Apache HTTP Server Version 2.3
Available Languages: en
Description: | Support for Solaris privileges and for running virtual hosts under different user IDs. |
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Status: | Experimental |
Module Identifier: | privileges_module |
Compatibility: | Available in Apache 2.3 and up, on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris platforms |
This module enables different Virtual Hosts to run with different
Unix™ User and Group IDs, and with different
Solaris Privileges. In particular, it offers a solution to the
problem of privilege separation between different Virtual Hosts, first
promised by the abandoned perchild
MPM.
It also offers other security enhancements.
Unlike perchild
, mod_privileges
is not itself an MPM. It works within a processing model to
set privileges and User/Group per request in a running process.
It is therefore not compatible with a threaded MPM, and will refuse
to run under one.
mod_privileges
raises security issues similar to
those of suexec. But unlike suexec,
it applies not only to CGI programs but to the entire request processing
cycle, including in-process applications and subprocesses.
It is ideally suited to running PHP applications under mod_php,
which is also incompatible with threaded MPMs. It is also well-suited
to other in-process scripting applications such as mod_perl,
mod_python, and mod_ruby, and to
applications implemented in C as apache modules where privilege
separation is an issue.
There are three principal security concerns with mod_privileges:
The first is amply discussed in the suexec page and elsewhere, and doesn't need repeating here. The second and third boil down to one principle: ensure no untrusted privileges-aware code can be loaded.
There are several ways privileges-aware code could be loaded into Apache:
What gets loaded at startup is under the control of the sysop, and relatively easy to deal with. A tool will be provided to audit your installation. That leaves code loaded in the course of processing a request as the threat. There is unfortunately no generic way apache can control what a script running under an application module can load, so you should use the security provided by your scripting module and language.
There is no known PHP extension supporting Solaris privileges, so it is unlikely that a script could escalate privileges unless it can load external (non-PHP) privileges-aware code. However, you should nevertheless audit your mod_php installation.
To prevent scripts loading privileges-aware code, PHP's dl() function should be disabled. This is automatic in safe mode.
Perl has an extension Sun::Solaris::Privileges that exposes the privileges API to scripts. You should ensure this extension is NOT installed if you have untrusted users.
You will also need to ensure that your users cannot load shared objects (including PerlXS) from their own user directories, or that if this is enabled, the entire user-space must be carefully audited.
There is no known Python extension supporting Solaris privileges, so it is unlikely that a script could escalate privileges unless it can load external (non-Python) privileges-aware code. However, you should nevertheless audit your mod_ruby installation.
*** What are the issues of Python loading a shared object?
There is no known Ruby extension supporting Solaris privileges, so it is unlikely that a script could escalate privileges unless it can load external (non-Ruby) privileges-aware code. However, you should nevertheless audit your mod_ruby installation.
*** What are the issues of Ruby loading a shared object?
???
The security issues of mod_privileges do not affect scripts such as traditional CGI, which run in a separate process. That includes PHP, Perl, Python, Ruby, etc, run out-of-process.
Description: | Determines whether the privileges required by dtrace are enabled. |
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Syntax: | DTracePrivileges On|Off |
Default: | DTracePrivileges Off |
Context: | server config |
Status: | Experimental |
Module: | mod_privileges |
Compatibility: | Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (prefork or custom MPM). |
This server-wide directive determines whether Apache will run with the privileges required to run dtrace. Note that DTracePrivileges On will not in itself activate DTrace, but DTracePrivileges Off will prevent it working.
Description: | Determines whether the virtualhost can run subprocesses, and the privileges available to subprocesses. |
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Syntax: | VHostCGIMode On|Off|Secure |
Default: | VHostCGIMode On |
Context: | virtual host |
Status: | Experimental |
Module: | mod_privileges |
Compatibility: | Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (prefork or custom MPM). |
Determines whether the virtual host is allowed to run fork and exec,
the privileges required to run subprocesses. If this is set to
Off the virtualhost is denied the privileges and will not
be able to run traditional CGI programs or scripts under the traditional
mod_cgi
, nor similar external programs such as those
created by mod_ext_filter
or
RewriteMap
prog.
Note that it does not prevent CGI programs running under alternative
process and security models such as mod_fcgid, which is a recommended solution in Solaris.
