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mbedtls/library/ssl_misc.h
Ronald Cron feb5e26619 Cleanup following the removal of MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_.*_ENABLED options 
Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron <ronald.cron@arm.com>
2025-09-16 15:53:43 +02:00

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/**
* \file ssl_misc.h
*
* \brief Internal functions shared by the SSL modules
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MISC_H
#include "tf_psa_crypto_common.h"
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#include "mbedtls/error.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
#include "debug_internal.h"
#include "mbedtls/private/cipher.h"
#include "psa/crypto.h"
#include "psa_util_internal.h"
extern const mbedtls_error_pair_t psa_to_ssl_errors[7];
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5)
#include "mbedtls/private/md5.h"
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1)
#include "mbedtls/private/sha1.h"
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
#include "mbedtls/private/sha256.h"
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
#include "mbedtls/private/sha512.h"
#endif
#include "mbedtls/pk.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_PRIVATE_HEADER)
#include <mbedtls/private/pk_private.h>
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_PRIVATE_HEADER */
#include "ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h"
#include "x509_internal.h"
#include "pk_internal.h"
/* Shorthand for restartable ECC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED
#endif
/** Flag values for mbedtls_ssl_context::flags. */
typedef enum {
/** Set if mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname() has been called. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAG_HOSTNAME_SET = 1,
} mbedtls_ssl_context_flags_t;
/** Flags from ::mbedtls_ssl_context_flags_t to keep in
* mbedtls_ssl_session_reset().
*
* The flags that are in this list are kept until explicitly updated or
* until mbedtls_ssl_free(). The flags that are not listed here are
* reset to 0 in mbedtls_ssl_session_reset().
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAGS_KEEP_AT_SESSION \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_FLAG_HOSTNAME_SET)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS 1 /* In progress */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DONE 2 /* Done or aborted */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_PENDING 3 /* Requested (server only) */
/* Faked handshake message identity for HelloRetryRequest. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_HS_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST (-MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO)
/*
* Internal identity of handshake extensions
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_STATUS_REQUEST 3
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 4
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 4
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG 5
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_USE_SRTP 6
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_HEARTBEAT 7
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ALPN 8
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SCT 9
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CLI_CERT_TYPE 10
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERV_CERT_TYPE 11
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PADDING 12
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PRE_SHARED_KEY 13
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EARLY_DATA 14
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 15
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_COOKIE 16
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 17
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_CERT_AUTH 18
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_OID_FILTERS 19
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 20
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SIG_ALG_CERT 21
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_KEY_SHARE 22
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_TRUNCATED_HMAC 23
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 24
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 25
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 26
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SESSION_TICKET 27
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28
/* Utility for translating IANA extension type. */
uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_id(unsigned int extension_type);
uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(unsigned int extension_type);
/* Macros used to define mask constants */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(id) (1ULL << (MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_##id))
/* Reset value of extension mask */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK_NONE 0
/* In messages containing extension requests, we should ignore unrecognized
* extensions. In messages containing extension responses, unrecognized
* extensions should result in handshake abortion. Messages containing
* extension requests include ClientHello, CertificateRequest and
* NewSessionTicket. Messages containing extension responses include
* ServerHello, HelloRetryRequest, EncryptedExtensions and Certificate.
*
* RFC 8446 section 4.1.3
*
* The ServerHello MUST only include extensions which are required to establish
* the cryptographic context and negotiate the protocol version.
*
* RFC 8446 section 4.2
*
* If an implementation receives an extension which it recognizes and which is
* not specified for the message in which it appears, it MUST abort the handshake
* with an "illegal_parameter" alert.
*/
/* Extensions that are not recognized by TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SESSION_TICKET) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(TRUNCATED_HMAC) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(UNRECOGNIZED))
/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ClientHello */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PADDING) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED)
/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for EncryptedExtensions */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_EE \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERVERNAME) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_GROUPS) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(USE_SRTP) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(HEARTBEAT) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(ALPN) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CLI_CERT_TYPE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SERV_CERT_TYPE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT))
/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for CertificateRequest */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CR \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(CERT_AUTH) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(OID_FILTERS) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SIG_ALG_CERT) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED)
/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for Certificate */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CT \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(STATUS_REQUEST) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SCT))
/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for ServerHello */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_SH \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(PRE_SHARED_KEY) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS))
/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for HelloRetryRequest */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_HRR \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(KEY_SHARE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(COOKIE) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(SUPPORTED_VERSIONS))
/* RFC 8446 section 4.2. Allowed extensions for NewSessionTicket */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_NST \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA) | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_EXT_MASK_UNRECOGNIZED)
/*
* Helper macros for function call with return check.
*/
/*
* Exit when return non-zero value
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(f) \
do { \
ret = (f); \
if (ret != 0) \
{ \
goto cleanup; \
} \
} while (0)
/*
* Exit when return negative value
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK_NEG(f) \
do { \
ret = (f); \
if (ret < 0) \
{ \
goto cleanup; \
} \
} while (0)
/*
* DTLS retransmission states, see RFC 6347 4.2.4
*
* The SENDING state is merged in PREPARING for initial sends,
* but is distinct for resends.
*
* Note: initial state is wrong for server, but is not used anyway.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_PREPARING 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_WAITING 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_FINISHED 3
/*
* Allow extra bytes for record, authentication and encryption overhead:
* counter (8) + header (5) + IV(16) + MAC (16-48) + padding (0-256).
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* This macro determines whether CBC is supported. */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING) && \
(defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES) || \
defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA) || \
defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ARIA))
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC
#endif
/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite using a
* stream cipher can be used. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHERSUITES)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM
#endif
/* This macro determines whether the CBC construct used in TLS 1.2 is supported. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_TLS_CBC
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_STREAM) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC
#endif
/* This macro determines whether a ciphersuite uses Encrypt-then-MAC with CBC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
/* Ciphersuites using HMAC */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 48 /* SHA-384 used for HMAC */
#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 32 /* SHA-256 used for HMAC */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 20 /* SHA-1 used for HMAC */
#endif
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
/* AEAD ciphersuites: GCM and CCM use a 128 bits tag */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD 16
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 256
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD 0
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION 0
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD (MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAC_ADD + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PADDING_ADD + \
MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CID_EXPANSION \
)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN))
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN (MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD + \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN))
/* The maximum number of buffered handshake messages. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS 4
/* Maximum length we can advertise as our max content length for
RFC 6066 max_fragment_length extension negotiation purposes
(the lesser of both sizes, if they are unequal.)
