mirror of
https://github.com/postgres/postgres.git
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Last-minute updates for release notes.
Add entries for security issues. Security: CVE-2014-0060 through CVE-2014-0067
This commit is contained in:
parent
ff3d533e58
commit
4bde115e7e
@ -40,6 +40,145 @@
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<itemizedlist>
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<itemizedlist>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Shore up <literal>GRANT ... WITH ADMIN OPTION</> restrictions
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(Noah Misch)
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</para>
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<para>
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Granting a role without <literal>ADMIN OPTION</> is supposed to
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prevent the grantee from adding or removing members from the granted
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role, but this restriction was easily bypassed by doing <literal>SET
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ROLE</> first. The security impact is mostly that a role member can
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revoke the access of others, contrary to the wishes of his grantor.
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Unapproved role member additions are a lesser concern, since an
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uncooperative role member could provide most of his rights to others
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anyway by creating views or <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</> functions.
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(CVE-2014-0060)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Prevent privilege escalation via manual calls to PL validator
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functions (Andres Freund)
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</para>
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<para>
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The primary role of PL validator functions is to be called implicitly
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during <command>CREATE FUNCTION</>, but they are also normal SQL
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functions that a user can call explicitly. Calling a validator on
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a function actually written in some other language was not checked
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for and could be exploited for privilege-escalation purposes.
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The fix involves adding a call to a privilege-checking function in
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each validator function. Non-core procedural languages will also
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need to make this change to their own validator functions, if any.
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(CVE-2014-0061)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Avoid multiple name lookups during table and index DDL
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(Robert Haas, Andres Freund)
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</para>
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<para>
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If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
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activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
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than other parts. At least in the case of <command>CREATE INDEX</>,
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|
this can be used to cause the permissions checks to be performed
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against a different table than the index creation, allowing for a
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|
privilege escalation attack.
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(CVE-2014-0062)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Prevent buffer overrun with long datetime strings (Noah Misch)
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</para>
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<para>
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The <literal>MAXDATELEN</> constant was too small for the longest
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possible value of type <type>interval</>, allowing a buffer overrun
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in <function>interval_out()</>. Although the datetime input
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|
functions were more careful about avoiding buffer overrun, the limit
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was short enough to cause them to reject some valid inputs, such as
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input containing a very long timezone name. The <application>ecpg</>
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library contained these vulnerabilities along with some of its own.
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(CVE-2014-0063)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Prevent buffer overrun due to integer overflow in size calculations
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(Noah Misch, Heikki Linnakangas)
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</para>
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<para>
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Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an
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allocation size without checking for overflow. If overflow did
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occur, a too-small buffer would be allocated and then written past.
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(CVE-2014-0064)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Prevent overruns of fixed-size buffers
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(Peter Eisentraut, Jozef Mlich)
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</para>
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<para>
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Use <function>strlcpy()</> and related functions to provide a clear
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guarantee that fixed-size buffers are not overrun. Unlike the
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preceding items, it is unclear whether these cases really represent
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live issues, since in most cases there appear to be previous
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|
constraints on the size of the input string. Nonetheless it seems
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prudent to silence all Coverity warnings of this type.
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(CVE-2014-0065)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Avoid crashing if <function>crypt()</> returns NULL (Honza Horak,
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Bruce Momjian)
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</para>
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<para>
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There are relatively few scenarios in which <function>crypt()</>
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could return NULL, but <filename>contrib/chkpass</> would crash
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if it did. One practical case in which this could be an issue is
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if <application>libc</> is configured to refuse to execute unapproved
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hashing algorithms (e.g., <quote>FIPS mode</>).
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(CVE-2014-0066)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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Document risks of <literal>make check</> in the regression testing
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instructions (Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
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</para>
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<para>
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Since the temporary server started by <literal>make check</>
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uses <quote>trust</> authentication, another user on the same machine
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|
could connect to it as database superuser, and then potentially
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|
exploit the privileges of the operating-system user who started the
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|
tests. A future release will probably incorporate changes in the
|
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|
testing procedure to prevent this risk, but some public discussion is
|
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|
needed first. So for the moment, just warn people against using
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|
<literal>make check</> when there are untrusted users on the
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same machine.