If set to On or Secure, the virtual host
is permitted to run external programs and scripts as above.
Setting VHostCGIMode
Secure has
the effect of denying privileges to the subprocesses, as described
for VHostSecure
.
Description: | Assign arbitrary privileges to subprocesses created by a virtual host. |
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Syntax: | VHostPrivs [+-]?privilege-name [[+-]?privilege-name] ... |
Default: | None |
Context: | virtual host |
Status: | Experimental |
Module: | mod_privileges |
Compatibility: | Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (prefork or custom MPM)
and when mod_privileges is compiled with the
BIG_SECURITY_HOLE compile-time option. |
VHostCGIPrivs
can be used to assign arbitrary privileges to subprocesses created by a virtual host, as discussed
under VHostCGIMode
. Each privilege-name
is the name of a Solaris privilege, such as file_setid
or sys_nfs.
A privilege-name may optionally be prefixed by + or -, which will respectively allow or deny a privilege. If used with neither + nor -, all privileges otherwise assigned to the virtualhost will be denied. You can use this to override any of the default sets and construct your own privilege set.
This directive can open huge security holes in apache subprocesses, up to and including running them with root-level powers. Do not use it unless you fully understand what you are doing!
Description: | Sets the Group ID under which a virtual host runs. |
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Syntax: | VHostGroup unix-groupid |
Default: | Inherits the group id specified in
|
Context: | virtual host |
Status: | Experimental |
Module: | mod_privileges |
Compatibility: | Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (prefork or custom MPM). |
The VHostGroup
directive sets the Unix group
under which the server will process requests to a virtualhost.
The group is set before the request is processed and reset afterwards
using Solaris Privileges. Since the setting applies to the
process, this is not compatible with threaded MPMs.
Unix-group is one of:
#
followed by a group number.This directive cannot be used to run apache as root! Nevertheless, it opens potential security issues similar to those discussed in the suexec documentation.
Description: | Assign arbitrary privileges to a virtual host. |
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Syntax: | VHostPrivs [+-]?privilege-name [[+-]?privilege-name] ... |
Default: | None |
Context: | virtual host |
Status: | Experimental |
Module: | mod_privileges |
Compatibility: | Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (prefork or custom MPM).
and when mod_privileges is compiled with the
BIG_SECURITY_HOLE compile-time option. |
VHostPrivs
can be used to assign arbitrary privileges to a virtual host. Each privilege-name
is the name of a Solaris privilege, such as file_setid
or sys_nfs.
A privilege-name may optionally be prefixed by + or -, which will respectively allow or deny a privilege. If used with neither + nor -, all privileges otherwise assigned to the virtualhost will be denied. You can use this to override any of the default sets and construct your own privilege set.
This directive can open huge security holes in apache, up to and including running requests with root-level powers. Do not use it unless you fully understand what you are doing!
Description: | Determines whether the server runs with enhanced security for the virtualhost. |
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Syntax: | VHostSecure On|Off |
Default: | VHostSecure On |
Context: | virtual host |
Status: | Experimental |
Module: | mod_privileges |
Compatibility: | Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (prefork or custom MPM). |
Determines whether the virtual host processes requests with security enhanced by removal of Privileges that are rarely needed in a webserver, but which are available by default to a normal Unix user and may therefore be required by modules and applications. It is recommended that you retain the default (On) unless it prevents an application running. Since the setting applies to the process, this is not compatible with threaded MPMs.
If VHostSecure
prevents an application
running, this may be a warning sign that the application should be
reviewed for security.
Description: | Sets the User ID under which a virtual host runs. |
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Syntax: | VHostUser unix-userid |
Default: | Inherits the userid specified in
|
Context: | virtual host |
Status: | Experimental |
Module: | mod_privileges |
Compatibility: | Available on Solaris 10 and OpenSolaris with
non-threaded MPMs (prefork or custom MPM). |
The VHostUser
directive sets the Unix userid
under which the server will process requests to a virtualhost.
The userid is set before the request is processed and reset afterwards
using Solaris Privileges. Since the setting applies to the
process, this is not compatible with threaded MPMs.
Unix-userid is one of:
#
followed by a user number.This directive cannot be used to run apache as root! Nevertheless, it opens potential security issues similar to those discussed in the suexec documentation.
Available Languages: en