You've already forked matrix-js-sdk
mirror of
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk.git
synced 2025-07-30 04:23:07 +03:00
Improve integration test for interactive verification (#3495)
* Tweaks to the integ test to conform to the spec Rust is a bit more insistent than legacy crypto... * Improve documentation on request*Verification * Check more things in the integration test * Create an E2EKeyResponder * Test verification with custom method list * Add a test for SAS cancellation * Update spec/integ/crypto/verification.spec.ts
This commit is contained in:
Richard van der Hoff
committed by
GitHub
GitHub
parent
3c59476cf7
commit
f884c78579
@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ import {
|
||||
TEST_USER_ID,
|
||||
} from "../../test-utils/test-data";
|
||||
import { mockInitialApiRequests } from "../../test-utils/mockEndpoints";
|
||||
import { E2EKeyResponder } from "../../test-utils/E2EKeyResponder";
|
||||
|
||||
// The verification flows use javascript timers to set timeouts. We tell jest to use mock timer implementations
|
||||
// to ensure that we don't end up with dangling timeouts.
|
||||
@ -79,7 +80,18 @@ afterAll(() => {
|
||||
* These tests work by intercepting HTTP requests via fetch-mock rather than mocking out bits of the client, so as
|
||||
* to provide the most effective integration tests possible.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
// we test with both crypto stacks...
|
||||
describe.each(Object.entries(CRYPTO_BACKENDS))("verification (%s)", (backend: string, initCrypto: InitCrypto) => {
|
||||
// and with (1) the default verification method list, (2) a custom verification method list.
|
||||
describe.each([undefined, ["m.sas.v1", "m.qr_code.show.v1", "m.reciprocate.v1"]])(
|
||||
"supported methods=%s",
|
||||
(methods) => {
|
||||
runTests(backend, initCrypto, methods);
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
function runTests(backend: string, initCrypto: InitCrypto, methods: string[] | undefined) {
|
||||
// oldBackendOnly is an alternative to `it` or `test` which will skip the test if we are running against the
|
||||
// Rust backend. Once we have full support in the rust sdk, it will go away.
|
||||
const oldBackendOnly = backend === "rust-sdk" ? test.skip : test;
|
||||
@ -90,6 +102,9 @@ describe.each(Object.entries(CRYPTO_BACKENDS))("verification (%s)", (backend: st
|
||||
/** an object which intercepts `/sync` requests from {@link #aliceClient} */
|
||||
let syncResponder: SyncResponder;
|
||||
|
||||
/** an object which intercepts `/keys/query` requests from {@link #aliceClient} */
|
||||
let e2eKeyResponder: E2EKeyResponder;
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(async () => {
|
||||
// anything that we don't have a specific matcher for silently returns a 404
|
||||
fetchMock.catch(404);
|
||||
@ -101,9 +116,15 @@ describe.each(Object.entries(CRYPTO_BACKENDS))("verification (%s)", (backend: st
|
||||
userId: TEST_USER_ID,
|
||||
accessToken: "akjgkrgjs",
|
||||
deviceId: "device_under_test",
|
||||
verificationMethods: methods,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await initCrypto(aliceClient);
|
||||
|
||||
e2eKeyResponder = new E2EKeyResponder(aliceClient.getHomeserverUrl());
|
||||
syncResponder = new SyncResponder(aliceClient.getHomeserverUrl());
|
||||
mockInitialApiRequests(aliceClient.getHomeserverUrl());
|
||||
await aliceClient.startClient();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
afterEach(async () => {
|
||||
@ -111,156 +132,157 @@ describe.each(Object.entries(CRYPTO_BACKENDS))("verification (%s)", (backend: st
|
||||
fetchMock.mockReset();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
syncResponder = new SyncResponder(aliceClient.getHomeserverUrl());
|
||||
mockInitialApiRequests(aliceClient.getHomeserverUrl());
|
||||
aliceClient.startClient();
|
||||
});
|
||||
describe("Outgoing verification requests for another device", () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(async () => {
|
||||
// pretend that we have another device, which we will verify
|
||||
e2eKeyResponder.addDeviceKeys(TEST_USER_ID, TEST_DEVICE_ID, SIGNED_TEST_DEVICE_DATA);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
oldBackendOnly("Outgoing verification: can verify another device via SAS", async () => {
|
||||
// expect requests to download our own keys
|
||||
fetchMock.post(new RegExp("/_matrix/client/(r0|v3)/keys/query"), {
|
||||
device_keys: {
|
||||
[TEST_USER_ID]: {
|
||||
[TEST_DEVICE_ID]: SIGNED_TEST_DEVICE_DATA,
|
||||
oldBackendOnly("can verify via SAS", async () => {
|
||||
// have alice initiate a verification. She should send a m.key.verification.request
|
||||
let [requestBody, request] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.request"),
|
||||
