From 720c638717ee0d4b19f888537e316cfac154c311 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Maciej=20Zwoli=C5=84ski?= Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 12:02:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 001/551] Add AES encrypted keys support for PKCS5 PBES2 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: Maciej Zwoliński --- include/mbedtls/oid.h | 3 +++ library/oid.c | 14 +++++++++++++- tests/suites/host_test.function | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/include/mbedtls/oid.h index 9545072296..3a7f740c99 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/oid.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/oid.h @@ -306,6 +306,9 @@ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_RSA_COMPANY "\x03\x07" /**< des-ede3-cbc OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) -- us(840) rsadsi(113549) encryptionAlgorithm(3) 7 } */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_AES MBEDTLS_OID_NIST_ALG "\x01" /** aes OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) 1 } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x02" /** aes128-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes128-CBC-PAD(2) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x16" /** aes192-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes192-CBC-PAD(22) } */ +#define MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_AES "\x2a" /** aes256-cbc-pad OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithms(4) aes(1) aes256-CBC-PAD(42) } */ /* * Key Wrapping algorithms diff --git a/library/oid.c b/library/oid.c index d139a6d0de..89d133dfe4 100644 --- a/library/oid.c +++ b/library/oid.c @@ -695,10 +695,22 @@ static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, "des-ede3-cbc", "DES-EDE3-CBC"), MBEDTLS_CIPHER_DES_EDE3_CBC, }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_128_CBC, "aes128-cbc", "AES128-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_128_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_192_CBC, "aes192-cbc", "AES192-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_192_CBC, + }, + { + OID_DESCRIPTOR(MBEDTLS_OID_AES_256_CBC, "aes256-cbc", "AES256-CBC"), + MBEDTLS_CIPHER_AES_256_CBC, + }, { NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, - }, + } }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg) diff --git a/tests/suites/host_test.function b/tests/suites/host_test.function index 06f391fa4f..95d30f8d20 100644 --- a/tests/suites/host_test.function +++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ int execute_tests(int argc, const char **argv) int ret; unsigned total_errors = 0, total_tests = 0, total_skipped = 0; FILE *file; - char buf[5000]; + char buf[10000]; char *params[50]; /* Store for processed integer params. */ mbedtls_test_argument_t int_params[50]; diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index f3ea5536fd..8480b5c006 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -142,6 +142,22 @@ PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding enabled) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ecrypt DES-EDE3-CBC (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C040832A773780540A2D602020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301406082A864886F70D03070408480B29975B655BCE":"7A776F6C696E":"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":0:"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" + +PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C0408E9ED80B476045B2602020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301D0609608648016503040102041052C89F1A8BE8E0EAE6D415F1974624A4":"7A776F6C696E":"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":0:"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" + +PBES2 Decrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C0408777618CD183CC88102020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"7A776F6C696E":"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":0:"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" + +PBES2 Decrypt AES-256-CBC (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C0408B948C29B606B981502020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301D060960864801650304012A0410FD87E5DBEE6E498D887C771C454D4265":"7A776F6C696E":"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":0:"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" + PBES2 Decrypt (bad params tag) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"":"":"":0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PKCS5_INVALID_FORMAT + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG:"" From 1c19557f49c191df26d4066838575f42d1b786d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 17:27:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 002/551] Revert increase of test buffer size. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/host_test.function | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/host_test.function b/tests/suites/host_test.function index 95d30f8d20..06f391fa4f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/host_test.function +++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ int execute_tests(int argc, const char **argv) int ret; unsigned total_errors = 0, total_tests = 0, total_skipped = 0; FILE *file; - char buf[10000]; + char buf[5000]; char *params[50]; /* Store for processed integer params. */ mbedtls_test_argument_t int_params[50]; From 1a913093244aff20c37fa1b6b60fc7c21139ff37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2023 14:15:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 003/551] Restore array formatting Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/oid.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/oid.c b/library/oid.c index 89d133dfe4..a1cf6fcd07 100644 --- a/library/oid.c +++ b/library/oid.c @@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ static const oid_cipher_alg_t oid_cipher_alg[] = { NULL_OID_DESCRIPTOR, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE, - } + }, }; FN_OID_TYPED_FROM_ASN1(oid_cipher_alg_t, cipher_alg, oid_cipher_alg) From 223e716693f969561db05d887e66b6aad576e814 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2023 14:26:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 004/551] Replace AES-CBC test data Previously the buffer size was increased in order to allow for large test data, these new tests fit in the original sized buffer. Test data generated with openssl using the following command line: openssl kdf -keylen $LEN -kdfopt digest:SHA256 -kdfopt iter:10000 -kdfopt pass:"PasswordPasswordPassword" -kdfopt hexsalt:0102030405060708 PBKDF2 openssl enc -$ENC -iv 2F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C -K $KEY -in $IN -e -out $OUT Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index 8480b5c006..94ac86c045 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -142,21 +142,17 @@ PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding enabled) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ecrypt DES-EDE3-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C040832A773780540A2D602020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301406082A864886F70D03070408480B29975B655BCE":"7A776F6C696E":"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":0:"308204BD020100300D06092A864886F70D0101010500048204A7308204A30201000282010100D0680E66E3F69348A111BC720B747A402236FA15B330004F21A97E903AB94419F485688BAF2EEC07306D4C321D91DEA5D426D6336D342D967DC4192D537FDFE42548AEE817B57B82A9D75C8308839C739C830C3B6847D9F2EE65899F117DA196DBF64BD6AC6CE4486619FDFB41C57AFB8B8E893526699976CEB8CD3E07B668FB3F18D70C816F6BC1B26F767B1BF987B4D994FD5F53F7B497FF6A43F73D383F8DA05BAA2A68DDDDCFD2B3A7AACFA8B06D26D2C261BFEC13E7BA7C88AC7CA5AE187BE31D8E579FEE2FC90C31E38C249EBC13C70490AC3463269FACF294D419505ADBC54B0697BF01DEB8EB83DF3236DD9059E6BD0CE64D8D39CB80A2DCDF82E19B020301000102820100517E4F1B66CAF5BEF1D4F8A673DA412FB0F1648B75BD3071C10D0143AEE2E14170FF75E92140ACE506C7C682D6534307FF548C7021A4C4AAD3550A2F52366FBB4BE5071814A54FBDC1624877A8ADA6510303AF95CF6A414CA0722E05789672C8860CE28CF871C0369B4E50A59E8B7552C5B89FE89BB3B161E6E616C3C9CA47743A32482A8885035BEB72E85564A0F004C4A99A935F4BAB523857E558FCF4A27ECD30EA5A91205BD84B9F550565561C9CDC324E3CFC478445D12C032B0057035EF4F548280F238038F3EE6097864D8724AFB53BCA8C62A8F5177AA072D4784EAAEB8B81BB6A3ACF453C5859B374E1FA3B3959FDBD630044B530A2FB50232517D902818100FE860C42D18CBDF8758CF5D4D2487E8EA4C0D6D3A1C735AD14A37A66D972B7B2B3D9551E0B25BAB7F58EAD0B7A696686F4B98DDCB15A20A388D1AB7793004B83B97915D747F8CB09390D2C2A0DE05FCAFAA36911DA2F5D30E0E0178FA7B7B0E57006A44056169078690F9B48225340812A2ADA48CC56B48A0FC75C842DE94FA702818100D19D86F612C92312B3C7F673CA9F4C4808ABEBAD925526A4509E3179C025DFE351720B40562355955B5856A0C9B306F0AAA3C132CEF8E04D94651FCE6A6B89FAD6A683E40551743D962FB4AE5895F7186D9EEC1F5E8A11CCC8BE1783080C5C86E909CF366B26E79316AC687F42E6A6300BC50B944642CF297393FE9EF47F3CED0281806035C18ABC754C1610314177BA2947159A777E7D2F0903643289FD29C58694A3CB521AD7A97510989B0CDCA29B1A1E74632B84D16884DE13931356927391C7F9B9F1686D213A8D5D2620B1920FFEC1971399138D79013063DA8D3ABAC5B62CFAFD96B51DD0ACE4DD6F31440C47555AEBB849CC8B7A1A48526BD67B4547A98ABF0281800E8210AD476F9475DEEBA02B3383030C994D0CEADE8DF636B93DB9BEEB85B3915039CC7D8F78B29BBBCEC9702785B49D43B241D4FA6E4F580F45508640E7608D73FDE2730DCB2D7875C4A784C9ACD7856150F696D53C492F1B55CCDACCDBCE2BA8457D8A0EB08AA6AB9313487BA0EB2FB820D34457F897CE0EA9D79DB8DE75A102818100DB30BDD1E07CB8131091FB3DE7284553FCB0C5C9797C02A74D364D235A41DBCB3D210528722440AF91B073BD5D8EEE0123DC32FF67CE8410E9875B3061AA976E0470797A03C7A59B4A25986AF2C79D2237AABADEF8A9F7BD117CA7274FBFAB4DB7BB77583720419A14938FF1DC643D7AAF7119A3DC46F7F178778C51310579A1" - PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C0408E9ED80B476045B2602020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301D0609608648016503040102041052C89F1A8BE8E0EAE6D415F1974624A4":"7A776F6C696E":"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":0:"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" +pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C0408777618CD183CC88102020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"7A776F6C696E":"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":0:"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" +pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt AES-256-CBC (OK) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -mbedtls_pkcs5_pbes2:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302906092A864886F70D01050C301C0408B948C29B606B981502020800300C06082A864886F70D02090500301D060960864801650304012A0410FD87E5DBEE6E498D887C771C454D4265":"7A776F6C696E":"3BDA5B8B7C541816276A84F779F4961C291CCA695D2DEE57F23B359886852947F1609CAA73072A3D1CEC95B17E987B05C4F401ADBF73B602F031BE107D2290E905E1B16455954C58DE8605CA679FDC83EB3C16427294400AFF227126300E4568CF1332ADAA4CB361F52E0DC4FD19682B7762EAF860B1674549D30ABF4DA2F998364FED59247552E807CCCE4CFD5E4B1F5E37EF3F18ED31BC1318193160AC1FFC487646FAB1FC006A0603AB3DFAB0F068B459665D4902624AC487B924914135BDDD7A2899007F45DB30847745464E1D134A58FCFBA69E13C4BDCDAA6845D57404EF0C46C102DB3621A5EFB0B8DC247951C51BB3777782EF59BBA0211AA5B8E6A91AF6409ED2984B50DC06A2295BE99E4A9B2D769BE13E8E6CF9F01259FCDB09642C10AF77B3B3F057F2D8F7AF234293DF08175D40831FAF776C299CCE88AA5F860318BF96F5C4B52CBAEB3E9BF3092A818A4B638F835084C9666D79668E08D125E0668925123F24BE675B592068F8E29D0FCD9D763148F261D88A9DE9022A6759467EA1BB06CDB20FD335E8D080F18A8DE331873C4A5C4213D36C332E319C146EA10F6FB1BF82493616776BBBD6B38251F847F1961FDAE518E18BECACE932C1EB477946D9381036DC2C9537786A3BE295D5156AB479DD6DD0B3E85652A4B66C0BF69926504A2DC5068A99E05F08DDAC2FD99C2AFA76203B64886D99E8D3C67C94C92BDB9D22B28CA775512A55BB7B4A9483DD2541B0BABF58769CDBFB05EE53FE452E0B4B42DF086F2932969AE943837CD2EDF7B5B731245B1A6C83079F42BFF3B170819F852B5AA493B2D9A378FB8C99F400E7F4E2FE503AB7399F271451238DCA8667077E555D6F96747C5854A9D2F13CE93D2BD6AAF9808DAF0BEFE1448A5536927A9D8C7886FCA937C6912943E4B20412540625F277552E6B6FB914F2916B780CD529FB0A3491C9011E3CFED7BDBFEC3BD18B260DB882294D647AB70577E60C6E3E85F6CAAE9F2EC6820115B5CD854A1368CB4B6D23B16B32CB5DB9D77D7A556EEB6ECD4075C74CE606EA25E0300EC65761F0EFDA7B6E8DA3C0196E274D86BC2911C2A96A6E0B6C259449E4D43C248AE5614D4D74147FB1963C5770958523F7AB8606F904892523BECD2D7CC81DD296361C0D11DFB2CA306B42CC0481E9B3A66FE2E17562FC9210139CE33B9724283207EF6B17496D6D0E1D07641A7BDB4DEF9A7CDE297CFBB119FDB43CF970B6DFF5F08EABE5E087DFBDB067CAEEEB460D381C844154947B527C4C40F452A64EF2E15A4A9D13F060835380FA49B5201682F13E543207E791147D15C54C6540F2F3F3D8AAFC50623B260422EA5558906798FB555BEF0EE8BAFB544442185911883C3CA4DAC700BB8198C4C9E136F3517410AB2FFE605BA6AA27CB35958C7B51EDDA0961CD8F42ED7B61342E9BF7783289CB9D299C9CC84F08B7546D28CCCE2ABCB68A7BAEAC6C67E3FAA14E4502D9711CFAC16E4BBFBE016A9755D49E233B3DDDBF03C77F4542D7566B03264B0B85E006CAABEED61715F2E97913F36DB841B3DFEC1CF6549976D93D35AAE9BC1383F84133F38904F819DF3FDC3DBE636F0661DABEF654D2C52BF1A1A2E33F79032F4E2C34981BC354B74B727CCC759209790FFAFED8E9DB5532AD6F9F0BD7B74A5DE63A4363464DC5A137D56BCCFACBB8C77229B048A587027B24D1968A1BEB3935C6C416E4A8AB14F3AF2C1858942D27CB976AF4":0:"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" +pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt (bad params tag) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C From 8494c986a0cf12ad8e8dd8359bed055eb7028f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2023 18:26:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 005/551] Add Encryption test data for AES 128,196,256 PBES2 Data (for encryption and decryption) generated using openssl: openssl kdf -keylen 24 -kdfopt digest:SHA256 -kdfopt iter:10000 -kdfopt pass:"PasswordPasswordPassword" -kdfopt hexsalt:0102030405060708 PBKDF2 69D1831EA16816B82797E5E9619C2F62153BC65C1791B5C0 openssl enc $MODE -iv 2F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C -K $KEY -in $FILE -e -out $ENC Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index 94ac86c045..f372520e3d 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -142,6 +142,18 @@ PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding enabled) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ncrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e" + +PBES2 Encrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94" + +PBES2 Encrypt AES-256-CBC (OK) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" + PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" From 632699b9255be5070c35618622b70db1bbc7248d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2023 14:20:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 006/551] Add Changelog Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..96f48d6e7c --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Features + * Add support for using AES-CBC 128, 192, and 256 bit schemes + with PKCS#5 PBES2. \ No newline at end of file From cd80f09aa3628d671394fa985948de1b287c5689 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:08:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 007/551] Fix Changelog formatting Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt index 96f48d6e7c..e00c1e0a6c 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ Features * Add support for using AES-CBC 128, 192, and 256 bit schemes - with PKCS#5 PBES2. \ No newline at end of file + with PKCS#5 PBES2. From 86bfbe8ef2621973f4760bc8f0299e14aa1dc7a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:19:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 008/551] Fix test data dependencies Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index f372520e3d..3bd6b49f09 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -143,27 +143,27 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIP pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ncrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e" PBES2 Encrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94" PBES2 Encrypt AES-256-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt AES-256-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt (bad params tag) From b1f60163ba3aff6c8209c48f85d398fdfb19a901 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 15:46:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 009/551] ssl_tls: remove RSA sig-algs in ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- library/ssl_tls.c | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index b163e93c25..08f5a5b9b9 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -5143,16 +5143,6 @@ static uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384) #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) - MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, -#endif \ - /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) - MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ - MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE }; From 69ceb391a0bb216f6c1fc1ca9b8c2d7718fd94a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 16:32:39 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 010/551] ssl_tls: remove RSA sig-algs in ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- library/ssl_tls.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 08f5a5b9b9..830278243d 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -5153,17 +5153,12 @@ static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), -#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), -#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE }; From 55933a3e9c93db693e53a8a61e4e07d36be6a2f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 16:34:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 011/551] tls13: fix a wrong RFC reference section Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 3c2696fe40..0ca802bc1b 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ /* * TLS 1.3 signature algorithms - * RFC 8446, Section 4.2.2 + * RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3 */ /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */ From 1136fad1263216e88c8cf32d85977b55bddbdc9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 16:54:31 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 012/551] ssl_tls: improve readability in ssl_*_preset_*_sig_algs - fix wrong comment in #endif - no semantics changes Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- library/ssl_tls.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 830278243d..511e4360ef 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -5054,23 +5054,17 @@ static uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { // == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512) #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, -#endif \ - /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, -#endif \ - /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ +#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, -#endif \ - /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT && MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512, @@ -5090,42 +5084,47 @@ static uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { /* NOTICE: see above */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { + #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512), #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256, -#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT */ +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ + /* NOTICE: see above */ static uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { @@ -5149,17 +5148,19 @@ static uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { /* NOTICE: see above */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { + #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256), #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED) MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS12_SIG_AND_HASH_ALG(MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA, MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384), #endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256*/ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384 */ + MBEDTLS_TLS_SIG_NONE }; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ From d8c899cb179f2bae8a89740c0f9819681a9a83be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2023 18:14:38 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 013/551] TLS Suite B fix: add ChangeLog entry Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-SuiteB.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-SuiteB.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-SuiteB.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-SuiteB.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0be753ac5e --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-tls-SuiteB.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Bugfix + * Remove accidental introduction of RSA signature algorithms + in TLS Suite B Profile. Fixes #8221. From 7ee4cc302a113edf92ff231573a52eb5b3964ba9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 15:49:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 014/551] Create legacy-API bridge API design document Do the analysis for hashes. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- .../psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 137 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 137 insertions(+) create mode 100644 docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e8f20b2b67 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +Bridges between legacy and PSA crypto APIs +========================================== + +## Introduction + +### Goal of this document + +This document explores the needs of applications that use both Mbed TLS legacy crypto interfaces and PSA crypto interfaces. Based on [requirements](#requirements), we [analyze gaps](#gap-analysis) and [API design](#api-design). + +This is a design document. The target audience is library maintainers. See the companion document [“Transitioning to the PSA API”](../../psa-transition.md) for a user focus on the same topic. + +### Keywords + +* [TODO] A part of the analysis that isn't finished. +* [QUESTION] A specific aspect of the design where there are several plausible decisions. +* [ACTION] A finalized part of the design that will need to be carried out. + +### Context + +Mbed TLS 3.x supports two cryptographic APIs: + +* The legacy API `mbedtls_xxx` is inherited from PolarSSL. +* The PSA API `psa_xxx` was introduced in Mbed TLS 2.17. + +Mbed TLS is gradually shifting from the legacy API to the PSA API. Mbed TLS 4.0 will be the first version where the PSA API is considered the main API, and large parts of the legacy API will be removed. + +In Mbed TLS 4.0, the cryptography will be provided by a separate project [TF-PSA-Crypto](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/TF-PSA-Crypto). For simplicity, in this document, we just refer to the whole as “Mbed TLS”. + +### Document history + +This document was originally written when preparing Mbed TLS 3.6. Mbed TLS 3.6 includes both PSA and legacy APIs covering largely overlapping ground. Many legacy APIs will be removed in Mbed TLS 4.0. + +## Requirements + +### Why mix APIs? + +There is functionality that is tied to one API and is not directly available in the other API: + +* Only PSA fully supports PSA accelerators and secure element integration. +* Only PSA supports isolating cryptographic material in a secure service. +* The legacy API has features that are not present (yet) in PSA, notably parsing and formatting asymmetric keys. + +The legacy API can partially leverage PSA features via `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`, but this has limited scope. + +In addition, many applications cannot be migrated in a single go. For large projects, it is impractical to rewrite a significant part of the code all at once. (For example, Mbed TLS itself will have taken more than 6 years to transition.) Projects that use one or more library in addition to Mbed TLS must follow the evolution of these libraries, each of which might have its own pace. + +### Where mixing happens + +Mbed TLS can be, and normally is, built with support for both APIs. Therefore no special effort is necessary to allow an application to use both APIs. + +Special effort is necessary to use both APIs as part of the implementation of the same feature. From an informal analysis of typical application requirements, we identify four parts of the use of cryptography which can be provided by different APIs: + +* Metadata manipulation: parsing and producing encrypted or signed files, finding mutually supported algorithms in a network protocol negotiation, etc. +* Key management: parsing, generating, deriving and formatting cryptographic keys. +* Data manipulation other than keys. In practice, most data formats within the scope of the legacy crypto APIs are trivial (ciphertexts, hashes, MACs, shared secrets). The one exception is ECDSA signatures. +* Cryptographic operations: hash, sign, encrypt, etc. + +From this, we deduce the following requirements: + +* Convert between PSA and legacy metadata. +* Creating a key with the legacy API and consuming it in the PSA API. +* Creating a key with the PSA API and consuming it in the legacy API. +* Manipulating data formats, other than keys, where the PSA API is lacking. + +### Scope limitations + +The goal of this document is to bridge the legacy API and the PSA API. The goal is not to provide a PSA way to do everything that is currently possible with the legacy API. The PSA API is less flexible in some regards, and extending it is out of scope in the present study. + +With respect to the legacy API, we do not consider functionality of low-level modules for individual algorithms. Our focus is on applications that use high-level legacy crypto modules (md, cipher, pk) and need to combine that with uses of the PSA APIs. + +## Gap analysis + +Based on “[Where mixing happens](#where-mixing-happens)”, we focus the gap analysis on two topics: metadata and keys. This chapter explores the gaps in each family of cryptographic mechanisms. + +### Generic metadata gaps + +#### Need for error code conversion + +[QUESTION] Do we need public functions to convert between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` error codes? We have such functions for internal use. + +### Hash gap analysis + +Hashes do not involve keys, and involves no nontrivial data format. Therefore the only gap is with metadata, namely specifying a hash algorithm. + +Hashes are often used as building blocks for other mechanisms (HMAC, signatures, key derivation, etc.). Therefore metadata about hashes is relevant not only when calculating hashes, but also when performing many other cryptographic operations. + +Gap: functions to convert between `psa_algorithm_t` hash algorithms and `mbedtls_md_type_t`. Such functions exist in Mbed TLS 3.5 (`mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type`, `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg`) but they are declared only in private headers. + +### MAC gap analysis + +[TODO] + +### Cipher and AEAD gap analysis + +[TODO] + +### Key derivation gap analysis + +[TODO] + +### Random generation gap analysis + +[TODO] + +### Asymmetric cryptography gap analysis + +[TODO] + +## New APIs + +This section presents new APIs to implement based on the [gap analysis](#gap-analysis). + +### Hash APIs + +Based on the [gap analysis](#hash-gap-analysis): + +[ACTION] Move `mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type` and `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg` from `library/md_psa.h` to `include/mbedtls/md.h`. + +### MAC APIs + +[TODO] + +### Cipher and AEAD APIs + +[TODO] + +### Key derivation APIs + +[TODO] + +### Random generation APIs + +[TODO] + +### Asymmetric cryptography APIs + +[TODO] From e6886102ef23ad38dd8e3ac8df1e26f34c22c75e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 18:22:06 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 015/551] New function mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id Add a simple function to get the group id from a key object. This information is available via mbedtls_ecp_export, but that function consumes a lot of memory, which is a waste if all you need is to identify the curve. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 12 ++++++++++++ library/ecp.c | 6 ++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index 7f5e880809..a29a6f7a60 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1323,6 +1323,18 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** \brief Query the group that a key pair belongs to. + * + * \param key The key pair to query. + * + * \return The group ID for the group registered in the key pair + * object. + * This is \c MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if no group has been set + * in the key pair object. + */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key); + /** * \brief This function exports generic key-pair parameters. * diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c index ee86cbc6e7..351e9e8feb 100644 --- a/library/ecp.c +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -3357,6 +3357,12 @@ cleanup: } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key) +{ + return key->grp.id; +} + /* * Export generic key-pair parameters. */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index 5751624804..58d54ed084 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -1030,6 +1030,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(int id) &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(&key), id); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&key.grp, &key.Q) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key.grp, &key.d) == 0); @@ -1052,6 +1053,7 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_read_key(int grp_id, data_t *in_key, int expected, int canonica TEST_ASSERT(ret == expected); if (expected == 0) { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(&key), grp_id); ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key.grp, &key.d); TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); @@ -1233,6 +1235,10 @@ void ecp_export(int id, char *Qx, char *Qy, char *d, int expected_ret, int inval TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &export_Q), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&key.d, &export_d), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_cmp(&key.grp, &export_grp), 0); + + /* Check consistency with the group id */ + TEST_EQUAL(export_grp.id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(&key)); } exit: From ba5b5d67aa10e3c7dc5d2136efc226368df1b262 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 18:24:04 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 016/551] Support partial export from mbedtls_ecp_keypair Sometimes you don't need to have all the parts of a key pair object. Relax the behavior of mbedtls_ecp_keypair so that you can extract just the parts that you need. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 9 ++++++--- library/ecp.c | 6 +++--- tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 14 ++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index a29a6f7a60..9effb725d0 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1338,13 +1338,16 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( /** * \brief This function exports generic key-pair parameters. * + * Each of the output parameters can be a null pointer + * if you do not need that parameter. + * * \param key The key pair to export from. * \param grp Slot for exported ECP group. - * It must point to an initialized ECP group. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP group. * \param d Slot for the exported secret value. - * It must point to an initialized mpi. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized mpi. * \param Q Slot for the exported public value. - * It must point to an initialized ECP point. + * It must either be null or point to an initialized ECP point. * * \return \c 0 on success, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c index 351e9e8feb..b4da3c50fe 100644 --- a/library/ecp.c +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -3371,15 +3371,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_export(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) { + if (grp != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(grp, &key->grp)) != 0) { return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) { + if (d != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(d, &key->d)) != 0) { return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { + if (Q != NULL && (ret = mbedtls_ecp_copy(Q, &key->Q)) != 0) { return ret; } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index 58d54ed084..a4c86e283c 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -1239,6 +1239,20 @@ void ecp_export(int id, char *Qx, char *Qy, char *d, int expected_ret, int inval /* Check consistency with the group id */ TEST_EQUAL(export_grp.id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(&key)); + + /* Test null arguments */ + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&export_grp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&export_d); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&export_Q); + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&export_grp); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&export_d); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&export_Q); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_export(&key, &export_grp, NULL, NULL), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_cmp(&key.grp, &export_grp), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_export(&key, NULL, &export_d, NULL), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&key.d, &export_d), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_export(&key, NULL, NULL, &export_Q), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &export_Q), 0); } exit: From 091a85a7624aa452f46d3090718631907c04f215 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 19:51:28 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 017/551] Promise mbedtls_ecp_read_key doesn't overwrite the public key Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 10 ++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 15 +++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index 9effb725d0..f1690085a4 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1262,6 +1262,16 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, /** * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. * + * \note This function does not set the public key in the + * key pair object. Without a public key, the key pair object + * cannot be used with operations that require the public key. + * + * \note If a public key has already been set in the key pair + * object, this function does not check that it is consistent + * with the private key. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() + * after setting both the public key and the private key + * to make that check. + * * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. * \param key The destination key. * \param buf The buffer containing the binary representation of the diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index a4c86e283c..aefb57a582 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -1044,11 +1044,16 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_read_key(int grp_id, data_t *in_key, int expected, int canonica { int ret = 0; mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; - mbedtls_ecp_keypair key2; - mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key2; mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key2); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&key.Q.X, 1), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&key.Q.Y, 2), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&key.Q.Z, 3), 0); +#endif + ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(grp_id, &key, in_key->x, in_key->len); TEST_ASSERT(ret == expected); @@ -1057,6 +1062,12 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_read_key(int grp_id, data_t *in_key, int expected, int canonica ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key.grp, &key.d); TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&key.Q.X, 1), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&key.Q.Y, 2), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&key.Q.Z, 3), 0); +#endif + if (canonical) { unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; From 28240323d3246908aff6379022bebf5678673c98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 19:52:11 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 018/551] New function mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key Set the public key in a key pair. This complements mbedtls_ecp_read_key and the functions can be used in either order. Document the need to call check functions separately. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 32 +++++++++ library/ecp.c | 19 +++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data | 42 +++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 196 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index f1690085a4..96f030d1f2 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1259,6 +1259,38 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** \brief Set the public key in a key pair object. + * + * \note This function does not check that the point actually + * belongs to the given group. Call mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey() + * on \p Q before calling this function to check that. + * + * \note This function does not check that the public key matches + * the private key that is already in \p key, if any. + * To check the consistency of the resulting key pair object, + * call mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() after setting both + * the public key and the private key. + * + * \param grp_id The ECP group identifier. + * \param key The key pair object. It must be initialized. + * If its group has already been set, it must match \p grp_id. + * If its group has not been set, it will be set to \p grp_id. + * If the public key has already been set, it is overwritten. + * \param Q The public key to copy. This must be a point on the + * curve indicated by \p grp_id. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p key does not + * match \p grp_id. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the operation for + * the group is not implemented. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED on memory-allocation failure. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q); + /** * \brief This function reads an elliptic curve private key. * diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c index b4da3c50fe..bb0cf6905c 100644 --- a/library/ecp.c +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -3198,6 +3198,25 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_gen_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (key->grp.id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { + /* Group not set yet */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key->grp, grp_id)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + } else if (key->grp.id != grp_id) { + /* Group mismatch */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + return mbedtls_ecp_copy(&key->Q, Q); +} + + #define ECP_CURVE25519_KEY_SIZE 32 #define ECP_CURVE448_KEY_SIZE 56 /* diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data index 100299195f..8bf288b79e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data @@ -581,6 +581,48 @@ genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ECP generate Montgomery key: Curve448, not enough entropy genkey_mx_known_answer:447:"4f0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f30313233343536":"" +ECP set public key: invalid group (0) +ecp_set_public_key_group_check:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECP set public key: valid group (secp256r1) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_group_check:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:0 + +ECP set public key: group not supported (secp256r1) +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_group_check:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECP set public key: bad group (not in enum) +ecp_set_public_key_group_check:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX:MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE + +ECP set public key: good, secp256r1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_good:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e0e1ff20e1ffe120e1e1e173287170a761308491683e345cacaebb500c96e1a7bbd37772968b2c951f0579" + +ECP set public key: good, Curve25519 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_good:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +ECP set public key after private: good, secp256r1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_after_private:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"70726976617465206b6579":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e0e1ff20e1ffe120e1e1e173287170a761308491683e345cacaebb500c96e1a7bbd37772968b2c951f0579" + +ECP set public key after private: good, Curve25519 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_after_private:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"70076d0a7318a57d3c16c17251b26645df4c2f87ebc0992ab177fba51db92c6a":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +ECP set public key after private: secp256r1 then secp256k1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_after_private:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"70726976617465206b6579":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e0e1ff20e1ffe120e1e1e173287170a761308491683e345cacaebb500c96e1a7bbd37772968b2c951f0579" + +ECP set public key after private: secp256r1 then secp384r1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_after_private:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"70726976617465206b6579":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"04aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaae1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e0e1ff20e1ffe120e1e1e173287170a761308491683e345cacaebb500c96e1a7bbd37772968b2c951f0579bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb" + +ECP set public key after private: secp384r1 then secp256r1 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_set_public_key_after_private:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:"70726976617465206b6579":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"04e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e1e0e1ff20e1ffe120e1e1e173287170a761308491683e345cacaebb500c96e1a7bbd37772968b2c951f0579" + ECP read key #1 (short weierstrass, too small) depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED mbedtls_ecp_read_key:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:"00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:0 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index aefb57a582..53b78d9009 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -1039,6 +1039,109 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_set_public_key_group_check(int grp_id, int expected_ret) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key); + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(grp_id, &key, &Q), + expected_ret); + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&key); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_set_public_key_good(int grp_id, data_t *public_data) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key); + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, grp_id), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&grp, &Q, + public_data->x, public_data->len), + 0); + + /* Freshly initialized key */ + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(grp_id, &key, &Q), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(key.grp.id, grp_id); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &Q), 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + /* Key with a public key already set to a different value */ + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&key.Q.X, &key.Q.X, 1), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&key.Q.Y, &key.Q.Y, 1), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&key.Q.Z, &key.Q.Z, 1), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(grp_id, &key, &Q), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(key.grp.id, grp_id); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &Q), 0); +#endif + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&key); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecp_set_public_key_after_private(int private_grp_id, data_t *private_data, + int public_grp_id, data_t *public_data) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key); + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi d; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&d); +#endif + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, public_grp_id), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&grp, &Q, + public_data->x, public_data->len), + 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_read_key(private_grp_id, &key, + private_data->x, private_data->len), + 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&d, &key.d), 0); +#endif + + int ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(public_grp_id, &key, &Q); + + if (private_grp_id == public_grp_id) { + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + TEST_EQUAL(key.grp.id, public_grp_id); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &Q), 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&d, &key.d), 0); +#endif + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&key); + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + mbedtls_mpi_free(&d); +#endif +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE */ void mbedtls_ecp_read_key(int grp_id, data_t *in_key, int expected, int canonical) { From 7ea72026cde2d9c9e0cc6141f0d8f34493163189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 20:39:08 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 019/551] New function mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public For when you calculate or import a private key, and then need to calculate the public key. