tried a variant file from resultmap and it didn't match. This is already done
in HEAD's C-code version, and is needed because OpenBSD has recently migrated
to a more standard handling of float underflow --- see buildfarm results
from emu.
quote chars inside quote marks, should emit one quote *and stay in inquotes
mode*. No doubt the lack of reports of this have something to do with the
poor documentation of the feature ...
Martin Pitt [2006-06-16 0:15 +0200]:
> Upstream confirmed my reply in the last mail in [1]: the complete
> escaping logic in DBMirror.pl is seriously screwew.
>
> [1] http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-bugs/2006-06/msg00065.php
I finally found some time to debug this, and I think I found a better
patch than the one you proposed. Mine is still hackish and is still a
workaround around a proper quoting solution, but at least it repairs
the parsing without introducing the \' quoting again.
I consider this a band-aid patch to fix the recent security update.
PostgreSQL gurus, would you consider applying this until a better
solution is found for DBMirror.pl?
Martin Pitt http://www.piware.de
previously-missing spinlock code for x86_64 and ppc64 architectures,
converts the ppc/ppc64 code into gcc inlines, and provides a better
spinlock backoff algorithm on all architectures. Aside from being
almost identical to the community 7.4 source code, this exact patch
has been in use for awhile in Red Hat's RHEL3 RPMs, so I have pretty
good confidence in it. Why bother, you ask? I'm taking pity on a
couple of buildfarm members that have been vainly trying to build 7.3
on these 64-bit architectures.
and standard_conforming_strings. The encoding changes are needed for proper
escaping in multibyte encodings, as per the SQL-injection vulnerabilities
noted in CVE-2006-2313 and CVE-2006-2314. Concurrent fixes are being applied
to the server to ensure that it rejects queries that may have been corrupted
by attempted SQL injection, but this merely guarantees that unpatched clients
will fail rather than allow injection. An actual fix requires changing the
client-side code. While at it we have also fixed these routines to understand
about standard_conforming_strings, so that the upcoming changeover to SQL-spec
string syntax can be somewhat transparent to client code.
Since the existing API of PQescapeString and PQescapeBytea provides no way to
inform them which settings are in use, these functions are now deprecated in
favor of new functions PQescapeStringConn and PQescapeByteaConn. The new
functions take the PGconn to which the string will be sent as an additional
parameter, and look inside the connection structure to determine what to do.
So as to provide some functionality for clients using the old functions,
libpq stores the latest encoding and standard_conforming_strings values
received from the backend in static variables, and the old functions consult
these variables. This will work reliably in clients using only one Postgres
connection at a time, or even multiple connections if they all use the same
encoding and string syntax settings; which should cover many practical
scenarios.
Clients that use homebrew escaping methods, such as PHP's addslashes()
function or even hardwired regexp substitution, will require extra effort
to fix :-(. It is strongly recommended that such code be replaced by use of
PQescapeStringConn/PQescapeByteaConn if at all feasible.
parser will allow "\'" to be used to represent a literal quote mark. The
"\'" representation has been deprecated for some time in favor of the
SQL-standard representation "''" (two single quote marks), but it has been
used often enough that just disallowing it immediately won't do. Hence
backslash_quote allows the settings "on", "off", and "safe_encoding",
the last meaning to allow "\'" only if client_encoding is a valid server
encoding. That is now the default, and the reason is that in encodings
such as SJIS that allow 0x5c (ASCII backslash) to be the last byte of a
multibyte character, accepting "\'" allows SQL-injection attacks as per
CVE-2006-2314 (further details will be published after release). The
"on" setting is available for backward compatibility, but it must not be
used with clients that are exposed to untrusted input.
Thanks to Akio Ishida and Yasuo Ohgaki for identifying this security issue.
characters in all cases. Formerly we mostly just threw warnings for invalid
input, and failed to detect it at all if no encoding conversion was required.
The tighter check is needed to defend against SQL-injection attacks as per
CVE-2006-2313 (further details will be published after release). Embedded
zero (null) bytes will be rejected as well. The checks are applied during
input to the backend (receipt from client or COPY IN), so it no longer seems
necessary to check in textin() and related routines; any string arriving at
those functions will already have been validated. Conversion failure
reporting (for characters with no equivalent in the destination encoding)
has been cleaned up and made consistent while at it.
Also, fix a few longstanding errors in little-used encoding conversion
routines: win1251_to_iso, win866_to_iso, euc_tw_to_big5, euc_tw_to_mic,
mic_to_euc_tw were all broken to varying extents.
Patches by Tatsuo Ishii and Tom Lane. Thanks to Akio Ishida and Yasuo Ohgaki
for identifying the security issues.
in leaking memory when invoking a PL/Python procedure that raises an
exception. Unfortunately this still leaks memory, but at least the
largest leak has been plugged.
This patch also fixes a reference counting mistake in PLy_modify_tuple()
for 8.0, 8.1 and HEAD: we don't actually own a reference to `platt', so
we shouldn't Py_DECREF() it.
pgcrypto crypt()/md5 and hmac() leak memory when compiled against
OpenSSL as openssl.c digest ->reset will do two DigestInit calls
against a context. This happened to work with OpenSSL 0.9.6
but not with 0.9.7+.
Reason for the messy code was that I tried to avoid creating
wrapper structure to transport algorithm info and tried to use
OpenSSL context for it. The fix is to create wrapper structure.
It also uses newer digest API to avoid memory allocations
on reset with newer OpenSSLs.
Thanks to Daniel Blaisdell for reporting it.
to try to create a log segment file concurrently, but the code erroneously
specified O_EXCL to open(), resulting in a needless failure. Before 7.4,
it was even a PANIC condition :-(. Correct code is actually simpler than
what we had, because we can just say O_CREAT to start with and not need a
second open() call. I believe this accounts for several recent reports of
hard-to-reproduce "could not create file ...: File exists" errors in both
pg_clog and pg_subtrans.
our own command (or more generally, xmin = our xact and cmin >= current
command ID) should not be seen as good. Else we may try to update rows
we already updated. This error was inserted last August while fixing the
even bigger problem that the old coding wouldn't see *any* tuples inserted
by our own transaction as good. Per report from Euler Taveira de Oliveira.
It seems that recent gcc versions can optimize away calls to these functions
even when the functions do not exist on the platform, resulting in a bogus
positive result. Avoid this by using a non-constant argument and ensuring
that the function result is not simply discarded. Per report from
François Laupretre.
operator names. This is needed when dumping operator definitions that have
COMMUTATOR (or similar) links to operators in other schemas.
Apparently Daniel Whitter is the first person ever to try this :-(
