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Jim Meyering committed 2003-07-14 06:30:32 +00:00
1 parent 3eecca631b
commit e4c013c0f4
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@@ -5,16 +5,6 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*-
- new program: `[' (much like `test')
** New features
- chown no longer tries to preserve set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits;
on some systems, the chown syscall resets those bits, and previous
versions of the chown command would call chmod to restore the original,
pre-chown(2) settings, but that behavior is problematic.
1) There was a window whereby a malicious user, M, could subvert a
chown command run by some other user and operating on files in a
directory where M has write access.
2) Before (and even now, on systems with chown(2) that doesn't reset
those bits), an unwary admin. could use chown unwittingly to create e.g.,
a set-user-ID root copy of /bin/sh.
- head now accepts --lines=-N (--bytes=-N) to print all but the
N lines (bytes) at the end of the file
- md5sum --check now accepts the output of the BSD md5sum program, e.g.,
@@ -25,6 +15,16 @@ GNU coreutils NEWS -*- outline -*-
on such a system, then it still accepts `.', by default. If chown
was compiled on a POSIX 1003.1-2001 system, then you may enable the
old behavior by setting _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 in your environment.
- chown no longer tries to preserve set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits;
on some systems, the chown syscall resets those bits, and previous
versions of the chown command would call chmod to restore the original,
pre-chown(2) settings, but that behavior is problematic.
1) There was a window whereby a malicious user, M, could subvert a
chown command run by some other user and operating on files in a
directory where M has write access.
2) Before (and even now, on systems with chown(2) that doesn't reset
those bits), an unwary admin. could use chown unwittingly to create e.g.,
a set-user-ID root copy of /bin/sh.
** Bug fixes
- chown --dereference no longer leaks a file descriptor per symlink processed