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 17 ++++++++++++++ library/ecp.c | 8 +++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data | 18 +++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 77 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index 96f030d1f2..1847f2cb2c 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1365,6 +1365,23 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *pub, const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *prv, int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); +/** \brief Calculate the public key from a private key in a key pair. + * + * \param key A keypair structure. It must have a private key set. + * If the public key is set, it will be overwritten. + * \param f_rng The RNG function. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param p_rng The RNG context to be passed to \p f_rng. This may be \c + * NULL if \p f_rng doesn't need a context. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. The key pair object can be used for + * operations that require the public key. + * \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_XXX or an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_XXX + * error code on calculation failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public( + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); + /** \brief Query the group that a key pair belongs to. * * \param key The key pair to query. diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c index bb0cf6905c..43f7d6930a 100644 --- a/library/ecp.c +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -3374,6 +3374,14 @@ cleanup: return ret; } + +int mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), + void *p_rng) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_mul(&key->grp, &key->Q, &key->d, &key->grp.G, + f_rng, p_rng); +} #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id( diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data index 8bf288b79e..01fdc477f7 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.data @@ -529,6 +529,24 @@ ECP check public-private #7 (wrong Qy) depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edfe":MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":"37cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f76822596292":"4ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edfe":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA +ECP calculate public: secp256r1, good +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_calc_public:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"00f12a1320760270a83cbffd53f6031ef76a5d86c8a204f2c30ca9ebf51f0f0ea7":0:"0437cc56d976091e5a723ec7592dff206eee7cf9069174d0ad14b5f768225962924ee500d82311ffea2fd2345d5d16bd8a88c26b770d55cd8a2a0efa01c8b4edff" + +ECP calculate public: secp256r1, private value out of range +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED +ecp_calc_public:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:"ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:"" + +# Alice's private key from rfc 7748, masked and adjusted for endianness +# because the test function wants the little-endian representation. +ECP calculate public: Curve25519, good +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_calc_public:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"6a2cb91da5fb77b12a99c0eb872f4cdf4566b25172c1163c7da518730a6d0770":0:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + +ECP calculate public: Curve25519, private value not masked +depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED +ecp_calc_public:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:"2a2cb91da5fb77b12a99c0eb872f4cdf4566b25172c1163c7da518730a6d0770":MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_INVALID_KEY:"8520f0098930a754748b7ddcb43ef75a0dbf3a0d26381af4eba4a98eaa9b4e6a" + ECP gen keypair [#1] depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index 53b78d9009..8c8d32699d 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -988,6 +988,40 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +void ecp_calc_public(int grp_id, data_t *private, + int expected_ret, data_t *expected_public) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key); + mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info rnd_info; + memset(&rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof(mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info)); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key.grp, grp_id), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&key.d, private->x, private->len), 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(&key, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info), + expected_ret); + + if (expected_ret == 0) { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv(&key, &key, + &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info), + 0); + unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + size_t length; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key.grp, &key.Q, + MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &length, buf, sizeof(buf)), + 0); + ASSERT_COMPARE(expected_public->x, expected_public->len, buf, length); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&key); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ void mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair(int id) { From ad5e437c8e185d6a6d5ffc5c6e295475d560669c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 21:59:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 020/551] mbedtls_ecp_read_key: explain how to set the public key Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index 1847f2cb2c..fc0a7636b4 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1297,6 +1297,11 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, * \note This function does not set the public key in the * key pair object. Without a public key, the key pair object * cannot be used with operations that require the public key. + * Call mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public() to set the public + * key from the private key. Alternatively, you can call + * mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key() to set the public key part, + * and then optionally mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() to check + * that the private and public parts are consistent. * * \note If a public key has already been set in the key pair * object, this function does not check that it is consistent From 6dd87384ae26c5c828997b582b78265f7c355d50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2023 20:27:19 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 021/551] Rename variable that's a C++ keyword It gave uncrustify trouble (https://github.com/uncrustify/uncrustify/issues/4044) Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index 8c8d32699d..354a92cec8 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -989,7 +989,7 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ -void ecp_calc_public(int grp_id, data_t *private, +void ecp_calc_public(int grp_id, data_t *private_data, int expected_ret, data_t *expected_public) { mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; @@ -998,7 +998,8 @@ void ecp_calc_public(int grp_id, data_t *private, memset(&rnd_info, 0x00, sizeof(mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_info)); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&key.grp, grp_id), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&key.d, private->x, private->len), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&key.d, + private_data->x, private_data->len), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(&key, &mbedtls_test_rnd_pseudo_rand, &rnd_info), From 62e33bcc64c05027a5873830b7a26dbdbb84f282 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2023 22:27:32 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 022/551] New function mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key Directly export the public part of a key pair without having to go through intermediate objects (using mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary would require a group object and a point object). Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/ecp.c | 12 +++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 30 +++++++++++++++++++--------- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index fc0a7636b4..619a8a51a3 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1346,6 +1346,32 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_read_key(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); +/** + * \brief This function exports an elliptic curve public key. + * + * \param key The public key. + * \param format The point format. This must be either + * #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED or #MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED. + * (For groups without these formats, this parameter is + * ignored. But it still has to be either of the above + * values.) + * \param olen The address at which to store the length of + * the output in Bytes. This must not be \c NULL. + * \param buf The output buffer. This must be a writable buffer + * of length \p buflen Bytes. + * \param buflen The length of the output buffer \p buf in Bytes. + * + * \return \c 0 on success. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if the output buffer + * is too small to hold the point. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the point format + * or the export for the given group is not implemented. + * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); + /** * \brief This function checks that the keypair objects * \p pub and \p prv have the same group and the diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c index 43f7d6930a..12924bf325 100644 --- a/library/ecp.c +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -3333,6 +3333,18 @@ cleanup: return ret; } +/* + * Write a public key. + */ +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, + int format, size_t *olen, + unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + return mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->grp, &key->Q, + format, olen, buf, buflen); +} + + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) /* * Check a public-private key pair diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index 354a92cec8..ced4ca3876 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -590,29 +590,41 @@ void ecp_write_binary(int id, char *x, char *y, char *z, int format, { mbedtls_ecp_group grp; mbedtls_ecp_point P; + mbedtls_ecp_keypair key; unsigned char buf[256]; size_t olen; memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&P); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, id) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, id), 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P.X, x) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P.Y, y) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P.Z, z) == 0); - - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&grp, &P, format, - &olen, buf, blen) == ret); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P.X, x), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P.Y, y), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P.Z, z), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&grp, &P, format, + &olen, buf, blen), ret); if (ret == 0) { - TEST_ASSERT(olen <= MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_hexcmp(buf, out->x, olen, out->len) == 0); + TEST_LE_U(olen, MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN); + ASSERT_COMPARE(buf, olen, + out->x, out->len); + } + + memset(buf, 0, blen); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(grp.id, &key, &P), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(&key, format, + &olen, buf, blen), ret); + if (ret == 0) { + ASSERT_COMPARE(buf, olen, + out->x, out->len); } exit: mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&P); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&key); } /* END_CASE */ From 52cc2a6368872eb2116bc3ed1066e884920e91fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2023 22:32:05 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 023/551] Use new mbedtls_ecp_keypair functions in sample programs This eliminates the use of MBEDTLS_PRIVATE in sample programs to access fields of an mbedtls_ecp_keypair structure. When displaying elliptic curve points, the program now display the coordinates in the standard form instead of the internal representation. The auxiliary function show_ecp_key is present in three programs. It's more complex than the previous code which was also triplicated. There's no good place for such auxiliary functions that don't belong in the library and are used in multiple sample programs. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- programs/pkey/ecdsa.c | 23 +++++---- programs/pkey/gen_key.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- programs/pkey/key_app.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 4 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c b/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c index afd6fb31a4..5664b8c4e5 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c +++ b/programs/pkey/ecdsa.c @@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ static void dump_pubkey(const char *title, mbedtls_ecdsa_context *key) unsigned char buf[300]; size_t len; - if (mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary(&key->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp), &key->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q), - MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, &len, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(key, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf("internal error\n"); return; } @@ -79,6 +79,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) int ret = 1; int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; mbedtls_ecdsa_context ctx_sign, ctx_verify; + mbedtls_ecp_point Q; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q); mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctr_drbg; unsigned char message[100]; @@ -128,7 +130,10 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) goto exit; } - mbedtls_printf(" ok (key size: %d bits)\n", (int) ctx_sign.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).pbits); + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(&ctx_sign); + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); + mbedtls_printf(" ok (key size: %d bits)\n", (int) curve_info->bit_size); dump_pubkey(" + Public key: ", &ctx_sign); @@ -174,16 +179,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) mbedtls_printf(" . Preparing verification context..."); fflush(stdout); - if ((ret = - mbedtls_ecp_group_copy(&ctx_verify.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp), - &ctx_sign.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp))) != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_ecp_group_copy returned %d\n", ret); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_export(&ctx_sign, NULL, NULL, &Q)) != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_ecp_export returned %d\n", ret); goto exit; } - if ((ret = - mbedtls_ecp_copy(&ctx_verify.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q), &ctx_sign.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q))) != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_ecp_copy returned %d\n", ret); + if ((ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(grp_id, &ctx_verify, &Q)) != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key returned %d\n", ret); goto exit; } @@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ exit: mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx_verify); mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ctx_sign); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctr_drbg); mbedtls_entropy_free(&entropy); diff --git a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c index f6bb237877..cbdf5b7602 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c +++ b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c @@ -160,6 +160,71 @@ static int write_private_key(mbedtls_pk_context *key, const char *output_file) return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static int show_ecp_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, int has_private) +{ + int ret = 0; + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(ecp)); + mbedtls_printf("curve: %s\n", curve_info->name); + + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + mbedtls_mpi D; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); + mbedtls_ecp_point pt; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&pt); + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_export(ecp, &grp, + (has_private ? &D : NULL), + &pt)); + + unsigned char point_bin[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + size_t len = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( + &grp, &pt, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, point_bin, sizeof(point_bin))); + switch (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp)) { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS: + if ((len & 1) == 0 || point_bin[0] != 0x04) { + /* Point in an unxepected format. This shouldn't happen. */ + ret = -1; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, point_bin + 1, len / 2)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&Y, point_bin + 1 + len / 2, len / 2)); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("X_Q: ", &X, 16, NULL); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Y_Q: ", &Y, 16, NULL); + break; + case MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY: + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, point_bin, len)); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("X_Q: ", &X, 16, NULL); + break; + default: + mbedtls_printf( + "This program does not yet support listing coordinates for this curve type.\n"); + break; + } + + if (has_private) { + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("D: ", &D, 16, NULL); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&pt); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); + return ret; +} +#endif + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int ret = 1; @@ -365,12 +430,10 @@ usage: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec(key); - mbedtls_printf("curve: %s\n", - mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(grp).id)->name); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("X_Q: ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X), 16, NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Y_Q: ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y), 16, NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("D: ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d), 16, NULL); + if (show_ecp_key(mbedtls_pk_ec(key), 1) != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! could not export ECC parameters\n\n"); + goto exit; + } } else #endif mbedtls_printf(" ! key type not supported\n"); diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app.c b/programs/pkey/key_app.c index 194c4102dd..e3a6966050 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/key_app.c +++ b/programs/pkey/key_app.c @@ -53,6 +53,71 @@ int main(void) #else +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static int show_ecp_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, int has_private) +{ + int ret = 0; + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(ecp)); + mbedtls_printf("curve: %s\n", curve_info->name); + + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + mbedtls_mpi D; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); + mbedtls_ecp_point pt; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&pt); + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_export(ecp, &grp, + (has_private ? &D : NULL), + &pt)); + + unsigned char point_bin[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + size_t len = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( + &grp, &pt, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, point_bin, sizeof(point_bin))); + switch (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp)) { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS: + if ((len & 1) == 0 || point_bin[0] != 0x04) { + /* Point in an unxepected format. This shouldn't happen. */ + ret = -1; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, point_bin + 1, len / 2)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&Y, point_bin + 1 + len / 2, len / 2)); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("X_Q: ", &X, 16, NULL); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Y_Q: ", &Y, 16, NULL); + break; + case MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY: + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, point_bin, len)); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("X_Q: ", &X, 16, NULL); + break; + default: + mbedtls_printf( + "This program does not yet support listing coordinates for this curve type.\n"); + break; + } + + if (has_private) { + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("D: ", &D, 16, NULL); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&pt); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); + return ret; +} +#endif + /* * global options */ @@ -219,17 +284,10 @@ usage: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec(pk); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(X): ", - &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X), 16, - NULL)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Y): ", - &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y), 16, - NULL)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Z): ", - &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z), 16, - NULL)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_file("D : ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d), 16, NULL)); + if (show_ecp_key(mbedtls_pk_ec(pk), 1) != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! could not export ECC parameters\n\n"); + goto cleanup; + } } else #endif { @@ -269,16 +327,10 @@ usage: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec(pk); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(X): ", - &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X), 16, - NULL)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Y): ", - &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y), 16, - NULL)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Z): ", - &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z), 16, - NULL)); + if (show_ecp_key(mbedtls_pk_ec(pk), 0) != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! could not export ECC parameters\n\n"); + goto cleanup; + } } else #endif { diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c index c07c56464e..cc4c4dc727 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c +++ b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c @@ -176,6 +176,71 @@ static int write_private_key(mbedtls_pk_context *key, const char *output_file) return 0; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +static int show_ecp_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp, int has_private) +{ + int ret = 0; + + const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = + mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(ecp)); + mbedtls_printf("curve: %s\n", curve_info->name); + + mbedtls_ecp_group grp; + mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); + mbedtls_mpi D; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); + mbedtls_ecp_point pt; + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&pt); + mbedtls_mpi X, Y; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Y); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_export(ecp, &grp, + (has_private ? &D : NULL), + &pt)); + + unsigned char point_bin[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN]; + size_t len = 0; + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_ecp_point_write_binary( + &grp, &pt, MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED, + &len, point_bin, sizeof(point_bin))); + switch (mbedtls_ecp_get_type(&grp)) { + case MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_SHORT_WEIERSTRASS: + if ((len & 1) == 0 || point_bin[0] != 0x04) { + /* Point in an unxepected format. This shouldn't happen. */ + ret = -1; + goto cleanup; + } + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, point_bin + 1, len / 2)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&Y, point_bin + 1 + len / 2, len / 2)); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("X_Q: ", &X, 16, NULL); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Y_Q: ", &Y, 16, NULL); + break; + case MBEDTLS_ECP_TYPE_MONTGOMERY: + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, point_bin, len)); + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("X_Q: ", &X, 16, NULL); + break; + default: + mbedtls_printf( + "This program does not yet support listing coordinates for this curve type.\n"); + break; + } + + if (has_private) { + mbedtls_mpi_write_file("D: ", &D, 16, NULL); + } + +cleanup: + mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D); + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&pt); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Y); + return ret; +} +#endif + int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int ret = 1; @@ -338,11 +403,10 @@ usage: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec(key); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(X): ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X), 16, NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Y): ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y), 16, NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Z): ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z), 16, NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("D : ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(d), 16, NULL); + if (show_ecp_key(mbedtls_pk_ec(key), 1) != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! could not export ECC parameters\n\n"); + goto exit; + } } else #endif mbedtls_printf("key type not supported yet\n"); @@ -384,10 +448,10 @@ usage: #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&key) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) { - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = mbedtls_pk_ec(key); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(X): ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(X), 16, NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Y): ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Y), 16, NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_write_file("Q(Z): ", &ecp->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Q).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(Z), 16, NULL); + if (show_ecp_key(mbedtls_pk_ec(key), 0) != 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! could not export ECC parameters\n\n"); + goto exit; + } } else #endif mbedtls_printf("key type not supported yet\n"); From 9552a52f5f334bf0f0eba5bcb8221c9d6ff29ea1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Sat, 23 Dec 2023 18:44:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 024/551] Declare dependency on bignum in sample programs Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- programs/pkey/gen_key.c | 32 +++++++++++++----------------- programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c | 36 +++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c index cbdf5b7602..6914c9390d 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c +++ b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c @@ -9,8 +9,19 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int main(void) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C " + "not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit(0); +} +#else + #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" @@ -61,7 +72,6 @@ int dev_random_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, return 0; } #endif /* !_WIN32 */ -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #define DFL_EC_CURVE mbedtls_ecp_curve_list()->grp_id @@ -96,19 +106,6 @@ int dev_random_entropy_poll(void *data, unsigned char *output, USAGE_DEV_RANDOM \ "\n" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) -int main(void) -{ - mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " - "MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C" - "not defined.\n"); - mbedtls_exit(0); -} -#else - /* * global options @@ -478,5 +475,4 @@ exit: mbedtls_exit(exit_code); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && - * MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +#endif /* program viability conditions */ diff --git a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c index cc4c4dc727..60f992e431 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c +++ b/programs/pkey/key_app_writer.c @@ -9,9 +9,21 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +int main(void) +{ + mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " + "MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C not defined.\n"); + mbedtls_exit(0); +} +#else + #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -21,7 +33,6 @@ #include #include -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #define USAGE_OUT \ @@ -66,20 +77,6 @@ USAGE_OUT \ "\n" -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) -int main(void) -{ - mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C and/or MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C and/or " - "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C and/or MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or " - "MBEDTLS_FS_IO not defined.\n"); - mbedtls_exit(0); -} -#else - /* * global options @@ -495,5 +492,4 @@ exit: mbedtls_exit(exit_code); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C && MBEDTLS_FS_IO && - MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C && MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C */ +#endif /* program viability conditions */ From 3b17ae78d2123cfb8f1596ff4a9c85d288ba50c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Fri, 23 Jun 2023 11:08:39 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 025/551] Add ECP-heavy-only test cases to the driver parity analysis ignore list Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py index d3ea8c0e1a..96d4e46bb5 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py +++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py @@ -325,6 +325,7 @@ KNOWN_TASKS = { # is required. 'test_suite_ecp': [ re.compile(r'ECP check public-private .*'), + re.compile(r'ECP calculate public: .*'), re.compile(r'ECP gen keypair .*'), re.compile(r'ECP point muladd .*'), re.compile(r'ECP point multiplication .*'), From 28e9d86cbc23ea4f202f9dc639cd3a2925dbc5fe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 20:40:55 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 026/551] Changelog entry for the new ECP functions Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- ChangeLog.d/ecp-keypair-utilities.txt | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/ecp-keypair-utilities.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ecp-keypair-utilities.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ecp-keypair-utilities.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6f9714aaa5 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/ecp-keypair-utilities.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +Features + * Add utility functions to manipulate mbedtls_ecp_keypair objects, filling + gaps made by making its fields private: mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(), + mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(), mbedtls_ecp_keypair_calc_public(), + mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(). Fixes #5017, #5441, #8367, #8652. From 8f1307adcd818f628014d97a77ffb21e06b8d9fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Mon, 25 Dec 2023 21:42:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 027/551] Asymmetric cryptography: rough draft Still many open questions Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- .../psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 194 +++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 189 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index e8f20b2b67..75a05fc24e 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ This is a design document. The target audience is library maintainers. See the c ### Keywords * [TODO] A part of the analysis that isn't finished. -* [QUESTION] A specific aspect of the design where there are several plausible decisions. +* [OPEN] Open question: a specific aspect of the design where there are several plausible decisions. * [ACTION] A finalized part of the design that will need to be carried out. ### Context @@ -70,13 +70,18 @@ With respect to the legacy API, we do not consider functionality of low-level mo ## Gap analysis +The document [“Transitioning to the PSA API”](../../psa-transition.md) enumerates the public header files in Mbed TLS 3.4 and the API elements (especially enums and functions) that they provide, listing PSA equivalents where they exist. There are gaps in two cases: + +* Where the PSA equivalents do not provide the same functionality. A typical example is parsing and formatting asymmetric keys. +* To convert between data representations used by legacy APIs and data representations used by PSA APIs. + Based on “[Where mixing happens](#where-mixing-happens)”, we focus the gap analysis on two topics: metadata and keys. This chapter explores the gaps in each family of cryptographic mechanisms. ### Generic metadata gaps #### Need for error code conversion -[QUESTION] Do we need public functions to convert between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` error codes? We have such functions for internal use. +[OPEN] Do we need public functions to convert between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` error codes? We have such functions for internal use. ### Hash gap analysis @@ -104,17 +109,101 @@ Gap: functions to convert between `psa_algorithm_t` hash algorithms and `mbedtls ### Asymmetric cryptography gap analysis -[TODO] +#### Asymmetric cryptography metadata + +The legacy API only has generic support for two key types: RSA and ECC, via the pk module. The type of ECC keys is divided in subtypes: one for each curve. The legacy API also supports DHM (Diffie-Hellman-Merkle = FFDH: finite-field Diffie-Hellman) keys, but those are not integrated in the pk module. + +An RSA or ECC key can potentially be used for different algorithms in the scope of the pk module: + +* RSA: PKCS#1v1.5 signature, PSS signature, PKCS#1v1.5 encryption, OAEP encryption. +* ECC: ECDSA signature (randomized or deterministic), ECDH key agreement. + +ECC keys are also involved in EC-JPAKE, but this happens internally: the EC-JPAKE interface only needs one piece of metadata, namely, to identify a curve. + +Since there is no algorithm that can be used with multiple types, and PSA keys have a policy that (for the most part) limits them to one algorithm, there does not seem to be a need to convert between legacy and PSA asymmetric key types on their own. The useful metadata conversions are: + +* Selecting an **elliptic curve**. + + This means converting between an `mbedtls_ecp_group_id` and a pair of `{psa_ecc_family_t; size_t}`. + + This is fulfilled by `mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa` and `mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa`, which were introduced into the public API after Mbed TLS 3.5. + +* Selecting A **DHM group**. + + PSA only supports predefined groups, whereas legacy only supports ad hoc groups. An existing application referring to `MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHExxx` values would need to refer to `PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919`; an existing application using arbitrary groups cannot migrate to PSA. + +* Simultaneously supporting **a key type and an algorithm**. + + On the legacy side, this is an `mbedtls_pk_type_t` value and more. For ECDSA, the choice between randomized and deterministic is made at compile time. For RSA, the choice of encryption or signature algorithm is made either by configuring the underlying `mbedtls_rsa_context` or when calling the operation function. + + On the PSA side, this is a `psa_key_type_t` value and an algorithm which is normally encoded as policy information in a `psa_key_attributes_t`. The algorithm is also needed in its own right when calling operation functions. + +#### Using a legacy key pair or public key with PSA + +There are several scenarios where an application has a legacy key pair or public key (`mbedtls_pk_context`) and needs to create a PSA key object (`psa_key_id_t`). + +Reasons for creating a legacy key object, where it's impossible or impractical to directly create a PSA key: + +* A very common case where the input is a legacy key object is parsing. PSA does not (yet) have an equivalent of the `mbedtls_pk_parse_xxx` functions. +* The PSA key creation interface is less flexible in some cases. In particular, PSA RSA key generation does not (yet) allow choosing the public exponent. +* The pk object may be created by a part of the application (or a third-party library) that hasn't been migrated to the PSA API yet. + +Reasons for needing a PSA key object: + +* Using the key in TLS 1.3 or some third-party interface that takes a PSA key identifier as input. +* Benefiting from a PSA accelerator, or from PSA's world separation, even without `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. (Not a priority scenario: we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA.) + +Gap: a way to create a PSA key object from an `mbedtls_pk_context`. This partially exists in the form of `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`, but it is not fully satisfactory, for reasons that are detailed in “[API to create a PSA key from a PK context](#api-to-create-a-psa-key-from-a-pk-context)” below. + +#### Using a PSA key as a PK context + +There are several scenarios where an application has a PSA key and needs to use it through an interface that wants an `mbedtls_pk_context` object. Typically, there is an existing key in the PSA key store (possibly in a secure element and non-exportable), and the key needs to be used in an interface that requires a `mbedtls_pk_context *` input, such as Mbed TLS's X.509 API or a similar third-party interface, or the `mbedtls_pk_write_xxx` interfaces which do not (yet) have PSA equivalents. + +There is a function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` that mostly does this. However, it has several limitations: + +* It creates a PK key of type `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE` that wraps the PSA key. This is good enough in some scenarios, but not others. For example, it's ok for pkwrite, because we've upgraded the pkwrite code to handle `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That doesn't help users of third-party libraries that haven't yet been upgraded. +* It ties the lifetime of the PK object to the PSA key, which is error-prone: if the PSA key is destroyed but the PK object isn't, there is no way to reliably detect any subsequent misuse of the PK object. +* It is only available under `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. (Not a priority concern: we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA.) + +Gap: a way to copy a PSA key into a PK context. This can only be expected to work if the PSA key is exportable. + +[OPEN] Is `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` ok or do we want to tweak it? + +#### Signature formats + +The pk module uses signature formats intended for X.509. The PSA module uses the simplest sensible signature format. + +* For RSA, the formats are the same. +* For ECDSA, PSA uses a fixed-size concatenation of (r,s), whereas X.509 and pk use an ASN.1 DER encoding of the sequence (r,s). + +Gap: We need APIs to convert between these two formats. The conversion code already exists under the hood, but it's in pieces that can't be called directly. + +There is a design choice here: do we provide conversions functions for ECDSA specifically, or do we provide conversion functions that take an algorithm as argument and just happen to be a no-op with RSA? One factor is plausible extensions. These conversions functions will remain useful in Mbed TLS 4.x and perhaps beyond. We will at least add EdDSA support, and its signature encoding is the fixed-size concatenation (r,s) even in X.509. We may well also add support for some post-quantum signatures, and their concrete format is still uncertain. + +Given the uncertainty, it would be nice to provide a sufficiently generic interface to convert between the PSA and the pk signature format, parametrized by the algorithm. However, it is difficult to predict exactly what parameters are needed. For example, converting from an ASN.1 ECDSA signature to (r,s) requires the knowledge of the curve, or at least the curve's size. + +#### Asymmetric cryptography TODO + +[TODO] Other gaps? ## New APIs This section presents new APIs to implement based on the [gap analysis](#gap-analysis). +### General notes + +Each action to implement a function entails: + +* Implement the library function. +* Document it precisely, including error conditions. +* Unit-test it. +* Mention it where relevant in the PSA transition guide. + ### Hash APIs Based on the [gap analysis](#hash-gap-analysis): -[ACTION] Move `mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type` and `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg` from `library/md_psa.h` to `include/mbedtls/md.h`. +[ACTION] [#8340](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8340) Move `mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type` and `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg` from `library/md_psa.h` to `include/mbedtls/md.h`. ### MAC APIs @@ -134,4 +223,99 @@ Based on the [gap analysis](#hash-gap-analysis): ### Asymmetric cryptography APIs -[TODO] +#### Asymmetric cryptography metadata APIs + +Based on the [gap analysis](#asymmetric-cryptography-metadata): + +* No further work is needed about RSA specifically. The amount of metadata other than hashes is sufficiently small to be handled in ad hoc ways in applications, and hashes have [their own conversions](#hash-apis). +* No further work is needed about ECC specifically. We have just added adequate functions. +* No further work is needed about DHM specifically. There is no good way to translate the relevant information. +* [OPEN] Is there a decent way to convert between `mbedtls_pk_type_t` plus extra information, and `psa_key_type_t` plus policy information? The two APIs are different in crucial ways, with different splits between key type, policy information and operation algorithm. + +#### API to create a PSA key from a PK context + +Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-legacy-key-pair-or-public-key-with-psa): + +Given an `mbedtls_pk_context`, we want a function that creates a PSA key with the same key material and algorithm. “Same key material” is straightforward, but “same algorithm” is not, because a PK context has incomplete algorithm information. For example, there is no way to distinguish between an RSA key that is intended for signature or for encryption. Between algorithms of the same nature, there is no way to distinguish a key intended for PKCS#1v1.5 and one intended for PKCS#1v2.1 (OAEP/PSS): this is indicated in the underlying RSA context, but the indication there is only a default that can be overridden by calling `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}_ext`. Also there is no way to distinguish between `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)` and `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW`: in the legacy interface, this is only determined when actually doing a signature/verification operation. Therefore the function that creates the PSA key needs extra information to indicate which algorithm to put in the key's policy. + +When creating a PSA key, apart from the key material, the key is determined by attributes, which fall under three categories: + +* Type and size. These are directly related to the key material and can be deduced from it if the key material is in a structured format, which is the case with an `mbedtls_pk_context` input. +* Policy. This includes the chosen algorithm, which as discussed above cannot be fully deduced from the `mbedtls_pk_context` object. Just choosing one algorithm is problematic because it doesn't allow implementation-specific extensions, such as Mbed TLS's enrollment algorithm. The intended usage flags cannot be deduced from the PK context either, but the conversion function could sensibly just enable all the relevant usage flags. Users who want a more restrictive usage can call `psa_copy_key` and `psa_destroy_key` to obtain a PSA key object with a more restrictive usage. +* Persistence and location. This is completely orthogonal to the information from the `mbedtls_pk_context` object. It is convenient, but not necessary, for the conversion function to allow customizing these aspects. If it doesn't, users can call the conversion function and then call `psa_copy_key` and `psa_destroy_key` to move the key to its desired location. + +To allow the full flexibility around policies, and make the creation of a persistent key more convenient, the conversion function shall take a `const psa_key_attributes_t *` input, like all other functions