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https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-js-sdk.git
synced 2025-08-07 23:02:56 +03:00
Check recipient and sender in Olm messages
Embed the sender, recipient, and recipient keys in the plaintext of Olm messages, and check those fields on receipt. Fixes https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2483
This commit is contained in:
@@ -374,6 +374,10 @@ OlmDevice.prototype.encryptMessage = function(
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) {
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var self = this;
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if (payloadString === undefined) {
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throw new Error("payloadString undefined");
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}
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return this._getSession(theirDeviceIdentityKey, sessionId, function(session) {
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var res = session.encrypt(payloadString);
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self._saveSession(theirDeviceIdentityKey, session);
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@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ module.exports.DECRYPTION_CLASSES = {};
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* @alias module:crypto/algorithms/base.EncryptionAlgorithm
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*
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* @param {object} params parameters
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* @param {string} params.userId The UserID for the local user
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* @param {string} params.deviceId The identifier for this device.
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* @param {module:crypto} params.crypto crypto core
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* @param {module:crypto/OlmDevice} params.olmDevice olm.js wrapper
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@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ module.exports.DECRYPTION_CLASSES = {};
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* @param {string} params.roomId The ID of the room we will be sending to
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*/
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var EncryptionAlgorithm = function(params) {
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this._userId = params.userId;
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this._deviceId = params.deviceId;
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this._crypto = params.crypto;
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this._olmDevice = params.olmDevice;
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@@ -101,9 +103,11 @@ EncryptionAlgorithm.prototype.onNewDevice = function(userId, deviceId) {};
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* @alias module:crypto/algorithms/base.DecryptionAlgorithm
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*
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* @param {object} params parameters
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* @param {string} params.userId The UserID for the local user
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* @param {module:crypto/OlmDevice} params.olmDevice olm.js wrapper
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*/
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var DecryptionAlgorithm = function(params) {
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this._userId = params.userId;
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this._olmDevice = params.olmDevice;
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};
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/** */
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@@ -244,17 +244,27 @@ MegolmEncryption.prototype._shareKeyWithDevices = function(session_id, shareMap)
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var deviceInfo = sessionResult.device;
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var encryptedContent = {
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algorithm: olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM,
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sender_key: self._olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key,
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ciphertext: {},
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};
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olmlib.encryptMessageForDevice(
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encryptedContent.ciphertext,
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self._userId,
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self._deviceId,
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self._olmDevice,
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userId,
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deviceInfo,
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payload
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);
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if (!contentMap[userId]) {
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contentMap[userId] = {};
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}
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contentMap[userId][deviceId] =
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olmlib.encryptMessageForDevices(
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self._deviceId,
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self._olmDevice,
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[deviceInfo.getIdentityKey()],
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payload
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);
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contentMap[userId][deviceId] = encryptedContent;
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haveTargets = true;
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}
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}
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@@ -413,21 +423,35 @@ MegolmDecryption.prototype.decryptEvent = function(event) {
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throw new base.DecryptionError("Missing fields in input");
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}
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var res;
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try {
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var res = this._olmDevice.decryptGroupMessage(
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res = this._olmDevice.decryptGroupMessage(
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event.room_id, content.sender_key, content.session_id, content.ciphertext
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);
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if (res === null) {
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return null;
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}
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return {
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payload: JSON.parse(res.result),
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keysClaimed: res.keysClaimed,
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keysProved: res.keysProved,
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};
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} catch (e) {
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throw new base.DecryptionError(e);
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}
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if (res === null) {
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return null;
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}
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var payload = JSON.parse(res.result);
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// belt-and-braces check that the room id matches that indicated by the HS
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// (this is somewhat redundant, since the megolm session is scoped to the
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// room, so neither the sender nor a MITM can lie about the room_id).
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if (payload.room_id !== event.room_id) {
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throw new base.DecryptionError(
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"Message intended for room " + payload.room_id
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);
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}
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return {
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payload: payload,
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keysClaimed: res.keysClaimed,
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keysProved: res.keysProved,
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};
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};
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/**
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@@ -95,32 +95,43 @@ OlmEncryption.prototype.encryptMessage = function(room, eventType, content) {
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var self = this;
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return this._ensureSession(users).then(function() {
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var participantKeys = [];
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var payloadFields = {
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room_id: room.roomId,
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type: eventType,
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content: content,
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};
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var encryptedContent = {
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algorithm: olmlib.OLM_ALGORITHM,
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sender_key: self._olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key,
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ciphertext: {},
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};
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for (var i = 0; i < users.length; ++i) {
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var userId = users[i];
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var devices = self._crypto.getStoredDevicesForUser(userId);
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for (var j = 0; j < devices.length; ++j) {
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var deviceInfo = devices[j];
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var key = deviceInfo.getIdentityKey();
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if (key == self._olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key) {
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// don't bother setting up session to ourself
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// don't bother sending to ourself
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continue;
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}
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if (deviceInfo.verified == DeviceVerification.BLOCKED) {
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// don't bother setting up sessions with blocked users
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continue;
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}
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participantKeys.push(key);
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olmlib.encryptMessageForDevice(
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encryptedContent.ciphertext,
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self._userId, self._deviceId, self._olmDevice,
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userId, deviceInfo, payloadFields
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);
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}
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}
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return olmlib.encryptMessageForDevices(
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self._deviceId, self._olmDevice, participantKeys, {
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room_id: room.roomId,
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type: eventType,
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content: content,
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}
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);
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return encryptedContent;
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});
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};
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@@ -173,10 +184,70 @@ OlmDecryption.prototype.decryptEvent = function(event) {
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throw new base.DecryptionError("Bad Encrypted Message");
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}
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// TODO: Check the sender user id matches the sender key.