*/
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ADV_CONTENT_LEN ( \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \
? (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN) \
: (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN) \
)
/* Maximum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 65534
/* Minimum size in bytes of list in signature algorithms ext., RFC 5246/8446 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MIN_SIG_ALG_LIST_LEN 2
/* Maximum size in bytes of list in supported elliptic curve ext., RFC 4492 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN 65535
#define MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE 20
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(sig, hash) ((hash << 8) | sig)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg & 0xFF)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_HASH_ALG_FROM_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(alg) (alg >> 8)
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/*
* Check that we obey the standard's message size bounds
*/
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
#error "Bad configuration - incoming record content too large."
#endif
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN > 16384
#error "Bad configuration - outgoing record content too large."
#endif
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
#error "Bad configuration - incoming protected record payload too large."
#endif
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN + 2048
#error "Bad configuration - outgoing protected record payload too large."
#endif
/* Calculate buffer sizes */
/* Note: Even though the TLS record header is only 5 bytes
long, we're internally using 8 bytes to store the
implicit sequence number. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN 13
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN))
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_BUFFER_LEN \
((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_PAYLOAD_LEN) \
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX))
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN))
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_BUFFER_LEN \
((MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN) + (MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_PAYLOAD_LEN) \
+ (MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX))
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32
#define MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN 32
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
/**
* \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
* the output buffer. For the client, this is the configured
* value. For the server, it is the minimum of two - the
* configured value and the negotiated one.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the maximum fragment length (payload, in bytes) for
* the input buffer. This is the negotiated maximum fragment
* length, or, if there is none, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN.
* If it is not defined either, the value is 2^14. This function
* works as its predecessor, \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len().
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum fragment length for the output buffer.
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
/**
* \brief Get the size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing records
* as defined in RFC 8449
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return The size limit in bytes for the protected outgoing
* records as defined in RFC 8449.
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_record_size_limit(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_output_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX;
#else
return mbedtls_ssl_get_output_max_frag_len(ctx)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
#endif
}
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_input_buflen(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX;
#else
return mbedtls_ssl_get_input_max_frag_len(ctx)
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_HEADER_LEN + MBEDTLS_SSL_PAYLOAD_OVERHEAD;
#endif
}
#endif
/*
* TLS extension flags (for extensions with outgoing ServerHello content
* that need it (e.g. for RENEGOTIATION_INFO the server already knows because
* of state of the renegotiation flag, so no indicator is required)
*/
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT (1 << 0)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK (1 << 1)
/**
* \brief This function checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
* greater or equal than a needed space.
*
* \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
* \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
* \param need Needed space in bytes.
*
* \return Zero if the needed space is available in the buffer, non-zero
* otherwise.
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur,
const uint8_t *end, size_t need)
{
return (cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur));
}
#else
typedef struct {
const uint8_t *cur;
const uint8_t *end;
size_t need;
} mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args;
void mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(
const uint8_t *cur, const uint8_t *end, size_t need);
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(void);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_cmp_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args);
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr(const uint8_t *cur,
const uint8_t *end, size_t need)
{
if ((cur > end) || (need > (size_t) (end - cur))) {
mbedtls_ssl_set_chk_buf_ptr_fail_args(cur, end, need);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */
/**
* \brief This macro checks if the remaining size in a buffer is
* greater or equal than a needed space. If it is not the case,
* it returns an SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL error.
*
* \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
* \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
* \param need Needed space in bytes.
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(cur, end, need) \
do { \
if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \
{ \
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; \
} \
} while (0)
/**
* \brief This macro checks if the remaining length in an input buffer is
* greater or equal than a needed length. If it is not the case, it
* returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR error and pends a
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR alert message.
*
* This is a function-like macro. It is guaranteed to evaluate each
* argument exactly once.
*
* \param cur Pointer to the current position in the buffer.
* \param end Pointer to one past the end of the buffer.
* \param need Needed length in bytes.
*
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_READ_PTR(cur, end, need) \
do { \
if (mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr((cur), (end), (need)) != 0) \
{ \
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, \
("missing input data in %s", __func__)); \
MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR, \
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR); \
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR; \
} \
} while (0)
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb(const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const char *label,
const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen);
/* cipher.h exports the maximum IV, key and block length from
* all ciphers enabled in the config, regardless of whether those
* ciphers are actually usable in SSL/TLS. Notably, XTS is enabled
* in the default configuration and uses 64 Byte keys, but it is
* not used for record protection in SSL/TLS.
*
* In order to prevent unnecessary inflation of key structures,
* we introduce SSL-specific variants of the max-{key,block,IV}
* macros here which are meant to only take those ciphers into
* account which can be negotiated in SSL/TLS.
*
* Since the current definitions of MBEDTLS_MAX_{KEY|BLOCK|IV}_LENGTH
* in cipher.h are rough overapproximations of the real maxima, here
* we content ourselves with replicating those overapproximations
* for the maximum block and IV length, and excluding XTS from the
* computation of the maximum key length. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH 16
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH 16
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH 32
/**
* \brief The data structure holding the cryptographic material (key and IV)
* used for record protection in TLS 1.3.
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set {
/*! The key for client->server records. */
unsigned char client_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
/*! The key for server->client records. */
unsigned char server_write_key[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
/*! The IV for client->server records. */
unsigned char client_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
/*! The IV for server->client records. */
unsigned char server_write_iv[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
size_t key_len; /*!< The length of client_write_key and
* server_write_key, in Bytes. */
size_t iv_len; /*!< The length of client_write_iv and
* server_write_iv, in Bytes. */
};
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_set mbedtls_ssl_key_set;
typedef struct {
unsigned char binder_key[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char client_early_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_early_secrets;
typedef struct {
unsigned char client_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char server_handshake_traffic_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets;
/*
* This structure contains the parameters only needed during handshake.
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params {
/* Frequently-used boolean or byte fields (placed early to take
* advantage of smaller code size for indirect access on Arm Thumb) */
uint8_t resume; /*!< session resume indicator*/
uint8_t cli_exts; /*!< client extension presence*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
uint8_t sni_authmode; /*!< authmode from SNI callback */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent
* to the client or not. */
uint8_t certificate_request_sent;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
/* Flag indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. */
uint8_t early_data_accepted;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
uint8_t new_session_ticket; /*!< use NewSessionTicket? */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/** Minimum TLS version to be negotiated.
*
* It is set up in the ClientHello writing preparation stage and used
* throughout the ClientHello writing. Not relevant anymore as soon as
* the protocol version has been negotiated thus as soon as the
* ServerHello is received.
* For a fresh handshake not linked to any previous handshake, it is
* equal to the configured minimum minor version to be negotiated. When
* renegotiating or resuming a session, it is equal to the previously
* negotiated minor version.
*
* There is no maximum TLS version field in this handshake context.