that create a PSA key. In addition, there shall be a helper function to populate a `psa_key_attributes_t` with a sensible default. This lets the caller choose a more flexible, or just different usage policy, unlike the default-then-copy approach which only allows restricting the policy. + +This is close to the existing function `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`, but does not bake in the implementation-specific consideration that a PSA key has exactly two algorithms, and also allows the caller to benefit from default for the policy in more cases. + +[ACTION] Implement `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` and `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` as described below. These functions are available whenever `MBEDTLS_PK_C` and `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` are both defined. Deprecate `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`. + +``` +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); +int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t *key_id); +``` + +* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` does not change the id/lifetime fields of the attributes (which indicate a volatile key by default). +* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the type and size based on what's in the pk context. + * The key type is a key pair if the context contains a private key, and a public key if the context only contains a public key. +* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets all the potentially applicable usage flags: `EXPORT`, `COPY`; `VERIFY_HASH | VERIFY_MESSAGE` or `ENCRYPT` as applicable for both public keys and key pairs; `SIGN` or `DECRYPT` as applicable for a key pair. +* [OPEN] What is the default algorithm for `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes`? Suggestion: assume signature by default. For RSA, either `PSA_RSA_PKCS1_V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` or `PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg)` depending on the RSA context's padding mode. For ECC, `PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` if `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC` is enabled and `PSA_ALG_ECDSA` otherwise. +* [OPEN] Or does `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` need an extra argument indicating how to treat RSA and ECC keys? +* `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` checks that the type field in the attributes is consistent with the content of the `mbedtls_pk_context` object (RSA/ECC, and availability of the private key). + * The key type can be a public key even if the private key is available. +* `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` does not need to check the bit-size in the attributes: `psa_import_key` will do enough checks. +* `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` does not check that the policy in the attributes is sensible. That's on the user. + +#### API to copy a PSA key to a PK context + +Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-psa-key-as-a-pk-context): + +[ACTION] Implement `mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa` as described below. + +``` +int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk); +``` + +* `pk` must be initialized, but not set up. +* It is an error if the key is neither a key pair nor a public key. +* It is an error if the key is not exportable. +* The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. +* Once this function returns, the pk object is completely independent of the PSA key. +* Calling `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt` on the resulting pk context will perform an algorithm that is compatible with the PSA key's primary algorithm policy (`psa_get_key_algorithm`), but with no restriction on the hash (as if the policy had `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` instead of a specific hash, and with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW` merged with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)`). For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will be based on the compile-time setting `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC`, like `mbedtls_pk_sign` today. + * [OPEN] How do we distinguish between signature-only and encryption-only RSA keys? Do we just allow both (e.g. a PSS key gets generalized into a PSS/OAEP key)? + * [OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`? + +[OPEN] Should there be a way to use a different algorithm? This can be resolved by `psa_copy_key` on the input to tweak the policy if needed. + +#### API to create a PK object that wraps a PSA key + +Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-psa-key-as-a-pk-context): + +[ACTION] Clarify the documentation of `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` regarding which algorithms the resulting key will perform with `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt`. + +[OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`? + +#### API to convert between signature formats + +Based on the [gap analysis](#signature-formats): + +[ACTION] [#7765](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7765) Implement `mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der` and `mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw` as described below. + +``` +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len); +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, + size_t bits); +``` + +* These functions convert between the signature format used by `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}{,_ext}` and the signature format used by `psa_{sign,verify}_{hash,message}`. +* The input and output buffers can overlap. +* [OPEN] Should we maybe use a different interface that is better integrated with ASN.1 and X.509 parsing and writing functions in Mbed TLS? That is: + * DER production writes from right to left in the destination buffer. + * DER parsing takes a pointer-to-pointer to the start of the buffer and an end pointer, instead of pointer-to-start and size. + * Names should match the patterns found in X.509 and ASN.1 parsing and writing function. From 93cdb778352ca5a59d9074aecc9f3359abaabe06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 13:15:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 028/551] Minor clarifications Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- .../psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 75a05fc24e..5798728c2e 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -111,12 +111,12 @@ Gap: functions to convert between `psa_algorithm_t` hash algorithms and `mbedtls #### Asymmetric cryptography metadata -The legacy API only has generic support for two key types: RSA and ECC, via the pk module. The type of ECC keys is divided in subtypes: one for each curve. The legacy API also supports DHM (Diffie-Hellman-Merkle = FFDH: finite-field Diffie-Hellman) keys, but those are not integrated in the pk module. +The legacy API only has generic support for two key types: RSA and ECC, via the pk module. ECC keys can also be further classified according to their curve. The legacy API also supports DHM (Diffie-Hellman-Merkle = FFDH: finite-field Diffie-Hellman) keys, but those are not integrated in the pk module. An RSA or ECC key can potentially be used for different algorithms in the scope of the pk module: * RSA: PKCS#1v1.5 signature, PSS signature, PKCS#1v1.5 encryption, OAEP encryption. -* ECC: ECDSA signature (randomized or deterministic), ECDH key agreement. +* ECC: ECDSA signature (randomized or deterministic), ECDH key agreement (via `mbedtls_pk_ec`). ECC keys are also involved in EC-JPAKE, but this happens internally: the EC-JPAKE interface only needs one piece of metadata, namely, to identify a curve. @@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ Since there is no algorithm that can be used with multiple types, and PSA keys h There are several scenarios where an application has a legacy key pair or public key (`mbedtls_pk_context`) and needs to create a PSA key object (`psa_key_id_t`). -Reasons for creating a legacy key object, where it's impossible or impractical to directly create a PSA key: +Reasons for first creating a legacy key object, where it's impossible or impractical to directly create a PSA key: * A very common case where the input is a legacy key object is parsing. PSA does not (yet) have an equivalent of the `mbedtls_pk_parse_xxx` functions. * The PSA key creation interface is less flexible in some cases. In particular, PSA RSA key generation does not (yet) allow choosing the public exponent. @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ Gap: a way to create a PSA key object from an `mbedtls_pk_context`. This partial #### Using a PSA key as a PK context -There are several scenarios where an application has a PSA key and needs to use it through an interface that wants an `mbedtls_pk_context` object. Typically, there is an existing key in the PSA key store (possibly in a secure element and non-exportable), and the key needs to be used in an interface that requires a `mbedtls_pk_context *` input, such as Mbed TLS's X.509 API or a similar third-party interface, or the `mbedtls_pk_write_xxx` interfaces which do not (yet) have PSA equivalents. +There are several scenarios where an application has a PSA key and needs to use it through an interface that wants an `mbedtls_pk_context` object. Typically, there is an existing key in the PSA key store (possibly in a secure element and non-exportable), and the key needs to be used in an interface that requires a `mbedtls_pk_context *` input, such as Mbed TLS's X.509 and TLS APIs or a similar third-party interface, or the `mbedtls_pk_write_xxx` interfaces which do not (yet) have PSA equivalents. There is a function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` that mostly does this. However, it has several limitations: @@ -165,6 +165,11 @@ There is a function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` that mostly does this. However, it * It ties the lifetime of the PK object to the PSA key, which is error-prone: if the PSA key is destroyed but the PK object isn't, there is no way to reliably detect any subsequent misuse of the PK object. * It is only available under `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. (Not a priority concern: we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA.) +It therefore appears that we need two ways to “convert” a PSA key to PK: + +* Wrapping, which is what `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` does. This works for any PSA key but is limited by the key's lifetime and creates a PK object with limited functionality. +* Copying, which requires a new function. This requires an exportable key but creates a fully independent, fully functional PK object. + Gap: a way to copy a PSA key into a PK context. This can only be expected to work if the PSA key is exportable. [OPEN] Is `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` ok or do we want to tweak it? @@ -180,7 +185,7 @@ Gap: We need APIs to convert between these two formats. The conversion code alre There is a design choice here: do we provide conversions functions for ECDSA specifically, or do we provide conversion functions that take an algorithm as argument and just happen to be a no-op with RSA? One factor is plausible extensions. These conversions functions will remain useful in Mbed TLS 4.x and perhaps beyond. We will at least add EdDSA support, and its signature encoding is the fixed-size concatenation (r,s) even in X.509. We may well also add support for some post-quantum signatures, and their concrete format is still uncertain. -Given the uncertainty, it would be nice to provide a sufficiently generic interface to convert between the PSA and the pk signature format, parametrized by the algorithm. However, it is difficult to predict exactly what parameters are needed. For example, converting from an ASN.1 ECDSA signature to (r,s) requires the knowledge of the curve, or at least the curve's size. +Given the uncertainty, it would be nice to provide a sufficiently generic interface to convert between the PSA and the pk signature format, parametrized by the algorithm. However, it is difficult to predict exactly what parameters are needed. For example, converting from an ASN.1 ECDSA signature to (r,s) requires the knowledge of the curve, or at least the curve's size. Therefore we are not going to add a generic function at this stage. #### Asymmetric cryptography TODO @@ -263,7 +268,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, * The key type is a key pair if the context contains a private key, and a public key if the context only contains a public key. * `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets all the potentially applicable usage flags: `EXPORT`, `COPY`; `VERIFY_HASH | VERIFY_MESSAGE` or `ENCRYPT` as applicable for both public keys and key pairs; `SIGN` or `DECRYPT` as applicable for a key pair. * [OPEN] What is the default algorithm for `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes`? Suggestion: assume signature by default. For RSA, either `PSA_RSA_PKCS1_V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` or `PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg)` depending on the RSA context's padding mode. For ECC, `PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` if `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC` is enabled and `PSA_ALG_ECDSA` otherwise. -* [OPEN] Or does `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` need an extra argument indicating how to treat RSA and ECC keys? +* [OPEN] Or does `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` need an extra argument that conveys some kind of policy for RSA keys and, independently, some kind of policy for ECC keys? * `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` checks that the type field in the attributes is consistent with the content of the `mbedtls_pk_context` object (RSA/ECC, and availability of the private key). * The key type can be a public key even if the private key is available. * `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` does not need to check the bit-size in the attributes: `psa_import_key` will do enough checks. From a7226a1f60fa08f2f8de65d67241b7aaad8a9693 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 13:15:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 029/551] Our TLS 1.3 API doesn't actually require PSA key identifiers Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 5798728c2e..6ffe28f09a 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Reasons for first creating a legacy key object, where it's impossible or impract Reasons for needing a PSA key object: -* Using the key in TLS 1.3 or some third-party interface that takes a PSA key identifier as input. +* Using the key with third-party interface that takes a PSA key identifier as input. (Mbed TLS itself has a few TLS functions that take PSA key identifiers, but as of Mbed TLS 3.5, it is always possible to use a legacy key instead.) * Benefiting from a PSA accelerator, or from PSA's world separation, even without `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. (Not a priority scenario: we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA.) Gap: a way to create a PSA key object from an `mbedtls_pk_context`. This partially exists in the form of `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`, but it is not fully satisfactory, for reasons that are detailed in “[API to create a PSA key from a PK context](#api-to-create-a-psa-key-from-a-pk-context)” below. From f80dcc5f8bb54ae441be07a5cac3c77c22e70263 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 13:15:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 030/551] Resolve ECDSA conversion API: don't use an ASN.1 interface Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 6ffe28f09a..0c3e05a650 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -187,6 +187,8 @@ There is a design choice here: do we provide conversions functions for ECDSA spe Given the uncertainty, it would be nice to provide a sufficiently generic interface to convert between the PSA and the pk signature format, parametrized by the algorithm. However, it is difficult to predict exactly what parameters are needed. For example, converting from an ASN.1 ECDSA signature to (r,s) requires the knowledge of the curve, or at least the curve's size. Therefore we are not going to add a generic function at this stage. +For ECDSA, there are two plausible APIs: follow the ASN.1/X.509 write/parse APIs, or present an ordinary input/output API. The ASN.1 APIs are the way they are to accommodate nested TLV structures. But ECDSA signatures do not appear nested in TLV structures in either TLS (there's just a signature field) or X.509 (the signature is inside a BITSTRING, not directly in a SEQUENCE). So there does not seem to be a need for an ASN.1-like API for the ASN.1 format, just the format conversion itself in a buffer that just contains the signature. + #### Asymmetric cryptography TODO [TODO] Other gaps? @@ -320,7 +322,3 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, * These functions convert between the signature format used by `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}{,_ext}` and the signature format used by `psa_{sign,verify}_{hash,message}`. * The input and output buffers can overlap. -* [OPEN] Should we maybe use a different interface that is better integrated with ASN.1 and X.509 parsing and writing functions in Mbed TLS? That is: - * DER production writes from right to left in the destination buffer. - * DER parsing takes a pointer-to-pointer to the start of the buffer and an end pointer, instead of pointer-to-start and size. - * Names should match the patterns found in X.509 and ASN.1 parsing and writing function. From 9fe1c699a8a73a528878f3072c5ee127a3928f84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 13:16:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 031/551] Clarify PSA-to-PK copy intent Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 0c3e05a650..064b7d2788 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -290,9 +290,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, * `pk` must be initialized, but not set up. * It is an error if the key is neither a key pair nor a public key. * It is an error if the key is not exportable. -* The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. +* The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That's `MBEDTLS_PK_RSA` for RSA keys (since pk objects don't use `MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS)` as a type, and `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` for ECC keys (following the example of pkparse). * Once this function returns, the pk object is completely independent of the PSA key. * Calling `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt` on the resulting pk context will perform an algorithm that is compatible with the PSA key's primary algorithm policy (`psa_get_key_algorithm`), but with no restriction on the hash (as if the policy had `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` instead of a specific hash, and with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW` merged with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)`). For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will be based on the compile-time setting `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC`, like `mbedtls_pk_sign` today. + * The primary intent of this requirement is to allow an application to switch to PSA for creating the key material (for example to benefit from a PSA accelerator driver, or to start using a secure element), without modifying the code that consumes the key. For RSA keys, the PSA primary algorithm policy is how one conveys the same information as RSA key padding information in the legacy API. [ACTION] Convey this in the documentation. * [OPEN] How do we distinguish between signature-only and encryption-only RSA keys? Do we just allow both (e.g. a PSS key gets generalized into a PSS/OAEP key)? * [OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`? From 45c3cae8a5b9c6282d3ffb3efd980ac92f5a4288 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 13:26:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 032/551] md: move PSA conversion functions from md_psa.h to psa_util.h Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/md_psa.h | 37 ------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 5f6a05315a..249b8d421c 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -148,6 +148,43 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, int bits_is_sloppy); #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +/** + * \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier + * associated with the given digest type. + * + * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE. + * + * \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will + * not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm. + * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * + * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type, + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + */ +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type; +} + +/** + * \brief This function returns the given digest type + * associated with the PSA algorithm identifier. + * + * \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for. + * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * + * \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg, + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + */ +static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) +{ + return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); +} + /**@}*/ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/md_psa.h b/library/md_psa.h index b201263b1a..028ba2409c 100644 --- a/library/md_psa.h +++ b/library/md_psa.h @@ -15,43 +15,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/md.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" -/** - * \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier - * associated with the given digest type. - * - * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE. - * - * \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will - * not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm. - * - * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is - * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. - * - * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type, - * regardless of whether it is supported or not. - */ -static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) -{ - return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type; -} - -/** - * \brief This function returns the given digest type - * associated with the PSA algorithm identifier. - * - * \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for. - * - * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is - * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. - * - * \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg, - * regardless of whether it is supported or not. - */ -static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) -{ - return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); -} - /** Convert PSA status to MD error code. * * \param status PSA status. From 384fbde49a4e9d6b87dac45217557eed06267661 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 13:26:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 033/551] library/tests: replace md_psa.h with psa_util.h as include file for MD conversion Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pk.c | 2 +- library/pk_wrap.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 2 +- library/ssl_ciphersuites.c | 2 +- library/ssl_cookie.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls.c | 1 + library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_keys.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 2 +- library/x509_crt.c | 2 +- library/x509write_crt.c | 2 +- library/x509write_csr.c | 2 +- tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_md.function | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function | 2 +- 20 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 61ac0dfab0..9261837017 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa_util_internal.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif #include diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c index 9247945230..c232650229 100644 --- a/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include "pk_wrap.h" #include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" /* Even if RSA not activated, for the sake of RSA-alt */ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 10d17b6df5..a20dafaf01 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" #include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/sha512.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index e4a372d242..41641549c9 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include "psa_crypto_core.h" #include "psa_crypto_ecp.h" #include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include #include diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c index 0679f41eab..7b58ea22a5 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #include "psa_crypto_random_impl.h" #include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" #include "psa_crypto_hash.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include #include diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c index 6224ef205f..23619a26c8 100644 --- a/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c +++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif #include diff --git a/library/ssl_cookie.c b/library/ssl_cookie.c index ee81eb420f..2772cac4be 100644 --- a/library/ssl_cookie.c +++ b/library/ssl_cookie.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" /* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many * arguments in each translating place. */ static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index e1fb1283e6..28bf1d8a0c 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include "md_psa.h" #include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index ae1136431e..ffaffe925a 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #include "ssl_client.h" #include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" #include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) /* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index fe2a2eba78..30b444d597 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" #include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c index 9b775ec954..edb453c3e2 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #include "ssl_tls13_invasive.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" /* Define a local translating function to save code size by not using too many * arguments in each translating place. */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index fe7a674d66..82b6bfcec1 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" #include "ssl_tls13_keys.h" diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c index 4e7672e374..84b92a891a 100644 --- a/library/x509_crt.c +++ b/library/x509_crt.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa_util_internal.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include "pk_internal.h" diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c index 44b6b1781e..913b15a709 100644 --- a/library/x509write_crt.c +++ b/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa_util_internal.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ void mbedtls_x509write_crt_init(mbedtls_x509write_cert *ctx) diff --git a/library/x509write_csr.c b/library/x509write_csr.c index 254da69a9f..af75e7f720 100644 --- a/library/x509write_csr.c +++ b/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa_util_internal.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #include diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index d02d305394..6233580b95 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ */ #include -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function index 9d9aa3c778..0e870d80fd 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_constant_time_hmac.function @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ #include #include #include -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include #include diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function index 866ff588f8..2a885e2371 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* BEGIN_HEADER */ #include "mbedtls/md.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 226598c724..f054443178 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ * but the test code generator requires test case data to be valid C code * unconditionally (https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/2023). */ #include "psa/crypto.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" /* Used for properly sizing the key buffer in pk_genkey_ec() */ #include "psa_util_internal.h" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function index b59fd48f3c..543b441ffe 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#include "md_psa.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) int mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func(void *ctx, size_t *olen, From 3d2e0f5f42b9ac646f63d67e442f4af0f8a3fe4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 14:57:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 034/551] psa_util: add algorithm's availability checks for MD conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 27 +++------- library/psa_util.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 249b8d421c..e8fb3de61a 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -152,21 +152,12 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, * \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier * associated with the given digest type. * - * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE. + * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. * - * \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will - * not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm. - * - * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is - * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. - * - * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type, - * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type; + * #PSA_ALG_NONE if the algorithm is unuspported or invalid. */ -static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) -{ - return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type; -} +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type); /** * \brief This function returns the given digest type @@ -174,16 +165,10 @@ static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_ * * \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for. * - * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is - * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. - * * \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg, - * regardless of whether it is supported or not. + * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if the algorithm is unsupported or invalid. */ -static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) -{ - return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); -} +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg); /**@}*/ diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 9b06de273f..bb054a33fb 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -330,4 +330,110 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, } #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + switch (md_type) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) + case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: + return PSA_ALG_MD5; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: + return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_224; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_256; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_384; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: + return PSA_ALG_SHA_512; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_224; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_256; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_384; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) + case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: + return PSA_ALG_SHA3_512; +#endif + case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: + default: + return PSA_ALG_NONE; + } +} + +mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) +{ + switch (psa_alg) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) + case PSA_ALG_MD5: + return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) + case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: + return MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384; +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) + case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: + return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512; +#endif + case PSA_ALG_NONE: + default: + return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; + } +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ From 2c1070b39700be8a6fcda5f2266e8bbe5ac42e1c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 14:58:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 035/551] test_suite_md: improve md_to_from_psa() test function and related data Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_md.data | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- tests/suites/test_suite_md.function | 24 +++------------ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data index fb9b5effa0..b831500d6f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data @@ -2,8 +2,52 @@ MD list mbedtls_md_list: -MD <-> PSA conversion -md_to_from_psa: +MD <-> PSA conversion - MD5 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:PSA_ALG_MD5 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - RIPEMD160 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:PSA_ALG_SHA_1 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:PSA_ALG_SHA_224 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:PSA_ALG_SHA_256 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:PSA_ALG_SHA_384 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:PSA_ALG_SHA_512 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_224 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_384 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_512 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 + +MD <-> PSA conversion - NONE +md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE MD NULL/uninitialised arguments md_null_args: diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function index 2a885e2371..0a8e4216ee 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function @@ -4,10 +4,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" - -#define MD_PSA(md, psa) \ - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md), psa); \ - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa), md); /* END_HEADER */ /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES @@ -63,23 +59,13 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ -void md_to_from_psa() +void md_to_from_psa(int md_alg_arg, int psa_alg_arg) { - /* We use a simplified implementation that relies on numerical values - * being aligned, so make sure they remain so. */ - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, PSA_ALG_MD5); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, PSA_ALG_SHA_1); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, PSA_ALG_SHA_224); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, PSA_ALG_SHA_512); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, PSA_ALG_SHA3_224); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, PSA_ALG_SHA3_256); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, PSA_ALG_SHA3_384); - MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, PSA_ALG_SHA3_512); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = md_alg_arg; + psa_algorithm_t psa_alg = psa_alg_arg; - /* Don't test for NONE<->NONE as this is not guaranteed */ + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg), psa_alg); \ + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_alg), md_alg); } /* END_CASE */ From a835d6da087ff55e9ec103074bba805490862140 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 15:02:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 036/551] changelog: document MD's conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8664.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/8664.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8664.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8664.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..03e297c18b --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8664.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Features + * mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type() and mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg() helper + functions were added to convert from mbedtls_md_type_t to psa_algorithm_t + and viceversa. From a87cd17b35325092ebb7933ccad61303de89b12a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 15:12:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 037/551] psa-transition: update with MD translation functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- docs/psa-transition.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/psa-transition.md b/docs/psa-transition.md index 067ffafbd3..48beb80a34 100644 --- a/docs/psa-transition.md +++ b/docs/psa-transition.md @@ -443,6 +443,10 @@ The equivalent to `mbedtls_md_type_t` and `MBEDTLS_MD_XXX` constants is the type | `MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384` | `PSA_ALG_SHA3_384` | | `MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512` | `PSA_ALG_SHA3_512` | +The following helper functions can be used to convert between the 2 types: +- `mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type()` converts from legacy `mbedtls_md_type_t` to PSA's `psa_algorithm_t`. +- `mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg()` converts from PSA's `psa_algorithm_t` to legacy `mbedtls_md_type_t`. + ### MAC mechanism selection PSA Crypto has a generic API with the same functions for all MAC mechanisms. The mechanism is determined by a combination of an algorithm value of type [`psa_algorithm_t`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1gac2e4d47f1300d73c2f829a6d99252d69) and a key type value of type [`psa_key_type_t`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga63fce6880ca5933b5d6baa257febf1f6). From 39b7bba8a08ad1fd171659ea8f231627a6f3367c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 17:56:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 038/551] Make input parameter const Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/ecp.h | 2 +- library/ecp.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h index 619a8a51a3..76aef32fbc 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ecp.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ecp.h @@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecp_write_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, * or the export for the given group is not implemented. * \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int format, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen); diff --git a/library/ecp.c b/library/ecp.c index 12924bf325..758d54bd76 100644 --- a/library/ecp.c +++ b/library/ecp.c @@ -3336,7 +3336,7 @@ cleanup: /* * Write a public key. */ -int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, +int mbedtls_ecp_write_public_key(const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *key, int format, size_t *olen, unsigned char *buf, size_t buflen) { From 5d867872dda985052ac9304f06f7060f4f15e261 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 17:57:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 039/551] Improve readability of null-argument tests Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index ced4ca3876..c8be4e581b 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -1401,17 +1401,21 @@ void ecp_export(int id, char *Qx, char *Qy, char *d, int expected_ret, int inval TEST_EQUAL(export_grp.id, mbedtls_ecp_keypair_get_group_id(&key)); - /* Test null arguments */ + /* Test null arguments: grp only */ mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&export_grp); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&export_d); - mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&export_Q); mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&export_grp); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&export_d); - mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&export_Q); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_export(&key, &export_grp, NULL, NULL), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_cmp(&key.grp, &export_grp), 0); + + /* Test null arguments: d only */ + mbedtls_mpi_free(&export_d); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&export_d); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_export(&key, NULL, &export_d, NULL), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&key.d, &export_d), 0); + + /* Test null arguments: Q only */ + mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&export_Q); + mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&export_Q); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_export(&key, NULL, NULL, &export_Q), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &export_Q), 0); } From a10d112e456bfebab8a55757d8ef1efc7d90e54d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 14:08:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 040/551] Remove useless guards on MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C All of ECP requires the bignum module and there is no plan to change that, so guarding a few bits of code is just noise. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function | 14 -------------- 1 file changed, 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function index c8be4e581b..295fe7f151 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ecp.function @@ -1123,7 +1123,6 @@ void ecp_set_public_key_good(int grp_id, data_t *public_data) TEST_EQUAL(key.grp.id, grp_id); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &Q), 0); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) /* Key with a public key already set to a different value */ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&key.Q.X, &key.Q.X, 1), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_add_int(&key.Q.Y, &key.Q.Y, 1), 0); @@ -1131,7 +1130,6 @@ void ecp_set_public_key_good(int grp_id, data_t *public_data) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(grp_id, &key, &Q), 0); TEST_EQUAL(key.grp.id, grp_id); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &Q), 0); -#endif exit: mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&key); @@ -1150,10 +1148,8 @@ void ecp_set_public_key_after_private(int private_grp_id, data_t *private_data, mbedtls_ecp_group_init(&grp); mbedtls_ecp_point Q; mbedtls_ecp_point_init(&Q); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) mbedtls_mpi d; mbedtls_mpi_init(&d); -#endif TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&grp, public_grp_id), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&grp, &Q, @@ -1162,9 +1158,7 @@ void ecp_set_public_key_after_private(int private_grp_id, data_t *private_data, TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_read_key(private_grp_id, &key, private_data->x, private_data->len), 0); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&d, &key.d), 0); -#endif int ret = mbedtls_ecp_set_public_key(public_grp_id, &key, &Q); @@ -1172,9 +1166,7 @@ void ecp_set_public_key_after_private(int private_grp_id, data_t *private_data, TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); TEST_EQUAL(key.grp.id, public_grp_id); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_point_cmp(&key.Q, &Q), 0); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&d, &key.d), 0); -#endif } else { TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA); } @@ -1183,9 +1175,7 @@ exit: mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free(&key); mbedtls_ecp_group_free(&grp); mbedtls_ecp_point_free(&Q); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) mbedtls_mpi_free(&d); -#endif } /* END_CASE */ @@ -1198,11 +1188,9 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_read_key(int grp_id, data_t *in_key, int expected, int canonica mbedtls_ecp_keypair key2; mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&key2); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&key.Q.X, 1), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&key.Q.Y, 2), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&key.Q.Z, 3), 0); -#endif ret = mbedtls_ecp_read_key(grp_id, &key, in_key->x, in_key->len); TEST_ASSERT(ret == expected); @@ -1212,11 +1200,9 @@ void mbedtls_ecp_read_key(int grp_id, data_t *in_key, int expected, int canonica ret = mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&key.grp, &key.d); TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&key.Q.X, 1), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&key.Q.Y, 2), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(&key.Q.Z, 3), 0); -#endif if (canonical) { unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; From 2a185c30af0ea800335b179e0af59cbccd88ae0c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 13:31:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 041/551] changelog: rename changelog file to reflect the number of the related issue Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/{8664.txt => 8340.txt} | 0 1 file changed, 0 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) rename ChangeLog.d/{8664.txt => 8340.txt} (100%) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8664.