apache/modules/proxy

mod_proxy_beacon

Self-registering reverse-proxy balancer membership: backend servers announce
themselves to a front-end proxy over UDP datagrams, and the proxy adds, enables,
and evicts them as live balancer members. See
docs/manual/mod/mod_proxy_beacon.xml for the user-facing directive reference;
this file describes the architecture.

The transport is plain APR UDP sockets -- small, periodic, fire-and-forget
announcements with no third-party dependency.


Dependencies:
  Requires mod_watchdog and mod_proxy_balancer. No external library: the UDP
  transport uses APR sockets and authentication uses SipHash from APR-util (no
  OpenSSL dependency).


Transport (unicast UDP, not multicast):
  Each backend sends a point-to-point UDP datagram (apr_socket_sendto) to the
  proxy's configured address. This is deliberately UNICAST -- unlike
  mod_heartbeat, which multicasts to a group. Multicast is filtered on most
  networks and does not traverse the public Internet, so a cross-host control
  plane must be unicast. The socket-handling pattern is adapted from
  mod_heartmonitor's unicast receive path.

  Datagrams are fire-and-forget. The design tolerates UDP loss and reordering
  without a reconnect or framing layer: a lost announcement just delays an update
  by one interval (announcements are periodic and idempotent), and an out-of-order
  datagram is rejected by the per-url monotonic timestamp (see Authentication).


Roles:
  Backend  = sender   (ProxyBeaconAddress): sends to the proxy, advertising its
             own routable URL (ProxyBeaconAdvertise) periodically.
  Proxy    = receiver (ProxyBeaconListen): binds a stable address, receives
             announcements, and manages balancer://<name> (ProxyBeaconBalancer).

  The proxy is the fixed unicast rendezvous; each backend is configured with its
  address. One proxy receiver serves many backend senders. A leading scheme in
  an address (e.g. tcp://) is accepted and ignored.

  ProxyBeaconListen's host and port are both optional: an omitted host/port (or
  no argument at all) is inherited from the server's own address/port. Since UDP
  and TCP are independent port spaces, the beacon socket can share the server's
  service port without colliding with its TCP listener -- so a backend can beacon
  to the proxy at its real service endpoint. (The listener binds in an
  unprivileged watchdog child, so privileged ports like 80/443 cannot be shared
  this way.) The sender's ProxyBeaconAddress targets the proxy and must be given
  in full.


Where it runs:
  All background work runs in a single mod_watchdog SINGLETON callback -- exactly
  one child process owns the socket (so only one process binds the receive port
  and performs membership changes). The watchdog fires every ~100ms:

    STARTING  open the UDP socket; receiver binds, sender resolves its dest.
    RUNNING   sender:   send a throttled announcement (ProxyBeaconInterval).
              receiver: drain the socket, then run a throttled (~1s) eviction
                        sweep.
    STOPPING  close the socket.

  Because this relies on a singleton watchdog child, it is inactive under the
  prefork MPM.


Adding/removing members (reuses the balancer-manager path):
  Runtime worker *removal* does not exist in httpd, so membership is managed
  entirely as status-flag changes via mod_proxy_balancer's exported
  balancer_manage() optional function -- the same code the balancer-manager web
  UI calls. The receiver synthesizes a minimal request_rec (no real client
  request exists in the watchdog thread; see beacon_make_fake_request) and calls:

    add     b=<name> b_nwrkr=<url> b_wyes=1     (worker created, disabled)
    enable  b=<name> w=<url> w_status_D=0       (cleared -> serves traffic)
    evict   b=<name> w=<url> w_status_D=1       (disabled -> out of rotation)

  Adds bump the balancer's shm "updated" timestamp, so every other child picks
  up the new worker through the normal ap_proxy_sync_balancer() path -- the
  change made in the singleton propagates fleet-wide. The target balancer must
  have spare slots (ProxySet growth / BalancerGrowth).

  Per-backend state (last-seen time, added/evicted flags) is kept in a hash in
  the singleton's own pool -- no shared memory is needed, since the singleton is
  the only process that adds or evicts. A re-announcement after eviction
  re-enables the worker; the flags make these transitions idempotent.


Message format:
  Plain ASCII, space-separated key=value tokens, one datagram per announcement:

    BEACON url=http://host:port host=<h> pid=<n> seq=<n> ts=<usec> mac=<hex>

  url= is the routable backend origin the proxy adds as a BalancerMember. ts=
  (microseconds since the epoch) and mac= authenticate the message and are always
  present, since a shared secret is required (see below). host=/pid=/seq= are
  informational.

  A UDP datagram is delivered whole, so the receiver reads each message into a
  fixed stack buffer and NUL-terminates it (buf[len] = '\0') before parsing.
  The sender transmits strlen(msg) bytes (no trailing NUL on the wire).


Authentication (ProxyBeaconSecret, REQUIRED):
  ProxyBeaconSecret must be set on every participating server (the receiver and
  every sender); startup fails otherwise. There is no unauthenticated mode:
  without a MAC, anyone who can reach the receiver port could announce a URL and
  hijack client traffic, and a UDP source address is trivially spoofable, so
  authentication matters at least as much here as it would over a connection.

  With ProxyBeaconSecret set identically on the proxy and all backends, each
  announcement is signed with a SipHash-2-4 MAC over the message prefix (the key
  is derived from the passphrase via apr_md5, as in mod_session_crypto). The
  receiver recomputes the MAC (constant-time compare) and rejects anything that
  does not match -- before the URL is parsed or acted on. Replay protection has
  two parts, both keyed on the signed ts= (microseconds): (1) a freshness window
  (ProxyBeaconMaxSkew) rejects messages whose timestamp is too far from now,
  which assumes proxy and backend clocks are roughly synchronized (NTP); (2) a
  per-url high-water mark rejects any ts= that does not strictly exceed the last
  one accepted for that url, so a byte-identical replay (same ts, same MAC) --
  e.g. replaying a dead backend's last announcement to keep it from being evicted
  -- is dropped even within the freshness window. Microsecond granularity ensures
  genuine sub-second announcements always advance. seq= is NOT used for replay
  (it resets when a backend restarts); the wall-clock ts= does not.

  Announcements are authenticated, not encrypted -- the payload is operational
  metadata, not secret. For transport confidentiality, DTLS would be a separate,
  orthogonal future layer.