* From the start of the handshake, we need to define a current protocol
* version for the record layer which we define as the maximum TLS
* version to be negotiated. The `tls_version` field of the SSL context is
* used to store this maximum value until it contains the actual
* negotiated value.
*/
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
uint8_t extended_ms; /*!< use Extended Master Secret? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
uint8_t async_in_progress; /*!< an asynchronous operation is in progress */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
unsigned char retransmit_state; /*!< Retransmission state */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
uint8_t ecrs_enabled; /*!< Handshake supports EC restart? */
enum { /* this complements ssl->state with info on intra-state operations */
ssl_ecrs_none = 0, /*!< nothing going on (yet) */
ssl_ecrs_crt_verify, /*!< Certificate: crt_verify() */
ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing, /*!< ServerKeyExchange: pk_verify() */
ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret, /*!< ClientKeyExchange: ECDH step 2 */
ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign, /*!< CertificateVerify: pk_sign() */
} ecrs_state; /*!< current (or last) operation */
mbedtls_x509_crt *ecrs_peer_cert; /*!< The peer's CRT chain. */
size_t ecrs_n; /*!< place for saving a length */
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t const *ciphersuite_info;
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int (*update_checksum)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int (*calc_verify)(const mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, size_t *);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int (*calc_finished)(mbedtls_ssl_context *, unsigned char *, int);
mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf_cb *tls_prf;
/*
* Handshake specific crypto variables
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */
/**
* Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, an
* HelloRetryRequest message has been sent by the server or received by
* the client (<> 0) or not (0).
*/
uint8_t hello_retry_request_flag;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE)
/**
* Flag indicating if, in the course of the current handshake, a dummy
* change_cipher_spec (CCS) record has already been sent. Used to send only
* one CCS per handshake while not complicating the handshake state
* transitions for that purpose.
*/
uint8_t ccs_sent;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */
#endif
/** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */
uint16_t hrr_selected_group;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
uint16_t received_sig_algs[MBEDTLS_RECEIVED_SIG_ALGS_SIZE];
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
const uint16_t *group_list;
const uint16_t *sig_algs;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED)
psa_key_type_t xxdh_psa_type;
size_t xxdh_psa_bits;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t xxdh_psa_privkey;
uint8_t xxdh_psa_privkey_is_external;
unsigned char xxdh_psa_peerkey[PSA_EXPORT_PUBLIC_KEY_MAX_SIZE];
size_t xxdh_psa_peerkey_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_XXDH_PSA_ANY_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_ctx; /*!< EC J-PAKE key exchange */
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_pake_password;
uint8_t psa_pake_ctx_is_ok;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
unsigned char *ecjpake_cache; /*!< Cache for ClientHello ext */
size_t ecjpake_cache_len; /*!< Length of cached data */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
uint16_t *curves_tls_id; /*!< List of TLS IDs of supported elliptic curves */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk_opaque; /*!< Opaque PSK from the callback */
uint8_t psk_opaque_is_internal;
uint16_t selected_identity;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx ecrs_ctx; /*!< restart context */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert; /*!< chosen key/cert pair (server) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *sni_key_cert; /*!< key/cert list from SNI */
mbedtls_x509_crt *sni_ca_chain; /*!< trusted CAs from SNI callback */
mbedtls_x509_crl *sni_ca_crl; /*!< trusted CAs CRLs from SNI */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_pk_context peer_pubkey; /*!< The public key from the peer. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
struct {
size_t total_bytes_buffered; /*!< Cumulative size of heap allocated
* buffers used for message buffering. */
uint8_t seen_ccs; /*!< Indicates if a CCS message has
* been seen in the current flight. */
struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer {
unsigned is_valid : 1;
unsigned is_fragmented : 1;
unsigned is_complete : 1;
unsigned char *data;
size_t data_len;
} hs[MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_BUFFERED_HS];
struct {
unsigned char *data;
size_t len;
unsigned epoch;
} future_record;
} buffering;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \
(defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3))
unsigned char *cookie; /*!< HelloVerifyRequest cookie for DTLS
* HelloRetryRequest cookie for TLS 1.3 */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
/* RFC 6347 page 15
...
opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
...
*/
uint8_t cookie_len;
#else
/* RFC 8446 page 39
...
opaque cookie<0..2^16-1>;
...
If TLS1_3 is enabled, the max length is 2^16 - 1
*/
uint16_t cookie_len; /*!< DTLS: HelloVerifyRequest cookie length
* TLS1_3: HelloRetryRequest cookie length */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C &&
( MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS ||
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 ) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
unsigned char cookie_verify_result; /*!< Srv: flag for sending a cookie */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
unsigned int out_msg_seq; /*!< Outgoing handshake sequence number */
unsigned int in_msg_seq; /*!< Incoming handshake sequence number */
uint32_t retransmit_timeout; /*!< Current value of timeout */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight; /*!< Current outgoing flight */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *cur_msg; /*!< Current message in flight */
unsigned char *cur_msg_p; /*!< Position in current message */
unsigned int in_flight_start_seq; /*!< Minimum message sequence in the
flight being received */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *alt_transform_out; /*!< Alternative transform for
resending messages */
unsigned char alt_out_ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Alternative record epoch/counter
for resending messages */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* The state of CID configuration in this handshake. */
uint8_t cid_in_use; /*!< This indicates whether the use of the CID extension
* has been negotiated. Possible values are
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED and
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX]; /*! The peer's CID */
uint8_t peer_cid_len; /*!< The length of
* \c peer_cid. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
uint16_t mtu; /*!< Handshake mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* Checksum contexts
*/
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha256_psa;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
psa_hash_operation_t fin_sha384_psa;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
uint16_t offered_group_id; /* The NamedGroup value for the group
* that is being used for ephemeral
* key exchange.
*
* On the client: Defaults to the first
* entry in the client's group list,
* but can be overwritten by the HRR. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
uint8_t client_auth; /*!< used to check if CertificateRequest has been
received from server side. If CertificateRequest
has been received, Certificate and CertificateVerify
should be sent to server */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/*
* State-local variables used during the processing
* of a specific handshake state.
*/
union {
/* Outgoing Finished message */
struct {
uint8_t preparation_done;
/* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to
* but excluding the outgoing finished message. */
unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t digest_len;
} finished_out;
/* Incoming Finished message */
struct {
uint8_t preparation_done;
/* Buffer holding digest of the handshake up to but
* excluding the peer's incoming finished message. */
unsigned char digest[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
size_t digest_len;
} finished_in;
} state_local;
/* End of state-local variables. */
unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN +
MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
/*!< random bytes */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
unsigned char premaster[MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE];
/*!< premaster secret */
size_t pmslen; /*!< premaster length */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
uint32_t sent_extensions; /*!< extensions sent by endpoint */
uint32_t received_extensions; /*!< extensions received by endpoint */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
unsigned char certificate_request_context_len;
unsigned char *certificate_request_context;
#endif
/** TLS 1.3 transform for encrypted handshake messages. */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_handshake;
union {
unsigned char early[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char handshake[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char app[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
} tls13_master_secrets;
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_secrets tls13_hs_secrets;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
/** TLS 1.3 transform for early data and handshake messages. */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform_earlydata;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
/** Asynchronous operation context. This field is meant for use by the
* asynchronous operation callbacks (mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_sign_start,
* mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_resume, mbedtls_ssl_config::f_async_cancel).