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt similarity index 100% rename from ChangeLog.d/8664.txt rename to ChangeLog.d/8340.txt From 04cccef256e2f66ead467e46e38c483e5765b2a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 13:33:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 042/551] changelog: improve wording Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8340.txt | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt index 03e297c18b..78e84f7daf 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ Features - * mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type() and mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg() helper - functions were added to convert from mbedtls_md_type_t to psa_algorithm_t - and viceversa. + * Add functions mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type() and + mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg() to convert between mbedtls_md_type_t and + psa_algorithm_t and vice versa. From d7dc7ff91cc5c2638d7ee41b61fa5af25668c25e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 16:40:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 043/551] Update psa_key_slot_t Remove the `status` field and replace with the `state` field. Remove the `lock_count` field and replace with the `registered_readers` field. Add documentation which describes how and why these fields are to be used. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 46c57755ec..9ea482da2c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ int psa_can_do_hash(psa_algorithm_t hash_alg); typedef enum { PSA_SLOT_EMPTY = 0, - PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED, -} psa_key_slot_status_t; + PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, +} psa_key_slot_state_t; /** The data structure representing a key slot, containing key material * and metadata for one key. @@ -44,18 +46,39 @@ typedef enum { typedef struct { psa_core_key_attributes_t attr; - psa_key_slot_status_t status; + /* + * The current state of the key slot, as described in + * docs/architecture/psa-thread-safety/psa-thread-safety.md. + * + * Library functions can modify the state of a key slot by calling + * psa_key_slot_state_transition. + * + * The state variable is used to help determine whether library functions + * which operate on the slot succeed. For example, psa_finish_key_creation, + * which transfers the state of a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * if the state of the slot is not PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * + * Library functions which traverse the array of key slots only consider + * slots that are in a suitable state for the function. + * For example, psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory, which finds a slot + * containing a given key ID, will only check slots whose state variable is + * PSA_SLOT_FULL. */ + psa_key_slot_state_t state; /* - * Number of locks on the key slot held by the library. + * Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot. * - * This counter is incremented by one each time a library function - * retrieves through one of the dedicated internal API a pointer to the - * key slot. + * Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers + * (unless the slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING and the slot needs to be + * wiped following a failed key creation). * - * This counter is decremented by one each time a library function stops - * accessing the key slot and states it by calling the - * psa_unlock_key_slot() API. + * A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current + * contents of the slot for an operation. + * They then must call psa_unregister_read(slot) once they have finished + * reading the current contents of the slot. + * A function must call psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot) to check if + * the slot is in use for reading. * * This counter is used to prevent resetting the key slot while the library * may access it. For example, such control is needed in the following @@ -66,10 +89,9 @@ typedef struct { * the library cannot be reclaimed to free a key slot to load the * persistent key. * . In case of a multi-threaded application where one thread asks to close - * or purge or destroy a key while it is in used by the library through - * another thread. - */ - size_t lock_count; + * or purge or destroy a key while it is in use by the library through + * another thread. */ + size_t registered_readers; /* Dynamically allocated key data buffer. * Format as specified in psa_export_key(). */ From aa33c512cc489d18cbb48b6b64aa959046a83dd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 17:32:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 044/551] Update psa_wipe_key_slot Change psa_wipe_key_slot to use the new state system. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 16 +++++++++++----- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 9 ++++++--- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 10d17b6df5..7a76c0bbfa 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -981,18 +981,23 @@ psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * Persistent storage is not affected. */ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) { + if (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); /* * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, - * do our best to report an unexpected lock counter. Assert with - * MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the lock counter is equal to one: + * do our best to report an unexpected amount of registered readers. + * Assert with MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that registered_readers is + * equal to one: * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and the * function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. */ - if (slot->lock_count != 1) { - MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->lock_count == 1); + if (slot->registered_readers != 1) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1); status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } @@ -1003,7 +1008,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * key material can linger until all operations are completed. */ /* At this point, key material and other type-specific content has * been wiped. Clear remaining metadata. We can call memset and not - * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. */ + * zeroize because the metadata is not particularly sensitive. + * This memset also sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. */ memset(slot, 0, sizeof(*slot)); return status; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 9ea482da2c..5c1edafe7a 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -200,13 +200,16 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( /** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. * * Persistent storage is not affected. + * Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. * * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - * Success. This includes the case of a key slot that was - * already fully wiped. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription + * The slot has been successfully wiped. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * The amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. */ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); From 62aa79ac5c4dd4623af9a04a0caa96bcb6c23580 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 16:21:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 045/551] Implement psa_key_slot_has_readers and remove psa_is_key_slot_occupied Remove psa_is_key_slot_occupied, any function which calls this can just check the state variable instead. Replace psa_is_key_slot_locked with psa_key_slot_has_readers. References to the now removed functions are changed in future commits. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 24 ++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 5c1edafe7a..3b5c634975 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -106,31 +106,15 @@ typedef struct { #define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \ 0) -/** Test whether a key slot is occupied. - * - * A key slot is occupied iff the key type is nonzero. This works because - * no valid key can have 0 as its key type. +/** Test whether a key slot has any registered readers. * * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. * - * \return 1 if the slot is occupied, 0 otherwise. + * \return 1 if the slot has any registered readers, 0 otherwise. */ -static inline int psa_is_key_slot_occupied(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) +static inline int psa_key_slot_has_readers(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) { - return slot->status == PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED; -} - -/** Test whether a key slot is locked. - * - * A key slot is locked iff its lock counter is strictly greater than 0. - * - * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. - * - * \return 1 if the slot is locked, 0 otherwise. - */ -static inline int psa_is_key_slot_locked(const psa_key_slot_t *slot) -{ - return slot->lock_count > 0; + return slot->registered_readers > 0; } /** Retrieve flags from psa_key_slot_t::attr::core::flags. From 39cc9d755e20827cb7ebc3cde53065def94e2ef6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 17:57:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 046/551] Implement psa_register_read and psa_unregister_read Replaces psa_lock_key_slot and psa_unlock_key_slot. Future commits will remove the calls to locking/unlocking functions, and add calls to registering/unregistering functions. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 25 ++++++++++++----- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++----------- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 5ecc3a76c7..32881e5e9e 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -394,26 +394,37 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ } -psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) { if (slot == NULL) { return PSA_SUCCESS; } + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } - if (slot->lock_count > 0) { - slot->lock_count--; + /* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion, + * we must wipe the slot here. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) && + (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { + return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } + + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { + slot->registered_readers--; return PSA_SUCCESS; } /* * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, - * do our best to report if the lock counter is equal to zero. Assert with - * MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the lock counter is strictly greater - * than zero: if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and + * do our best to report if there are no registered readers. Assert with + * MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that there are registered readers: + * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and * the function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. */ - MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->lock_count > 0); + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)); return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index 6041a35289..c38876d3dd 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -113,32 +113,39 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); -/** Lock a key slot. +/** Register as a reader of a key slot. * - * This function increments the key slot lock counter by one. + * This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one. * * \param[in] slot The key slot. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - The key slot lock counter was incremented. + The key slot registered reader counter was incremented. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED - * The lock counter already reached its maximum value and was not + * The reader counter already reached its maximum value and was not * increased. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL. */ -static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) +static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) { - if (slot->lock_count >= SIZE_MAX) { + if (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + if (slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX) { return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } - - slot->lock_count++; + slot->registered_readers++; return PSA_SUCCESS; } -/** Unlock a key slot. +/** Unregister from reading a key slot. * - * This function decrements the key slot lock counter by one. + * This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one. + * If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, + * and there is only one registered reader (the caller), + * this function will call psa_wipe_slot(). * * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns @@ -146,13 +153,16 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_lock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * * \param[in] slot The key slot. * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS - * \p slot is NULL or the key slot lock counter has been - * decremented successfully. + * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been + * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED - * The lock counter was equal to 0. - * + * registered_readers was equal to 0. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, or a wipe was attempted and + * the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. */ -psa_status_t psa_unlock_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); +psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot); /** Test whether a lifetime designates a key in an external cryptoprocessor. * From 4a78277cb2684ca0e9615ba390ecee87d27dde06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:53:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 047/551] Implement psa_key_slot_state_transition This inline function is used in every case we want to change the state of a slot, except for where we do not care about what the state of the slot was before. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index c38876d3dd..f0bbed98fc 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -112,6 +112,31 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); */ psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); +/** Change the state of a key slot. + * + * This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to + * new state. If the state of the slot was not expected_state, the state is + * unchanged. + * + * \param[in] slot The key slot. + * \param[in] expected_state The current state of the slot. + * \param[in] new_state The new state of the slot. + * + * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS + The key slot's state variable is new_state. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * The slot's state was not expected_state. + */ +static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( + psa_key_slot_t *slot, psa_key_slot_state_t expected_state, + psa_key_slot_state_t new_state) +{ + if (slot->state != expected_state) { + return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + } + slot->state = new_state; + return PSA_SUCCESS; +} /** Register as a reader of a key slot. * From 2afb5160110f54a5d89e968723b3dbb940de42b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 15:59:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 048/551] Update and rename psa_get_empty_key_slot Rename to psa_reserve_free_key_slot, as this function reserves a slot which is free (not always empty) for filling. Implement necessary state transitions and state checks. Rename unlocked_persistent_key_slot to unused_persistent_key_slot. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++----------- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 24 ++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 32881e5e9e..0f480fb098 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -147,30 +147,31 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; } -psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, - psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot) { psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t slot_idx; - psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unlocked_persistent_key_slot; + psa_key_slot_t *selected_slot, *unused_persistent_key_slot; if (!global_data.key_slots_initialized) { status = PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; goto error; } - selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot = NULL; + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot = NULL; for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) { + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { selected_slot = slot; break; } - if ((unlocked_persistent_key_slot == NULL) && - (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && - (!psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot))) { - unlocked_persistent_key_slot = slot; + if ((unused_persistent_key_slot == NULL) && + (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (!psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) && + (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime))) { + unused_persistent_key_slot = slot; } } @@ -182,16 +183,24 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, * storage. */ if ((selected_slot == NULL) && - (unlocked_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) { - selected_slot = unlocked_persistent_key_slot; - selected_slot->lock_count = 1; - psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot); + (unused_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) { + selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot; + psa_register_read(selected_slot); + /* If the state is not changed then psa_wipe_key_slot + * will report an error. */ + psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto error; + } } if (selected_slot != NULL) { - status = psa_lock_key_slot(selected_slot); + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_EMPTY, + PSA_SLOT_FILLING); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - goto error; + return status; } *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index f0bbed98fc..b2cf570112 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -95,23 +95,29 @@ psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void); * This does not affect persistent storage. */ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); -/** Find a free key slot. +/** Find a free key slot and reserve it to be filled with a key. * - * This function returns a key slot that is available for use and is in its - * ground state (all-bits-zero). On success, the key slot is locked. It is - * the responsibility of the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not - * access it anymore. + * This function finds a key slot that is free, + * sets its state to PSA_SLOT_FILLING and then returns the slot. + * + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. * * \param[out] volatile_key_id On success, volatile key identifier * associated to the returned slot. * \param[out] p_slot On success, a pointer to the slot. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY + * There were no free key slots. + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an + * unexpected state. */ -psa_status_t psa_get_empty_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, - psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); +psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); + /** Change the state of a key slot. * * This function changes the state of the key slot from expected_state to From b69118ebd0b7aa63d5b7c9b2c17f295aa4c854f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 2 Jan 2024 15:54:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 049/551] Update key creation functions to use the new key slot states Update psa_start_key_creation, psa_finish_key_creation and psa_fail_key_creation. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 7a76c0bbfa..3c5bbbdf6e 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1576,8 +1576,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_attributes( * In case of failure at any step, stop the sequence and call * psa_fail_key_creation(). * - * On success, the key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the caller - * to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the key slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to change the slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_EMPTY/FULL once key creation has finished. * * \param method An identification of the calling function. * \param[in] attributes Key attributes for the new key. @@ -1608,7 +1609,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( return status; } - status = psa_get_empty_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } @@ -1634,7 +1635,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( /* Erase external-only flags from the internal copy. To access * external-only flags, query `attributes`. Thanks to the check * in psa_validate_key_attributes(), this leaves the dual-use - * flags and any internal flag that psa_get_empty_key_slot() + * flags and any internal flag that psa_reserve_free_key_slot() * may have set. */ slot->attr.flags &= ~MBEDTLS_PSA_KA_MASK_EXTERNAL_ONLY; @@ -1686,8 +1687,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED; - return PSA_SUCCESS; } @@ -1699,9 +1698,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use * of this function. * - * If the finalization succeeds, the function unlocks the key slot (it was - * locked by psa_start_key_creation()) and the key slot cannot be accessed - * anymore as part of the key creation process. + * If the finalization succeeds, the function sets the key slot's state to + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, and the key slot can no longer be accessed as part of the + * key creation process. * * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, @@ -1717,6 +1716,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription * * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. @@ -1777,7 +1777,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { *key = slot->attr.id; - status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { *key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; } @@ -1792,7 +1793,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_finish_key_creation( * or after psa_finish_key_creation() fails. In other circumstances, this * function may not clean up persistent storage. * See the documentation of psa_start_key_creation() for the intended use - * of this function. + * of this function. Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. * * \param[in,out] slot Pointer to the slot with key material. * \param[in] driver The secure element driver for the key, @@ -1824,6 +1825,11 @@ static void psa_fail_key_creation(psa_key_slot_t *slot, (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + /* Prepare the key slot to be wiped, and then wipe it. */ + slot->registered_readers = 1; + psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } From 098c6659ada1a89194caddcf8bc7334a463f502b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 13:03:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 050/551] Update psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_X functions Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 14 ++++++++------ library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 9 ++++++--- 3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 3c5bbbdf6e..a27fd42c42 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -881,8 +881,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key * into a key slot if not already done. * - * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of - * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot) + * when they have finished reading the contents of the slot. */ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, @@ -926,7 +927,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( error: *p_slot = NULL; - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + psa_unregister_read(slot); return status; } @@ -941,8 +942,9 @@ error: * psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy() when there is no opaque key support * for a cryptographic operation. * - * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of the - * caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot) + * when they have finished reading the contents of the slot. */ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, @@ -957,7 +959,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( } if (psa_key_lifetime_is_external((*p_slot)->attr.lifetime)) { - psa_unlock_key_slot(*p_slot); + psa_unregister_read(*p_slot); *p_slot = NULL; return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 0f480fb098..4846e33ea8 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -108,7 +108,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - if (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id)) { + /* Only consider slots which are in a full state. */ + if ((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) && + (mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key, slot->attr.id))) { break; } } @@ -117,7 +119,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( } if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - status = psa_lock_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_register_read(slot); if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { *p_slot = slot; } @@ -367,7 +369,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS) psa_key_id_t volatile_key_id; - status = psa_get_empty_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); + status = psa_reserve_free_key_slot(&volatile_key_id, p_slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } @@ -388,13 +390,24 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + /* Prepare the key slot to be wiped, and then wipe it. + * Don't overwrite status as a BAD_STATE error here + * can be reported in the psa_wipe_key_slot call. */ + (*p_slot)->registered_readers = 1; + psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); psa_wipe_key_slot(*p_slot); + if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; } } else { /* Add implicit usage flags. */ psa_extend_key_usage_flags(&(*p_slot)->attr.policy.usage); + + psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); + status = psa_register_read(*p_slot); } return status; diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index b2cf570112..5858b18514 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -54,8 +54,9 @@ static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id) * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key * into a key slot if not already done. * - * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of - * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + * On success, the returned key slot has been registered for reading. + * It is the responsibility of the caller to call psa_unregister_read(slot) + * when they have finished reading the contents of the slot. * * \param key Key identifier to query. * \param[out] p_slot On success, `*p_slot` contains a pointer to the @@ -67,7 +68,9 @@ static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id) * description of the key identified by \p key. * The key slot counter has been incremented. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE - * The library has not been initialized. + * The library has not been initialized. Or, + * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in + * an invalid state for the operation. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \p key is not a valid key identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY From c70ce576bd8856a8efa99d4353700bd3130d000b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 16:04:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 051/551] Update psa_destroy_key, psa_purge_key and psa_close_key This does not yet implement destruction while a key is in use for psa_destroy_key; that will be implemented in a separate pr. (I am not sure if I am allowed to change the documentation in the include files.) Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- include/psa/crypto.h | 8 ++++++-- include/psa/crypto_compat.h | 4 +++- library/psa_crypto.c | 8 +++++--- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h index fe10ee0e44..fd1928a656 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -415,7 +415,9 @@ void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize - * results in this error code. + * results in this error code. Or, + * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in + * an invalid state for the operation. */ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); @@ -555,7 +557,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize - * results in this error code. + * results in this error code. Or, + * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in + * an invalid state for the operation. */ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h index f896fae1c9..bfc00164b5 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h @@ -142,7 +142,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize - * results in this error code. + * results in this error code. Or, + * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in + * an invalid state for the operation. */ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index a27fd42c42..3e49d0a759 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1048,11 +1048,13 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) * implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have * stopped. */ - if (slot->lock_count > 1) { - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + if (slot->registered_readers > 1) { + psa_unregister_read(slot); return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; } + slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; + if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(slot->attr.lifetime)) { /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work * if we attempt it, depending on whether the key is merely read-only @@ -1126,7 +1128,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) exit: status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); - /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ + /* Prioritize an error from wiping over a storage error */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 4846e33ea8..a21388a0b3 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -539,11 +539,14 @@ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) return status; } - if (slot->lock_count <= 1) { - return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); - } else { - return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + if (slot->registered_readers == 1) { + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } } + return psa_unregister_read(slot); } psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) @@ -557,11 +560,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) } if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && - (slot->lock_count <= 1)) { - return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); - } else { - return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { + psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); } + return psa_unregister_read(slot); } void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) From eb27dc0f3a95e0c75b45a3366e862324b90bc742 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 16:19:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 052/551] Update psa_load_X_key_into_slot These functions (on success) take a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to PSA_SLOT_FULL. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index a21388a0b3..3d997a50c7 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -250,7 +250,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) slot, data->slot_number, sizeof(data->slot_number)); if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { - slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED; + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); } goto exit; } @@ -261,7 +262,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) goto exit; } - slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED; + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); exit: psa_free_persistent_key_data(key_data, key_data_length); @@ -335,8 +337,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_builtin_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) /* Copy actual key length and core attributes into the slot on success */ slot->key.bytes = key_buffer_length; slot->attr = attributes.core; - slot->status = PSA_SLOT_OCCUPIED; + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, + PSA_SLOT_FULL); exit: if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); From 1b70a07eca5bd44bef32203c59ecf5f033246f64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:32:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 053/551] Replace psa_unlock_key_slot calls in operations which act on FULL slots Replaces calls to psa_unlock_key_slot with calls to psa_unregister_read. All instances follow a pattern of a call to psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_X, followed by some code which reads from a slot, followed by a call to psa_unregister_read. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 44 ++++++++++++++-------------- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 3e49d0a759..da5e5be778 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_key_attributes(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_reset_key_attributes(attributes); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -1349,7 +1349,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes, data, data_size, data_length); - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -1463,7 +1463,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, data, data_size, data_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@ exit: psa_fail_key_creation(target_slot, driver); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(source_slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(source_slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2462,7 +2462,7 @@ exit: psa_mac_abort(operation); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2648,7 +2648,7 @@ exit: psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(mac, status, mac_size, *mac_length); - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2792,7 +2792,7 @@ exit: psa_wipe_tag_output_buffer(signature, status, signature_size, *signature_length); - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -2840,7 +2840,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_verify_internal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, signature, signature_length); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; @@ -3107,7 +3107,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, output, output_size, output_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -3159,7 +3159,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, output, output_size, output_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -3268,7 +3268,7 @@ exit: psa_sign_hash_abort_internal(operation); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { operation->error_occurred = 1; @@ -3413,7 +3413,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_verify_hash_start( psa_verify_hash_abort_internal(operation); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); if (unlock_status != PSA_SUCCESS) { operation->error_occurred = 1; @@ -3985,7 +3985,7 @@ exit: psa_cipher_abort(operation); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -4230,7 +4230,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, output_size - default_iv_length, output_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { status = unlock_status; } @@ -4291,7 +4291,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_cipher_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, output, output_size, output_length); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { status = unlock_status; } @@ -4417,7 +4417,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, } exit: - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + psa_unregister_read(slot); return status; } @@ -4472,7 +4472,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_aead_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, } exit: - psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + psa_unregister_read(slot); return status; } @@ -4584,7 +4584,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_aead_setup(psa_aead_operation_t *operation, operation->key_type = psa_get_key_type(&attributes); exit: - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { status = unlock_status; @@ -6907,7 +6907,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes); - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -7064,7 +7064,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(psa_key_derivation_operation_t *op } } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -7125,7 +7125,7 @@ exit: *output_length = output_size; } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } @@ -7799,7 +7799,7 @@ exit: if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { psa_pake_abort(operation); } - unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + unlock_status = psa_unregister_read(slot); return (status == PSA_SUCCESS) ? unlock_status : status; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 3d997a50c7..3c16de3343 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -516,7 +516,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle) *handle = key; - return psa_unlock_key_slot(slot); + return psa_unregister_read(slot); #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */ (void) key; From 6cd2b8db960e30cdd858a695b8618731c3225cc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 12:10:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 054/551] Update psa_wipe_all_key_slots This will still wipe the slot regardless of state/readers. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 3c16de3343..a8be912b73 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - slot->lock_count = 1; + slot->registered_readers = 1; + slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; From 6a9c14b918da52d614fcff92df382b03aa366ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 12:13:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 055/551] Update mbedtls_psa_get_stats Uses readers to report "locked_slots", and slot state empty to report "empty_slots". Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index a8be912b73..ef76dcb897 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -579,10 +579,10 @@ void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { const psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; - if (psa_is_key_slot_locked(slot)) { + if (psa_key_slot_has_readers(slot)) { ++stats->locked_slots; } - if (!psa_is_key_slot_occupied(slot)) { + if (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_EMPTY) { ++stats->empty_slots; continue; } From 3742f7c4b46d85369e8691efbf0f291a6f0d9830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 10:37:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 056/551] changelog: improve wording Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8340.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt index 78e84f7daf..5664bf170c 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8340.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ Features * Add functions mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type() and mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg() to convert between mbedtls_md_type_t and - psa_algorithm_t and vice versa. + psa_algorithm_t. From 98f5db9fca7fa9dc3a30c3264b720e41589d713d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:17:38 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 057/551] psa_util: fix typo in comment Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index e8fb3de61a..7fcc9d2b0f 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. * * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type; - * #PSA_ALG_NONE if the algorithm is unuspported or invalid. + * #PSA_ALG_NONE if the algorithm is unsupported or invalid. */ psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type); From 4580d4d8297d8339f23ef837a65d02a8aee5eeff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 18:41:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 058/551] Add accessor helpers for mbedtls_test_info Step one of being able to control access to mbedtls_test_info with a mutex. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c | 2 +- programs/test/metatest.c | 6 ++- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- tests/src/helpers.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++ tests/src/threading_helpers.c | 14 ++--- tests/suites/host_test.function | 37 +++++++------- tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function | 2 +- 7 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c index b49dd67c26..d4511acb8a 100644 --- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c +++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ int test_hooks_failure_detected(void) mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check(); #endif - if (mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_result() != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS) { return 1; } return 0; diff --git a/programs/test/metatest.c b/programs/test/metatest.c index b8dffa9bbd..545129dff4 100644 --- a/programs/test/metatest.c +++ b/programs/test/metatest.c @@ -343,9 +343,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check(); #endif + int result = (int) mbedtls_test_get_result(); + mbedtls_printf("Running metatest %s... done, result=%d\n", - argv[1], (int) mbedtls_test_info.result); - mbedtls_exit(mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS ? + argv[1], result); + mbedtls_exit(result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS ? MBEDTLS_EXIT_SUCCESS : MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE); } diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index 7c962a283b..689a1b5736 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -74,7 +74,81 @@ typedef struct { #endif } mbedtls_test_info_t; -extern mbedtls_test_info_t mbedtls_test_info; + +/** + * \brief Get the current test result status + * + * \return The current test result status + */ +mbedtls_test_result_t mbedtls_test_get_result(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the current test name/description + * + * \return The current test name/description + */ +const char *mbedtls_test_get_test(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the current test filename + * + * \return The current test filename + */ +const char *mbedtls_get_test_filename(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the current test file line number (for failure / skip) + * + * \return The current test file line number (for failure / skip) + */ +int mbedtls_test_get_line_no(void); + +/** + * \brief Increment the current test step. + */ +void mbedtls_test_increment_step(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the current test step + * + * \return The current test step + */ +unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the current test line buffer 1 + * + * \return The current test line buffer 1 + */ +const char *mbedtls_test_get_line1(void); + +/** + * \brief Get the current test line buffer 2 + * + * \return The current test line buffer 2 + */ +const char *mbedtls_test_get_line2(void); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) +/** + * \brief Get the current mutex usage error message + * + * \return The current mutex error message (may be NULL if no error) + */ +const char *mbedtls_test_get_mutex_usage_error(void); + +/** + * \brief Set the current mutex usage error message + * + * \note This will only set the mutex error message if one has not + * already been set, or if we are clearing the message (msg is + * NULL) + * + * \param msg Error message to set (can be NULL to clear) + */ +void mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(const char *msg); +#endif + int mbedtls_test_platform_setup(void); void mbedtls_test_platform_teardown(void); diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index eb28919b8d..6bfe15dd70 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -22,6 +22,61 @@ static mbedtls_platform_context platform_ctx; mbedtls_test_info_t mbedtls_test_info; +/*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ +/* Mbedtls Test Info accessors */ + +mbedtls_test_result_t mbedtls_test_get_result(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.result; +} + +const char *mbedtls_test_get_test(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.test; +} +const char *mbedtls_get_test_filename(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.filename; +} + +int mbedtls_test_get_line_no(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.line_no; +} + +void mbedtls_test_increment_step(void) +{ + ++mbedtls_test_info.step; +} + +unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.step; +} + +const char *mbedtls_test_get_line1(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.line1; +} +const char *mbedtls_test_get_line2(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.line2; +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) +const char *mbedtls_test_get_mutex_usage_error(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error; +} + +void mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(const char *msg) +{ + if (mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error == NULL || msg == NULL) { + mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = msg; + } +} +#endif // #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) + /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* Helper Functions */ diff --git a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c index 5fbf65b2da..261d14175f 100644 --- a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c @@ -109,9 +109,7 @@ static void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex, { (void) mutex; - if (mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error == NULL) { - mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = msg; - } + mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(msg); mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "[mutex: %s] ", msg); /* Don't mark the test as failed yet. This way, if the test fails later * for a functional reason, the test framework will report the message @@ -233,17 +231,15 @@ void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check(void) * negative number means a missing init somewhere. */ mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "[mutex: %d leaked] ", live_mutexes); live_mutexes = 0; - if (mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error == NULL) { - mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = "missing free"; - } + mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error("missing free"); } - if (mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error != NULL && - mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_mutex_usage_error() != NULL && + mbedtls_test_get_result() != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { /* Functionally, the test passed. But there was a mutex usage error, * so mark the test as failed after all. */ mbedtls_test_fail("Mutex usage error", __LINE__, __FILE__); } - mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = NULL; + mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(NULL); } void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_end(void) diff --git a/tests/suites/host_test.function b/tests/suites/host_test.function index cc286973cf..1ebaf46deb 100644 --- a/tests/suites/host_test.function +++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function @@ -371,14 +371,12 @@ static void write_outcome_entry(FILE *outcome_file, * \param missing_unmet_dependencies Non-zero if there was a problem tracking * all unmet dependencies, 0 otherwise. * \param ret The test dispatch status (DISPATCH_xxx). - * \param info A pointer to the test info structure. */ static void write_outcome_result(FILE *outcome_file, size_t unmet_dep_count, int unmet_dependencies[], int missing_unmet_dependencies, - int ret, - const mbedtls_test_info_t *info) + int ret) { if (outcome_file == NULL) { return; @@ -401,7 +399,7 @@ static void write_outcome_result(FILE *outcome_file, } break; } - switch (info->result) { + switch (mbedtls_test_get_result()) { case MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS: mbedtls_fprintf(outcome_file, "PASS;"); break; @@ -410,8 +408,9 @@ static void write_outcome_result(FILE *outcome_file, break; default: mbedtls_fprintf(outcome_file, "FAIL;%s:%d:%s", - info->filename, info->line_no, - info->test); + mbedtls_get_test_filename(), + mbedtls_test_get_line_no(), + mbedtls_test_get_test()); break; } break; @@ -614,7 +613,7 @@ int execute_tests(int argc, const char **argv) break; } mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "%s%.66s", - mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ? + mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED ? "\n" : "", buf); mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, " "); for (i = strlen(buf) + 1; i < 67; i++) { @@ -690,7 +689,7 @@ int execute_tests(int argc, const char **argv) write_outcome_result(outcome_file, unmet_dep_count, unmet_dependencies, missing_unmet_dependencies, - ret, &mbedtls_test_info); + ret); if (unmet_dep_count > 0 || ret == DISPATCH_UNSUPPORTED_SUITE) { total_skipped++; mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "----"); @@ -715,30 +714,30 @@ int execute_tests(int argc, const char **argv) unmet_dep_count = 0; missing_unmet_dependencies = 0; } else if (ret == DISPATCH_TEST_SUCCESS) { - if (mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS) { mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "PASS\n"); - } else if (mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED) { + } else if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED) { mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "----\n"); total_skipped++; } else { total_errors++; mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "FAILED\n"); mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, " %s\n at ", - mbedtls_test_info.test); - if (mbedtls_test_info.step != (unsigned long) (-1)) { + mbedtls_test_get_test()); + if (mbedtls_test_get_step() != (unsigned long) (-1)) { mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "step %lu, ", - mbedtls_test_info.step); + mbedtls_test_get_step()); } mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "line %d, %s", - mbedtls_test_info.line_no, - mbedtls_test_info.filename); - if (mbedtls_test_info.line1[0] != 0) { + mbedtls_test_get_line_no(), + mbedtls_get_test_filename()); + if (mbedtls_test_get_line1()[0] != 0) { mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "\n %s", - mbedtls_test_info.line1); + mbedtls_test_get_line1()); } - if (mbedtls_test_info.line2[0] != 0) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_line2()[0] != 0) { mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "\n %s", - mbedtls_test_info.line2); + mbedtls_test_get_line2()); } } fflush(stdout); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function index e6f75de777..20905940ba 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_dhm.function @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static int check_dhm_param_output(const mbedtls_mpi *expected, int ok = 0; mbedtls_mpi_init(&actual); - ++mbedtls_test_info.step; + mbedtls_test_increment_step(); TEST_ASSERT(size >= *offset + 2); n = (buffer[*offset] << 8) | buffer[*offset + 1]; From 5c498f355dffbb479283125bb2c22b08ac076273 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 16:38:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 059/551] Use mbedtls_test_info accessors internally as well Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 6 ++- tests/src/helpers.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index 689a1b5736..564a5539f4 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -61,14 +61,16 @@ typedef enum { MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED } mbedtls_test_result_t; +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH 76 + typedef struct { mbedtls_test_result_t result; const char *test; const char *filename; int line_no; unsigned long step; - char line1[76]; - char line2[76]; + char line1[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; + char line2[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) const char *mutex_usage_error; #endif diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 6bfe15dd70..52785fc01a 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -30,6 +30,15 @@ mbedtls_test_result_t mbedtls_test_get_result(void) return mbedtls_test_info.result; } +void mbedtls_test_set_result(mbedtls_test_result_t result, const char *test, + int line_no, const char *filename) +{ + mbedtls_test_info.result = result; + mbedtls_test_info.test = test; + mbedtls_test_info.line_no = line_no; + mbedtls_test_info.filename = filename; +} + const char *mbedtls_test_get_test(void) { return mbedtls_test_info.test; @@ -54,15 +63,38 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void) return mbedtls_test_info.step; } +void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) { + mbedtls_test_info.step = step; +} + const char *mbedtls_test_get_line1(void) { return mbedtls_test_info.line1; } + +void mbedtls_test_set_line1(const char *line) +{ + if (line == NULL) { + memset(mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1)); + } else { + strncpy(mbedtls_test_info.line1, line, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1)); + } +} + const char *mbedtls_test_get_line2(void) { return mbedtls_test_info.line2; } +void mbedtls_test_set_line2(const char *line) { + if (line == NULL) { + memset(mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2)); + } else { + strncpy(mbedtls_test_info.line2, line, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2)); + } +} + + #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) const char *mbedtls_test_get_mutex_usage_error(void) { @@ -126,28 +158,17 @@ int mbedtls_test_ascii2uc(const char c, unsigned char *uc) void mbedtls_test_fail(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) { - if (mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ return; } - mbedtls_test_info.result = MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED; - mbedtls_test_info.test = test; - mbedtls_test_info.line_no = line_no; - mbedtls_test_info.filename = filename; + mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED, test, line_no, filename); } void mbedtls_test_skip(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) { - mbedtls_test_info.result = MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED; - mbedtls_test_info.test = test; - mbedtls_test_info.line_no = line_no; - mbedtls_test_info.filename = filename; -} - -void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) -{ - mbedtls_test_info.step = step; + mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED, test, line_no, filename); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) @@ -156,13 +177,11 @@ unsigned mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0 = 0; void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void) { - mbedtls_test_info.result = MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS; - mbedtls_test_info.step = (unsigned long) (-1); - mbedtls_test_info.test = 0; - mbedtls_test_info.line_no = 0; - mbedtls_test_info.filename = 0; - memset(mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1)); - memset(mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2)); + mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS, 0, 0, 0); + mbedtls_test_set_step((unsigned long) (-1)); + mbedtls_test_set_line1(NULL); + mbedtls_test_set_line2(NULL); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0 = 0; #endif @@ -178,20 +197,21 @@ int mbedtls_test_equal(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, return 1; } - if (mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ return 0; } + char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(mbedtls_test_info.line1, - sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1), + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", value1, (long long) value1); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(mbedtls_test_info.line2, - sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2), + mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", value2, (long long) value2); + mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); return 0; } @@ -205,20 +225,21 @@ int mbedtls_test_le_u(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, return 1; } - if (mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ return 0; } + char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(mbedtls_test_info.line1, - sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1), + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "lhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", value1, value1); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(mbedtls_test_info.line2, - sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2), + mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "rhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", value2, value2); + mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); return 0; } @@ -232,20 +253,21 @@ int mbedtls_test_le_s(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, return 1; } - if (mbedtls_test_info.result == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ return 0; } + char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(mbedtls_test_info.line1, - sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1), + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", (unsigned long long) value1, value1); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(mbedtls_test_info.line2, - sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2), + mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", (unsigned long long) value2, value2); + mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); return 0; } From 17c119a5e30631716773eb96ce3e8b507daf4a41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 16:55:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 060/551] Migrate to threading_helpers.h Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c | 2 +- programs/test/metatest.c | 1 + tests/include/test/helpers.h | 24 +------------- tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/src/threading_helpers.c | 1 + tests/suites/helpers.function | 1 + 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c index b49dd67c26..d562cb156c 100644 --- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c +++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include "ssl_test_lib.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) -#include "test/helpers.h" +#include "test/threading_helpers.h" #endif #if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TEST_IMPOSSIBLE) diff --git a/programs/test/metatest.c b/programs/test/metatest.c index b8dffa9bbd..82ecf953b1 100644 --- a/programs/test/metatest.c +++ b/programs/test/metatest.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include "test/helpers.h" +#include "test/threading_helpers.h" #include "test/macros.h" #include diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index 7c962a283b..b2b07cfa8b 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -35,11 +35,7 @@ # endif #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) -#define MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE -#endif - +#include "test/threading_helpers.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include @@ -254,24 +250,6 @@ int mbedtls_test_hexcmp(uint8_t *a, uint8_t *b, #include "test/fake_external_rng_for_test.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) -/** - * Activate the mutex usage verification framework. See threading_helpers.c for - * information. - * */ -void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_init(void); - -/** - * Deactivate the mutex usage verification framework. See threading_helpers.c - * for information. - */ -void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_end(void); - -/** Call this function after executing a test case to check for mutex usage - * errors. */ -void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check(void); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) /** * \brief Check that only a pure high-level error code is being combined with diff --git a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3c4d44126a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +/** + * \file threading_helpers.h + * + * \brief This file contains the prototypes of helper functions for the purpose + * of testing threading. + */ + +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#ifndef THREADING_HELPERS_H +#define THREADING_HELPERS_H + +#if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) && defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) +/** + * Activate the mutex usage verification framework. See threading_helpers.c for + * information. + */ +void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_init(void); + +/** + * Deactivate the mutex usage verification framework. See threading_helpers.c + * for information. + */ +void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_end(void); + +/** + * Call this function after executing a test case to check for mutex usage + * errors. + */ +void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check(void); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + +#endif /* THREADING_HELPERS_H */ + diff --git a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c index 5fbf65b2da..38059343d8 100644 --- a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ */ #include +#include #include #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) diff --git a/tests/suites/helpers.function b/tests/suites/helpers.function index 86ff5b4893..b5f5796e42 100644 --- a/tests/suites/helpers.function +++ b/tests/suites/helpers.function @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include From 3a4d2f14a8c05a4f16a86d4ebf3d46f2d9f59a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 20:49:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 061/551] Add test thread create/join abstraction Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++- tests/src/threading_helpers.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h index 3c4d44126a..9b7ced519b 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h @@ -15,6 +15,66 @@ #if defined MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +/* Most fields of publicly available structs are private and are wrapped with + * MBEDTLS_PRIVATE macro. This define allows tests to access the private fields + * directly (without using the MBEDTLS_PRIVATE wrapper). */ +#define MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS + +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_THREAD_ERROR -0x001F + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) +#include + +typedef struct mbedtls_test_thread_t { + pthread_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(thread); +} mbedtls_test_thread_t; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) +/* You should define the mbedtls_test_thread_t type in your header */ +#include "threading_alt.h" + +/** + * \brief Set your alternate threading implementation + * function pointers fgr test threads. If used, + * this function must be called once in the main thread + * before any other MbedTLS function is called. + * + * \note These functions are part of the testing API only and + * thus not considered part of the public API of + * MbedTLS and thus may change without notice. + * + * \param thread_create The thread create function implementation + * \param thread_join The thread join function implementation + + */ +void mbedtls_test_thread_set_alt(int (*thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, + void *(*thread_func)( + void *), + void *thread_data), + int (*thread_join)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread)); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT*/ + +/** + * \brief The function pointers for thread create and thread + * join. + * + * \note These functions are part of the testing API only and + * thus not considered part of the public API of + * MbedTLS and thus may change without notice. + * + * \note All these functions are expected to work or + * the result will be undefined. + */ +extern int (*mbedtls_test_thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, + void *(*thread_func)(void *), void *thread_data); +extern int (*mbedtls_test_thread_join)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) && defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) #define MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE #endif @@ -42,4 +102,3 @@ void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check(void); #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #endif /* THREADING_HELPERS_H */ - diff --git a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c index 38059343d8..5a871e102d 100644 --- a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c @@ -9,6 +9,71 @@ #include #include +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + +static int threading_thread_create_pthread(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, void *(*thread_func)( + void *), void *thread_data) +{ + if (thread == NULL || thread_func == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (pthread_create(&thread->thread, NULL, thread_func, thread_data)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_THREAD_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int threading_thread_join_pthread(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread) +{ + if (thread == NULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (pthread_join(thread->thread, NULL) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_THREAD_ERROR; + } + + return 0; +} + +int (*mbedtls_test_thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, void *(*thread_func)(void *), + void *thread_data) = threading_thread_create_pthread; +int (*mbedtls_test_thread_join)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread) = threading_thread_join_pthread; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) + +static int threading_thread_create_fail(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, + void *(*thread_func)(void *), + void *thread_data) +{ + (void) thread; + (void) thread_func; + (void) thread_data; + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +static int threading_thread_join_fail(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread) +{ + (void) thread; + + return MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_BAD_INPUT_DATA; +} + +int (*mbedtls_test_thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, void *(*thread_func)(void *), + void *thread_data) = threading_thread_create_fail; +int (*mbedtls_test_thread_join)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread) = threading_thread_join_fail; + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" @@ -258,3 +323,5 @@ void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_end(void) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ From 3dce2327ab55525bdecdf69f73805d016fbd08d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 21:13:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 062/551] Use new thread abstraction for ctr_drbg tests Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function index 1f0a072c7c..492a65f7d9 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ exit: void ctr_drbg_threads(data_t *expected_result, int reseed, int arg_thread_count) { size_t thread_count = (size_t) arg_thread_count; - pthread_t *threads = NULL; + mbedtls_test_thread_t *threads = NULL; unsigned char out[16]; unsigned char *entropy = NULL; @@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void ctr_drbg_threads(data_t *expected_result, int reseed, int arg_thread_count) AES_PSA_INIT(); - TEST_CALLOC(threads, sizeof(pthread_t) * thread_count); + TEST_CALLOC(threads, sizeof(mbedtls_test_thread_t) * thread_count); memset(out, 0, sizeof(out)); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context ctx; @@ -392,13 +392,13 @@ void ctr_drbg_threads(data_t *expected_result, int reseed, int arg_thread_count) for (size_t i = 0; i < thread_count; i++) { TEST_EQUAL( - pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, - thread_random_function, (void *) &ctx), + mbedtls_test_thread_create(&threads[i], + thread_random_function, (void *) &ctx), 0); } for (size_t i = 0; i < thread_count; i++) { - TEST_EQUAL(pthread_join(threads[i], NULL), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_thread_join(&threads[i]), 0); } /* Take a last output for comparing and thus verifying the DRBG state */ From 4068c7e47cf7180550c7a52e3c5f6513392c7720 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 17:14:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 063/551] Link programs with pthread via cmake All programs are now linked directly with all test code, thus adding a pthread abstraction into the test code means having to link the programs with pthread (if the library is found under cmake). Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt | 3 +++ programs/fuzz/Makefile | 4 ++++ programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt | 6 ++++-- programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- programs/random/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt | 2 +- programs/test/CMakeLists.txt | 8 +++++--- programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- programs/util/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt | 4 +++- 13 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt index 85bcd5fcad..457a0fc26f 100644 --- a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(executables crypt_and_hash ) foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() diff --git a/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt index 93e5f31ee8..c047dd69e8 100644 --- a/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,10 +1,12 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(executables cipher_aead_demo ) foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() diff --git a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt index 7747744cd1..a0eba0fd0f 100644 --- a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,5 +1,8 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(libs ${mbedtls_target} + ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT} ) find_library(FUZZINGENGINE_LIB FuzzingEngine) diff --git a/programs/fuzz/Makefile b/programs/fuzz/Makefile index b4fc76ae11..3b9b50df83 100644 --- a/programs/fuzz/Makefile +++ b/programs/fuzz/Makefile @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ endif ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt +else +ifeq ($(THREADING),pthread) +LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lpthread +endif endif # A test application is built for each suites/test_suite_*.data file. diff --git a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt index da98188443..3d6989cca5 100644 --- a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(executables generic_sum hello @@ -6,7 +8,7 @@ set(executables foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() diff --git a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt index 3ad56436e6..e2fb404029 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(executables_mbedtls dh_client dh_server @@ -5,7 +7,7 @@ set(executables_mbedtls foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_mbedtls) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedtls_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedtls_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() @@ -32,7 +34,7 @@ set(executables_mbedcrypto foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_mbedcrypto) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() diff --git a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt index c8ee626d81..d86f29e2c2 100644 --- a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(executables aead_demo crypto_examples @@ -28,7 +30,7 @@ endif() foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() diff --git a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt index e5edf7b58c..a4c99f5613 100644 --- a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(executables gen_entropy gen_random_ctr_drbg @@ -5,7 +7,7 @@ set(executables foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() diff --git a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt index 280bbcf3d2..8ffa854647 100644 --- a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) endif() add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $ ${extra_sources}) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) if(exe STREQUAL "ssl_client2" OR exe STREQUAL "ssl_server2") if(GEN_FILES) diff --git a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt index 0778731125..a7260452fc 100644 --- a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(libs ${mbedtls_target} ) @@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ if(TEST_CPP) ) add_executable(cpp_dummy_build "${cpp_dummy_build_cpp}") target_include_directories(cpp_dummy_build PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../include) - target_link_libraries(cpp_dummy_build ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(cpp_dummy_build ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) endif() if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY AND @@ -81,9 +83,9 @@ foreach(exe IN LISTS executables_libs executables_mbedcrypto) # This emulates "if ( ... IN_LIST ... )" which becomes available in CMake 3.3 list(FIND executables_libs ${exe} exe_index) if (${exe_index} GREATER -1) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) else() - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${mbedcrypto_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) endif() endforeach() diff --git a/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt index 3c3cba3c2d..dd23d6165f 100644 --- a/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.5.1) +find_package(Threads) + # Test the target renaming support by adding a prefix to the targets built set(MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX subproject_test_) @@ -20,4 +22,4 @@ set(libs ) add_executable(cmake_subproject cmake_subproject.c) -target_link_libraries(cmake_subproject ${libs}) +target_link_libraries(cmake_subproject ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) diff --git a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt index 7fc58cbcf4..920f69e880 100644 --- a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(libs ${mbedcrypto_target} ) @@ -9,7 +11,7 @@ set(executables foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() diff --git a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt index 5876b8d21d..c507de2a74 100644 --- a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +find_package(Threads) + set(libs ${mbedx509_target} ) @@ -13,7 +15,7 @@ set(executables foreach(exe IN LISTS executables) add_executable(${exe} ${exe}.c $) - target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs}) + target_link_libraries(${exe} ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) target_include_directories(${exe} PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../../tests/include) endforeach() From 7ed1cf57ba67c736cf311663ba995805d4428b2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:10:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 064/551] Enable common.make to be included by programs/fuzz Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- scripts/common.make | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/common.make b/scripts/common.make index 6c95b42354..2714bcd327 100644 --- a/scripts/common.make +++ b/scripts/common.make @@ -1,25 +1,29 @@ # To compile on SunOS: add "-lsocket -lnsl" to LDFLAGS +ifndef MBEDTLS_PATH +MBEDTLS_PATH := .. +endif + CFLAGS ?= -O2 WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral WARNING_CXXFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra -Wformat=2 -Wno-format-nonliteral LDFLAGS ?= -LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I$(MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH)/include -I../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -LOCAL_CXXFLAGS = $(WARNING_CXXFLAGS) -I../include -I../tests/include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I$(MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH)/include -I$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 +LOCAL_CXXFLAGS = $(WARNING_CXXFLAGS) -I$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/include -I$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/tests/include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 LOCAL_LDFLAGS = ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS} \ - -L../library \ + -L$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library \ -lmbedtls$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ -lmbedx509$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ -lmbedcrypto$(SHARED_SUFFIX) -include ../3rdparty/Makefile.inc +include $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/3rdparty/Makefile.inc LOCAL_CFLAGS+=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) ifndef SHARED -MBEDLIBS=../library/libmbedcrypto.a ../library/libmbedx509.a ../library/libmbedtls.a +MBEDLIBS=$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library/libmbedcrypto.a $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library/libmbedx509.a $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library/libmbedtls.a else -MBEDLIBS=../library/libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) ../library/libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) ../library/libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) +MBEDLIBS=$(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library/libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library/libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library/libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) endif ifdef DEBUG @@ -97,7 +101,7 @@ endif default: all $(MBEDLIBS): - $(MAKE) -C ../library + $(MAKE) -C $(MBEDTLS_PATH)/library neat: clean ifndef WINDOWS From 053db696b37dfccb4e251ebd22c532438f92b0ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:11:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 065/551] Allow programs/fuzz to be linked against pthread Use the same mechanisms used to link other programs against pthread with make, i.e. include common.make, and remove common code from programs/ fuzz/Makefile Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- programs/fuzz/Makefile | 34 ++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/fuzz/Makefile b/programs/fuzz/Makefile index 3b9b50df83..afe80b7d58 100644 --- a/programs/fuzz/Makefile +++ b/programs/fuzz/Makefile @@ -1,40 +1,17 @@ -MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH:=../../tests/src -MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS:=$(patsubst %.c,%.o,$(wildcard ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH}/*.c ${MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH}/drivers/*.c)) +MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH:=../../tests -CFLAGS ?= -O2 -WARNING_CFLAGS ?= -Wall -Wextra LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I../../tests/include -I../../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 -LOCAL_LDFLAGS = ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS} \ - -L../../library \ - -lmbedtls$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ - -lmbedx509$(SHARED_SUFFIX) \ - -lmbedcrypto$(SHARED_SUFFIX) +MBEDTLS_PATH := ../.. +include ../../scripts/common.make LOCAL_CFLAGS += $(patsubst -I../%,-I../../%,$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES)) -ifndef SHARED -DEP=../../library/libmbedcrypto.a ../../library/libmbedx509.a ../../library/libmbedtls.a -else -DEP=../../library/libmbedcrypto.$(DLEXT) ../../library/libmbedx509.$(DLEXT) ../../library/libmbedtls.$(DLEXT) -endif - - -DLEXT ?= so -EXEXT= -SHARED_SUFFIX= +DEP=${MBEDLIBS} ifdef FUZZINGENGINE LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lFuzzingEngine endif -ifdef WINDOWS_BUILD -LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lbcrypt -else -ifeq ($(THREADING),pthread) -LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -lpthread -endif -endif - # A test application is built for each suites/test_suite_*.data file. # Application name is same as .data file's base name and can be # constructed by stripping path 'suites/' and extension .data. @@ -49,9 +26,6 @@ BINARIES := $(addsuffix $(EXEXT),$(APPS)) all: $(BINARIES) -$(DEP): - $(MAKE) -C ../../library - C_FILES := $(addsuffix .c,$(APPS)) %.o: %.c From cd38f2720678fffd28669aa1625695106060695f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 08:41:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 066/551] Revert "psa_util: fix typo in comment" This reverts commit 98f5db9fca7fa9dc3a30c3264b720e41589d713d. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 7fcc9d2b0f..e8fb3de61a 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. * * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type; - * #PSA_ALG_NONE if the algorithm is unsupported or invalid. + * #PSA_ALG_NONE if the algorithm is unuspported or invalid. */ psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type); From 9b2d738ccde53c4643a9905f548509e2a8457d86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 08:41:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 067/551] Revert "test_suite_md: improve md_to_from_psa() test function and related data" This reverts commit 2c1070b39700be8a6fcda5f2266e8bbe5ac42e1c. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_md.data | 48 ++--------------------------- tests/suites/test_suite_md.function | 24 ++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data index b831500d6f..fb9b5effa0 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.data @@ -2,52 +2,8 @@ MD list mbedtls_md_list: -MD <-> PSA conversion - MD5 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_MD5:PSA_ALG_MD5 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - RIPEMD160 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160:PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA1 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1:PSA_ALG_SHA_1 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA224 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224:PSA_ALG_SHA_224 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA256 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:PSA_ALG_SHA_256 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA384 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384:PSA_ALG_SHA_384 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA512 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:PSA_ALG_SHA_512 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_224 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224:PSA_ALG_SHA3_224 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_256 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256:PSA_ALG_SHA3_256 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_384 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384:PSA_ALG_SHA3_384 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - SHA3_512 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512 -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512:PSA_ALG_SHA3_512 - -MD <-> PSA conversion - NONE -md_to_from_psa:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:PSA_ALG_NONE +MD <-> PSA conversion +md_to_from_psa: MD NULL/uninitialised arguments md_null_args: diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function index 0a8e4216ee..2a885e2371 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_md.function @@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" + +#define MD_PSA(md, psa) \ + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md), psa); \ + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa), md); /* END_HEADER */ /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES @@ -59,13 +63,23 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ -void md_to_from_psa(int md_alg_arg, int psa_alg_arg) +void md_to_from_psa() { - mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = md_alg_arg; - psa_algorithm_t psa_alg = psa_alg_arg; + /* We use a simplified implementation that relies on numerical values + * being aligned, so make sure they remain so. */ + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_MD5, PSA_ALG_MD5); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160, PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, PSA_ALG_SHA_1); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224, PSA_ALG_SHA_224); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384, PSA_ALG_SHA_384); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512, PSA_ALG_SHA_512); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224, PSA_ALG_SHA3_224); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256, PSA_ALG_SHA3_256); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384, PSA_ALG_SHA3_384); + MD_PSA(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512, PSA_ALG_SHA3_512); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg), psa_alg); \ - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_alg), md_alg); + /* Don't test for NONE<->NONE as this is not guaranteed */ } /* END_CASE */ From dd2afcd881df115474eb12f9aa877b35530ec799 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 08:41:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 068/551] Revert "psa_util: add algorithm's availability checks for MD conversion functions" This reverts commit 3d2e0f5f42b9ac646f63d67e442f4af0f8a3fe4f. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 27 +++++++--- library/psa_util.c | 106 ------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index e8fb3de61a..249b8d421c 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -152,12 +152,21 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, * \brief This function returns the PSA algorithm identifier * associated with the given digest type. * - * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. + * \param md_type The type of digest to search for. Must not be NONE. * - * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type; - * #PSA_ALG_NONE if the algorithm is unuspported or invalid. + * \warning If \p md_type is \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, this function will + * not return \c PSA_ALG_NONE, but an invalid algorithm. + * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * + * \return The PSA algorithm identifier associated with \p md_type, + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. */ -psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type); +static inline psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) +{ + return PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | (psa_algorithm_t) md_type; +} /** * \brief This function returns the given digest type @@ -165,10 +174,16 @@ psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type); * * \param psa_alg The PSA algorithm identifier to search for. * + * \warning This function does not check if the algorithm is + * supported, it always returns the corresponding identifier. + * * \return The MD type associated with \p psa_alg, - * #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if the algorithm is unsupported or invalid. + * regardless of whether it is supported or not. */ -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg); +static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) +{ + return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); +} /**@}*/ diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index bb054a33fb..9b06de273f 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -330,110 +330,4 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, } #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ -psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(mbedtls_md_type_t md_type) -{ - switch (md_type) { -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) - case MBEDTLS_MD_MD5: - return PSA_ALG_MD5; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) - case MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160: - return PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_224; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_256; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_384; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512: - return PSA_ALG_SHA_512; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224: - return PSA_ALG_SHA3_224; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256: - return PSA_ALG_SHA3_256; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384: - return PSA_ALG_SHA3_384; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) - case MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512: - return PSA_ALG_SHA3_512; -#endif - case MBEDTLS_MD_NONE: - default: - return PSA_ALG_NONE; - } -} - -mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa_alg) -{ - switch (psa_alg) { -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) - case PSA_ALG_MD5: - return MBEDTLS_MD_MD5; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) - case PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160: - return MBEDTLS_MD_RIPEMD160; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_1: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_224: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA224; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_256: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_384: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512) - case PSA_ALG_SHA_512: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_224) - case PSA_ALG_SHA3_224: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_224; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_256) - case PSA_ALG_SHA3_256: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_256; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_384) - case PSA_ALG_SHA3_384: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_384; -#endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA3_512) - case PSA_ALG_SHA3_512: - return MBEDTLS_MD_SHA3_512; -#endif - case PSA_ALG_NONE: - default: - return MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; - } -} - #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ From ddba51e6c9120869c15bd931d4dad9bd3d35e787 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 10:16:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 069/551] psa: rename "mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa" to "mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa" Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 6 +++--- library/pk_internal.h | 4 ++-- library/pkparse.