systemd sends the whole cgroup SIGTERM, so the core died before the
service and was recorded as a crash; the next boot then refused to
restore the proxy ("exited abnormally the last time", discussion
#1922). The signal handler marks the manager as shutting down before
anything else, a core exit in that state keeps the running flag, and
the units use KillMode=mixed so only the service receives the signal.
A SQLite file that an earlier release's migration left empty next to an
intact bolt.db was taken as authoritative; a file without the system
settings a completed migration writes is discarded and the migration
runs again. A database migrated by that earlier release holds its
groups and outbound settings in the two tables the runtime never read;
opening it copies them into the keys it reads, for outbounds that have
none yet.
A start whose host-state recovery failed refused to run, and a start
that rolled back after its own stop tore the host state down a second
time; recovery is logged and retried at the next start, and a rollback
that stopped its process only clears the marker. A system-proxy
snapshot pending from an earlier run blocked every later system-proxy
start; it is reused as the original instead (Linux and macOS here; the
Windows side follows with its per-profile snapshot).
An empty /etc/resolv.conf was backed up as an empty file, which the
restore rejects as truncated; it is written as a marker and restored as
empty. db.Close resets the once so a reopen works.
Start persisted running=false, stopped the old core, published the new
process and unlocked, installed the firewall rules, DNS hijack, TUN
routes or system proxy, and only then persisted running=true. A crash in
that window made the next start skip the core and clean only TUN
residue, so redirect rules, a hijacked resolver or the system proxy kept
pointing at a dead listener.
Before it installs anything, Start now stores a host-state marker (the
transparent type, API port and TUN teardown settings) and clears it once
the start commits or is rolled back; startup and the next Start tear
that state down when they find the marker. Every host mutation and the
final commit check that the process they started is still the manager's
current one, so a core that exits during afterStart fails the start
instead of leaving the UI and the store saying running. The system-proxy
implementations persist the user's original proxy settings when they
capture them and restore from that copy when the in-memory one is gone.
A recovery that fails is logged and retried at the next start; it never
blocks the service.
The core hooks ran under exec.Command with no deadline while Start held
the manager's lock, so a hook that never returned left the proxy stopped
and every status read blocked. They now run with the startup timeout as
their deadline in their own process group.
The custom-inbound POST and DELETE handlers did not take the mutation
turn; two concurrent additions read the same list and the last write
won. They take it like every other state-changing handler.
A failed HTTP bind ended in log.Fatal before the deferred cleanup, so
the core and the transparent-proxy rules stayed behind; run() now
returns the error through the same cleanup the shutdown path uses.
The resolv.conf backup was written in place; a crash mid-write left a
truncated file that the next start restored as the original. It is
written to a temporary file, synced and renamed, and an empty backup is
ignored on restore.
SetAPI starts the traffic and observatory producers together with the
template, and only a running process closes them. A start that failed
before the process existed — the config write, the inbound port check or
the missing GFWList — returned without closing the template, and the
latency test returned early on port exhaustion the same way. Each such
failure left goroutines dialling a port nothing listens on and logging a
warning every second for the rest of the service's life.
NewProcess closes the template on every error path, the GFWList check
closes it before returning, and the latency test closes its template
until the process manager owns it.
Running() reads the process under the manager's lock; the early-exit
flag is atomic; a second Close no longer waits on the reaped process; an
empty log chunk no longer panics. The observatory producer rejects tags
it cannot map instead of attributing them to the first node, paces every
path so an unknown tag cannot spin it, closes an unavailable connection
before dropping it and cancels each dial context at once. Balancer
outbounds get their serverInfoMap entry on success, not only on failure.
The resolv hijacker is serialised between the start path and the
connectivity monitor.
The binaries workflow, the PR workflow and build.ps1 no longer pass
-tags tinytun; there is nothing behind the tag. The Windows installer
takes wintun.dll from the official 0.14.1 package, pinned by hash, one
DLL per architecture, and deletes a tinytun.exe an earlier installer left
in the application's bin directory. The README states what the built-in
TUN does and its known limitation on Windows and macOS.
Shutdown asks for the teardown twice: pre_run calls CheckAndStopTransparentProxy
and then Stop calls it again through beforeStop. Both ran the user's pre-stop
and post-stop transparent hooks, so a hook that is not idempotent ran twice on
every exit.
Record whether this process installed the rules and make the teardown a no-op
once they are gone. Rules left behind by an earlier process are still removed
by cleanupResidualTransparentProxyRules when the next ones are written.
Errors that reach the GUI were written for the log: "ResolveURL failed:
invalid parameters", "httpGetUsingSpecificClient: response is nil",
"LocateServerRaw: invalid TYPE", "bad request", "illegal base64 data at
input byte 18". Reword the messages that can reach a user so each names
the input that was rejected (link scheme, missing password, port, server
id, request field), states the expected form for malformed input, drops
Go function names, keeps the %w chain so errors.Is/As still work, and
never echoes passwords, tokens or full share links (hosts only).
Messages the GUI string-matches ("invalid config", "the last request is
being processed") are unchanged.
Interface names and whitelist IPs from the settings were interpolated
into iptables/nft command text run through sh -c; they are now validated
(interface names may still use the "*" wildcard, translated to "+" for
iptables) and rejected with a message naming the value. nftTproxy emitted
"elements = { }" for an empty whitelist, an nft syntax error that failed
the whole setup. waitForDnsPort dialed UDP, which succeeds without a
listener; it now sends a DNS query and waits for an answer. The resolv
hijacker's ticker goroutine never exited because Stop does not close the
channel. A failing transparent pre-stop hook skipped rule deletion and
left the tproxy chains and resolv hijack behind. The DNS REDIRECT rules
ran through raw ExecCommands instead of the iptables backend setter, so
nft-only hosts silently skipped them. On darwin/BSD sysctl was invoked
with the whole command line as the program name.
core: fix geosite.dat parsing in DNS resolver
- Replace broken GeoSiteList unmarshal with correct varint-length-delimited
stream parser matching xray-core's format
- Add result caching to avoid re-reading the file per tag expansion
service: persist kernel exit status for proper state restoration
- Add LastKernelExitStatus (running/stopped/crashed) to DB
- Set 'running' on graceful shutdown while kernel is active so it
is automatically restored on next startup
- Set 'stopped' when user explicitly stops the kernel via API
- Set 'crashed' when the kernel exits unexpectedly
- Check saved status at startup and log appropriate messages
- Expose lastKernelExit field via GET /api/version for the frontend