the macros to extract a byte from a multi-byte integer MBEDTLS_BYTE_{0-8}.
- the macros to write in memory in big-endian order a multi-byte integer
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE.
- the macros to read from memory a multi-byte integer in big-endian order
MBEDTLS_GET_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE.
- the macro to check for space when writing into an output buffer
`MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR`.
- the macro to check for data when reading from an input buffer
`MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR`.
These macros were introduced after the prototype was written thus are
likely not to be used in prototype where we now would use them in
development.
The three first types, MBEDTLS_BYTE_{0-8}, MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE
and MBEDTLS_GET_UINT{8|16|32|64}_BE improve the readability of the code and
reduce the risk of writing or reading bytes in the wrong order.
The two last types, `MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR` and
`MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR`, improve the readability of the code and
reduce the risk of error in the non-completely-trivial arithmetic to
check that we do not write or read past the end of a data buffer. The
usage of those macros combined with the following rule mitigate the risk
to read/write past the end of a data buffer.
Examples:
```
hs_hdr[1] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_2( total_hs_len );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, p, 0 );
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 7 );
```
- To mitigate what happened here
(https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/4882#discussion_r701704527) from
happening again, use always a local variable named `p` for the reading
pointer in functions parsing TLS 1.3 data, and for the writing pointer in
functions writing data into an output buffer and only that variable. The
name `p` has been chosen as it was already widely used in TLS code.
- When an TLS 1.3 structure is written or read by a function or as part of
a function, provide as documentation the definition of the structure as
it is in the TLS 1.3 specification.
General coding rules:
- We prefer grouping "related statement lines" by not adding blank lines
between them.
Example 1:
```
ret = ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_cipher_suites( ssl, buf, end, &output_len );
if( ret != 0 )
return( ret );
buf += output_len;
```
Example 2:
```
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( cipher_suites_iter, end, 2 );
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( cipher_suite, cipher_suites_iter, 0 );
cipher_suites_iter += 2;
```
- Use macros for constants that are used in different functions, different
places in the code. When a constant is used only locally in a function
(like the length in bytes of the vector lengths in functions reading and
writing TLS handshake message) there is no need to define a macro for it.
Example: `#define CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32`
- When declaring a pointer the dereferencing operator should be prepended to
the pointer name not appended to the pointer type:
Example: `mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl;`
- Maximum line length is 80 characters.
Exceptions:
- string literals can extend beyond 80 characters as we do not want to
split them to ease their search in the code base.
- A line can be more than 80 characters by a few characters if just looking
at the 80 first characters is enough to fully understand the line. For
example it is generally fine if some closure characters like ";" or ")"
are beyond the 80 characters limit.
If a line becomes too long due to a refactoring (for example renaming a
function to a longer name, or indenting a block more), avoid rewrapping
lines in the same commit: it makes the review harder. Make one commit with
the longer lines and another commit with just the rewrapping.
- When in successive lines, functions and macros parameters should be aligned
vertically.
Example:
```
int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char **buf,
size_t *buf_len );
```
- When a function's parameters span several lines, group related parameters
together if possible.
For example, prefer:
```
mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl, hs_type,
buf, buf_len );
```
over
```
mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg( ssl, hs_type, buf,
buf_len );
```
even if it fits.
Overview of handshake code organization
---------------------------------------
The TLS 1.3 handshake protocol is implemented as a state machine. The
functions `mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_{client,server}_step` are the top level
functions of that implementation. They are implemented as a switch over all the
possible states of the state machine.
Most of the states are either dedicated to the processing or writing of an
handshake message.
The implementation does not go systematically through all states as this would
result in too many checks of whether something needs to be done or not in a
given state to be duplicated across several state handlers. For example, on
client side, the states related to certificate parsing and validation are
bypassed if the handshake is based on a pre-shared key and thus does not
involve certificates.
On the contrary, the implementation goes systematically though some states
even if they could be bypassed if it helps in minimizing when and where inbound
and outbound keys are updated. The `MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE` state on
client side is a example of that.
The names of the handlers processing/writing an handshake message are
prefixed with `(mbedtls_)ssl_tls13_{process,write}`. To ease the maintenance and
reduce the risk of bugs, the code of the message processing and writing
handlers is split into a sequence of stages.
The sending of data to the peer only occurs in `mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step`
between the calls to the handlers and as a consequence handlers do not have to
care about the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE error code. Furthermore, all pending
data are flushed before to call the next handler. That way, handlers do not
have to worry about pending data when changing outbound keys.
### Message processing handlers
For message processing handlers, the stages are:
* coordination stage: check if the state should be bypassed. This stage is
optional. The check is either purely based on the reading of the value of some
fields of the SSL context or based on the reading of the type of the next
message. The latter occurs when it is not known what the next handshake message
will be, an example of that on client side being if we are going to receive a
CertificateRequest message or not. The intent is, apart from the next record
reading to not modify the SSL context as this stage may be repeated if the
next handshake message has not been received yet.
* fetching stage: at this stage we are sure of the type of the handshake
message we must receive next and we try to fetch it. If we did not go through
a coordination stage involving the next record type reading, the next
handshake message may not have been received yet, the handler returns with
`MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ` without changing the current state and it will be
called again later.
* pre-processing stage: prepare the SSL context for the message parsing. This
stage is optional. Any processing that must be done before the parsing of the
message or that can be done to simplify the parsing code. Some simple and
partial parsing of the handshake message may append at that stage like in the
ServerHello message pre-processing.
* parsing stage: parse the message and restrict as much as possible any
update of the SSL context. The idea of the pre-processing/parsing/post-processing
organization is to concentrate solely on the parsing in the parsing function to
reduce the size of its code and to simplify it.
* post-processing stage: following the parsing, further update of the SSL
context to prepare for the next incoming and outgoing messages. This stage is
optional. For example, secret and key computations occur at this stage, as well
as handshake messages checksum update.
* state change: the state change is done in the main state handler to ease the
navigation of the state machine transitions.
### Message writing handlers
For message writing handlers, the stages are:
* coordination stage: check if the state should be bypassed. This stage is
optional. The check is based on the value of some fields of the SSL context.
* preparation stage: prepare for the message writing. This stage is optional.
Any processing that must be done before the writing of the message or that can
be done to simplify the writing code.
* writing stage: write the message and restrict as much as possible any update
of the SSL context. The idea of the preparation/writing/finalization
organization is to concentrate solely on the writing in the writing function to
reduce the size of its code and simplify it.
* finalization stage: following the writing, further update of the SSL
context to prepare for the next incoming and outgoing messages. This stage is
optional. For example, handshake secret and key computation occur at that
stage (ServerHello writing finalization), switching to handshake keys for
outbound message on server side as well.
* state change: the state change is done in the main state handler to ease
the navigation of the state machine transitions.
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