* The library does not use it internally. */
void *user_async_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
const unsigned char *sni_name; /*!< raw SNI */
size_t sni_name_len; /*!< raw SNI len */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
const mbedtls_x509_crt *dn_hints; /*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
};
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer;
/*
* Representation of decryption/encryption transformations on records
*
* There are the following general types of record transformations:
* - Stream transformations (TLS versions == 1.2 only)
* Transformation adding a MAC and applying a stream-cipher
* to the authenticated message.
* - CBC block cipher transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only)
* For TLS 1.2, no IV is generated at key extraction time, but every
* encrypted record is explicitly prefixed by the IV with which it was
* encrypted.
* - AEAD transformations ([D]TLS versions == 1.2 only)
* These come in two fundamentally different versions, the first one
* used in TLS 1.2, excluding ChaChaPoly ciphersuites, and the second
* one used for ChaChaPoly ciphersuites in TLS 1.2 as well as for TLS 1.3.
* In the first transformation, the IV to be used for a record is obtained
* as the concatenation of an explicit, static 4-byte IV and the 8-byte
* record sequence number, and explicitly prepending this sequence number
* to the encrypted record. In contrast, in the second transformation
* the IV is obtained by XOR'ing a static IV obtained at key extraction
* time with the 8-byte record sequence number, without prepending the
* latter to the encrypted record.
*
* Additionally, DTLS 1.2 + CID as well as TLS 1.3 use an inner plaintext
* which allows to add flexible length padding and to hide a record's true
* content type.
*
* In addition to type and version, the following parameters are relevant:
* - The symmetric cipher algorithm to be used.
* - The (static) encryption/decryption keys for the cipher.
* - For stream/CBC, the type of message digest to be used.
* - For stream/CBC, (static) encryption/decryption keys for the digest.
* - For AEAD transformations, the size (potentially 0) of an explicit,
* random initialization vector placed in encrypted records.
* - For some transformations (currently AEAD) an implicit IV. It is static
* and (if present) is combined with the explicit IV in a transformation-
* -dependent way (e.g. appending in TLS 1.2 and XOR'ing in TLS 1.3).
* - For stream/CBC, a flag determining the order of encryption and MAC.
* - The details of the transformation depend on the SSL/TLS version.
* - The length of the authentication tag.
*
* The struct below refines this abstract view as follows:
* - The cipher underlying the transformation is managed in
* cipher contexts cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}, which must have the
* same cipher type. The mode of these cipher contexts determines
* the type of the transformation in the sense above: e.g., if
* the type is MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC resp. MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_GCM
* then the transformation has type CBC resp. AEAD.
* - The cipher keys are never stored explicitly but
* are maintained within cipher_ctx_{enc/dec}.
* - For stream/CBC transformations, the message digest contexts
* used for the MAC's are stored in md_ctx_{enc/dec}. These contexts
* are unused for AEAD transformations.
* - For stream/CBC transformations, the MAC keys are not stored explicitly
* but maintained within md_ctx_{enc/dec}.
* - The mac_enc and mac_dec fields are unused for EAD transformations.
* - For transformations using an implicit IV maintained within
* the transformation context, its contents are stored within
* iv_{enc/dec}.
* - The value of ivlen indicates the length of the IV.
* This is redundant in case of stream/CBC transformations
* which always use 0 resp. the cipher's block length as the
* IV length, but is needed for AEAD ciphers and may be
* different from the underlying cipher's block length
* in this case.
* - The field fixed_ivlen is nonzero for AEAD transformations only
* and indicates the length of the static part of the IV which is
* constant throughout the communication, and which is stored in
* the first fixed_ivlen bytes of the iv_{enc/dec} arrays.
* - tls_version denotes the 2-byte TLS version
* - For stream/CBC transformations, maclen denotes the length of the
* authentication tag, while taglen is unused and 0.
* - For AEAD transformations, taglen denotes the length of the
* authentication tag, while maclen is unused and 0.
* - For CBC transformations, encrypt_then_mac determines the
* order of encryption and authentication. This field is unused
* in other transformations.
*
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_transform {
/*
* Session specific crypto layer
*/
size_t minlen; /*!< min. ciphertext length */
size_t ivlen; /*!< IV length */
size_t fixed_ivlen; /*!< Fixed part of IV (AEAD) */
size_t maclen; /*!< MAC(CBC) len */
size_t taglen; /*!< TAG(AEAD) len */
unsigned char iv_enc[16]; /*!< IV (encryption) */
unsigned char iv_dec[16]; /*!< IV (decryption) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_enc; /*!< MAC (encryption) */
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_mac_dec; /*!< MAC (decryption) */
psa_algorithm_t psa_mac_alg; /*!< psa MAC algorithm */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
int encrypt_then_mac; /*!< flag for EtM activation */
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC */
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version;
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_enc; /*!< psa encryption key */
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psa_key_dec; /*!< psa decryption key */
psa_algorithm_t psa_alg; /*!< psa algorithm */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
uint8_t in_cid_len;
uint8_t out_cid_len;
unsigned char in_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
unsigned char out_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX];
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES)
/* We need the Hello random bytes in order to re-derive keys from the
* Master Secret and other session info and for the keying material
* exporter in TLS 1.2.
* See ssl_tls12_populate_transform() */
unsigned char randbytes[MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN +
MBEDTLS_CLIENT_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
/*!< ServerHello.random+ClientHello.random */
#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_RANDBYTES) */
};
/*
* Return 1 if the transform uses an AEAD cipher, 0 otherwise.
* Equivalently, return 0 if a separate MAC is used, 1 otherwise.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_transform_uses_aead(
const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
return transform->maclen == 0 && transform->taglen != 0;
#else
(void) transform;
return 1;
#endif
}
/*
* Internal representation of record frames
*
* Instances come in two flavors:
* (1) Encrypted
* These always have data_offset = 0
* (2) Unencrypted
* These have data_offset set to the amount of
* pre-expansion during record protection. Concretely,
* this is the length of the fixed part of the explicit IV
* used for encryption, or 0 if no explicit IV is used
* (e.g. for stream ciphers).