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 6 +++--- library/psa_util.c | 6 +++--- 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 5f6a05315a..5368e040e4 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -143,9 +143,9 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not * correct for \p curve. */ -mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, - size_t bits, - int bits_is_sloppy); +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy); #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ /**@}*/ diff --git a/library/pk_internal.h b/library/pk_internal.h index 025ee8b019..642a0c7bb7 100644 --- a/library/pk_internal.h +++ b/library/pk_internal.h @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_c } opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type); - id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs), 0); + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs), 0); psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) - id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0); + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0); #else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index d36fa3f838..ef3aff22b0 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; int ret; - ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0); + ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0); mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key); ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id); diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index a8baa6b6f5..d393109811 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -5708,7 +5708,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( slot->attr.type); mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = - mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, bits, 0); + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, bits, 0); if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index e4a372d242..3f2ec23e3d 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -83,8 +83,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp); /* Load the group. */ - grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), - curve_bits, !explicit_bits); + grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), + curve_bits, !explicit_bits); if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { /* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination * (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type); mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = - mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits, 0); + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits, 0); const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 36b7175dfb..f4685dbc69 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -252,9 +252,9 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, } } -mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, - size_t bits, - int bits_is_sloppy) +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, + size_t bits, + int bits_is_sloppy) { switch (curve) { case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: From d36c313b53b4ba45561bbcde9408f8c0f39b8ece Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 14:03:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 070/551] psa: remove bits_is_sloppy parameter from mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 3 +-- library/pk_internal.h | 4 ++-- library/pkparse.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- library/psa_util.c | 16 +++------------- 6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 5368e040e4..e1dd822e53 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -144,8 +144,7 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, * correct for \p curve. */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, - size_t bits, - int bits_is_sloppy); + size_t bits); #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ /**@}*/ diff --git a/library/pk_internal.h b/library/pk_internal.h index 642a0c7bb7..3d5adf8de7 100644 --- a/library/pk_internal.h +++ b/library/pk_internal.h @@ -98,13 +98,13 @@ static inline mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_pk_get_ec_group_id(const mbedtls_pk_c } opaque_key_type = psa_get_key_type(&opaque_attrs); curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(opaque_key_type); - id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs), 0); + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, psa_get_key_bits(&opaque_attrs)); psa_reset_key_attributes(&opaque_attrs); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) - id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0); + id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); #else /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ id = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk)->grp.id; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index ef3aff22b0..5f95545af6 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static int pk_ecc_set_pubkey_psa_ecp_fallback(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecp_group_id; int ret; - ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits, 0); + ecp_group_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(pk->ec_family, pk->ec_bits); mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(&ecp_key); ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&(ecp_key.grp), ecp_group_id); diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index d393109811..850f206101 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -5708,7 +5708,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_generate_derived_ecc_key_weierstrass_helper( psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( slot->attr.type); mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = - mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, bits, 0); + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, bits); if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index 3f2ec23e3d..20ef29c122 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( psa_status_t status; mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; size_t curve_bytes = data_length; + size_t curve_bits_check; int explicit_bits = (curve_bits != 0); if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) && @@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( /* Load the group. */ grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), - curve_bits, !explicit_bits); + curve_bits); if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { /* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination * (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a @@ -96,6 +97,17 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( goto exit; } + /* Get the exact number of bits which are necessary for this key. This is + * used to validate the "curve_bits" input parameter (only in case it was + * provided). + * Note: we intentionally ignore the return value of mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() + * because we are only interested in the curve's bit size. */ + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &curve_bits_check); + if (explicit_bits && (curve_bits_check != curve_bits)) { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + goto exit; + } + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecp->grp, grp_id)); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { @@ -285,7 +297,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_generate_key( psa_ecc_family_t curve = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY( attributes->core.type); mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = - mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits, 0); + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(curve, attributes->core.bits); const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id(grp_id); diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index f4685dbc69..abd7a5f6b9 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -253,8 +253,7 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, } mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, - size_t bits, - int bits_is_sloppy) + size_t bits) { switch (curve) { case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: @@ -277,12 +276,8 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) case 521: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; case 528: - if (bits_is_sloppy) { - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; - } - break; + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; #endif } break; @@ -308,12 +303,8 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, switch (bits) { #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) case 255: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; case 256: - if (bits_is_sloppy) { - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; - } - break; + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) case 448: @@ -340,7 +331,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, break; } - (void) bits_is_sloppy; return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; } #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ From 673868be5df7918878c78b98f4ef87f7ec76b7a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 14:48:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 071/551] psa_crypto_ecp: add helper for checking EC parameters This commit also updates "test_suite_psa_crypto.data" replacing PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED with PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT when a wrong bit size is provided while importing key. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++------ tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 6 +- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index 20ef29c122..866ef7956a 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -32,6 +32,60 @@ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) +/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are + * valid. */ +static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t bits, int allow_bit_size_roundup) +{ + switch (family) { + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: + switch (bits) { + case 192: + case 224: + case 256: + case 384: + case 521: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 528: + if (allow_bit_size_roundup) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: + switch (bits) { + case 256: + case 384: + case 512: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: + switch (bits) { + case 448: + case 255: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + case 256: + if (allow_bit_size_roundup) { + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + } + break; + + case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: + switch (bits) { + case 192: + case 224: + case 256: + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + + return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +} + psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( psa_key_type_t type, size_t curve_bits, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length, @@ -41,7 +95,6 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( psa_status_t status; mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ecp = NULL; size_t curve_bytes = data_length; - size_t curve_bits_check; int explicit_bits = (curve_bits != 0); if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type) && @@ -83,27 +136,16 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( } mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp); + status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), curve_bits, + !explicit_bits); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } + /* Load the group. */ grp_id = mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), curve_bits); if (grp_id == MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE) { - /* We can't distinguish between a nonsensical family/size combination - * (which would warrant PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT) and a - * well-regarded curve that Mbed TLS just doesn't know about (which - * would warrant PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED). For uniformity with how - * curves that Mbed TLS knows about but for which support is disabled - * at build time, return NOT_SUPPORTED. */ - status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - goto exit; - } - - /* Get the exact number of bits which are necessary for this key. This is - * used to validate the "curve_bits" input parameter (only in case it was - * provided). - * Note: we intentionally ignore the return value of mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() - * because we are only interested in the curve's bit size. */ - mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &curve_bits_check); - if (explicit_bits && (curve_bits_check != curve_bits)) { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 1bd8b65002..0cb800573e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ import_with_data:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:8:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size=255 for secp256r1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -import_with_data:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):255:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +import_with_data:"49c9a8c18c4b885638c431cf1df1c994131609b580d4fd43a0cab17db2f13eee":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):255:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size=521 for secp521r1 (good) depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ import_with_data:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size=528 for secp521r1 (bad) depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 -import_with_data:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):528:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +import_with_data:"01b1b6ad07bb79e7320da59860ea28e055284f6058f279de666e06d435d2af7bda28d99fa47b7dd0963e16b0073078ee8b8a38d966a582f46d19ff95df3ad9685aae":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):528:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA import EC keypair: explicit bit-size, DER format depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ import_with_data:"04dea5e45d0ea37fc566232a508f4ad20ea13d47e4bf5fa4d54a57a0ba0120 PSA import EC keypair: implicit bit-size, not a valid length depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -import_with_data:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +import_with_data:"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):0:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA import EC keypair: secp256r1, all-bits-zero (bad) depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 From 3b7663de29940dd6b6c00995711936f50ebf7c62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 14:56:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 072/551] psa_util: update the documentation of ECC conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index e1dd822e53..a2604e1f31 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -109,9 +109,6 @@ extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; #include /** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the Mbed TLS encoding to PSA. - * - * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of - * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. * * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). @@ -125,9 +122,6 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, size_t *bits); /** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. - * - * \note This function is provided solely for the convenience of - * Mbed TLS and may be removed at any time without notice. * * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). From bf999cb22ec7de888cf3ca3baf79bca137f53f57 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2023 17:48:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 073/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: add test functions and cases for ECC conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 29 +++++++++++ 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 0cb800573e..d2fa842500 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -7406,3 +7406,58 @@ persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"":PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY PSA derive persistent key: HKDF SHA-256, exportable persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA:1024:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:0:DERIVE_KEY + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP192R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP224R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP256R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP384R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP521R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - BP256R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - BP384R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - BP512R1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - CURVE25519 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP192K1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP224K1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP256K1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - CURVE448 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - fail +ecc_conversion_functions_fail: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index 4c08a9017c..a2d156d4ee 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "common.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" + /* For MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST, knowing that psa_generate_random() * uses mbedtls_ctr_drbg internally. */ #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" @@ -9479,6 +9481,33 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecc_conversion_functions(int grp_id_arg) +{ + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = grp_id_arg; + psa_ecc_family_t ecc_family; + size_t bits; + + ecc_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &bits); + TEST_ASSERT(ecc_family != 0); + TEST_EQUAL(grp_id, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(ecc_family, bits)); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecc_conversion_functions_fail(void) +{ + psa_ecc_family_t ecc_family; + size_t bits; + + // Pick an invalid group ID (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 is the last enum) + ecc_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 + 1, &bits); + TEST_EQUAL(ecc_family, 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 0)); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE */ void key_agreement_output(int alg_arg, int our_key_type_arg, data_t *our_key_data, From 90e764c1bff2416eadfca2a901786c98f32966f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2023 18:16:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 074/551] changelog: added documentation for the 2 new public functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/7764.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/7764.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..be332cd605 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Features + * mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() helper + functions were added to convert from mbedtls_ecp_group_id to + psa_ecc_family_t and curve's bit size and viceversa, respectively. \ No newline at end of file From dc33200b74db515ef0e031d97f8207282ed41e06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2023 18:28:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 075/551] psa-transition: extend "Elliptic curve mechanism selection" Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- docs/psa-transition.md | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/psa-transition.md b/docs/psa-transition.md index 067ffafbd3..71b3d68f90 100644 --- a/docs/psa-transition.md +++ b/docs/psa-transition.md @@ -743,6 +743,10 @@ A curve is fully determined by a curve family identifier and the private key siz | `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1` | [`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga48bb340b5544ba617b0f5b89542665a7) | 256 | | `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448` | [`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga1f624c5cdaf25b21287af33024e1aff8) | 448 | +The following helper functions can be used to convert between the 2 types: +- `mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa()` converts from the legacy curve type identifier to PSA curve family and bit-size. +- `mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa()` converts from PSA curve family and bit-size to the legacy identifier. + The following cryptographic algorithms work with ECC keys: * ECDH key agreement (including X25519 and X448): [`PSA_ALG_ECDH`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1gab2dbcf71b63785e7dd7b54a100edee43). From 0e608807e36e46c06abcd7bd1bdb8c6cef2c3f66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 11:46:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 076/551] psa: let mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() accept only exact bit lengths Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 9 ++------- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 30 +++++++++++++++--------------- library/psa_util.c | 2 -- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index a2604e1f31..cfb4bce58c 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -126,16 +126,11 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. - * \param bits_is_sloppy If true, \p bits may be the bit-length rounded up - * to the nearest multiple of 8. This allows the caller - * to infer the exact curve from the length of a key - * which is supplied as a byte string. * * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). - * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \c curve is not recognized. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if \p bits is not - * correct for \p curve. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve + * and \p bits is not recognized. */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits); diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index 866ef7956a..3c5aa729bd 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -32,13 +32,16 @@ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_ECDH) -/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are - * valid. */ -static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t bits, int allow_bit_size_roundup) +/* Helper function to verify if the provided EC's family and key bit size are valid. + * + * Note: "bits" parameter is used both as input and output and it might be updated + * in case provided input value is not multiple of 8 ("sloppy" bits). + */ +static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) { switch (family) { case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: - switch (bits) { + switch (*bits) { case 192: case 224: case 256: @@ -46,14 +49,13 @@ static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t bits, int allow_ case 521: return PSA_SUCCESS; case 528: - if (allow_bit_size_roundup) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } + *bits = 521; + return PSA_SUCCESS; } break; case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1: - switch (bits) { + switch (*bits) { case 256: case 384: case 512: @@ -62,19 +64,18 @@ static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t bits, int allow_ break; case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY: - switch (bits) { + switch (*bits) { case 448: case 255: return PSA_SUCCESS; case 256: - if (allow_bit_size_roundup) { - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } + *bits = 255; + return PSA_SUCCESS; } break; case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: - switch (bits) { + switch (*bits) { case 192: case 224: case 256: @@ -136,8 +137,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ecp_load_representation( } mbedtls_ecp_keypair_init(ecp); - status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), curve_bits, - !explicit_bits); + status = check_ecc_parameters(PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type), &curve_bits); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index abd7a5f6b9..28b0285521 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -276,7 +276,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) case 521: - case 528: return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; #endif } @@ -303,7 +302,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, switch (bits) { #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) case 255: - case 256: return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) From ad819679a55a36338d8c1ba4e72db69d11409646 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 12:14:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 077/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: explicitly check return values of conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 31 ++++++++++---------- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 32 ++++++++------------- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index d2fa842500..501cbb7833 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -7409,55 +7409,56 @@ persistent_key_load_key_from_storage:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP192R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:192 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP224R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:224 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP256R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:256 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP384R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:384 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP521R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1:521 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - BP256R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:256 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - BP384R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:384 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - BP512R1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1:512 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - CURVE25519 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:255 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP192K1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:192 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP224K1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:224 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - SECP256K1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1:256 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - CURVE448 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:448 + +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - Wrong values +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX:0:0 -ECP group ID <-> PSA family - fail -ecc_conversion_functions_fail: \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index a2d156d4ee..ec8afe705f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -9481,30 +9481,22 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE */ -void ecc_conversion_functions(int grp_id_arg) +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +void ecc_conversion_functions(int grp_id_arg, int psa_family_arg, int bits_arg) { mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = grp_id_arg; - psa_ecc_family_t ecc_family; - size_t bits; + psa_ecc_family_t ecc_family = psa_family_arg; + size_t bits = bits_arg; + size_t bits_tmp; - ecc_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &bits); - TEST_ASSERT(ecc_family != 0); - TEST_EQUAL(grp_id, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(ecc_family, bits)); -} -/* END_CASE */ + TEST_EQUAL(ecc_family, mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &bits_tmp)); + TEST_EQUAL(bits, bits_tmp); -/* BEGIN_CASE */ -void ecc_conversion_functions_fail(void) -{ - psa_ecc_family_t ecc_family; - size_t bits; - - // Pick an invalid group ID (MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 is the last enum) - ecc_family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448 + 1, &bits); - TEST_EQUAL(ecc_family, 0); - - TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 0)); + if (grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX) { + TEST_EQUAL(grp_id, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(ecc_family, bits)); + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(ecc_family, bits)); + } } /* END_CASE */ From 8bd330dff554dfbf3e170463bcd21d31e2405595 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 13:35:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 078/551] changelog: add missing newline Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/7764.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt index be332cd605..5eb14b4d22 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ Features * mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() helper functions were added to convert from mbedtls_ecp_group_id to - psa_ecc_family_t and curve's bit size and viceversa, respectively. \ No newline at end of file + psa_ecc_family_t and curve's bit size and viceversa, respectively. From 0bc8598d20071c1a8ae122cdeae74f7c53ba0e62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 15:22:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 079/551] psa_util: properly handle secp224r1 private key size Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 5 +++++ library/psa_util.c | 8 ++++++-- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index 3c5aa729bd..f38efff670 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -80,6 +80,11 @@ static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) case 224: case 256: return PSA_SUCCESS; + /* secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private keys. + * This means that private keys are represented with 232 bits. */ + case 232: + *bits = 225; + return PSA_SUCCESS; } break; } diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 28b0285521..971f965e40 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -232,8 +232,10 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) + /* secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private keys. + * The nominal key size in PSA is the private key size, hence 225. */ case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: - *bits = 224; + *bits = 225; return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) @@ -318,7 +320,9 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1; #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) - case 224: + /* secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private keys. + * The nominal key size in PSA is the private key size, hence 225. */ + case 225: return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1; #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) From fc8a48a9e34d0bd42a0b8c6aaffeffc11391f230 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 09:03:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 080/551] changelog: fix working Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/7764.txt | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt index 5eb14b4d22..0734fb9113 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ Features - * mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() helper - functions were added to convert from mbedtls_ecp_group_id to - psa_ecc_family_t and curve's bit size and viceversa, respectively. + * Add functions mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() + to convert between mbedtls_ecp_group_id and psa_ecc_family_t and curve's + bit size and vice versa, respectively. From afa01c7394a2e02b060f741f56c3614f7af70b86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 09:47:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 081/551] psa-transition: update "Elliptic curve mechanism selection" section - add hyperlinks for the conversion functions. - move conversion functions' description before the legacy<->PSA table. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- docs/psa-transition.md | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/psa-transition.md b/docs/psa-transition.md index 71b3d68f90..617426cfd7 100644 --- a/docs/psa-transition.md +++ b/docs/psa-transition.md @@ -725,7 +725,11 @@ An ECC public key has the type [`PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)`](https://mb An ECC key pair has the type [`PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga0b6f5d4d5037c54ffa850d8059c32df0) where `curve` is a curve family identifier. A key with this type can be used both for private-key and public-key operations (there is no separate key type for a private key without the corresponding public key). You can always use a private key for operations on the corresponding public key (as long as the policy permits it). -A curve is fully determined by a curve family identifier and the private key size in bits. The following table gives the correspondence between legacy and PSA elliptic curve designations. +A curve is fully determined by a curve family identifier and the private key size in bits. You can use the following functions to convert between the PSA and legacy elliptic curve designations: +- [`mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa()`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__psa__tls__helpers/#group__psa__tls__helpers_1ga9c83c095adfec7da99401cf81e164f99) converts from the legacy curve type identifier to PSA curve family and bit-size. +- [`mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa()`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__psa__tls__helpers/#group__psa__tls__helpers_1ga6243eb619d5b2f5fe4667811adeb8a12) converts from PSA curve family and bit-size to the legacy identifier. + +The following table gives the correspondence between legacy and PSA elliptic curve designations. | Mbed TLS legacy curve identifier | PSA curve family | Curve bit-size | | -------------------------------- | ---------------- | -------------- | @@ -743,10 +747,6 @@ A curve is fully determined by a curve family identifier and the private key siz | `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1` | [`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga48bb340b5544ba617b0f5b89542665a7) | 256 | | `MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448` | [`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1ga1f624c5cdaf25b21287af33024e1aff8) | 448 | -The following helper functions can be used to convert between the 2 types: -- `mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa()` converts from the legacy curve type identifier to PSA curve family and bit-size. -- `mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa()` converts from PSA curve family and bit-size to the legacy identifier. - The following cryptographic algorithms work with ECC keys: * ECDH key agreement (including X25519 and X448): [`PSA_ALG_ECDH`](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/projects/api/en/development/api/group/group__crypto__types/#group__crypto__types_1gab2dbcf71b63785e7dd7b54a100edee43). From 4ba0c61eda41c5873879d670e58842e4f6196f52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 09:51:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 082/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: add test case for ECP conversion with null values Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 501cbb7833..c0916e067f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -7459,6 +7459,9 @@ ECP group ID <-> PSA family - CURVE448 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448 ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448:PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY:448 +ECP group ID <-> PSA family - Null values +ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:0:0 + ECP group ID <-> PSA family - Wrong values ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX:0:0 From ac739524740747292352b8b8393e7fdbe244b6d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:22:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 083/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: improve failing tests for EC conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 30 ++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index c0916e067f..eda6f5d8c2 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -7463,5 +7463,5 @@ ECP group ID <-> PSA family - Null values ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE:0:0 ECP group ID <-> PSA family - Wrong values -ecc_conversion_functions:MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX:0:0 +ecc_conversion_functions_fail diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index ec8afe705f..1112cfcd59 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -9491,15 +9491,33 @@ void ecc_conversion_functions(int grp_id_arg, int psa_family_arg, int bits_arg) TEST_EQUAL(ecc_family, mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &bits_tmp)); TEST_EQUAL(bits, bits_tmp); - - if (grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX) { - TEST_EQUAL(grp_id, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(ecc_family, bits)); - } else { - TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(ecc_family, bits)); - } + TEST_EQUAL(grp_id, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(ecc_family, bits)); } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +void ecc_conversion_functions_fail() +{ + size_t bits; + + /* Invalid legacy curve identifier. */ + TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, &bits)); + TEST_EQUAL(0, bits); + + /* Invalid PSA EC family. */ + TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(0, 192)); + /* Invalid bit-size for a valid EC family. */ + TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 512)); + + /* Twisted-Edward curves are not supported yet. */ + TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255)); + TEST_EQUAL(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, + mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448)); +} +/* END_CASE */ + + /* BEGIN_CASE */ void key_agreement_output(int alg_arg, int our_key_type_arg, data_t *our_key_data, From 65df79303fafe853809dc392f8eb91d2bddec31d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 10:58:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 084/551] psa_crypto_ecp: return unsupported for secp224k1 in check_ecc_parameters() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index f38efff670..d6b640cf75 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -77,14 +77,14 @@ static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: switch (*bits) { case 192: - case 224: case 256: return PSA_SUCCESS; - /* secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private keys. - * This means that private keys are represented with 232 bits. */ + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). + * Note: secp224k1 has 225-bit private keys which are rounded + * up to 232 for their representation. */ + case 224: case 232: - *bits = 225; - return PSA_SUCCESS; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } break; } From 7863627bd6fe7320542095fde87eae093b30a61d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 13:17:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 085/551] psa_util: remove support for secp224k1 in EC conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 11 ++--------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 971f965e40..d833299e8c 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -232,11 +232,7 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP224K1) - /* secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private keys. - * The nominal key size in PSA is the private key size, hence 225. */ - case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1: - *bits = 225; - return PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1; + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256K1) case MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1: @@ -320,10 +316,7 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1; #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) - /* secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private keys. - * The nominal key size in PSA is the private key size, hence 225. */ - case 225: - return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1; + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ #endif #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) case 256: From eca07140f3c160eba07cf63c34c1d2495c925b40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 13:17:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 086/551] psa_util: update documentation of EC conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index cfb4bce58c..d0d95ae19a 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -112,11 +112,16 @@ extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; * * \param grpid An Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). - * \param[out] bits On success, the bit size of the curve. + * \param[out] bits On success the bit size of the curve; 0 on failure. * - * \return The corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier + * \return On success the corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). - * \return \c 0 on failure (\p grpid is not recognized). + * \return \c 0 if \p grpid is not supported. + * + * \note A successful conversion means that the curve is supported + * in PSA. Legacy support (`mbedtls_ecp_xxx`) is only + * enabled if the curve is builtin (see + * `config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h` for details). */ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, size_t *bits); @@ -127,10 +132,23 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. * - * \return The corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve identifier - * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). + * \return On success the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve + * identifier (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve - * and \p bits is not recognized. + * and \p bits is not supported or invalid: + * - not supported means that the proper `PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx` + * symbol is not enabled for the requested curve. + * - invalid if `PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx` is enabled, but the + * combination of \p curve and \p bits are not correct + * for that curve. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE for secp224k1 curve, no matter + * what the status of `PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224` is, because + * this curve is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). + * + * \note A successful conversion means that the curve is supported + * in PSA. Legacy support (`mbedtls_ecp_xxx`) is only + * enabled if the curve is builtin (see + * `config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h` for details). */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits); From db6e02902de5c399e37fc9f171f117d1c9afa962 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 10:15:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 087/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: test also MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX in ecc_conversion_functions_fail() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index 1112cfcd59..7b6f5ae04d 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -9500,7 +9500,9 @@ void ecc_conversion_functions_fail() { size_t bits; - /* Invalid legacy curve identifier. */ + /* Invalid legacy curve identifiers. */ + TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX, &bits)); + TEST_EQUAL(0, bits); TEST_EQUAL(0, mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE, &bits)); TEST_EQUAL(0, bits); From 0d438fa390355958c0745f0393859110029f0bf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 10:33:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 088/551] psa_crypto_ecp: fix comment for secp224k1 in check_ecc_parameters Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index d6b640cf75..4d9a59baa9 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) case 256: return PSA_SUCCESS; /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). - * Note: secp224k1 has 225-bit private keys which are rounded - * up to 232 for their representation. */ + * Note: secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private + * keys which are rounded up to 232 for their representation. */ case 224: case 232: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; From 2622b1dab364d29923035189620a44a5109d0c20 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 10:36:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 089/551] changelog: improve wording Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/7764.