aliceClient.getCrypto()!.requestDeviceVerification(TEST_USER_ID, TEST_DEVICE_ID),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const transactionId = request.transactionId;
|
||||
expect(transactionId).toBeDefined();
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Requested);
|
||||
expect(request.roomId).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
expect(request.isSelfVerification).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(request.otherPartySupportsMethod("m.sas.v1")).toBe(false); // no reply yet
|
||||
expect(request.chosenMethod).toBe(null); // nothing chosen yet
|
||||
expect(request.initiatedByMe).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(request.otherUserId).toEqual(TEST_USER_ID);
|
||||
|
||||
let toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.from_device).toEqual(aliceClient.deviceId);
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
if (methods !== undefined) {
|
||||
// eslint-disable-next-line jest/no-conditional-expect
|
||||
expect(new Set(toDeviceMessage.methods)).toEqual(new Set(methods));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The dummy device replies with an m.key.verification.ready...
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.ready",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
methods: ["m.sas.v1"],
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
await waitForVerificationRequestChanged(request);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Ready);
|
||||
expect(request.otherDeviceId).toEqual(TEST_DEVICE_ID);
|
||||
|
||||
// have alice initiate a verification. She should send a m.key.verification.request
|
||||
let [requestBody, request] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.request"),
|
||||
aliceClient.getCrypto()!.requestDeviceVerification(TEST_USER_ID, TEST_DEVICE_ID),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const transactionId = request.transactionId;
|
||||
expect(transactionId).toBeDefined();
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Requested);
|
||||
expect(request.roomId).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
|
||||
let toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.methods).toContain("m.sas.v1");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.from_device).toEqual(aliceClient.deviceId);
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
|
||||
// The dummy device replies with an m.key.verification.ready...
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.ready",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
methods: ["m.sas.v1"],
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
await waitForVerificationRequestChanged(request);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Ready);
|
||||
expect(request.otherDeviceId).toEqual(TEST_DEVICE_ID);
|
||||
|
||||
// ... and picks a method with m.key.verification.start
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.start",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
method: "m.sas.v1",
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
hashes: ["sha256"],
|
||||
key_agreement_protocols: ["curve25519"],
|
||||
message_authentication_codes: ["hkdf-hmac-sha256.v2"],
|
||||
short_authentication_string: ["emoji"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
await waitForVerificationRequestChanged(request);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Started);
|
||||
expect(request.chosenMethod).toEqual("m.sas.v1");
|
||||
|
||||
// there should now be a verifier
|
||||
const verifier: Verifier = request.verifier!;
|
||||
expect(verifier).toBeDefined();
|
||||
expect(verifier.getShowSasCallbacks()).toBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
// start off the verification process: alice will send an `accept`
|
||||
const verificationPromise = verifier.verify();
|
||||
// advance the clock, because the devicelist likes to sleep for 5ms during key downloads
|
||||
jest.advanceTimersByTime(10);
|
||||
|
||||
requestBody = await expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.accept");
|
||||
toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.key_agreement_protocol).toEqual("curve25519");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.short_authentication_string).toEqual(["emoji"]);
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
|
||||
// The dummy device makes up a curve25519 keypair and sends the public bit back in an `m.key.verification.key'
|
||||
// We use the Curve25519, HMAC and HKDF implementations in libolm, for now
|
||||
const olmSAS = new global.Olm.SAS();
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.key",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
key: olmSAS.get_pubkey(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// alice responds with a 'key' ...