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// TODO: check the room_id and fingerprint
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var payload = JSON.parse(payloadString);
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// check that we were the intended recipient, to avoid unknown-key attack
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// https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2483
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if (payload.recipient === undefined) {
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// older versions of riot did not set this field, so we cannot make
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// this check. TODO: kill this off once our users have updated
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console.warn(
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"Olm event (id=" + event.event_id + ") contains no 'recipient' " +
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"property; cannot prevent unknown-key attack");
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} else if (payload.recipient != this._userId) {
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console.warn(
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"Event " + event.event_id + ": Intended recipient " +
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payload.recipient + " does not match our id " + this._userId
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);
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throw new base.DecryptionError(
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"Message was intented for " + payload.recipient
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);
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}
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if (payload.recipient_keys === undefined) {
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// ditto
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console.warn(
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"Olm event (id=" + event.event_id + ") contains no " +
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"'recipient_keys' property; cannot prevent unknown-key attack");
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} else if (payload.recipient_keys.ed25519 !=
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this._olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key) {
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console.warn(
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"Event " + event.event_id + ": Intended recipient ed25519 key " +
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payload.recipient_keys.ed25519 + " did not match ours"
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);
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throw new base.DecryptionError("Message not intended for this device");
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}
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// check that the original sender matches what the homeserver told us, to
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// avoid people masquerading as others.
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// (this check is also provided via the sender's embedded ed25519 key,
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// which is checked elsewhere).
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if (payload.sender === undefined) {
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// ditto
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console.warn(
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"Olm event (id=" + event.event_id + ") contains no " +
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"'sender' property; cannot prevent unknown-key attack");
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} else if (payload.sender != event.sender) {
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console.warn(
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"Event " + event.event_id + ": original sender " + payload.sender +
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" does not match reported sender " + event.sender
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);
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throw new base.DecryptionError(
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"Message forwarded from " + payload.sender
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);
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}
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// Olm events intended for a room have a room_id.
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if (payload.room_id !== event.room_id) {
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console.warn(
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"Event " + event.event_id + ": original room " + payload.room_id +
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" does not match reported room " + event.room_id
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);
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throw new base.DecryptionError(
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"Message intended for room " + payload.room_id
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);
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}
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return {
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payload: payload,
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sessionExists: true,
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@@ -694,6 +694,7 @@ Crypto.prototype.setRoomEncryption = function(roomId, config) {
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this._sessionStore.storeEndToEndRoom(roomId, config);
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var alg = new AlgClass({
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userId: this._userId,
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deviceId: this._deviceId,
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crypto: this,
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olmDevice: this._olmDevice,
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@@ -901,6 +902,7 @@ Crypto.prototype.decryptEvent = function(event) {
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throw new algorithms.DecryptionError("Unable to decrypt " + content.algorithm);
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}
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var alg = new AlgClass({
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userId: this._userId,
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olmDevice: this._olmDevice,
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});
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var r = alg.decryptEvent(event);
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@@ -1084,6 +1086,7 @@ Crypto.prototype._onRoomKeyEvent = function(event) {
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);
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}
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var alg = new AlgClass({
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userId: this._userId,
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olmDevice: this._olmDevice,
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});
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alg.onRoomKeyEvent(event);
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@@ -34,22 +34,38 @@ module.exports.MEGOLM_ALGORITHM = "m.megolm.v1.aes-sha2";
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/**
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* Encrypt an event payload for a list of devices
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* Encrypt an event payload for an Olm device
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*
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* @param {Object<string, string>} resultsObject The `ciphertext` property
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* of the m.room.encrypted event to which to add our result
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*
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* @param {string} ourUserId
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* @param {string} ourDeviceId
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* @param {module:crypto/OlmDevice} olmDevice olm.js wrapper
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* @param {string[]} participantKeys list of curve25519 keys to encrypt for
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* @param {string} recipientUserId
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* @param {module:crypto/deviceinfo} recipientDevice
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* @param {object} payloadFields fields to include in the encrypted payload
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*
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* @return {object} content for an m.room.encrypted event
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*/
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module.exports.encryptMessageForDevices = function(
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ourDeviceId, olmDevice, participantKeys, payloadFields
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module.exports.encryptMessageForDevice = function(
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resultsObject,
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ourUserId, ourDeviceId, olmDevice, recipientUserId, recipientDevice,
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payloadFields
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) {
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participantKeys.sort();
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var participantHash = ""; // Olm.sha256(participantKeys.join());
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var payloadJson = {
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fingerprint: participantHash,
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var deviceKey = recipientDevice.getIdentityKey();
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var sessionId = olmDevice.getSessionIdForDevice(deviceKey);
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if (sessionId === null) {
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// If we don't have a session for a device then
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// we can't encrypt a message for it.
