1
0
mirror of https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk.git synced 2025-11-25 05:23:13 +03:00
Files
matrix-js-sdk/src/common-crypto/CryptoBackend.ts
Richard van der Hoff 084beaa947 Fix up comments on globalErrorOnUnknownDevices (#3834)
The current deprecation notice advises you to use a method which does something
completely different.

Fixing this "properly" is slightly challenging because we don't want to support
setting it to `true` in Rust Crypto; yet I don't really want to change the
default for legacy crypto.

Let's just document the behaviour for now.
2023-10-25 14:32:16 +00:00

257 lines
8.9 KiB
TypeScript

/*
Copyright 2022 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
You may obtain a copy of the License at
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
limitations under the License.
*/
import type { IDeviceLists, IToDeviceEvent } from "../sync-accumulator";
import { IClearEvent, MatrixEvent } from "../models/event";
import { Room } from "../models/room";
import { CryptoApi } from "../crypto-api";
import { CrossSigningInfo, UserTrustLevel } from "../crypto/CrossSigning";
import { IEncryptedEventInfo } from "../crypto/api";
import { KeyBackupInfo, KeyBackupSession } from "../crypto-api/keybackup";
import { IMegolmSessionData } from "../@types/crypto";
/**
* Common interface for the crypto implementations
*
* @internal
*/
export interface CryptoBackend extends SyncCryptoCallbacks, CryptoApi {
/**
* Whether sendMessage in a room with unknown and unverified devices
* should throw an error and not send the message. This has 'Global' for
* symmetry with setGlobalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices but there is currently
* no room-level equivalent for this setting.
*
* @remarks This has no effect in Rust Crypto; it exists only for the sake of
* the accessors in MatrixClient.
*/
globalErrorOnUnknownDevices: boolean;
/**
* Shut down any background processes related to crypto
*/
stop(): void;
/**
* Get the verification level for a given user
*
* @param userId - user to be checked
*
* @deprecated Superceded by {@link CryptoApi#getUserVerificationStatus}.
*/
checkUserTrust(userId: string): UserTrustLevel;
/**
* Encrypt an event according to the configuration of the room.
*
* @param event - event to be sent
*
* @param room - destination room.
*
* @returns Promise which resolves when the event has been
* encrypted, or null if nothing was needed
*/
encryptEvent(event: MatrixEvent, room: Room): Promise<void>;
/**
* Decrypt a received event
*
* @returns a promise which resolves once we have finished decrypting.
* Rejects with an error if there is a problem decrypting the event.
*/
decryptEvent(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<EventDecryptionResult>;
/**
* Get information about the encryption of an event
*
* @param event - event to be checked
*/
getEventEncryptionInfo(event: MatrixEvent): IEncryptedEventInfo;
/**
* Get the cross signing information for a given user.
*
* The cross-signing API is currently UNSTABLE and may change without notice.
*
* @param userId - the user ID to get the cross-signing info for.
*
* @returns the cross signing information for the user.
* @deprecated Prefer {@link CryptoApi#userHasCrossSigningKeys}
*/
getStoredCrossSigningForUser(userId: string): CrossSigningInfo | null;
/**
* Check the cross signing trust of the current user
*
* @param opts - Options object.
*
* @deprecated Unneeded for the new crypto
*/
checkOwnCrossSigningTrust(opts?: CheckOwnCrossSigningTrustOpts): Promise<void>;
/**
* Get a backup decryptor capable of decrypting megolm session data encrypted with the given backup information.
* @param backupInfo - The backup information
* @param privKey - The private decryption key.
*/
getBackupDecryptor(backupInfo: KeyBackupInfo, privKey: ArrayLike<number>): Promise<BackupDecryptor>;
}
/** The methods which crypto implementations should expose to the Sync api
*
* @internal
*/
export interface SyncCryptoCallbacks {
/**
* Called by the /sync loop whenever there are incoming to-device messages.
*
* The implementation may preprocess the received messages (eg, decrypt them) and return an
* updated list of messages for dispatch to the rest of the system.
*
