palloc() will normally round allocation requests up to the next power of 2,
so make dynahash choose allocation sizes that are as close to a power of 2
as possible.
Back-patch to 8.1 --- the problem exists further back, but a much larger
patch would be needed and it doesn't seem worth taking any risks.
opposed to what other versions apparently do, so it's not safe to print an
error message. Besides, getopt_long itself already did, so it's redundant
anyway.
This is disallowed by the SQL spec because it doesn't have any very sensible
interpretation. Historically Postgres has allowed it but behaved strangely.
As of PG 8.1 a server crash is possible if the MIN/MAX index optimization gets
applied; rather than try to "fix" that, it seems best to just enforce the
spec restriction. Per report from Josh Drake and Alvaro Herrera.
initially be 0. This is needed as a previous ABORT might have wiped out
an automatically opened transaction without maintaining the cursor count.
- Fix regression test expected file for the correct ERROR message, which
we now get given the above bug fix.
We have once or twice seen failures suggesting that control didn't get
to the exception block before the timeout elapsed, which is unlikely
but not impossible in a parallel regression test (with a dozen other
backends competing for cycles). This change doesn't completely prevent
the problem of course, but it should reduce the probability enough that
we don't see it anymore. Per buildfarm results.
already-aborted transaction block. GetSnapshotData throws an Assert if
not in a valid transaction; hence we mustn't attempt to set a snapshot
for the function until after checking for aborted transaction. This is
harmless AFAICT if Asserts aren't enabled (GetSnapshotData will compute
a bogus snapshot, but it doesn't matter since HandleFunctionRequest will
throw an error shortly anywy). Hence, not a major bug.
Along the way, add some ability to log fastpath calls when statement
logging is turned on. This could probably stand to be improved further,
but not logging anything is clearly undesirable.
Backpatched as far as 8.0; bug doesn't exist before that.
was invoking obj_description() for each large object chunk, instead of once
per large object. This code is new as of 8.1, which may explain why the
problem hadn't been noticed already.
LWLocks during a panic exit. This avoids the possible self-deadlock pointed
out by Qingqing Zhou. Also, I noted that an error during LoadFreeSpaceMap()
or BuildFlatFiles() would result in exit(0) which would leave the postmaster
thinking all is well. Added a critical section to ensure such errors don't
allow startup to proceed.
Backpatched to 8.1. The 8.0 code is a bit different and I'm not sure if the
problem exists there; given we've not seen this reported from the field, I'm
going to be conservative about backpatching any further.
choose_bitmap_and(). It was way too fuzzy --- per comment, it was meant to be
1% relative difference, but was actually coded as 0.01 absolute difference,
thus causing selectivities of say 0.001 and 0.000000000001 to be treated as
equal. I believe this thinko explains Maxim Boguk's recent complaint. While
we could change it to a relative test coded like compare_fuzzy_path_costs(),
there's a bigger problem here, which is that any fuzziness at all renders the
comparison function non-transitive, which could confuse qsort() to the point
of delivering completely wrong results. So forget the whole thing and just
do an exact comparison.
versions of OpenSSL. If your OpenSSL does not contain SHA2, then there
should be no conflict. But ofcourse, if someone upgrades OpenSSL,
server starts crashing.
Backpatched to 8.1.X.
Marko Kreen
and standard_conforming_strings. The encoding changes are needed for proper
escaping in multibyte encodings, as per the SQL-injection vulnerabilities
noted in CVE-2006-2313 and CVE-2006-2314. Concurrent fixes are being applied
to the server to ensure that it rejects queries that may have been corrupted
by attempted SQL injection, but this merely guarantees that unpatched clients
will fail rather than allow injection. An actual fix requires changing the
client-side code. While at it we have also fixed these routines to understand
about standard_conforming_strings, so that the upcoming changeover to SQL-spec
string syntax can be somewhat transparent to client code.
Since the existing API of PQescapeString and PQescapeBytea provides no way to
inform them which settings are in use, these functions are now deprecated in
favor of new functions PQescapeStringConn and PQescapeByteaConn. The new
functions take the PGconn to which the string will be sent as an additional
parameter, and look inside the connection structure to determine what to do.
So as to provide some functionality for clients using the old functions,
libpq stores the latest encoding and standard_conforming_strings values
received from the backend in static variables, and the old functions consult
these variables. This will work reliably in clients using only one Postgres
connection at a time, or even multiple connections if they all use the same
encoding and string syntax settings; which should cover many practical
scenarios.
Clients that use homebrew escaping methods, such as PHP's addslashes()
function or even hardwired regexp substitution, will require extra effort
to fix :-(. It is strongly recommended that such code be replaced by use of
PQescapeStringConn/PQescapeByteaConn if at all feasible.
parser will allow "\'" to be used to represent a literal quote mark. The
"\'" representation has been deprecated for some time in favor of the
SQL-standard representation "''" (two single quote marks), but it has been
used often enough that just disallowing it immediately won't do. Hence
backslash_quote allows the settings "on", "off", and "safe_encoding",
the last meaning to allow "\'" only if client_encoding is a valid server
encoding. That is now the default, and the reason is that in encodings
such as SJIS that allow 0x5c (ASCII backslash) to be the last byte of a
multibyte character, accepting "\'" allows SQL-injection attacks as per
CVE-2006-2314 (further details will be published after release). The
"on" setting is available for backward compatibility, but it must not be
used with clients that are exposed to untrusted input.
Thanks to Akio Ishida and Yasuo Ohgaki for identifying this security issue.
characters in all cases. Formerly we mostly just threw warnings for invalid
input, and failed to detect it at all if no encoding conversion was required.
The tighter check is needed to defend against SQL-injection attacks as per
CVE-2006-2313 (further details will be published after release). Embedded
zero (null) bytes will be rejected as well. The checks are applied during
input to the backend (receipt from client or COPY IN), so it no longer seems
necessary to check in textin() and related routines; any string arriving at
those functions will already have been validated. Conversion failure
reporting (for characters with no equivalent in the destination encoding)
has been cleaned up and made consistent while at it.
Also, fix a few longstanding errors in little-used encoding conversion
routines: win1251_to_iso, win866_to_iso, euc_tw_to_big5, euc_tw_to_mic,
mic_to_euc_tw were all broken to varying extents.
Patches by Tatsuo Ishii and Tom Lane. Thanks to Akio Ishida and Yasuo Ohgaki
for identifying the security issues.
