This is an external function, so in the absence of link-time
optimisation (LTO) the compiler can't know anything about it and has to
call it the number of times it's called in the source code.
This only matters for pk_ec, but change pk_rsa as well for the sake of
uniformity.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
ssl_client2.c used to check that we force a ciphersuite that worked;
that would have prevented testing so I removed it. The library should be
robust even when the application tries something that doesn't work.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
That's actually the only non-PSK key exchange that needs to be
negative-tested: all the other key exchanges are either positive-tested
or use RSA, for which we can't even create opaque keys in this branch.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
ECDSA keys work with mbedtls_pk_ec() too, but we don't want to accept
them here, so the comment should reflect that the check is not just
about ensuring pk_ec() works.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Trusting the caller to perform the appropriate check is both risky, and
a bit user-unfriendly. Returning NULL on error seems both safer
(dereferencing a NULL pointer is more likely to result in a clean crash,
while mis-casting a pointer might have deeper, less predictable
consequences) and friendlier (the caller can just check the return
value for NULL, which is a common idiom).
Only add that as an additional way of using the function, for the sake
of backwards compatibility. Calls where we know the type of the context
for sure (for example because we just set it up) were legal and safe, so
they should remain legal without checking the result for NULL, which
would be redundant.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
The previous wording "ensure it holds an XXX" context did not mean
anything without looking at the source.
Looking at the source, the criterion is:
- for mbedtls_pk_rsa(), that the info structure uses rsa_alloc_wrap;
- for mbedtls_pk_ec(), that it uses eckey_alloc_wrap or
ecdsa_alloc_wrap, since mbedtls_ecdsa_context is a typedef for
mbedtls_ecp_keypair. (Note that our test code uses mbedtls_pk_ec() on
contexts of type MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA.)
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
Using opaque keys for static ECDH is not supported in this branch (will
be introduced in 3.2). In case we reach that point, error out cleanly
instead of miscasting a pointer. Since opaque keys were introduced,
mbedtls_pk_can_do() was no longer a precise enough check.
Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
This could lead to a potential buffer overread with small
MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN.
Change the bound calculations so that it is apparent
what lengths and sizes are used.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Use escape mechanism defined in RFC 1779 when parsing commas and other
special characters in X509 DN values. Resolves failures when generating
a certificate with a CSR containing a comma in subject value.
Fixes#769.
Signed-off-by: Werner Lewis <werner.lewis@arm.com>
When executing eval in the background, the next "$!" gives the
eval PID, not the ssl-client2 pid. This causes problems when
a client times out and the script tries to kill it. Instead, it
kills the parent eval call.
This caused problems with subsequent proxy tests receiving
old packets from a client from a previous test.
Moving the "&" to inside the eval call fixes the problem.
Signed-off-by: Andrzej Kurek <andrzej.kurek@arm.com>
Rewrite x25519 example program to fix fatal bug and show
current best practices with the ECDH API.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Daubney <thomas.daubney@arm.com>
Fix an issue reported by Coverity whereby some constant time functions
called from the ssl decrypt code could potentially access uninitialised
memory.
Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott <paul.elliott@arm.com>