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return;
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}
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console.log(
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"Using sessionid " + sessionId + " for device " +
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recipientUserId + ":" + recipientDevice.deviceId
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);
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var payload = {
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sender: ourUserId,
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sender_device: ourDeviceId,
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// Include the Ed25519 key so that the recipient knows what
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@@ -63,28 +79,24 @@ module.exports.encryptMessageForDevices = function(
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keys: {
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"ed25519": olmDevice.deviceEd25519Key,
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},
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};
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utils.extend(payloadJson, payloadFields);
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var ciphertext = {};
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var payloadString = JSON.stringify(payloadJson);
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for (var i = 0; i < participantKeys.length; ++i) {
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var deviceKey = participantKeys[i];
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var sessionId = olmDevice.getSessionIdForDevice(deviceKey);
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if (sessionId === null) {
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// If we don't have a session for a device then
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// we can't encrypt a message for it.
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continue;
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}
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console.log("Using sessionid " + sessionId + " for device " + deviceKey);
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ciphertext[deviceKey] = olmDevice.encryptMessage(
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deviceKey, sessionId, payloadString
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);
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}
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var encryptedContent = {
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algorithm: module.exports.OLM_ALGORITHM,
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sender_key: olmDevice.deviceCurve25519Key,
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ciphertext: ciphertext
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// include the recipient device details in the payload,
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// to avoid unknown key attacks, per
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// https://github.com/vector-im/vector-web/issues/2483
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recipient: recipientUserId,
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recipient_keys: {
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"ed25519": recipientDevice.getFingerprint(),
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},
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};
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return encryptedContent;
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// TODO: technically, a bunch of that stuff only needs to be included for
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// pre-key messages: after that, both sides know exactly which devices are
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// involved in the session. If we're looking to reduce data transfer in the
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// future, we could elide them for subsequent messages.
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utils.extend(payload, payloadFields);
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resultsObject[deviceKey] = olmDevice.encryptMessage(
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deviceKey, sessionId, JSON.stringify(payload)
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);
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};
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@@ -338,15 +338,15 @@ function expectSendMessageRequest(httpBackend) {
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function aliRecvMessage() {
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var message = bobMessages.shift();
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return recvMessage(aliHttpBackend, aliClient, message);
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return recvMessage(aliHttpBackend, aliClient, bobUserId, message);
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}
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function bobRecvMessage() {
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var message = aliMessages.shift();
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return recvMessage(bobHttpBackend, bobClient, message);
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return recvMessage(bobHttpBackend, bobClient, aliUserId, message);
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}
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function recvMessage(httpBackend, client, message) {
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function recvMessage(httpBackend, client, sender, message) {
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var syncData = {
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next_batch: "x",
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rooms: {
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@@ -361,7 +361,8 @@ function recvMessage(httpBackend, client, message) {
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test_utils.mkEvent({
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type: "m.room.encrypted",
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room: roomId,
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content: message
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content: message,
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sender: sender,
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})
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]
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}
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@@ -557,6 +558,63 @@ describe("MatrixClient crypto", function() {
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.catch(test_utils.failTest).done(done);
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});
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it("Bob receives a message with a bogus sender", function(done) {
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q()
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.then(bobUploadsKeys)
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.then(aliStartClient)
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.then(aliEnablesEncryption)
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.then(aliSendsFirstMessage)
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.then(bobStartClient)
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.then(function() {
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var message = aliMessages.shift();
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var syncData = {
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next_batch: "x",
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rooms: {
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join: {
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}
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}
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};
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syncData.rooms.join[roomId] = {
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timeline: {
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events: [
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test_utils.mkEvent({
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type: "m.room.encrypted",
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room: roomId,
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content: message,
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sender: "@bogus:sender",
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})
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]
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}
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};
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bobHttpBackend.when("GET", "/sync").respond(200, syncData);
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var deferred = q.defer();
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var onEvent = function(event) {
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console.log(bobClient.credentials.userId + " received event",
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event);
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// ignore the m.room.member events
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if (event.getType() == "m.room.member") {
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return;
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}
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expect(event.getType()).toEqual("m.room.message");
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expect(event.getContent().msgtype).toEqual("m.bad.encrypted");
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expect(event.isEncrypted()).toBeTruthy();
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bobClient.removeListener("event", onEvent);
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deferred.resolve();
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};
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bobClient.on("event", onEvent);
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bobHttpBackend.flush();
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return deferred.promise;
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})
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.catch(test_utils.failTest).done(done);
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});
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it("Ali blocks Bob's device", function(done) {
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q()
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.then(bobUploadsKeys)
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|
Reference in New Issue
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