*
* The reason for the data_offset in the unencrypted case
* is to allow for in-place conversion of an unencrypted to
* an encrypted record. If the offset wasn't included, the
* encrypted content would need to be shifted afterwards to
* make space for the fixed IV.
*
*/
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX
#else
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
#endif
typedef struct {
uint8_t ctr[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /* In TLS: The implicit record sequence number.
* In DTLS: The 2-byte epoch followed by
* the 6-byte sequence number.
* This is stored as a raw big endian byte array
* as opposed to a uint64_t because we rarely
* need to perform arithmetic on this, but do
* need it as a Byte array for the purpose of
* MAC computations. */
uint8_t type; /* The record content type. */
uint8_t ver[2]; /* SSL/TLS version as present on the wire.
* Convert to internal presentation of versions
* using mbedtls_ssl_read_version() and
* mbedtls_ssl_write_version().
* Keep wire-format for MAC computations. */
unsigned char *buf; /* Memory buffer enclosing the record content */
size_t buf_len; /* Buffer length */
size_t data_offset; /* Offset of record content */
size_t data_len; /* Length of record content */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
uint8_t cid_len; /* Length of the CID (0 if not present) */
unsigned char cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_LEN_MAX]; /* The CID */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
} mbedtls_record;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/*
* List of certificate + private key pairs
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert {
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert; /*!< cert */
mbedtls_pk_context *key; /*!< private key */
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *next; /*!< next key/cert pair */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/*
* List of handshake messages kept around for resending
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item {
unsigned char *p; /*!< message, including handshake headers */
size_t len; /*!< length of p */
unsigned char type; /*!< type of the message: handshake or CCS */
mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *next; /*!< next handshake message(s) */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/**
* \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS
* 1.2 specific extensions of the ClientHello message.
*
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
* \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions
* \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions
* \param uses_ec Whether one proposed ciphersuite uses an elliptic curve
* (<> 0) or not ( 0 ).
* \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
int uses_ec,
size_t *out_len);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Find the preferred hash for a given signature algorithm.
*
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
* \param[in] sig_alg A signature algorithm identifier as defined in the
* TLS 1.2 SignatureAlgorithm enumeration.
*
* \return The preferred hash algorithm for \p sig_alg. It is a hash algorithm
* identifier as defined in the TLS 1.2 HashAlgorithm enumeration.
*/
unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_get_preferred_hash_for_sig_alg(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned int sig_alg);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/**
* \brief Free referenced items in an SSL transform context and clear
* memory
*
* \param transform SSL transform context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_transform_free(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
/**
* \brief Free referenced items in an SSL handshake context and clear
* memory
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/* set inbound transform of ssl context */
void mbedtls_ssl_set_inbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
/* set outbound transform of ssl context */
void mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
/* Declared in "ssl_debug_helpers.h". We can't include this file from
* "ssl_misc.h" because it includes "ssl_misc.h" because it needs some
* type definitions. TODO: split the type definitions and the helper
* functions into different headers.
*/
const char *mbedtls_ssl_states_str(mbedtls_ssl_states state);
#endif
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_states state)
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("handshake state: %d (%s) -> %d (%s)",
ssl->state, mbedtls_ssl_states_str(ssl->state),
(int) state, mbedtls_ssl_states_str(state)));
ssl->state = (int) state;
}
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_increment_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, ssl->state + 1);
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_handle_message_type(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_prepare_handshake_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_update_handshake_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Update record layer
*
* This function roughly separates the implementation
* of the logic of (D)TLS from the implementation
* of the secure transport.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to use.
* \param update_hs_digest This indicates if the handshake digest
* should be automatically updated in case
* a handshake message is found.
*
* \return 0 or non-zero error code.
*
* \note A clarification on what is called 'record layer' here
* is in order, as many sensible definitions are possible:
*
* The record layer takes as input an untrusted underlying
* transport (stream or datagram) and transforms it into
* a serially multiplexed, secure transport, which
* conceptually provides the following:
*
* (1) Three datagram based, content-agnostic transports
* for handshake, alert and CCS messages.
* (2) One stream- or datagram-based transport
* for application data.
* (3) Functionality for changing the underlying transform
* securing the contents.
*
* The interface to this functionality is given as follows:
*
* a Updating
* [Currently implemented by mbedtls_ssl_read_record]
*
* Check if and on which of the four 'ports' data is pending:
* Nothing, a controlling datagram of type (1), or application
* data (2). In any case data is present, internal buffers
* provide access to the data for the user to process it.
* Consumption of type (1) datagrams is done automatically
* on the next update, invalidating that the internal buffers
* for previous datagrams, while consumption of application
* data (2) is user-controlled.
*
* b Reading of application data
* [Currently manual adaption of ssl->in_offt pointer]
*
* As mentioned in the last paragraph, consumption of data
* is different from the automatic consumption of control
* datagrams (1) because application data is treated as a stream.
*
* c Tracking availability of application data
* [Currently manually through decreasing ssl->in_msglen]
*
* For efficiency and to retain datagram semantics for
* application data in case of DTLS, the record layer
* provides functionality for checking how much application
* data is still available in the internal buffer.
*
* d Changing the transformation securing the communication.
*
* Given an opaque implementation of the record layer in the
* above sense, it should be possible to implement the logic
* of (D)TLS on top of it without the need to know anything
* about the record layer's internals. This is done e.g.
* in all the handshake handling functions, and in the
* application data reading function mbedtls_ssl_read.
*
* \note The above tries to give a conceptual picture of the
* record layer, but the current implementation deviates
* from it in some places. For example, our implementation of
* the update functionality through mbedtls_ssl_read_record
* discards datagrams depending on the current state, which
* wouldn't fall under the record layer's responsibility
* following the above definition.
*
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_read_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned update_hs_digest);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t nb_want);
/*
* Write handshake message header
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_start_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char hs_type,
unsigned char **buf, size_t *buf_len);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int update_checksum,
int force_flush);
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg_ext(ssl, 1 /* update checksum */, 1 /* force flush */);
}
/*
* Write handshake message tail
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_finish_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t buf_len, size_t msg_len);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_write_record(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int force_flush);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_write_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info);
/*
* Update checksum of handshake messages.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_msg_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char const *msg,
size_t msg_len);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_add_hs_hdr_to_checksum(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
size_t total_hs_len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_has_static_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf);
#endif
/**
* Get the first defined opaque PSK by order of precedence:
* 1. handshake PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in the PSK
* callback
* 2. static PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
* Return an opaque PSK
*/
static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_ssl_get_opaque_psk(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->handshake->psk_opaque)) {
return ssl->handshake->psk_opaque;
}
if (!mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(ssl->conf->psk_opaque)) {
return ssl->conf->psk_opaque;
}
return MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C)
unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk(mbedtls_pk_context *pk);
unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk_alg(mbedtls_pk_type_t type);
mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(unsigned char sig);
#endif
mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash(unsigned char hash);
unsigned char mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg(int md);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_set_calc_verify_md(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int md);
#endif
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t tls_id);
#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_check_curve(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id);
#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */
/**
* \brief Return PSA EC info for the specified TLS ID.
