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(RC_do_ordinary_chown): New enum value.
(restricted_chown): Return it, if the file cannot be accessed due to EPERM, or if no uid or gid are required, or if the file is neither a directory nor a regular file. Rewrite to avoid gotos. (change_file_owner): Handle RC_do_ordinary_chown case. Rewrite to avoid gotos.
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1 parent
6023a62148
commit
7126eb3216
1 file changed
+60
-65
+60
-65
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/* chown-core.c -- core functions for changing ownership.
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Copyright (C) 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation.
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Copyright (C) 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation.
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This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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@@ -43,6 +43,10 @@ enum RCH_status
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/* SAME_INODE check failed */
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RC_inode_changed,
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/* open/fchown isn't needed, isn't safe, or doesn't work due to
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permissions problems; fall back on chown */
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RC_do_ordinary_chown,
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/* open, fstat, fchown, or close failed */
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RC_error
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};
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@@ -159,10 +163,7 @@ describe_change (const char *file, enum Change_status changed,
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/* Change the owner and/or group of the FILE to UID and/or GID (safely)
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only if REQUIRED_UID and REQUIRED_GID match the owner and group IDs
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of FILE. ORIG_ST must be the result of `stat'ing FILE. If this
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function ends up being called with a FILE that is a symlink and when
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we are *not* dereferencing symlinks, we'll detect the problem via
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the SAME_INODE test below.
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of FILE. ORIG_ST must be the result of `stat'ing FILE.
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The `safely' part above means that we can't simply use chown(2),
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since FILE might be replaced with some other file between the time
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@@ -172,14 +173,9 @@ describe_change (const char *file, enum Change_status changed,
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the preceding stat call, and only then, if appropriate (given the
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required_uid and required_gid constraints) do we call fchown.
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A minor problem:
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This function fails when FILE cannot be opened, but chown/lchown have
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no such limitation. But this may not be a problem for chown(1),
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since chown is useful mainly to root, and since root seems to have
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no problem opening `unreadable' files (on Linux). However, this can
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cause trouble when non-root users apply chgrp to files they own but
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to which they have neither read nor write access. For now, that
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isn't a problem since chgrp doesn't have a --from=O:G option.
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Return RC_do_ordinary_chown if we can't open FILE, or if FILE is a
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special file that might have undesirable side effects when opening.
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In this case the caller can use the less-safe ordinary chown.
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Return one of the RCH_status values. */
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@@ -192,27 +188,31 @@ restricted_chown (char const *file,
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enum RCH_status status = RC_ok;
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struct stat st;
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int open_flags = O_NONBLOCK | O_NOCTTY;
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int fd;
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int fd = open (file, O_RDONLY | open_flags);
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if (required_uid == (uid_t) -1 && required_gid == (gid_t) -1)
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return RC_do_ordinary_chown;
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if (! S_ISREG (orig_st->st_mode))
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{
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if (S_ISDIR (orig_st->st_mode))
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open_flags |= O_DIRECTORY;
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else
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return RC_do_ordinary_chown;
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}
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fd = open (file, O_RDONLY | open_flags);
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if (! (0 <= fd
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|| (errno == EACCES
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|| (errno == EACCES && S_ISREG (orig_st->st_mode)
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&& 0 <= (fd = open (file, O_WRONLY | open_flags)))))
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return RC_error;
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return (errno == EACCES ? RC_do_ordinary_chown : RC_error);
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if (fstat (fd, &st) != 0)
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{
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status = RC_error;
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goto Lose;
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}
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if ( ! SAME_INODE (*orig_st, st))
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{
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status = RC_inode_changed;
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goto Lose;
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}
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if ((required_uid == (uid_t) -1 || required_uid == st.st_uid)
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&& (required_gid == (gid_t) -1 || required_gid == st.st_gid))
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status = RC_error;
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else if (! SAME_INODE (*orig_st, st))
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status = RC_inode_changed;
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else if ((required_uid == (uid_t) -1 || required_uid == st.st_uid)
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&& (required_gid == (gid_t) -1 || required_gid == st.st_gid))
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{
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if (fchown (fd, uid, gid) == 0)
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{
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@@ -226,7 +226,6 @@ restricted_chown (char const *file,
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}
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}
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Lose:
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{ /* FIXME: remove these curly braces when we assume C99. */
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int saved_errno = errno;
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close (fd);
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@@ -346,43 +345,41 @@ change_file_owner (FTS *fts, FTSENT *ent,
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}
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else
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{
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if ( required_uid == (uid_t) -1 && required_gid == (gid_t) -1)
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/* If possible, avoid a race condition with --from=O:G and without the
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(-h) --no-dereference option. If fts's stat call determined
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that the uid/gid of FILE matched the --from=O:G-selected
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owner and group IDs, blindly using chown(2) here could lead
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chown(1) or chgrp(1) mistakenly to dereference a *symlink*
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to an arbitrary file that an attacker had moved into the
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place of FILE during the window between the stat and
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chown(2) calls. If FILE is a regular file or a directory
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that can be opened, this race condition can be avoided safely. */
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enum RCH_status err
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= restricted_chown (file, file_stats, uid, gid,
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required_uid, required_gid);
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switch (err)
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{
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case RC_ok:
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break;
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case RC_do_ordinary_chown:
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ok = (chown (file, uid, gid) == 0);
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}
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else
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{
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/* Avoid a race condition with --from=O:G and without the
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(-h) --no-dereference option. If fts' stat call determined
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that the uid/gid of FILE matched the --from=O:G-selected
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owner and group IDs, blindly using chown(2) here could lead
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chown(1) or chgrp(1) mistakenly to dereference a *symlink*
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to an arbitrary file that an attacker had moved into the
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place of FILE during the window between the stat and
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chown(2) calls. */
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enum RCH_status err
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= restricted_chown (file, file_stats, uid, gid,
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required_uid, required_gid);
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switch (err)
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{
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case RC_ok:
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ok = true;
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break;
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break;
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case RC_error:
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ok = false;
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break;
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case RC_error:
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ok = false;
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break;
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case RC_inode_changed:
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/* FIXME: give a diagnostic in this case? */
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case RC_excluded:
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do_chown = false;
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ok = false;
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goto Skip_chown;
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case RC_inode_changed:
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/* FIXME: give a diagnostic in this case? */
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case RC_excluded:
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do_chown = false;
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ok = false;
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break;
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default:
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abort ();
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}
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default:
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abort ();
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}
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}
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@@ -393,15 +390,13 @@ change_file_owner (FTS *fts, FTSENT *ent,
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by some other user and operating on files in a directory
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where M has write access. */
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if (!ok && ! chopt->force_silent)
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if (do_chown && !ok && ! chopt->force_silent)
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error (0, errno, (uid != (uid_t) -1
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? _("changing ownership of %s")
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: _("changing group of %s")),
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quote (file_full_name));
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}
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Skip_chown:;
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if (chopt->verbosity != V_off)
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{
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bool changed =
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