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|
(CVE-2014-0067)
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</para>
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</listitem>
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<listitem>
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<listitem>
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<para>
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<para>
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Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
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Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
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@ -34,6 +34,145 @@
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|
|
||||||
<itemizedlist>
|
<itemizedlist>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Shore up <literal>GRANT ... WITH ADMIN OPTION</> restrictions
|
||||||
|
(Noah Misch)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
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|
<para>
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||||||
|
Granting a role without <literal>ADMIN OPTION</> is supposed to
|
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|
prevent the grantee from adding or removing members from the granted
|
||||||
|
role, but this restriction was easily bypassed by doing <literal>SET
|
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|
ROLE</> first. The security impact is mostly that a role member can
|
||||||
|
revoke the access of others, contrary to the wishes of his grantor.
|
||||||
|
Unapproved role member additions are a lesser concern, since an
|
||||||
|
uncooperative role member could provide most of his rights to others
|
||||||
|
anyway by creating views or <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</> functions.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0060)
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||||||
|
</para>
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|
</listitem>
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|
|
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|
<listitem>
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||||||
|
<para>
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||||||
|
Prevent privilege escalation via manual calls to PL validator
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|
functions (Andres Freund)
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|
</para>
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|
|
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|
<para>
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|
The primary role of PL validator functions is to be called implicitly
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|
during <command>CREATE FUNCTION</>, but they are also normal SQL
|
||||||
|
functions that a user can call explicitly. Calling a validator on
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|
a function actually written in some other language was not checked
|
||||||
|
for and could be exploited for privilege-escalation purposes.
|
||||||
|
The fix involves adding a call to a privilege-checking function in
|
||||||
|
each validator function. Non-core procedural languages will also
|
||||||
|
need to make this change to their own validator functions, if any.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0061)
|
||||||
|
</para>
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|
</listitem>
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||||||
|
|
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|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
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||||||
|
Avoid multiple name lookups during table and index DDL
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|
(Robert Haas, Andres Freund)
|
||||||
|
</para>
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|
|
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|
<para>
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||||||
|
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
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|
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
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|
than other parts. At least in the case of <command>CREATE INDEX</>,
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|
this can be used to cause the permissions checks to be performed
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|
against a different table than the index creation, allowing for a
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|
privilege escalation attack.
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|
(CVE-2014-0062)
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|
</para>
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</listitem>
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|
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<listitem>
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<para>
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|
Prevent buffer overrun with long datetime strings (Noah Misch)
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|
</para>
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|
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<para>
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The <literal>MAXDATELEN</> constant was too small for the longest
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|
possible value of type <type>interval</>, allowing a buffer overrun
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|
in <function>interval_out()</>. Although the datetime input
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|
functions were more careful about avoiding buffer overrun, the limit
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|
was short enough to cause them to reject some valid inputs, such as
|
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|
input containing a very long timezone name. The <application>ecpg</>
|
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|
library contained these vulnerabilities along with some of its own.
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|
(CVE-2014-0063)
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|
</para>
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|
</listitem>
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|
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|
<listitem>
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||||||
|
<para>
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|
Prevent buffer overrun due to integer overflow in size calculations
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|
(Noah Misch, Heikki Linnakangas)
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|
</para>
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|
|
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|
<para>
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|
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an
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|
allocation size without checking for overflow. If overflow did
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|
occur, a too-small buffer would be allocated and then written past.
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|
(CVE-2014-0064)
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|
</para>
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||||||
|
</listitem>
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||||||
|
|
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|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
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||||||
|
Prevent overruns of fixed-size buffers
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|
(Peter Eisentraut, Jozef Mlich)
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|
</para>
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|
|
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|
<para>
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|
Use <function>strlcpy()</> and related functions to provide a clear
|
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|
guarantee that fixed-size buffers are not overrun. Unlike the
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|
preceding items, it is unclear whether these cases really represent
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|
live issues, since in most cases there appear to be previous
|
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|
constraints on the size of the input string. Nonetheless it seems
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|
prudent to silence all Coverity warnings of this type.
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|
(CVE-2014-0065)
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|
</para>
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|
</listitem>
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||||||
|
|
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|
<listitem>
|
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|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Avoid crashing if <function>crypt()</> returns NULL (Honza Horak,
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|
Bruce Momjian)
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||||||
|
</para>
|
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|
|
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|
<para>
|
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|
There are relatively few scenarios in which <function>crypt()</>
|
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|
could return NULL, but <filename>contrib/chkpass</> would crash
|
||||||
|
if it did. One practical case in which this could be an issue is
|
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|
if <application>libc</> is configured to refuse to execute unapproved
|
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|
hashing algorithms (e.g., <quote>FIPS mode</>).
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0066)
|
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|
</para>
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|
</listitem>
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||||||
|
|
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|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Document risks of <literal>make check</> in the regression testing
|
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|
instructions (Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
|
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|
</para>
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|
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<para>
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|
Since the temporary server started by <literal>make check</>
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|
uses <quote>trust</> authentication, another user on the same machine
|
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|
could connect to it as database superuser, and then potentially
|
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|
exploit the privileges of the operating-system user who started the
|
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|
tests. A future release will probably incorporate changes in the
|
||||||
|
testing procedure to prevent this risk, but some public discussion is
|
||||||
|
needed first. So for the moment, just warn people against using
|
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|
<literal>make check</> when there are untrusted users on the
|
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|
same machine.