* Note that, unlike {@link ClientEvent.ToDeviceEvent} events, this is called on the raw to-device
* messages, rather than the results of any decryption attempts.
*
* @param events - the received to-device messages
* @returns A list of preprocessed to-device messages.
*/
preprocessToDeviceMessages(events: IToDeviceEvent[]): Promise<IToDeviceEvent[]>;
/**
* Called by the /sync loop when one time key counts and unused fallback key details are received.
*
* @param oneTimeKeysCounts - the received one time key counts
* @param unusedFallbackKeys - the received unused fallback keys
*/
processKeyCounts(oneTimeKeysCounts?: Record<string, number>, unusedFallbackKeys?: string[]): Promise<void>;
/**
* Handle the notification from /sync that device lists have
* been changed.
*
* @param deviceLists - device_lists field from /sync
*/
processDeviceLists(deviceLists: IDeviceLists): Promise<void>;
/**
* Called by the /sync loop whenever an m.room.encryption event is received.
*
* This is called before RoomStateEvents are emitted for any of the events in the /sync
* response (even if the other events technically happened first). This works around a problem
* if the client uses a RoomStateEvent (typically a membership event) as a trigger to send a message
* in a new room (or one where encryption has been newly enabled): that would otherwise leave the
* crypto layer confused because it expects crypto to be set up, but it has not yet been.
*
* @param room - in which the event was received
* @param event - encryption event to be processed
*/
onCryptoEvent(room: Room, event: MatrixEvent): Promise<void>;
/**
* Called by the /sync loop after each /sync response is processed.
*
* Used to complete batch processing, or to initiate background processes
*
* @param syncState - information about the completed sync.
*/
onSyncCompleted(syncState: OnSyncCompletedData): void;
}
/**
* @internal
*/
export interface OnSyncCompletedData {
/**
* The 'next_batch' result from /sync, which will become the 'since' token for the next call to /sync.
*/
nextSyncToken?: string;
/**
* True if we are working our way through a backlog of events after connecting.
*/
catchingUp?: boolean;
}
/**
* Options object for {@link CryptoBackend#checkOwnCrossSigningTrust}.
*/
export interface CheckOwnCrossSigningTrustOpts {
allowPrivateKeyRequests?: boolean;
}
/**
* The result of a (successful) call to {@link CryptoBackend.decryptEvent}
*/
export interface EventDecryptionResult {
/**
* The plaintext payload for the event (typically containing <tt>type</tt> and <tt>content</tt> fields).
*/
clearEvent: IClearEvent;
/**
* List of curve25519 keys involved in telling us about the senderCurve25519Key and claimedEd25519Key.
* See {@link MatrixEvent#getForwardingCurve25519KeyChain}.
*/
forwardingCurve25519KeyChain?: string[];
/**
* Key owned by the sender of this event. See {@link MatrixEvent#getSenderKey}.
*/
senderCurve25519Key?: string;
/**
* ed25519 key claimed by the sender of this event. See {@link MatrixEvent#getClaimedEd25519Key}.
*/
claimedEd25519Key?: string;
/**
* Whether the keys for this event have been received via an unauthenticated source (eg via key forwards, or
* restored from backup)
*/
untrusted?: boolean;
/**
* The sender doesn't authorize the unverified devices to decrypt his messages
*/
encryptedDisabledForUnverifiedDevices?: boolean;
}
/**
* Responsible for decrypting megolm session data retrieved from a remote backup.
* The result of {@link CryptoBackend#getBackupDecryptor}.
*/
export interface BackupDecryptor {
/**
* Whether keys retrieved from this backup can be trusted.
*
* Depending on the backup algorithm, keys retrieved from the backup can be trusted or not.
* If false, keys retrieved from the backup must be considered unsafe (authenticity cannot be guaranteed).
* It could be by design (deniability) or for some technical reason (eg asymmetric encryption).
*/
readonly sourceTrusted: boolean;
/**
*
* Decrypt megolm session data retrieved from backup.
*
* @param ciphertexts - a Record of sessionId to session data.
*
* @returns An array of decrypted `IMegolmSessionData`
*/
decryptSessions(ciphertexts: Record<string, KeyBackupSession>): Promise<IMegolmSessionData[]>;
/**
* Free any resources held by this decryptor.
*
* Should be called once the decryptor is no longer needed.
*/
free(): void;
}