openssl.test sets IFS=: around its cipher suite loops, so an unquoted
$TIMEOUT_KILL_2M inside them did not split back into separate words and
the shell looked for a command literally named "timeout -s KILL 2m".
Every wolfSSL client run in do_wolfssl_client() then died with "command
not found", which the script reported as a failing cipher suite.
Use an array, whose expansion does not depend on IFS, and keep a
flattened copy for the two eval call sites, where the shell re-parses the
string and IFS does not apply.
Three ways the bounds added here failed to do their job:
- get_first_free_port ended the scan cap with 'exit 1', but every caller
runs it in a command substitution, so only the subshell died. The port
variable came back empty, the next $((port + 1)) evaluated to 1, and the
run limped on to a confusing wait_for_readyFile failure. Forcing the cap
on ocsp-stapling.test: before, the script ran on and hung until an outer
timeout killed it; now it exits 1 at the error. Return instead, and check
the status at all 25 call sites across the six scripts.
- The macOS timeout shim was a shell function. Backgrounding a function
forks a subshell, so $! was the subshell and cleanup killed that while
the server it was meant to stop leaked. Use a prefix variable that
expands to nothing when timeout(1) is absent, keeping $! the real pid.
- timeout -s KILL exits 137, not 124. Sites that read $? and treat any
non-zero as 'feature not compiled in' turned a hang into exit 0, so the
bound made a hang less visible than before. Add timed_out() and check it
before those skip branches; use it for the version probes too, which
matched any status >= 124.
The 'Bad SSL version' probes branch on grep's status, so a client
killed by the 2m timeout read as 'TLS v1.2 supported' and ran the
wrong branch. Take both statuses from PIPESTATUS and fail loudly on
a probe timeout.
- tls13.test: take the client's exit status from PIPESTATUS[0]; $? after
the pipe was tee's status, hiding a client failure or 2m-timeout kill.
- ocsp-responder-openssl-interop.test: only escalate to SIGKILL if the
responder is still running, and make the reap counter local.
A test script that blocks forever burns the CI job's full
timeout-minutes with no logs. e82ecdff93 and 5c5cbd3094 bounded the
waited-on servers; this covers the remaining hang classes in
scripts/*.test:
- Wrap foreground example client/server, openssl s_client, and
openssl ocsp invocations in "timeout -s KILL 2m". A client wedged
before or without a live peer (e.g. blocked in first-seed entropy
gathering, or DTLS with no reset from a dead peer) is not bounded
by its peer's timeout.
- Add the macOS timeout() fallback shim to scripts that now use
timeout.
- Bound the get_first_free_port scan loops (nc -w 1, 100-port cap).
- Add -w 1 to the remaining nc probes and dtls.test UDP pcap markers.
- ocsp-responder-openssl-interop.test: bound the responder reap in
cleanup: give each responder 5 s to exit after SIGTERM, then
SIGKILL before waiting, so a wedged responder cannot hang the EXIT
trap.
- benchmark.test: bound the clients but leave the -i servers
unwrapped: the script ends them with kill -6, which timeout(1)
does not forward, so wrapping would orphan the server.
- trusted_peer/tls13: kill the server with SIGTERM instead of
SIGKILL in cleanup so the signal forwards through the timeout
wrapper to the wrapped server.
Add AVX512 implementations of ChaCha20 and Poly1305.
Add fused asm implementations of ChaCha20-Poly1305.
Wire the fused APIs into new API.
Use new API in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
In addition, only copy the certificate itself to WOLFSSL_X509, omitting trailing bytes.
Thanks to Lucca Hirschi (Inria, France) and the tlspuffin team for the report.
Adds wc_AesKeyWrap_Pad/wc_AesKeyUnWrap_Pad and their _ex variants plus crypto
callback dispatch, routing blocks through wc_AesEcb* so an ECB only callback works.