*
* \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for
* \param type If the TLD ID is supported, then proper \c psa_key_type_t
* value is returned here. Can be NULL.
* \param bits If the TLD ID is supported, then proper bit size is returned
* here. Can be NULL.
* \return PSA_SUCCESS if the TLS ID is supported,
* PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED otherwise
*
* \note If either \c family or \c bits parameters are NULL, then
* the corresponding value is not returned.
* The function can be called with both parameters as NULL
* simply to check if a specific TLS ID is supported.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_curve_info_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id,
psa_key_type_t *type,
size_t *bits);
/**
* \brief Return \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id for the specified TLS ID.
*
* \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for
* \return Proper \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id if the TLS ID is supported,
* or MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE otherwise
*/
mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id);
/**
* \brief Return TLS ID for the specified \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id.
*
* \param grp_id The \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id ID to look for
* \return Proper TLS ID if the \c mbedtls_ecp_group_id is supported,
* or 0 otherwise
*/
uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_get_tls_id_from_ecp_group_id(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
/**
* \brief Return EC's name for the specified TLS ID.
*
* \param tls_id The TLS ID to look for
* \return A pointer to a const string with the proper name. If TLS
* ID is not supported, a NULL pointer is returned instead.
*/
const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_curve_name_from_tls_id(uint16_t tls_id);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
static inline mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
(const uint16_t srtp_profile_value)
{
switch (srtp_profile_value) {
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:
return srtp_profile_value;
default: break;
}
return MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
static inline mbedtls_pk_context *mbedtls_ssl_own_key(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) {
key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
} else {
key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
}
return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->key;
}
static inline mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *key_cert;
if (ssl->handshake != NULL && ssl->handshake->key_cert != NULL) {
key_cert = ssl->handshake->key_cert;
} else {
key_cert = ssl->conf->key_cert;
}
return key_cert == NULL ? NULL : key_cert->cert;
}
/*
* Verify a certificate.
*
* [in/out] ssl: misc. things read
* ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result updated
* [in] authmode: one of MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_{NONE,OPTIONAL,REQUIRED}
* [in] chain: the certificate chain to verify (ie the peer's chain)
* [in] ciphersuite_info: For TLS 1.2, this session's ciphersuite;
* for TLS 1.3, may be left NULL.
* [in] rs_ctx: restart context if restartable ECC is in use;
* leave NULL for no restartable behaviour.
*
* Return:
* - 0 if the handshake should continue. Depending on the
* authmode it means:
* - REQUIRED: the certificate was found to be valid, trusted & acceptable.
* ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result is 0.
* - OPTIONAL: the certificate may or may not be acceptable, but
* ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result was updated with the result.
* - NONE: the certificate wasn't even checked.
* - MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_CERT_VERIFY_FAILED or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE if
* the certificate was found to be invalid/untrusted/unacceptable and the
* handshake should be aborted (can only happen with REQUIRED).
* - another error code if another error happened (out-of-memory, etc.)
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_verify_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int authmode,
mbedtls_x509_crt *chain,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info,
void *rs_ctx);
/*
* Check usage of a certificate wrt usage extensions:
* keyUsage and extendedKeyUsage.
* (Note: nSCertType is deprecated and not standard, we don't check it.)
*
* Note: if tls_version is 1.3, ciphersuite is ignored and can be NULL.
*
* Note: recv_endpoint is the receiver's endpoint.
*
* Return 0 if everything is OK, -1 if not.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage(const mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite,
int recv_endpoint,
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version,
uint32_t *flags);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
void mbedtls_ssl_write_version(unsigned char version[2], int transport,
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version);
uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_read_version(const unsigned char version[2],
int transport);
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_in_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
((void) ssl);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
return 13;
} else
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
{
return 5;
}
}
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_out_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return (size_t) (ssl->out_iv - ssl->out_hdr);
}
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
return 12;
}
#else
((void) ssl);
#endif
return 4;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
void mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_resend(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif
/* Visible for testing purposes only */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_session_copy(mbedtls_ssl_session *dst,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *src);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/* The hash buffer must have at least MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE bytes of length. */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *hash, size_t *hashlen,
unsigned char *data, size_t data_len,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
void mbedtls_ssl_transform_init(mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform,
mbedtls_record *rec);
/* Length of the "epoch" field in the record header */
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_ep_len(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) {
return 2;
}
#else
((void) ssl);
#endif
return 0;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_resend_hello_request(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint32_t millisecs);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_check_timer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_update_in_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_reset_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_update_out_pointers(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_int(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int partial);
void mbedtls_ssl_session_reset_msg_layer(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int partial);
/*
* Send pending alert
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_handle_pending_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/*
* Set pending fatal alert flag.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char alert_type,
int alert_reason);
/* Alias of mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT(type, user_return_value) \
mbedtls_ssl_pend_fatal_alert(ssl, type, user_return_value)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
void mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif
void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_start_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_current_mtu(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_buffering_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_flight_free(mbedtls_ssl_flight_item *flight);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/**
* ssl utils functions for checking configuration.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 &&
conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_only(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 &&
conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;
#else
((void) conf);
return 0;
#endif
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls12_enabled(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
return conf->min_tls_version <= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
conf->max_tls_version >= MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2;
#else
((void) conf);
return 0;
#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_hybrid_tls12_tls13(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
return conf->min_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 &&
conf->max_tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
extern const uint8_t mbedtls_ssl_tls13_hello_retry_request_magic[
MBEDTLS_SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_LEN];
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_finished_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_wrapup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS
* 1.3 specific extensions of the ClientHello message.
*
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
* \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extensions
* \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extensions
* \param[out] out_len Length of the data written into the buffer \p buf
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len);
/**
* \brief TLS 1.3 client side state machine entry
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief TLS 1.3 server side state machine entry
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/*
* Helper functions around key exchange modes.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int kex_mode_mask)
{
return (ssl->conf->tls13_kex_modes & kex_mode_mask) != 0;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_kex_mode_enabled(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL);
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
/**
* Given a list of key exchange modes, check if at least one of them is
* supported by peer.