|
||||
requestBody = await expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.key");
|
||||
toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
const aliceDevicePubKeyBase64 = toDeviceMessage.key;
|
||||
olmSAS.set_their_key(aliceDevicePubKeyBase64);
|
||||
|
||||
// ... and the client is notified to show the emoji
|
||||
const showSas = await new Promise<ShowSasCallbacks>((resolve) => {
|
||||
verifier.once(VerifierEvent.ShowSas, resolve);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// `getShowSasCallbacks` is an alternative way to get the callbacks
|
||||
expect(verifier.getShowSasCallbacks()).toBe(showSas);
|
||||
expect(verifier.getReciprocateQrCodeCallbacks()).toBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
// user confirms that the emoji match, and alice sends a 'mac'
|
||||
[requestBody] = await Promise.all([expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.mac"), showSas.confirm()]);
|
||||
toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
|
||||
// the dummy device also confirms that the emoji match, and sends a mac
|
||||
const macInfoBase = `MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_MAC${TEST_USER_ID}${TEST_DEVICE_ID}${TEST_USER_ID}${aliceClient.deviceId}${transactionId}`;
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.mac",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
keys: calculateMAC(olmSAS, `ed25519:${TEST_DEVICE_ID}`, `${macInfoBase}KEY_IDS`),
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
mac: {
|
||||
[`ed25519:${TEST_DEVICE_ID}`]: calculateMAC(
|
||||
olmSAS,
|
||||
TEST_DEVICE_PUBLIC_ED25519_KEY_BASE64,
|
||||
`${macInfoBase}ed25519:${TEST_DEVICE_ID}`,
|
||||
),
|
||||
// ... and picks a method with m.key.verification.start
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.start",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
method: "m.sas.v1",
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
hashes: ["sha256"],
|
||||
key_agreement_protocols: ["curve25519-hkdf-sha256"],
|
||||
message_authentication_codes: ["hkdf-hmac-sha256.v2"],
|
||||
// we have to include "decimal" per the spec.
|
||||
short_authentication_string: ["decimal", "emoji"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
await waitForVerificationRequestChanged(request);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Started);
|
||||
expect(request.otherPartySupportsMethod("m.sas.v1")).toBe(true);
|
||||
expect(request.chosenMethod).toEqual("m.sas.v1");
|
||||
|
||||
// that should satisfy Alice, who should reply with a 'done'
|
||||
await expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.done");
|
||||
// there should now be a verifier
|
||||
const verifier: Verifier = request.verifier!;
|
||||
expect(verifier).toBeDefined();
|
||||
expect(verifier.getShowSasCallbacks()).toBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
// ... and the whole thing should be done!
|
||||
await verificationPromise;
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Done);
|
||||
// start off the verification process: alice will send an `accept`
|
||||
const verificationPromise = verifier.verify();
|
||||
// advance the clock, because the devicelist likes to sleep for 5ms during key downloads
|
||||
jest.advanceTimersByTime(10);
|
||||
|
||||
// we're done with the temporary keypair
|
||||
olmSAS.free();
|
||||
});
|
||||
requestBody = await expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.accept");
|
||||
toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.key_agreement_protocol).toEqual("curve25519-hkdf-sha256");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.short_authentication_string).toEqual(["decimal", "emoji"]);
|
||||
const macMethod = toDeviceMessage.message_authentication_code;
|
||||
expect(macMethod).toEqual("hkdf-hmac-sha256.v2");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
|
||||
oldBackendOnly(
|
||||
"Outgoing verification: can verify another device via QR code with an untrusted cross-signing key",
|
||||
async () => {
|
||||
// expect requests to download our own keys
|
||||
fetchMock.post(new RegExp("/_matrix/client/(r0|v3)/keys/query"), {
|
||||
device_keys: {
|
||||
[TEST_USER_ID]: {
|
||||
[TEST_DEVICE_ID]: SIGNED_TEST_DEVICE_DATA,
|
||||
// The dummy device makes up a curve25519 keypair and sends the public bit back in an `m.key.verification.key'
|
||||
// We use the Curve25519, HMAC and HKDF implementations in libolm, for now
|
||||
const olmSAS = new global.Olm.SAS();
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.key",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
key: olmSAS.get_pubkey(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// alice responds with a 'key' ...
