Add AVX512 implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305.
Add fused asm implementations of ChaCha20-Poly1305.
Wire the fused APIs into new API.
Use new API in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
Adds wc_AesKeyWrap_Pad/wc_AesKeyUnWrap_Pad and their _ex variants plus crypto
callback dispatch, routing blocks through wc_AesEcb* so an ECB only callback works.
The PSS hook can hand back the recovered block through out/outSz/outLen.
A device that reports only a verdict leaves outLen at 0; wolfSSL then
zeroes the buffer and returns saltLen + hLen, and rejects a buffer
smaller than that with RSA_BUFFER_E. A reported length is clamped to the
buffer size, and any positive handler return maps to SIG_VERIFY_E.
Move the Ed448 sign WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO registration below the crypto
callback hook so the device path no longer returns past it, and guard the
RSA-PSS test callback against WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_RSA.
Adds tests for the recovered-data, over-claimed-length and undersized
buffer paths, and an os-check config that builds the hooks under
WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO.
Add WOLF_CRYPTO_CB dispatch hooks so a device can service:
* Ed448 sign and verify, mirroring the existing Ed25519 hooks.
* CMAC context free on wc_CmacFree (WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FREE), letting a device
release offload state.
* RSA-PSS verify with the digest (WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_RSA_PAD) so the device does
the full signature and padding check. On that path *out is set to NULL with a
positive return, documented in rsa.h.
Includes testwolfcrypt and API unit test coverage for each hook.
RFC 8446 Section 6.2 lists failure to validate a PSK binder under
decrypt_error, but TranslateErrorToAlert() mapped BAD_BINDER to
illegal_parameter. That told the peer its ClientHello was malformed, when
in fact the message was well formed and only the binder MAC did not match.
BAD_BINDER is also returned when no offered PSK matched and the server has
no certificate to fall back to. That reuse is deliberate, because it keeps
an unknown PSK identity indistinguishable from a failed binder, so both
conditions still map to a single alert after this change. A comment at the
return site in CheckPreSharedKeys() now records the invariant at both ends.
Splitting BAD_BINDER off illegal_parameter exposed a second path that had to
move with it. FindPsk() raised PSK_KEY_ERROR, which stays mapped to
illegal_parameter, when the server callback recognised an identity carrying
a non-zero obfuscated_ticket_age. That check ran before any binder was
derived, so on a certificate-less server the two alerts would have let an
unauthenticated peer enumerate valid PSK identities without holding a key.
The check is removed rather than made to fail differently: RFC 8446 Section
4.2.11 says that for an externally established identity an
obfuscated_ticket_age of 0 SHOULD be used and servers MUST ignore the value.
Ignoring it satisfies that requirement, closes the oracle, and lets a
conformant client that sends a non-zero age complete a handshake that was
previously rejected. test_tls13_psk_age_no_identity_oracle() asserts a known
and an unknown identity produce the same alert, with a positive control that
the known run really took the matched path.
Also removes an unreachable branch in CheckPreSharedKeys(). Since commit
089f1f7c9 added the earlier !*usingPSK certificate check, the later
certificate check and its BAD_BINDER return can no longer be reached. A
build with certificates returns BAD_BINDER earlier when none is loaded, and
a NO_CERTS build returns it unconditionally. The remaining branch now falls
through to the shared exit so WOLFSSL_LEAVE() is emitted on the certificate
fallback path as well.
Adds an os-check-linux configuration, tls13-psk-no-certs. psk.yml already
covers NO_CERTS with TLS 1.3 PSK through static-psk-lowresource-tls13, but
that config disables DH, so it only reaches the psk_ke branch. This one
leaves DH enabled and covers psk_dhe_ke under NO_CERTS.
Applications that inspect wolfSSL_get_alert_history() will observe alert 51
instead of 47 for these conditions. The affected tests are updated.