*
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
* \param kex_modes_mask Mask of the key exchange modes to check
*
* \return Non-zero if at least one of the key exchange modes is supported by
* the peer, otherwise \c 0.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int kex_modes_mask)
{
return (ssl->handshake->tls13_kex_modes & kex_modes_mask) != 0;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_psk_ephemeral_supported(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_ephemeral_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_some_psk_supported(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_kex_mode_supported(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C &&
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
/*
* Helper functions for extensions checking.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int hs_msg_type,
unsigned int received_extension_type,
uint32_t hs_msg_allowed_extensions_mask);
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int extension_type)
{
ssl->handshake->sent_extensions |=
mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(extension_type);
}
/*
* Helper functions to check the selected key exchange mode.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int kex_mask)
{
return (ssl->handshake->key_exchange_mode & kex_mask) != 0;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_psk(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_with_ephemeral(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_key_exchange_mode_check(ssl,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL);
}
/*
* Fetch TLS 1.3 handshake message header
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_fetch_handshake_msg(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned hs_type,
unsigned char **buf,
size_t *buf_len);
/**
* \brief Detect if a list of extensions contains a supported_versions
* extension or not.
*
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
* \param[in] buf Address of the first byte of the extensions vector.
* \param[in] end End of the buffer containing the list of extensions.
* \param[out] supported_versions_data If the extension is present, address of
* its first byte of data, NULL otherwise.
* \param[out] supported_versions_data_end If the extension is present, address
* of the first byte immediately
* following the extension data, NULL
* otherwise.
* \return 0 if the list of extensions does not contain a supported_versions
* extension.
* \return 1 if the list of extensions contains a supported_versions
* extension.
* \return A negative value if an error occurred while parsing the
* extensions.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_is_supported_versions_ext_present_in_exts(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char **supported_versions_data,
const unsigned char **supported_versions_data_end);
/*
* Handler of TLS 1.3 server certificate message
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
/*
* Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate message
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/*
* Handler of TLS 1.3 write Certificate Verify message
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
/*
* Generic handler of Certificate Verify
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_process_certificate_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/*
* Write of dummy-CCS's for middlebox compatibility
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_reset_transcript_for_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_generate_and_write_xxdh_key_exchange(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint16_t named_group,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len);
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int in_new_session_ticket,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len);
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_early_data_len(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t early_data_len);
typedef enum {
/*
* The client has not sent the first ClientHello yet, the negotiation of early
* data has not started yet.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE,
/*
* In its ClientHello, the client has not included an early data indication
* extension.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NO_IND_SENT,
/*
* The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first
* ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or
* HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data
* is not set either as for middlebox compatibility a dummy CCS may have to be
* sent in clear. Early data cannot be sent to the server yet.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IND_SENT,
/*
* The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first
* ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or
* HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data
* has been set and early data can be written now.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_CAN_WRITE,
/*
* The client has indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted
* it.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED,
/*
* The client has indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected
* it.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED,
/*
* The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first
* ClientHello, the server has accepted them and the client has received the
* server Finished message. It cannot send early data to the server anymore.
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED,
} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
/*
* Write Signature Algorithm extension
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_write_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len);
/*
* Parse TLS Signature Algorithm extension
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_sig_alg_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/* Get handshake transcript */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_get_handshake_transcript(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_md_type_t md,
unsigned char *dst,
size_t dst_len,
size_t *olen);
/*
* Helper functions for NamedGroup.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group)
{
/*
* RFC 8422 section 5.1.1
*/
return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 ||
/* Below deprecated curves should be removed with notice to users */
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(uint16_t named_group)
{
return named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 ||
named_group == MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(uint16_t named_group)
{
return named_group >= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 &&
named_group <= MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_offered(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t named_group)
{
const uint16_t *group_list = ssl->conf->group_list;
if (group_list == NULL) {
return 0;
}
for (; *group_list != 0; group_list++) {
if (*group_list == named_group) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_named_group_is_supported(uint16_t named_group)
{
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH)
if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ecdhe(named_group)) {
if (mbedtls_ssl_get_ecp_group_id_from_tls_id(named_group) !=
MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) {
return 1;
}
}
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
if (mbedtls_ssl_tls13_named_group_is_ffdh(named_group)) {
return 1;
}
#endif
#if !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
(void) named_group;
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Return supported signature algorithms.
*/
static inline const void *mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
if (ssl->handshake != NULL &&
ssl->handshake->sig_algs != NULL) {
return ssl->handshake->sig_algs;
}
#endif
return ssl->conf->sig_algs;
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
((void) ssl);
return NULL;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_received(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint16_t own_sig_alg)
{
const uint16_t *sig_alg = ssl->handshake->received_sig_algs;
if (sig_alg == NULL) {
return 0;
}
for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) {
if (*sig_alg == own_sig_alg) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(
const uint16_t sig_alg)
{
switch (sig_alg) {
#if defined(PSA_HAVE_ALG_SOME_ECDSA)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 && PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 && PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) && defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 && PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 */
#endif /* PSA_HAVE_ALG_SOME_ECDSA */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */
default:
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(
const uint16_t sig_alg)
{
switch (sig_alg) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512:
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN */
default:
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_for_cert_verify_is_supported(
sig_alg);
}
return 1;
}
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_sig_alg_cert_key_match(uint16_t sig_alg,
mbedtls_pk_context *key);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_offered(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uint16_t proposed_sig_alg)
{
const uint16_t *sig_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_sig_algs(ssl);
if (sig_alg == NULL) {
return 0;
}
for (; *sig_alg != MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE; sig_alg++) {
if (*sig_alg == proposed_sig_alg) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_get_pk_type_and_md_alg_from_sig_alg(
uint16_t sig_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_type, mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg)
{
*pk_type = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig(sig_alg & 0xff);
*md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash((sig_alg >> 8) & 0xff);
if (*pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_NONE && *md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE) {
return 0;
}
switch (sig_alg) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
case MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512:
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512;
*pk_type = MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS;
break;
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 */
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS */
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
}
return 0;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(
const uint16_t sig_alg)
{
/* High byte is hash */
unsigned char hash = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1(sig_alg);
unsigned char sig = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0(sig_alg);
switch (hash) {
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5:
break;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1:
break;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224:
break;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256:
break;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384:
break;
#endif
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512:
break;
#endif
default:
return 0;
}
switch (sig) {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA:
break;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA:
break;
#endif
default:
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_sig_alg_is_supported(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const uint16_t sig_alg)
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2) {
return mbedtls_ssl_tls12_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED)
if (ssl->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) {
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_sig_alg_is_supported(sig_alg);
}
#endif
((void) ssl);
((void) sig_alg);
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
/* Corresponding PSA algorithm for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL.