|
||||
requestBody = await expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.key");
|
||||
toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
const aliceDevicePubKeyBase64 = toDeviceMessage.key;
|
||||
olmSAS.set_their_key(aliceDevicePubKeyBase64);
|
||||
|
||||
// ... and the client is notified to show the emoji
|
||||
const showSas = await new Promise<ShowSasCallbacks>((resolve) => {
|
||||
verifier.once(VerifierEvent.ShowSas, resolve);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// `getShowSasCallbacks` is an alternative way to get the callbacks
|
||||
expect(verifier.getShowSasCallbacks()).toBe(showSas);
|
||||
expect(verifier.getReciprocateQrCodeCallbacks()).toBeNull();
|
||||
|
||||
// user confirms that the emoji match, and alice sends a 'mac'
|
||||
[requestBody] = await Promise.all([expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.mac"), showSas.confirm()]);
|
||||
toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
|
||||
// the dummy device also confirms that the emoji match, and sends a mac
|
||||
const macInfoBase = `MATRIX_KEY_VERIFICATION_MAC${TEST_USER_ID}${TEST_DEVICE_ID}${TEST_USER_ID}${aliceClient.deviceId}${transactionId}`;
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.mac",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
keys: calculateMAC(olmSAS, `ed25519:${TEST_DEVICE_ID}`, `${macInfoBase}KEY_IDS`),
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
mac: {
|
||||
[`ed25519:${TEST_DEVICE_ID}`]: calculateMAC(
|
||||
olmSAS,
|
||||
TEST_DEVICE_PUBLIC_ED25519_KEY_BASE64,
|
||||
`${macInfoBase}ed25519:${TEST_DEVICE_ID}`,
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
...SIGNED_CROSS_SIGNING_KEYS_DATA,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// that should satisfy Alice, who should reply with a 'done'
|
||||
await expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.done");
|
||||
|
||||
// the dummy device also confirms done-ness
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.done",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// ... and the whole thing should be done!
|
||||
await verificationPromise;
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Done);
|
||||
|
||||
// we're done with the temporary keypair
|
||||
olmSAS.free();
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
oldBackendOnly("can verify another via QR code with an untrusted cross-signing key", async () => {
|
||||
e2eKeyResponder.addCrossSigningData(SIGNED_CROSS_SIGNING_KEYS_DATA);
|
||||
|
||||
// QRCode fails if we don't yet have the cross-signing keys, so make sure we have them now.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Completing the initial sync will make the device list download outdated device lists (of which our own
|
||||
@ -279,8 +301,10 @@ describe.each(Object.entries(CRYPTO_BACKENDS))("verification (%s)", (backend: st
|
||||
|
||||
const toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.methods).toContain("m.qr_code.show.v1");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.methods).toContain("m.qr_code.scan.v1");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.methods).toContain("m.reciprocate.v1");
|
||||
if (methods === undefined) {
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.methods).toContain("m.qr_code.scan.v1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.from_device).toEqual(aliceClient.deviceId);
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(transactionId);
|
||||
|
||||
@ -351,57 +375,115 @@ describe.each(Object.entries(CRYPTO_BACKENDS))("verification (%s)", (backend: st
|
||||
// ... and the whole thing should be done!
|
||||
await verificationPromise;
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Done);
|
||||
},
|
||||
);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
oldBackendOnly("Incoming verification: can accept", async () => {
|
||||
// expect requests to download our own keys
|
||||
fetchMock.post(new RegExp("/_matrix/client/(r0|v3)/keys/query"), {
|
||||
device_keys: {
|
||||
[TEST_USER_ID]: {
|
||||
[TEST_DEVICE_ID]: SIGNED_TEST_DEVICE_DATA,
|
||||
oldBackendOnly("can cancel during the SAS phase", async () => {
|
||||
// have alice initiate a verification. She should send a m.key.verification.request
|
||||
const [, request] = await Promise.all([
|
||||
expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.request"),
|
||||
aliceClient.getCrypto()!.requestDeviceVerification(TEST_USER_ID, TEST_DEVICE_ID),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
const transactionId = request.transactionId;
|
||||
|
||||
// The dummy device replies with an m.key.verification.ready...
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.ready",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
methods: ["m.sas.v1"],
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
await waitForVerificationRequestChanged(request);
|
||||
|
||||
// ... and picks a method with m.key.verification.start
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.start",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
method: "m.sas.v1",
|
||||
transaction_id: transactionId,
|
||||
hashes: ["sha256"],
|
||||
key_agreement_protocols: ["curve25519-hkdf-sha256"],
|
||||
message_authentication_codes: ["hkdf-hmac-sha256.v2"],
|
||||
// we have to include "decimal" per the spec.
|
||||
short_authentication_string: ["decimal", "emoji"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
await waitForVerificationRequestChanged(request);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Started);
|
||||
|
||||
// there should now be a verifier...