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|
(CVE-2014-0067)
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|
</para>
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|
</listitem>
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|
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<listitem>
|
<listitem>
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<para>
|
<para>
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Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
|
Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
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@ -34,6 +34,145 @@
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|
|
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<itemizedlist>
|
<itemizedlist>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Shore up <literal>GRANT ... WITH ADMIN OPTION</> restrictions
|
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|
(Noah Misch)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
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|
<para>
|
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|
Granting a role without <literal>ADMIN OPTION</> is supposed to
|
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|
prevent the grantee from adding or removing members from the granted
|
||||||
|
role, but this restriction was easily bypassed by doing <literal>SET
|
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|
ROLE</> first. The security impact is mostly that a role member can
|
||||||
|
revoke the access of others, contrary to the wishes of his grantor.
|
||||||
|
Unapproved role member additions are a lesser concern, since an
|
||||||
|
uncooperative role member could provide most of his rights to others
|
||||||
|
anyway by creating views or <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</> functions.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0060)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
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|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent privilege escalation via manual calls to PL validator
|
||||||
|
functions (Andres Freund)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
The primary role of PL validator functions is to be called implicitly
|
||||||
|
during <command>CREATE FUNCTION</>, but they are also normal SQL
|
||||||
|
functions that a user can call explicitly. Calling a validator on
|
||||||
|
a function actually written in some other language was not checked
|
||||||
|
for and could be exploited for privilege-escalation purposes.
|
||||||
|
The fix involves adding a call to a privilege-checking function in
|
||||||
|
each validator function. Non-core procedural languages will also
|
||||||
|
need to make this change to their own validator functions, if any.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0061)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Avoid multiple name lookups during table and index DDL
|
||||||
|
(Robert Haas, Andres Freund)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
|
||||||
|
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
|
||||||
|
than other parts. At least in the case of <command>CREATE INDEX</>,
|
||||||
|
this can be used to cause the permissions checks to be performed
|
||||||
|
against a different table than the index creation, allowing for a
|
||||||
|
privilege escalation attack.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0062)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent buffer overrun with long datetime strings (Noah Misch)
|
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|
</para>
|
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|
|
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|
<para>
|
||||||
|
The <literal>MAXDATELEN</> constant was too small for the longest
|
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|
possible value of type <type>interval</>, allowing a buffer overrun
|
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|
in <function>interval_out()</>. Although the datetime input
|
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|
functions were more careful about avoiding buffer overrun, the limit
|
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|
was short enough to cause them to reject some valid inputs, such as
|
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|
input containing a very long timezone name. The <application>ecpg</>
|
||||||
|
library contained these vulnerabilities along with some of its own.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0063)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent buffer overrun due to integer overflow in size calculations
|
||||||
|
(Noah Misch, Heikki Linnakangas)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an
|
||||||
|
allocation size without checking for overflow. If overflow did
|
||||||
|
occur, a too-small buffer would be allocated and then written past.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0064)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent overruns of fixed-size buffers
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||||||
|
(Peter Eisentraut, Jozef Mlich)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
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|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Use <function>strlcpy()</> and related functions to provide a clear
|
||||||
|
guarantee that fixed-size buffers are not overrun. Unlike the
|
||||||
|
preceding items, it is unclear whether these cases really represent
|
||||||
|
live issues, since in most cases there appear to be previous
|
||||||
|
constraints on the size of the input string. Nonetheless it seems
|
||||||
|
prudent to silence all Coverity warnings of this type.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0065)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Avoid crashing if <function>crypt()</> returns NULL (Honza Horak,
|
||||||
|
Bruce Momjian)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
There are relatively few scenarios in which <function>crypt()</>
|
||||||
|
could return NULL, but <filename>contrib/chkpass</> would crash
|
||||||
|
if it did. One practical case in which this could be an issue is
|
||||||
|
if <application>libc</> is configured to refuse to execute unapproved
|
||||||
|
hashing algorithms (e.g., <quote>FIPS mode</>).
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0066)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Document risks of <literal>make check</> in the regression testing
|
||||||
|
instructions (Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Since the temporary server started by <literal>make check</>
|
||||||
|
uses <quote>trust</> authentication, another user on the same machine
|
||||||
|
could connect to it as database superuser, and then potentially
|
||||||
|
exploit the privileges of the operating-system user who started the
|
||||||
|
tests. A future release will probably incorporate changes in the
|
||||||
|
testing procedure to prevent this risk, but some public discussion is
|
||||||
|
needed first. So for the moment, just warn people against using
|
||||||
|
<literal>make check</> when there are untrusted users on the
|
||||||
|
same machine.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0067)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<listitem>
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
<para>
|
<para>
|
||||||
Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
|
Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
|
||||||
|
@ -34,6 +34,145 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
<itemizedlist>
|
<itemizedlist>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Shore up <literal>GRANT ... WITH ADMIN OPTION</> restrictions
|
||||||
|
(Noah Misch)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Granting a role without <literal>ADMIN OPTION</> is supposed to
|
||||||
|
prevent the grantee from adding or removing members from the granted
|
||||||
|
role, but this restriction was easily bypassed by doing <literal>SET
|
||||||
|
ROLE</> first. The security impact is mostly that a role member can
|
||||||
|
revoke the access of others, contrary to the wishes of his grantor.