* Same value is used for PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER, hence it is
* guaranteed to not be a valid PSA algorithm identifier.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER 0x04000000
/**
* \brief Translate mbedtls cipher type/taglen pair to psa:
* algorithm, key type and key size.
*
* \param mbedtls_cipher_type [in] given mbedtls cipher type
* \param taglen [in] given tag length
* 0 - default tag length
* \param alg [out] corresponding PSA alg
* There is no corresponding PSA
* alg for MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NULL, so
* in this case MBEDTLS_SSL_NULL_CIPHER
* is returned via this parameter
* \param key_type [out] corresponding PSA key type
* \param key_size [out] corresponding PSA key size
*
* \return PSA_SUCCESS on success or PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if
* conversion is not supported.
*/
psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_cipher_to_psa(mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_type,
size_t taglen,
psa_algorithm_t *alg,
psa_key_type_t *key_type,
size_t *key_size);
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
* \brief Convert given PSA status to mbedtls error code.
*
* \param status [in] given PSA status
*
* \return corresponding mbedtls error code
*/
static inline MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED int psa_ssl_status_to_mbedtls(psa_status_t status)
{
switch (status) {
case PSA_SUCCESS:
return 0;
case PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED;
case PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC;
case PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
case PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR;
case PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
default:
return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED;
}
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE,
MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO
} mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t;
/**
* \brief Parse the provided input buffer for getting the first round
* of key exchange. This code is common between server and client
*
* \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure
* \param buf [in] input buffer to parse
* \param len [in] length of the input buffer
* \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or
* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO
*
* \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure
*/
int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_read_round(
psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round);
/**
* \brief Write the first round of key exchange into the provided output
* buffer. This code is common between server and client
*
* \param pake_ctx [in] the PAKE's operation/context structure
* \param buf [out] the output buffer in which data will be written to
* \param len [in] length of the output buffer
* \param olen [out] the length of the data really written on the buffer
* \param round [in] either MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_ONE or
* MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_ROUND_TWO
*
* \return 0 on success or a negative error code in case of failure
*/
int mbedtls_psa_ecjpake_write_round(
psa_pake_operation_t *pake_ctx,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len, size_t *olen,
mbedtls_ecjpake_rounds_t round);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
/**
* \brief TLS record protection modes
*/
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_STREAM = 0,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_CBC_ETM,
MBEDTLS_SSL_MODE_AEAD
} mbedtls_ssl_mode_t;
mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_transform(
const mbedtls_ssl_transform *transform);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM)
mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite(
int encrypt_then_mac,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite);
#else
mbedtls_ssl_mode_t mbedtls_ssl_get_mode_from_ciphersuite(
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_CBC_ETM */
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_read_public_xxdhe_share(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_len);
#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH || PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_cipher_suite_is_offered(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int cipher_suite)
{
const int *ciphersuite_list = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list;
/* Check whether we have offered this ciphersuite */
for (size_t i = 0; ciphersuite_list[i] != 0; i++) {
if (ciphersuite_list[i] == cipher_suite) {
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/**
* \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param suite_info Cipher suite to validate
* \param min_tls_version Minimal TLS version to accept a cipher suite
* \param max_tls_version Maximal TLS version to accept a cipher suite
*
* \return 0 if valid, negative value otherwise.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_validate_ciphersuite(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info,
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version min_tls_version,
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version max_tls_version);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH (2)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) /* As defined in RFC 8449 */
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
const unsigned char *end);
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_write_alpn_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS)
int mbedtls_ssl_check_dtls_clihlo_cookie(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *cli_id, size_t cli_id_len,
const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len,
unsigned char *obuf, size_t buf_len, size_t *olen);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS
* 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension.
*
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
* \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the extension
* \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the extension
* \param[out] out_len Length in bytes of the Pre-Shared key extension: data
* written into the buffer \p buf by this function plus
* the length of the binders to be written.
* \param[out] binders_len Length of the binders to be written at the end of
* the extension.
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_identities_of_pre_shared_key_ext(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end,
size_t *out_len, size_t *binders_len);
/**
* \brief Given an SSL context and its associated configuration, write the TLS
* 1.3 specific Pre-Shared key extension binders at the end of the
* ClientHello.
*
* \param[in] ssl SSL context
* \param[in] buf Base address of the buffer where to write the binders
* \param[in] end End address of the buffer where to write the binders
*/
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_binders_of_pre_shared_key_ext(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *end);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
const char *hostname);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
int mbedtls_ssl_session_set_ticket_alpn(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
const char *alpn);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_MAX_ALLOWED_TICKET_LIFETIME (604800)
static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags)
{
return session->ticket_flags &
(flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK);
}
/**
* Check if at least one of the given flags is set in
* the session ticket. See the definition of
* `MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK` to get all
* permitted flags.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_get_ticket_flags(session, flags) != 0;
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags(
session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION);
}
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_psk_ephemeral(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags(
session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION);
}
static inline unsigned int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_allow_early_data(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
{
return mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_ticket_has_flags(
session, MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA);
}
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_set_ticket_flags(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags)
{
session->ticket_flags |= (flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK);
}
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_tls13_session_clear_ticket_flags(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned int flags)
{
session->ticket_flags &= ~(flags & MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC)
/** Compute the HMAC of variable-length data with constant flow.
*
* This function computes the HMAC of the concatenation of \p add_data and \p
* data, and does with a code flow and memory access pattern that does not
* depend on \p data_len_secret, but only on \p min_data_len and \p
* max_data_len. In particular, this function always reads exactly \p
* max_data_len bytes from \p data.
*
* \param key The HMAC key.
* \param mac_alg The hash algorithm.
* Must be one of SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-1 or MD-5.
* \param add_data The first part of the message whose HMAC is being
* calculated. This must point to a readable buffer
* of \p add_data_len bytes.
* \param add_data_len The length of \p add_data in bytes.
* \param data The buffer containing the second part of the
* message. This must point to a readable buffer
* of \p max_data_len bytes.
* \param data_len_secret The length of the data to process in \p data.
* This must be no less than \p min_data_len and no
* greater than \p max_data_len.
* \param min_data_len The minimal length of the second part of the
* message, read from \p data.
* \param max_data_len The maximal length of the second part of the
* message, read from \p data.
* \param output The HMAC will be written here. This must point to
* a writable buffer of sufficient size to hold the
* HMAC value.
*
* \retval 0 on success.
* \retval #MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
* The hardware accelerator failed.
*/
int mbedtls_ct_hmac(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t mac_alg,
const unsigned char *add_data,
size_t add_data_len,
const unsigned char *data,
size_t data_len_secret,
size_t min_data_len,
size_t max_data_len,
unsigned char *output);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SOME_SUITES_USE_MAC) */
#endif /* ssl_misc.h */
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