|
||||
const verifier: Verifier = request.verifier!;
|
||||
expect(verifier).toBeDefined();
|
||||
expect(verifier.hasBeenCancelled).toBe(false);
|
||||
|
||||
// start off the verification process: alice will send an `accept`
|
||||
const verificationPromise = verifier.verify();
|
||||
// advance the clock, because the devicelist likes to sleep for 5ms during key downloads
|
||||
jest.advanceTimersByTime(10);
|
||||
await expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.accept");
|
||||
|
||||
// now we unceremoniously cancel
|
||||
const requestPromise = expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.cancel");
|
||||
verifier.cancel(new Error("blah"));
|
||||
await requestPromise;
|
||||
|
||||
// ... which should cancel the verifier
|
||||
await expect(verificationPromise).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Cancelled);
|
||||
expect(verifier.hasBeenCancelled).toBe(true);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
describe("Incoming verification from another device", () => {
|
||||
beforeEach(() => {
|
||||
e2eKeyResponder.addDeviceKeys(TEST_USER_ID, TEST_DEVICE_ID, SIGNED_TEST_DEVICE_DATA);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const TRANSACTION_ID = "abcd";
|
||||
oldBackendOnly("Incoming verification: can accept", async () => {
|
||||
const TRANSACTION_ID = "abcd";
|
||||
|
||||
// Initiate the request by sending a to-device message
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.request",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
methods: ["m.sas.v1"],
|
||||
transaction_id: TRANSACTION_ID,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now() - 1000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
// Initiate the request by sending a to-device message
|
||||
returnToDeviceMessageFromSync({
|
||||
type: "m.key.verification.request",
|
||||
content: {
|
||||
from_device: TEST_DEVICE_ID,
|
||||
methods: ["m.sas.v1"],
|
||||
transaction_id: TRANSACTION_ID,
|
||||
timestamp: Date.now() - 1000,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
const request: VerificationRequest = await emitPromise(aliceClient, CryptoEvent.VerificationRequest);
|
||||
expect(request.transactionId).toEqual(TRANSACTION_ID);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Requested);
|
||||
expect(request.roomId).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
expect(request.initiatedByMe).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(request.otherUserId).toEqual(TEST_USER_ID);
|
||||
expect(request.chosenMethod).toBe(null); // nothing chosen yet
|
||||
expect(canAcceptVerificationRequest(request)).toBe(true);
|
||||
|
||||
// Alice accepts, by sending a to-device message
|
||||
const sendToDevicePromise = expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.ready");
|
||||
const acceptPromise = request.accept();
|
||||
expect(canAcceptVerificationRequest(request)).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Requested);
|
||||
await acceptPromise;
|
||||
const requestBody = await sendToDevicePromise;
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Ready);
|
||||
|
||||
const toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.methods).toContain("m.sas.v1");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.from_device).toEqual(aliceClient.deviceId);
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(TRANSACTION_ID);
|
||||
});
|
||||
const request: VerificationRequest = await emitPromise(aliceClient, CryptoEvent.VerificationRequest);
|
||||
expect(request.transactionId).toEqual(TRANSACTION_ID);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Requested);
|
||||
expect(request.roomId).toBeUndefined();
|
||||
expect(canAcceptVerificationRequest(request)).toBe(true);
|
||||
|
||||
// Alice accepts, by sending a to-device message
|
||||
const sendToDevicePromise = expectSendToDeviceMessage("m.key.verification.ready");
|
||||
const acceptPromise = request.accept();
|
||||
expect(canAcceptVerificationRequest(request)).toBe(false);
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Requested);
|
||||
await acceptPromise;
|
||||
const requestBody = await sendToDevicePromise;
|
||||
expect(request.phase).toEqual(VerificationPhase.Ready);
|
||||
|
||||
const toDeviceMessage = requestBody.messages[TEST_USER_ID][TEST_DEVICE_ID];
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.methods).toContain("m.sas.v1");
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.from_device).toEqual(aliceClient.deviceId);
|
||||
expect(toDeviceMessage.transaction_id).toEqual(TRANSACTION_ID);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
function returnToDeviceMessageFromSync(ev: { type: string; content: object; sender?: string }): void {
|
||||
ev.sender ??= TEST_USER_ID;
|
||||
syncResponder.sendOrQueueSyncResponse({ to_device: { events: [ev] } });
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Wait for the client under test to send a to-device message of the given type.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user