|
||||||
|
Unapproved role member additions are a lesser concern, since an
|
||||||
|
uncooperative role member could provide most of his rights to others
|
||||||
|
anyway by creating views or <literal>SECURITY DEFINER</> functions.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0060)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent privilege escalation via manual calls to PL validator
|
||||||
|
functions (Andres Freund)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
The primary role of PL validator functions is to be called implicitly
|
||||||
|
during <command>CREATE FUNCTION</>, but they are also normal SQL
|
||||||
|
functions that a user can call explicitly. Calling a validator on
|
||||||
|
a function actually written in some other language was not checked
|
||||||
|
for and could be exploited for privilege-escalation purposes.
|
||||||
|
The fix involves adding a call to a privilege-checking function in
|
||||||
|
each validator function. Non-core procedural languages will also
|
||||||
|
need to make this change to their own validator functions, if any.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0061)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Avoid multiple name lookups during table and index DDL
|
||||||
|
(Robert Haas, Andres Freund)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
If the name lookups come to different conclusions due to concurrent
|
||||||
|
activity, we might perform some parts of the DDL on a different table
|
||||||
|
than other parts. At least in the case of <command>CREATE INDEX</>,
|
||||||
|
this can be used to cause the permissions checks to be performed
|
||||||
|
against a different table than the index creation, allowing for a
|
||||||
|
privilege escalation attack.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0062)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent buffer overrun with long datetime strings (Noah Misch)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
The <literal>MAXDATELEN</> constant was too small for the longest
|
||||||
|
possible value of type <type>interval</>, allowing a buffer overrun
|
||||||
|
in <function>interval_out()</>. Although the datetime input
|
||||||
|
functions were more careful about avoiding buffer overrun, the limit
|
||||||
|
was short enough to cause them to reject some valid inputs, such as
|
||||||
|
input containing a very long timezone name. The <application>ecpg</>
|
||||||
|
library contained these vulnerabilities along with some of its own.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0063)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent buffer overrun due to integer overflow in size calculations
|
||||||
|
(Noah Misch, Heikki Linnakangas)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an
|
||||||
|
allocation size without checking for overflow. If overflow did
|
||||||
|
occur, a too-small buffer would be allocated and then written past.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0064)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Prevent overruns of fixed-size buffers
|
||||||
|
(Peter Eisentraut, Jozef Mlich)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Use <function>strlcpy()</> and related functions to provide a clear
|
||||||
|
guarantee that fixed-size buffers are not overrun. Unlike the
|
||||||
|
preceding items, it is unclear whether these cases really represent
|
||||||
|
live issues, since in most cases there appear to be previous
|
||||||
|
constraints on the size of the input string. Nonetheless it seems
|
||||||
|
prudent to silence all Coverity warnings of this type.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0065)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Avoid crashing if <function>crypt()</> returns NULL (Honza Horak,
|
||||||
|
Bruce Momjian)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
There are relatively few scenarios in which <function>crypt()</>
|
||||||
|
could return NULL, but <filename>contrib/chkpass</> would crash
|
||||||
|
if it did. One practical case in which this could be an issue is
|
||||||
|
if <application>libc</> is configured to refuse to execute unapproved
|
||||||
|
hashing algorithms (e.g., <quote>FIPS mode</>).
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0066)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Document risks of <literal>make check</> in the regression testing
|
||||||
|
instructions (Noah Misch, Tom Lane)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
<para>
|
||||||
|
Since the temporary server started by <literal>make check</>
|
||||||
|
uses <quote>trust</> authentication, another user on the same machine
|
||||||
|
could connect to it as database superuser, and then potentially
|
||||||
|
exploit the privileges of the operating-system user who started the
|
||||||
|
tests. A future release will probably incorporate changes in the
|
||||||
|
testing procedure to prevent this risk, but some public discussion is
|
||||||
|
needed first. So for the moment, just warn people against using
|
||||||
|
<literal>make check</> when there are untrusted users on the
|
||||||
|
same machine.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-0067)
|
||||||
|
</para>
|
||||||
|
</listitem>
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
<listitem>
|
<listitem>
|
||||||
<para>
|
<para>
|
||||||
Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
|
Fix possible mis-replay of WAL records when some segments of a
|
||||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user