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt index 0734fb9113..9830584034 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ Features * Add functions mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() to convert between mbedtls_ecp_group_id and psa_ecc_family_t and curve's - bit size and vice versa, respectively. + bit size. From 3afdd02e378f4e901845ad7d6f00e7379073d497 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 08:50:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 090/551] changelog: improve wording Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/7764.txt | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt index 9830584034..4cd20798a2 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/7764.txt @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ Features * Add functions mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa() and mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa() - to convert between mbedtls_ecp_group_id and psa_ecc_family_t and curve's - bit size. + to convert between Mbed TLS and PSA curve identifiers. From d0aa9c1316e4fdc98c3e5f501bf9aa1e0b3342b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 09:10:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 091/551] psa_util: update documentation for PSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 31 ++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index d0d95ae19a..f36d89ad62 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -114,14 +114,11 @@ extern mbedtls_psa_drbg_context_t *const mbedtls_psa_random_state; * (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). * \param[out] bits On success the bit size of the curve; 0 on failure. * - * \return On success the corresponding PSA elliptic curve identifier - * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). - * \return \c 0 if \p grpid is not supported. - * - * \note A successful conversion means that the curve is supported - * in PSA. Legacy support (`mbedtls_ecp_xxx`) is only - * enabled if the curve is builtin (see - * `config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h` for details). + * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function + * returns the proper PSA curve identifier + * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). This holds even if the curve is + * not supported by the ECP module. + * \return \c 0 if the curve is not supported in the PSA API. */ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, size_t *bits); @@ -132,23 +129,11 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. * - * \return On success the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve + * \return If the curve is supported in the PSA API, this function + * returns the corresponding Mbed TLS elliptic curve * identifier (`MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx`). * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve - * and \p bits is not supported or invalid: - * - not supported means that the proper `PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx` - * symbol is not enabled for the requested curve. - * - invalid if `PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx` is enabled, but the - * combination of \p curve and \p bits are not correct - * for that curve. - * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE for secp224k1 curve, no matter - * what the status of `PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224` is, because - * this curve is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). - * - * \note A successful conversion means that the curve is supported - * in PSA. Legacy support (`mbedtls_ecp_xxx`) is only - * enabled if the curve is builtin (see - * `config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h` for details). + * and \p bits is not supported. */ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t bits); From 39faa9cad4e83293094e74b2a39bab8914109994 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 09:11:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 092/551] psa_util: rename parameter of mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa The new name better reflects the fact that the 1st parameter is just the EC family and not the curve. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 4 ++-- library/psa_util.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index f36d89ad62..1b142562ec 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, /** Convert an ECC curve identifier from the PSA encoding to Mbed TLS. * - * \param curve A PSA elliptic curve identifier + * \param family A PSA elliptic curve family identifier * (`PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx`). * \param bits The bit-length of a private key on \p curve. * @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, * \return #MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE if the combination of \c curve * and \p bits is not supported. */ -mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t bits); #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index d833299e8c..41586e262c 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -250,10 +250,10 @@ psa_ecc_family_t mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(mbedtls_ecp_group_id grpid, } } -mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t curve, +mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t bits) { - switch (curve) { + switch (family) { case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1: switch (bits) { #if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) From c7a1e9936aaca86c85c1ec1bff3a56a04a6454fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2023 18:44:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 093/551] Move bignum flag for negative zero into test_info Add accessors ready for protection with test_info mutex. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h | 28 +++++++++---------------- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/src/bignum_helpers.c | 2 +- tests/src/helpers.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++----- tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function | 2 +- 5 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h index 2f6bf89317..cf175a3ac4 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h @@ -77,30 +77,22 @@ void mbedtls_test_mpi_mod_modulus_free_with_limbs(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); * * - This function guarantees that if \p s begins with '-' then the sign * bit of the result will be negative, even if the value is 0. - * When this function encounters such a "negative 0", it - * increments #mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0. - * - The size of the result is exactly the minimum number of limbs needed - * to fit the digits in the input. In particular, this function constructs - * a bignum with 0 limbs for an empty string, and a bignum with leading 0 - * limbs if the string has sufficiently many leading 0 digits. - * This is important so that the "0 (null)" and "0 (1 limb)" and - * "leading zeros" test cases do what they claim. + * When this function encounters such a "negative 0", it calls + * mbedtls_test_increment_case_uses_negative_0(). + * - The size of the result is exactly the minimum number of limbs needed to fit + * the digits in the input. In particular, this function constructs a bignum + * with 0 limbs for an empty string, and a bignum with leading 0 limbs if the + * string has sufficiently many leading 0 digits. This is important so that + * the "0 (null)" and "0 (1 limb)" and "leading zeros" test cases do what they + * claim. * - * \param[out] X The MPI object to populate. It must be initialized. - * \param[in] s The null-terminated hexadecimal string to read from. + * \param[out] X The MPI object to populate. It must be initialized. + * \param[in] s The null-terminated hexadecimal string to read from. * * \return \c 0 on success, an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code otherwise. */ int mbedtls_test_read_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const char *s); -/** Nonzero if the current test case had an input parsed with - * mbedtls_test_read_mpi() that is a negative 0 (`"-"`, `"-0"`, `"-00"`, etc., - * constructing a result with the sign bit set to -1 and the value being - * all-limbs-0, which is not a valid representation in #mbedtls_mpi but is - * tested for robustness). - */ -extern unsigned mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0; - #endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ #endif /* TEST_BIGNUM_HELPERS_H */ diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index 564a5539f4..b672ecca62 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -74,6 +74,9 @@ typedef struct { #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) const char *mutex_usage_error; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + unsigned case_uses_negative_0; +#endif } mbedtls_test_info_t; @@ -151,6 +154,28 @@ const char *mbedtls_test_get_mutex_usage_error(void); void mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(const char *msg); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +/** + * \brief Get whether the current test is a bignum test that uses + * negative zero. + * + * \return non zero if the current test uses bignum negative zero. + */ +unsigned mbedtls_test_get_case_uses_negative_0(void); + +/** + * \brief Indicate that the current test uses bignum negative zero. + * + * \note This function is called if the current test case had an + * input parsed with mbedtls_test_read_mpi() that is a negative + * 0 (`"-"`, `"-0"`, `"-00"`, etc., constructing a result with + * the sign bit set to -1 and the value being all-limbs-0, + * which is not a valid representation in #mbedtls_mpi but is + * tested for robustness). * + */ +void mbedtls_test_increment_case_uses_negative_0(void); +#endif int mbedtls_test_platform_setup(void); void mbedtls_test_platform_teardown(void); diff --git a/tests/src/bignum_helpers.c b/tests/src/bignum_helpers.c index c85e2caafa..913f5e3870 100644 --- a/tests/src/bignum_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/bignum_helpers.c @@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_read_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const char *s) } if (negative) { if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { - ++mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0; + mbedtls_test_increment_case_uses_negative_0(); } X->s = -1; } diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 52785fc01a..03a8fa7285 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -109,6 +109,25 @@ void mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(const char *msg) } #endif // #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) + +unsigned mbedtls_test_get_case_uses_negative_0(void) +{ + return mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0; +} + +void mbedtls_test_set_case_uses_negative_0(unsigned uses) +{ + mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0 = uses; +} + +void mbedtls_test_increment_case_uses_negative_0(void) +{ + ++mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0; +} + +#endif + /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* Helper Functions */ @@ -171,10 +190,6 @@ void mbedtls_test_skip(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED, test, line_no, filename); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -unsigned mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0 = 0; -#endif - void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void) { mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS, 0, 0, 0); @@ -183,7 +198,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void) mbedtls_test_set_line2(NULL); #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) - mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0 = 0; + mbedtls_test_set_case_uses_negative_0(0); #endif } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function index c90f1bbbb0..35900e6207 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static int sign_is_valid(const mbedtls_mpi *X) * we sometimes test the robustness of library functions when given * a negative zero input. If a test case has a negative zero as input, * we don't mind if the function has a negative zero output. */ - if (!mbedtls_test_case_uses_negative_0 && + if (!mbedtls_test_get_case_uses_negative_0() && mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) == 0 && X->s != 1) { return 0; } From 65064265c2706b88b8e6ba44f7d65e7053bd7140 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 17:29:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 094/551] Protect test info access with mutex Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 10 +- tests/src/helpers.c | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- tests/suites/host_test.function | 15 ++- 3 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index b672ecca62..73459d992f 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -123,16 +123,18 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void); /** * \brief Get the current test line buffer 1 * - * \return The current test line buffer 1 + * \param line Buffer of minimum size \c MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH, + * which will have line buffer 1 copied to it. */ -const char *mbedtls_test_get_line1(void); +void mbedtls_test_get_line1(char *line); /** * \brief Get the current test line buffer 2 * - * \return The current test line buffer 2 + * \param line Buffer of minimum size \c MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH, + * which will have line buffer 1 copied to it. */ -const char *mbedtls_test_get_line2(void); +void mbedtls_test_get_line2(char *line); #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) /** diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 03a8fa7285..1bad819acf 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -13,6 +13,10 @@ #include #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif + /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* Static global variables */ @@ -22,76 +26,200 @@ static mbedtls_platform_context platform_ctx; mbedtls_test_info_t mbedtls_test_info; +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_test_info_mutex; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* Mbedtls Test Info accessors */ mbedtls_test_result_t mbedtls_test_get_result(void) { - return mbedtls_test_info.result; + mbedtls_test_result_t result; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + result = mbedtls_test_info.result; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return result; } void mbedtls_test_set_result(mbedtls_test_result_t result, const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + mbedtls_test_info.result = result; mbedtls_test_info.test = test; mbedtls_test_info.line_no = line_no; mbedtls_test_info.filename = filename; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } const char *mbedtls_test_get_test(void) { - return mbedtls_test_info.test; + const char *test; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + test = mbedtls_test_info.test; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return test; } const char *mbedtls_get_test_filename(void) { - return mbedtls_test_info.filename; + const char *filename; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + /* It should be ok just to pass back the pointer here, as it is going to + * be a pointer into non changing data. */ + filename = mbedtls_test_info.filename; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return filename; } int mbedtls_test_get_line_no(void) { - return mbedtls_test_info.line_no; + int line_no; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + line_no = mbedtls_test_info.line_no; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return line_no; } void mbedtls_test_increment_step(void) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + ++mbedtls_test_info.step; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void) { - return mbedtls_test_info.step; + unsigned long step; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + step = mbedtls_test_info.step; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return step; } -void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) { - mbedtls_test_info.step = step; -} - -const char *mbedtls_test_get_line1(void) +void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) { - return mbedtls_test_info.line1; +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + mbedtls_test_info.step = step; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ +} + +void mbedtls_test_get_line1(char *line) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + memcpy(line, mbedtls_test_info.line1, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_set_line1(const char *line) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + if (line == NULL) { - memset(mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1)); + memset(mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } else { - strncpy(mbedtls_test_info.line1, line, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line1)); + memcpy(mbedtls_test_info.line1, line, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } -const char *mbedtls_test_get_line2(void) +void mbedtls_test_get_line2(char *line) { - return mbedtls_test_info.line2; +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + memcpy(line, mbedtls_test_info.line2, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } -void mbedtls_test_set_line2(const char *line) { +void mbedtls_test_set_line2(const char *line) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + if (line == NULL) { - memset(mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2)); + memset(mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } else { - strncpy(mbedtls_test_info.line2, line, sizeof(mbedtls_test_info.line2)); + memcpy(mbedtls_test_info.line2, line, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } @@ -103,9 +231,17 @@ const char *mbedtls_test_get_mutex_usage_error(void) void mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(const char *msg) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + if (mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error == NULL || msg == NULL) { mbedtls_test_info.mutex_usage_error = msg; } + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } #endif // #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE) @@ -113,17 +249,43 @@ void mbedtls_test_set_mutex_usage_error(const char *msg) unsigned mbedtls_test_get_case_uses_negative_0(void) { - return mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0; + unsigned test_case_uses_negative_0 = 0; +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + test_case_uses_negative_0 = mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + return test_case_uses_negative_0; } void mbedtls_test_set_case_uses_negative_0(unsigned uses) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0 = uses; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_increment_case_uses_negative_0(void) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + ++mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } #endif @@ -150,11 +312,19 @@ int mbedtls_test_platform_setup(void) ret = mbedtls_platform_setup(&platform_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + return ret; } void mbedtls_test_platform_teardown(void) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) mbedtls_platform_teardown(&platform_ctx); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */ diff --git a/tests/suites/host_test.function b/tests/suites/host_test.function index 1ebaf46deb..eb42a07eba 100644 --- a/tests/suites/host_test.function +++ b/tests/suites/host_test.function @@ -720,6 +720,8 @@ int execute_tests(int argc, const char **argv) mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "----\n"); total_skipped++; } else { + char line_buffer[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; + total_errors++; mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "FAILED\n"); mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, " %s\n at ", @@ -731,13 +733,14 @@ int execute_tests(int argc, const char **argv) mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "line %d, %s", mbedtls_test_get_line_no(), mbedtls_get_test_filename()); - if (mbedtls_test_get_line1()[0] != 0) { - mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "\n %s", - mbedtls_test_get_line1()); + + mbedtls_test_get_line1(line_buffer); + if (line_buffer[0] != 0) { + mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "\n %s", line_buffer); } - if (mbedtls_test_get_line2()[0] != 0) { - mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "\n %s", - mbedtls_test_get_line2()); + mbedtls_test_get_line2(line_buffer); + if (line_buffer[0] != 0) { + mbedtls_fprintf(stdout, "\n %s", line_buffer); } } fflush(stdout); From 0710ac4ec88faa168876525e17e9b409ee13cd16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 17:20:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 095/551] Add ability to exclude mutex from tests We need to be able to exclude mbedtls_test_info_mutex() from the normal tests, as this mutex has to be locked to report mutex errors, and also reports as leaked, due to where it is initialised / free'd. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/threading_helpers.c | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c index 261d14175f..0894700a31 100644 --- a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c @@ -117,40 +117,62 @@ static void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex, * mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check() will mark it as failed. */ } +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_test_info_mutex; + +static int mbedtls_test_mutex_can_test(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) +{ + /* If we attempt to run tests on this mutex then we are going to run into a + * couple of problems: + * 1. If any test on this mutex fails, we are going to deadlock when + * reporting that failure, as we already hold the mutex at that point. + * 2. Given the 'global' position of the initialization and free of this + * mutex, it will be shown as leaked on the first test run. */ + if (mutex == &mbedtls_test_info_mutex) { + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + static void mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_init(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { mutex_functions.init(mutex); - if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { - mutex->state = MUTEX_IDLE; - ++live_mutexes; + if (mbedtls_test_mutex_can_test(mutex)) { + if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { + mutex->state = MUTEX_IDLE; + ++live_mutexes; - mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); + mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); + } } } static void mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_free(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { - if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { + if (mbedtls_test_mutex_can_test(mutex)) { + if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { - switch (mutex->state) { - case MUTEX_FREED: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "free without init or double free"); - break; - case MUTEX_IDLE: - mutex->state = MUTEX_FREED; - --live_mutexes; - break; - case MUTEX_LOCKED: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "free without unlock"); - break; - default: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "corrupted state"); - break; + switch (mutex->state) { + case MUTEX_FREED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "free without init or double free"); + break; + case MUTEX_IDLE: + mutex->state = MUTEX_FREED; + --live_mutexes; + break; + case MUTEX_LOCKED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "free without unlock"); + break; + default: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "corrupted state"); + break; + } + + mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); } - - mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); } + mutex_functions.free(mutex); } @@ -160,26 +182,30 @@ static int mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_lock(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) * is to hold the passed in and internal mutex - otherwise we create a race * condition. */ int ret = mutex_functions.lock(mutex); - if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { - switch (mutex->state) { - case MUTEX_FREED: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "lock without init"); - break; - case MUTEX_IDLE: - if (ret == 0) { - mutex->state = MUTEX_LOCKED; - } - break; - case MUTEX_LOCKED: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "double lock"); - break; - default: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "corrupted state"); - break; - } - mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); + if (mbedtls_test_mutex_can_test(mutex)) { + if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { + switch (mutex->state) { + case MUTEX_FREED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "lock without init"); + break; + case MUTEX_IDLE: + if (ret == 0) { + mutex->state = MUTEX_LOCKED; + } + break; + case MUTEX_LOCKED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "double lock"); + break; + default: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "corrupted state"); + break; + } + + mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); + } } + return ret; } @@ -188,23 +214,26 @@ static int mbedtls_test_wrap_mutex_unlock(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) /* Lock the internal mutex first and change state, so that the only way to * change the state is to hold the passed in and internal mutex - otherwise * we create a race condition. */ - if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { - switch (mutex->state) { - case MUTEX_FREED: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "unlock without init"); - break; - case MUTEX_IDLE: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "unlock without lock"); - break; - case MUTEX_LOCKED: - mutex->state = MUTEX_IDLE; - break; - default: - mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "corrupted state"); - break; + if (mbedtls_test_mutex_can_test(mutex)) { + if (mutex_functions.lock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex) == 0) { + switch (mutex->state) { + case MUTEX_FREED: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "unlock without init"); + break; + case MUTEX_IDLE: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "unlock without lock"); + break; + case MUTEX_LOCKED: + mutex->state = MUTEX_IDLE; + break; + default: + mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mutex, "corrupted state"); + break; + } + mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); } - mutex_functions.unlock(&mbedtls_test_mutex_mutex); } + return mutex_functions.unlock(mutex); } From a8b4291836b788d509bd00cd2436e5cbd363544a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 11:10:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 096/551] tls13: add generic function to write Record Size Limit ext Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- library/ssl_misc.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index a8afd429cf..62b212d722 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2710,6 +2710,13 @@ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end); + +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t record_size_limit, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) From faf70bdf9d314e52fd8b3e7d92a922316cac05c5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 10:03:32 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 097/551] ssl_tls13_generic: check value of RecordSizeLimit in helper function Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index ecfaf8a1a9..0befe3bba3 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -1698,6 +1698,27 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) +/* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value + * smaller than 64. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value + * as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ +static int mbedtls_ssl_is_record_size_limit_valid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t record_size_limit) +{ + if (record_size_limit < MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid record size limit : %u Bytes", + record_size_limit)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + } + + return 0; +} + /* RFC 8449, section 4: * * The ExtensionData of the "record_size_limit" extension is @@ -1709,6 +1730,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end) { + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *p = buf; uint16_t record_size_limit; const size_t extension_data_len = end - buf; @@ -1731,17 +1753,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", record_size_limit)); - /* RFC 8449, section 4: - * - * Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value - * smaller than 64. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value - * as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. - */ - if (record_size_limit < MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + ret = mbedtls_ssl_is_record_size_limit_valid(ssl, record_size_limit); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; } ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit = record_size_limit; @@ -1749,6 +1763,37 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } +MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL +int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + uint16_t record_size_limit, + unsigned char *buf, + const unsigned char *end, + size_t *out_len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + unsigned char *p = buf; + *out_len = 0; + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_is_record_size_limit_valid(ssl, record_size_limit); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); + + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT, p, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(record_size_limit, p, 4); + + *out_len = 6; + + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", record_size_limit)); + + mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); + + return 0; +} + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ From 42017cd4c9dacef74a82618a1d1b8afbfbfe35a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yanray Wang Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 11:15:23 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 098/551] tls13: cli: write Record Size Limit ext in ClientHello - add the support in library - update corresponding test case Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang --- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 9 +++++++++ tests/ssl-opt.sh | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index 342ec5242e..0d132227c0 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -1160,6 +1160,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } p += ext_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_some_ephemeral_enabled(ssl)) { ret = ssl_tls13_write_key_share_ext(ssl, p, end, &ext_len); diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 92b3e171c6..1cd01dc0c2 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -4856,10 +4856,13 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client-side parsing and debug output" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE --disable-client-cert -d 4" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ 0 \ - -s "Preparing extension (Record Size Limit/28) for 'encrypted extensions'" -# The P_CLI can not yet send the Record Size Limit extension. Thus, the G_NEXT_SRV does not send -# a response in its EncryptedExtensions record. -# -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "found record_size_limit extension" \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension received." \ + -s "Parsing extension 'Record Size Limit/28' (2 bytes)" \ + -s "record_size_limit 16384 negotiated" # In the following (9) tests, --recordsize is the value used by the G_NEXT_CLI (3.7.2) to configure the # maximum record size using "https://gnutls.org/reference/gnutls-gnutls.html#gnutls-record-set-max-size". From 47d294694355b2544f8a2647c3fcfae5b77ac8fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 17:31:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 099/551] tls13: server: write Record Size Limit ext in EncryptedExtensions - add the support in library - update corresponding test cases. Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 9 +++++++++ tests/ssl-opt.sh | 24 ++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index a7c266b528..c9fddda1ee 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -2530,6 +2530,15 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; +#endif + extensions_len = (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(extensions_len, p_extensions_len, 0); diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 1cd01dc0c2..89243e4a29 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -4843,7 +4843,6 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server-side parsing and debug output" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4" \ 0 \ -s "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" \ - -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ -s "bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -4857,10 +4856,7 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client-side parsing and debug output" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ 0 \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ - -c "found record_size_limit extension" \ -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" \ - -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension received." \ -s "Parsing extension 'Record Size Limit/28' (2 bytes)" \ -s "record_size_limit 16384 negotiated" @@ -4937,8 +4933,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=512" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ 0 \ - -s "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ - -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ -s "512 bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -4951,8 +4947,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=1536" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ 0 \ - -s "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ - -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ -s "1536 bytes written in 2 fragments" @@ -4965,8 +4961,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=2560" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ 0 \ - -s "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ - -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ -s "2560 bytes written in 3 fragments" @@ -4979,8 +4975,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=2048" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ 0 \ - -s "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ - -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ -s "2048 bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -4993,8 +4989,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=6144" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ 0 \ - -s "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ - -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ -s "6144 bytes written in 2 fragments" From 598ea09dd5b142a0743c4a9b8ab7a3a9b6a9a813 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2024 17:34:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 100/551] TLS1.3: SRV/CLI: add support for sending Record Size Limit extension Signed-off-by: Yanray Wang Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 89243e4a29..e45a165df8 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -5003,11 +5003,33 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=10240" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ 0 \ - -s "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ - -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ -s "10240 bytes written in 3 fragments" +# TODO: For time being, we send fixed value of RecordSizeLimit defined by +# MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. Once we support variable buffer length of +# RecordSizeLimit, we need to modify value of RecordSizeLimit in below test. +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3 m->m: both peer comply with record size limit (16384)" \ + "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ + 0 \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ + -s "Maximum incoming record payload length is 16384" + # Tests for renegotiation # Renegotiation SCSV always added, regardless of SSL_RENEGOTIATION From 148dfb64575dab43a26fe66677d2b7f98d22f049 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 18:02:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 101/551] Change record size limit writing function Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- library/ssl_misc.h | 1 - library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 12 ++++-------- 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 62b212d722..7195d63432 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2713,7 +2713,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - uint16_t record_size_limit, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index 0d132227c0..2a8081ddac 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( - ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, end, &ext_len); + ssl, p, end, &ext_len); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index 0befe3bba3..ad2b7f6729 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -1765,29 +1765,25 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - uint16_t record_size_limit, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; unsigned char *p = buf; *out_len = 0; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_is_record_size_limit_valid(ssl, record_size_limit); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than the minimum record size limit"); MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT, p, 0); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH, p, 2); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(record_size_limit, p, 4); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, 4); *out_len = 6; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", record_size_limit)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)); mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); From d2fc90e024b055e023c412fac6a1377229396eff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2024 18:04:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 102/551] Stop sending record size limit extension if it's not sent from client Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index c9fddda1ee..36d1c059f5 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -2500,6 +2500,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t extensions_len = 0; unsigned char *p_extensions_len; size_t output_len; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) + uint32_t record_size_extension_mask; +#endif *out_len = 0; @@ -2531,12 +2534,15 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( - ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, end, &output_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + record_size_extension_mask = mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions | record_size_extension_mask) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( + ssl, p, end, &output_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += output_len; } - p += output_len; #endif extensions_len = (p - p_extensions_len) - 2; From e1ac98d8887872ccc8a5034a5e237f74965f3a47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:10:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 103/551] remove mbedtls_ssl_is_record_size_limit_valid function Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 46 +++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index ad2b7f6729..0afedbc356 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -1698,26 +1698,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) -/* RFC 8449, section 4: - * - * Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value - * smaller than 64. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value - * as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. - */ -static int mbedtls_ssl_is_record_size_limit_valid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - uint16_t record_size_limit) -{ - if (record_size_limit < MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid record size limit : %u Bytes", - record_size_limit)); - MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( - MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, - MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - } - - return 0; -} /* RFC 8449, section 4: * @@ -1730,7 +1710,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const unsigned char *p = buf; uint16_t record_size_limit; const size_t extension_data_len = end - buf; @@ -1753,9 +1732,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", record_size_limit)); - ret = mbedtls_ssl_is_record_size_limit_valid(ssl, record_size_limit); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + /* RFC 8449, section 4: + * + * Endpoints MUST NOT send a "record_size_limit" extension with a value + * smaller than 64. An endpoint MUST treat receipt of a smaller value + * as a fatal error and generate an "illegal_parameter" alert. + */ + if (record_size_limit < MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("Invalid record size limit : %u Bytes", + record_size_limit)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PEND_FATAL_ALERT( + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } ssl->session_negotiate->record_size_limit = record_size_limit; @@ -1773,17 +1762,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *out_len = 0; MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN >= MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN, - "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than the minimum record size limit"); + "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN is less than the " + "minimum record size limit"); MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR(p, end, 6); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT, p, 0); - MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH, p, 2); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH, + p, 2); MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, p, 4); *out_len = 6; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", + MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)); mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); From fbe42743eb37c0d8b846b6127144643400288fa4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:11:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 104/551] Fix issue in checking in writing extensions Fix issue in checking if server received record size limit extension. Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 36d1c059f5..227d287af5 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -2500,9 +2500,6 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t extensions_len = 0; unsigned char *p_extensions_len; size_t output_len; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) - uint32_t record_size_extension_mask; -#endif *out_len = 0; @@ -2534,8 +2531,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) - record_size_extension_mask = mbedtls_ssl_get_extension_mask(MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); - if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions | record_size_extension_mask) { + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext( ssl, p, end, &output_len); if (ret != 0) { From 3a37756496f89937214d600d5f2b7b8ccd95ed07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:13:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 105/551] Improve record size limit tests Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index e45a165df8..f47cc8ef6e 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -4843,6 +4843,7 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server-side parsing and debug output" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4" \ 0 \ -s "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ -s "bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -4856,6 +4857,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client-side parsing and debug output" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ 0 \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "found record_size_limit extension" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension received." \ -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" \ -s "Parsing extension 'Record Size Limit/28' (2 bytes)" \ -s "record_size_limit 16384 negotiated" @@ -4933,6 +4937,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=512" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ 0 \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ @@ -4947,6 +4953,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=1536" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ 0 \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ @@ -4961,6 +4969,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=2560" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ 0 \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ @@ -4975,6 +4985,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=2048" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ 0 \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ @@ -4989,6 +5001,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=6144" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ 0 \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ @@ -5003,6 +5017,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 response_size=10240" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ 0 \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ @@ -5011,23 +5027,20 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit # TODO: For time being, we send fixed value of RecordSizeLimit defined by # MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. Once we support variable buffer length of # RecordSizeLimit, we need to modify value of RecordSizeLimit in below test. -requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C -requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 +requires_config_value_equals "MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN" 16384 +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT -requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C -requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C -run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3 m->m: both peer comply with record size limit (16384)" \ +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3 m->m: both peer comply with record size limit (default)" \ "$P_SRV debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ - "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4" \ 0 \ - -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ - -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ - -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ - -s "RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ - -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ - -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ - -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ + -s "RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ + -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ -s "Maximum incoming record payload length is 16384" # Tests for renegotiation From 2a2462e8f93d290220cd63956fb1ada69646dc1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 18:58:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 106/551] Add Changlog entry for record size extension Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ca1a7c268d --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Features + * Add support for sending and receiving Record Size Limit extension. From 9457e67afd58b5e3deb67dbceb9662c34daeff41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 15:40:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 107/551] update record size limit tests to be more consistent Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 25 ++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index f47cc8ef6e..12605f5b01 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -4836,8 +4836,9 @@ run_test "Max fragment length: DTLS client, larger message" \ requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT -requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server-side parsing and debug output" \ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13" \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3 -V -d 4" \ @@ -4849,20 +4850,17 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server-side parsing and debug output" \ requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_record_size_limit -requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT -requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client-side parsing and debug output" \ - "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL:%DISABLE_TLS13_COMPAT_MODE --disable-client-cert -d 4" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL --disable-client-cert -d 4" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13" \ 0 \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ - -c "found record_size_limit extension" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension received." \ -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" \ - -s "Parsing extension 'Record Size Limit/28' (2 bytes)" \ - -s "record_size_limit 16384 negotiated" # In the following (9) tests, --recordsize is the value used by the G_NEXT_CLI (3.7.2) to configure the # maximum record size using "https://gnutls.org/reference/gnutls-gnutls.html#gnutls-record-set-max-size". @@ -4889,10 +4887,13 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit "$P_SRV debug_level=3 force_version=tls13 tls13_kex_modes=psk \ psk_list=Client_identity,6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70 \ response_size=256" \ - "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+PSK --recordsize 512 \ - --pskusername Client_identity --pskkey=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" \ + "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+PSK --recordsize 512 \ + --pskusername Client_identity --pskkey=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" \ 0 \ -s "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ -s "256 bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -4909,6 +4910,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit --pskusername Client_identity --pskkey=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" \ 0 \ -s "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ -s "768 bytes written in 2 fragments" @@ -4925,6 +4929,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit --pskusername Client_identity --pskkey=6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f70" \ 0 \ -s "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ + -s "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -s "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ -s "1280 bytes written in 3 fragments" From f501790ff20bf3896fff6299fd1f889106fab047 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 14:18:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 108/551] Improve comments across record size limit changes Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- library/ssl_misc.h | 1 + library/ssl_tls.c | 18 +++++++++--------- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 7195d63432..2e621be89d 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2704,6 +2704,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH (2) +/* This value is defined by RFC 8449 */ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index f92e40ac72..517af785a6 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -3521,15 +3521,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->transform_out != NULL && ssl->transform_out->tls_version == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { - /* RFC 8449, section 4: - * - * This value [record_size_limit] is the length of the plaintext - * of a protected record. - * The value includes the content type and padding added in TLS 1.3 - * (that is, the complete length of TLSInnerPlaintext). - * - * Thus, round down to a multiple of MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY - * and subtract 1 (for the content type that will be added later) + /* + * In TLS 1.3 case, when records are protected, `max_len` as computed + * above is the maximum length of the TLSInnerPlaintext structure that + * along the plaintext payload contains the inner content type (one byte) + * and some zero padding. Given the algorithm used for padding + * in mbedtls_ssl_encrypt_buf(), compute the maximum length for + * the plaintext payload. Round down to a multiple of + * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY and + * subtract 1. */ max_len = ((max_len / MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) * MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY) - 1; diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 12605f5b01..30e6a725a5 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -4862,16 +4862,18 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client-side parsing and debug output" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension received." \ -c "RecordSizeLimit: 16385 Bytes" \ -# In the following (9) tests, --recordsize is the value used by the G_NEXT_CLI (3.7.2) to configure the -# maximum record size using "https://gnutls.org/reference/gnutls-gnutls.html#gnutls-record-set-max-size". -# There is currently a lower limit of 512, caused by this function not respecting the -# "%ALLOW_SMALL_RECORDS" priority string and not using the more recent function -# https://gnutls.org/reference/gnutls-gnutls.html#gnutls-record-set-max-recv-size. +# In the following tests, --recordsize is the value used by the G_NEXT_CLI (3.7.2) to configure the +# maximum record size using gnutls_record_set_max_size() +# (https://gnutls.org/reference/gnutls-gnutls.html#gnutls-record-set-max-size). +# There is currently a lower limit of 512, caused by gnutls_record_set_max_size() +# not respecting the "%ALLOW_SMALL_RECORDS" priority string and not using the +# more recent function gnutls_record_set_max_recv_size() +# (https://gnutls.org/reference/gnutls-gnutls.html#gnutls-record-set-max-recv-size). # There is currently an upper limit of 4096, caused by the cli arg parser: # https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/blob/3.7.2/src/cli-args.def#L395. -# Thus, these tests are currently limit to that value range. -# Moreover, the value sent in the extension is expected to be larger by one compared -# to the value passed on the cli: +# Thus, these tests are currently limited to the value range 512-4096. +# Also, the value sent in the extension will be one larger than the value +# set at the command line: # https://gitlab.com/gnutls/gnutls/-/blob/3.7.2/lib/ext/record_size_limit.c#L142 # Currently test certificates being used do not fit in 513 record size limit @@ -5050,6 +5052,8 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3 m->m: both peer comply with record size -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ -s "Maximum incoming record payload length is 16384" +# End of Record size limit tests + # Tests for renegotiation # Renegotiation SCSV always added, regardless of SSL_RENEGOTIATION From 2fa99b2ddd5581f922a85555d84352cc291ff8d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 17:15:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 109/551] Add tests for client complying with record size limit Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 144 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 30e6a725a5..a0811a4289 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -5033,6 +5033,150 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Server complies with record size limit -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ -s "10240 bytes written in 3 fragments" +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (513), 1 fragment" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --disable-client-cert --recordsize 512" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=256" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ + -c "256 bytes written in 1 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (513), 2 fragments" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --disable-client-cert --recordsize 512" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=768" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ + -c "768 bytes written in 2 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (513), 3 fragments" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --disable-client-cert --recordsize 512" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=1280" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ + -c "1280 bytes written in 3 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (1024), 1 fragment" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=512" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ + -c "512 bytes written in 1 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (1024), 2 fragments" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=1536" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ + -c "1536 bytes written in 2 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (1024), 3 fragments" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=2560" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ + -c "2560 bytes written in 3 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (4096), 1 fragment" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=2048" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ + -c "2048 bytes written in 1 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (4096), 2 fragments" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=6144" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ + -c "6144 bytes written in 2 fragments" + +requires_gnutls_tls1_3 +requires_gnutls_record_size_limit +requires_all_configs_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT +requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED +run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit (4096), 3 fragments" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=10240" \ + 0 \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ + -c "10240 bytes written in 3 fragments" + # TODO: For time being, we send fixed value of RecordSizeLimit defined by # MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN. Once we support variable buffer length of # RecordSizeLimit, we need to modify value of RecordSizeLimit in below test. @@ -5046,7 +5190,6 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3 m->m: both peer comply with record size 0 \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ -c "RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ - -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ -s "RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ -s "Sent RecordSizeLimit: $MAX_IN_LEN Bytes" \ -s "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 16383" \ From e840263f76c830e17d09a1d8f4d4e5ab8b1644d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 17:21:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 110/551] Move record size limit testing to tls13 component Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 13 +------------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index f1b9cc23a6..1ab7e5833a 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -5645,6 +5645,7 @@ support_build_armcc () { component_test_tls13_only () { msg "build: default config with MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3, without MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2" scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA + scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/tls13-only.h\"'" msg "test: TLS 1.3 only, all key exchange modes enabled" @@ -5807,18 +5808,6 @@ component_test_tls13_no_compatibility_mode () { tests/ssl-opt.sh } -component_test_tls13_only_record_size_limit () { - msg "build: TLS 1.3 only from default, record size limit extension enabled" - scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT - make CFLAGS="'-DMBEDTLS_USER_CONFIG_FILE=\"../tests/configs/tls13-only.h\"'" - - msg "test_suite_ssl: TLS 1.3 only, record size limit extension enabled" - cd tests; ./test_suite_ssl; cd .. - - msg "ssl-opt.sh: (TLS 1.3 only, record size limit extension enabled)" - tests/ssl-opt.sh -} - component_build_mingw () { msg "build: Windows cross build - mingw64, make (Link Library)" # ~ 30s make CC=i686-w64-mingw32-gcc AR=i686-w64-mingw32-ar LD=i686-w64-minggw32-ld CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -maes -msse2 -mpclmul' WINDOWS_BUILD=1 lib programs From f37c70746b1c6645564b68ee52eb5e1fb55e232d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 17:22:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 111/551] Add MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT to full config Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- scripts/config.py | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/scripts/config.py b/scripts/config.py index d5fb85e52d..ab0e5ea6e8 100755 --- a/scripts/config.py +++ b/scripts/config.py @@ -207,7 +207,6 @@ EXCLUDE_FROM_FULL = frozenset([ 'MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY', # interacts with *_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT 'MBEDTLS_SHA512_USE_A64_CRYPTO_ONLY', # interacts with *_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT 'MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_A64_CRYPTO_IF_PRESENT', # setting *_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO is sufficient - 'MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT', # in development, currently breaks other tests 'MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN', # build dependency (clang+memsan) 'MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_VALGRIND', # build dependency (valgrind headers) 'MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO', # removes a feature From 7ae74b74cc8001cb83f61885893b05685966b933 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 21:51:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 112/551] Make sure record size limit is not configured without TLS 1.3 Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 1ab7e5833a..cf8d920c53 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -1335,6 +1335,7 @@ component_test_no_ctr_drbg_classic () { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT CC=$ASAN_CC cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . make @@ -1381,6 +1382,7 @@ component_test_no_hmac_drbg_classic () { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT CC=$ASAN_CC cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . make @@ -1434,6 +1436,7 @@ component_test_psa_external_rng_no_drbg_classic () { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED @@ -2436,6 +2439,7 @@ component_test_no_use_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan() { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C @@ -3360,6 +3364,7 @@ build_and_test_psa_want_key_pair_partial() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT # All the PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy are enabled by default in # crypto_config.h so we just disable the one we don't want. @@ -3958,6 +3963,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_ecdh() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED @@ -3974,6 +3980,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_hmac() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver make CC=$ASAN_CC CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC -I../tests/include" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" } @@ -3984,9 +3991,11 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_hkdf() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HKDF_C # Make sure to unset TLS1_3 since it requires HKDF_C and will not build properly without it. scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver make CC=$ASAN_CC CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF -I../tests/include" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" } @@ -3997,6 +4006,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_md5() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 @@ -4016,6 +4026,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_ripemd160() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 @@ -4035,6 +4046,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha1() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 @@ -4054,6 +4066,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha224() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4070,6 +4083,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha256() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4086,6 +4100,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha384() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4104,6 +4119,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha512() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4123,6 +4139,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pkcs1v15_crypt() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP @@ -4137,6 +4154,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pkcs1v15_sign() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP @@ -4151,6 +4169,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_oaep() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN @@ -4165,6 +4184,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pss() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN @@ -4179,6 +4199,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_key_type_rsa_key_pair() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 @@ -4194,6 +4215,7 @@ component_build_psa_accel_key_type_rsa_public_key() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver From a3bfdea82b55710bd1a1ff7ae6ebeecc3bc44634 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 15:30:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 113/551] Revert "Make sure record size limit is not configured without TLS 1.3" This reverts commit 52cac7a3e6782bbf46a76158c9034afad53981a7. Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 22 ---------------------- 1 file changed, 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index cf8d920c53..1ab7e5833a 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -1335,7 +1335,6 @@ component_test_no_ctr_drbg_classic () { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT CC=$ASAN_CC cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . make @@ -1382,7 +1381,6 @@ component_test_no_hmac_drbg_classic () { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC # requires HMAC_DRBG scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT CC=$ASAN_CC cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . make @@ -1436,7 +1434,6 @@ component_test_psa_external_rng_no_drbg_classic () { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py set MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED @@ -2439,7 +2436,6 @@ component_test_no_use_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan() { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C @@ -3364,7 +3360,6 @@ build_and_test_psa_want_key_pair_partial() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT # All the PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_KEY_PAIR_yyy are enabled by default in # crypto_config.h so we just disable the one we don't want. @@ -3963,7 +3958,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_ecdh() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDH_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED @@ -3980,7 +3974,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_hmac() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver make CC=$ASAN_CC CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HMAC -I../tests/include" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" } @@ -3991,11 +3984,9 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_hkdf() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HKDF_C # Make sure to unset TLS1_3 since it requires HKDF_C and will not build properly without it. scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver make CC=$ASAN_CC CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -DPSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST -DMBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF -I../tests/include" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" } @@ -4006,7 +3997,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_md5() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 @@ -4026,7 +4016,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_ripemd160() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 @@ -4046,7 +4035,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha1() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224 @@ -4066,7 +4054,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha224() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4083,7 +4070,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha256() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4100,7 +4086,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha384() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4119,7 +4104,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_sha512() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 @@ -4139,7 +4123,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pkcs1v15_crypt() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP @@ -4154,7 +4137,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pkcs1v15_sign() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP @@ -4169,7 +4151,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_oaep() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN @@ -4184,7 +4165,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_alg_rsa_pss() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN @@ -4199,7 +4179,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_key_type_rsa_key_pair() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 @@ -4215,7 +4194,6 @@ component_build_psa_accel_key_type_rsa_public_key() { scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PSS 1 scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" set PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 # Need to define the correct symbol and include the test driver header path in order to build with the test driver From 09561a75750d4924b5c06eb8cedee32433455369 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:13:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 114/551] Add MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT to config_adjust_ssl.h Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h index 8415f3e5f5..5dd331c765 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_ssl.h @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED #undef MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA +#undef MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ From 1487760b550c9cd87168ffa4ce464e8e80d94992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:15:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 115/551] Change order of checking of record size limit client tests Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index a0811a4289..10d75a77f2 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -5042,9 +5042,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --disable-client-cert --recordsize 512" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=256" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ -c "256 bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -5058,9 +5058,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --disable-client-cert --recordsize 512" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=768" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ -c "768 bytes written in 2 fragments" @@ -5074,9 +5074,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --disable-client-cert --recordsize 512" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=1280" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 513 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 511" \ -c "1280 bytes written in 3 fragments" @@ -5090,9 +5090,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=512" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ -c "512 bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -5106,9 +5106,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=1536" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ -c "1536 bytes written in 2 fragments" @@ -5122,9 +5122,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 1023" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=2560" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 1024 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 1023" \ -c "2560 bytes written in 3 fragments" @@ -5138,9 +5138,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=2048" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ -c "2048 bytes written in 1 fragments" @@ -5154,9 +5154,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=6144" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ -c "6144 bytes written in 2 fragments" @@ -5170,9 +5170,9 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3: Client complies with record size limit "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+CIPHER-ALL -d 4 --recordsize 4095" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=4 force_version=tls13 request_size=10240" \ 0 \ - -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ - -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Sent RecordSizeLimit: 16384 Bytes" \ + -c "ClientHello: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ + -c "RecordSizeLimit: 4096 Bytes" \ -c "EncryptedExtensions: record_size_limit(28) extension exists." \ -c "Maximum outgoing record payload length is 4095" \ -c "10240 bytes written in 3 fragments" From 3ff472441a704aa15aa55cf57d16c3e1b63062ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:15:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 116/551] Fix warning in ssl_tls13_generic.c Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index 0afedbc356..47fa65c188 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, *out_len = 6; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %u Bytes", + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("Sent RecordSizeLimit: %d Bytes", MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)); mbedtls_ssl_tls13_set_hs_sent_ext_mask(ssl, MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT); From 5f3a938d9542bfa93f82f926586bd0e715df08da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2023 16:28:12 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 117/551] Fix psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- library/psa_crypto.c | 83 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index a8baa6b6f5..3ca89fbe8b 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -6075,27 +6075,39 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( if (!is_kdf_alg_supported(kdf_alg)) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } + psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + operation->capacity = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { +#if (UINT_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#else + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX; +#endif + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif - /* All currently supported key derivation algorithms (apart from - * ecjpake to pms and pbkdf2_aes_cmac_128) are based on a hash algorithm. */ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); - if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { - hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); - } else if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { - hash_size = PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); - } else { - if (hash_size == 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } + if (hash_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } - /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise - * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially - * risk-prone. */ - psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise + * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially + * risk-prone. */ + status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; } if ((PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || @@ -6103,16 +6115,35 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( !(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg) || - (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS)) { + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { operation->capacity = hash_size; - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT || - MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS */ - operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; - return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } +#endif + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = UINT_MAX; + } + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { + /* Master Secret consists of 2-byte version number + * and a 46-byte random value */ + operation->capacity = 48U; + } + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { +#if (UINT_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * hash_size; +#else + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX; +#endif + } + return status; } static psa_status_t psa_key_agreement_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) From 4aa6b36a3510695d4caad9d272bb4160d393a05d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Wed, 13 Sep 2023 16:50:09 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 118/551] add tests for derive_full and derive_set_capacity Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 1bd8b65002..aa9f4e39ad 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6320,6 +6320,10 @@ PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):48U + 1U:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"ff":0:1:0 @@ -6528,6 +6532,14 @@ PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, read maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":47 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":48 + PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise AES128-CTR depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR From a0907f5750efedda58e11ea6b09395ba36b0fc2d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 27 Oct 2023 15:08:00 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 119/551] Reorder and correct comment Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- library/psa_crypto.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 3ca89fbe8b..a1d96bfa98 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -6110,11 +6110,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( return status; } - if ((PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || - PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) && - !(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; } @@ -6128,12 +6123,17 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; } #endif + if ((PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || + PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) && + !(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { operation->capacity = UINT_MAX; } if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { - /* Master Secret consists of 2-byte version number - * and a 46-byte random value */ + /* Master Secret is always 48 bytes + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246.html#section-8.1 */ operation->capacity = 48U; } if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { From 86e83dd4a7be88d6da353aa787d38aa777364aa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:38:26 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 120/551] Add kdf_set_max_capacity function Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- library/psa_crypto.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 82 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index a1d96bfa98..a116beff69 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -6063,6 +6063,86 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hash_try_support(psa_algorithm_t alg) return status; } +static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( + psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, + psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) +{ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + operation->capacity = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) + if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC); +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + return PSA_SUCCESS; + } +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128 */ + + /* After this point, if kdf_alg is not valid then value of hash_alg may be + * invalid or meaningless but it does not affect this function */ + psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); + size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + + /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise + * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially + * risk-prone. */ + psa_status_t status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { + operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg) && + (hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { + /* Master Secret is always 48 bytes + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246.html#section-8.1 */ + operation->capacity = 48U; + } else +#endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC) + if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { +#if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * hash_size; +#else + operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; +#endif + } else +#endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ + { + status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } + return status; +} + static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation, psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg) @@ -6075,74 +6155,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf( if (!is_kdf_alg_supported(kdf_alg)) { return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } - psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) - if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { - operation->capacity = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256); - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) - if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { -#if (UINT_MAX > UINT32_MAX) - operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, - 128U, - PSA_ALG_CMAC); -#else - operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX; -#endif - return PSA_SUCCESS; - } -#endif - - psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); - size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); - if (hash_size == 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - - /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise - * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially - * risk-prone. */ - status = psa_hash_try_support(hash_alg); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(kdf_alg)) { - operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; - } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(kdf_alg)) { - operation->capacity = hash_size; - } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND) - if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(kdf_alg)) { - operation->capacity = 255 * hash_size; - } -#endif - if ((PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg) || - PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) && - !(hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_256 || hash_alg == PSA_ALG_SHA_384)) { - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; - } - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(kdf_alg)) { - operation->capacity = UINT_MAX; - } - if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(kdf_alg)) { - /* Master Secret is always 48 bytes - * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5246.html#section-8.1 */ - operation->capacity = 48U; - } - if (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg)) { -#if (UINT_MAX > UINT32_MAX) - operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * hash_size; -#else - operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX; -#endif - } + psa_status_t status = psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity(operation, + kdf_alg); return status; } From 9ffd397e4c217ef7cb3fdae4ea79fb2a7a8a4de8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:40:13 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 121/551] Increase input parameter type and buffer size Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index 4c08a9017c..f87c8000cb 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -8451,7 +8451,7 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ -void derive_set_capacity(int alg_arg, int capacity_arg, +void derive_set_capacity(int alg_arg, int64_t capacity_arg, int expected_status_arg) { psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; @@ -8932,7 +8932,7 @@ void derive_full(int alg_arg, psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; size_t requested_capacity = requested_capacity_arg; psa_key_derivation_operation_t operation = PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT; - unsigned char output_buffer[16]; + unsigned char output_buffer[32]; size_t expected_capacity = requested_capacity; size_t current_capacity; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; From 2c4264bd412f64bafda9a19e6756efd3c0a1828d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:41:26 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 122/551] Add hkdf_extract, hkdf_expand and ecjpake_to_pms cases Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c index f8b36e1faa..560b7113d1 100644 --- a/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c +++ b/tests/src/psa_exercise_key.c @@ -414,6 +414,21 @@ int mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, input2, input2_length)); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg)) { + PSA_ASSERT(psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT, + input1, input1_length)); + PSA_ASSERT(psa_key_derivation_input_key(operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key)); + } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg)) { + PSA_ASSERT(psa_key_derivation_input_key(operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + key)); + PSA_ASSERT(psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO, + input2, + input2_length)); } else if (PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)) { PSA_ASSERT(psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(operation, @@ -436,6 +451,10 @@ int mbedtls_test_psa_setup_key_derivation_wrap( PSA_ASSERT(psa_key_derivation_input_key(operation, PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD, key)); + } else if (alg == PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS) { + PSA_ASSERT(psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(operation, + PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET, + input1, input1_length)); } else { TEST_FAIL("Key derivation algorithm not supported"); } From 604e1cbbe70d4485c6a34bf78bf2722aebc8f4ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:43:03 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 123/551] Change error status for invalid HKDF alg Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index aa9f4e39ad..61181f4481 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -5185,7 +5185,7 @@ derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation setup: algorithm from bad hash depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 -derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation setup: bad algorithm depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 @@ -7041,7 +7041,7 @@ key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA PSA key agreement setup: ECDH, unknown KDF depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key agreement setup: bad key agreement algorithm depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 From 1da06da398eb9c0d03a269ac546f7ea2f3f8c588 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:44:02 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 124/551] Add tests for derive_set_capacity for pbkdf and ecjpake_to_pms Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 61181f4481..3ab07d90c6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6324,6 +6324,32 @@ PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):48U + 1U:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +# UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) = 137438953440 +# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:UINT32_MAX * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF, request maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):SIZE_MAX:PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS + +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:UINT32_MAX * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS + PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_output:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:"000102030405060708090a0b0c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_SUCCESS:0:"":PSA_SUCCESS:"":42:"3cb25f25faacd57a90434f64d0362f2a2d2d0a90cf1a5a4c5db02d56ecc4c5bf34007208d5b887185865":"ff":0:1:0 From d3ae165adb1b375828e0724632acbcb13adaf387 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:44:52 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 125/551] Add tests for derive_full for hkdf_extract, hkdf_expand and ecjpake_to_pms Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 3ab07d90c6..3d79e459da 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6550,13 +6550,21 @@ PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, read maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) -PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF -derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 -PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, read maximum capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF -derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 + +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, read maximum capacity minus 1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS @@ -6566,6 +6574,10 @@ PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, read maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":48 +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:"deadbeef":"0409fc1accc230a205e4a208e64a8f204291f581a12756392da4b8c0cf5ef02b950000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise AES128-CTR depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_CTR:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES derive_key_exercise:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES:128:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_CTR From 83455ebcc002d5604c7a492b84c1158a8b428f6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:50:51 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 126/551] disable pbkdf2_hmac set max capacity test Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 3d79e459da..36f48f28db 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6328,11 +6328,10 @@ PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -# UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) = 137438953440 # This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines -PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +#PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity +#depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +#erive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES From 911eafda316e3f1ba3ba43af143c06cbbec48c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 16:59:56 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 127/551] add bugfix changelog entry Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6eeffd7777 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Bugfix + * Correct initial capacities for key derivation algorithms:TLS12_PRF, + TLS12_PSK_TO_MS, PBKDF2-HMAC, PBKDF2-CMAC From d3f70d321a16a5e043a8d6341a830b516024d1f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 16:20:04 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 128/551] fix unused variable warning and other fixes Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- ...ity.txt => fix_kdf_incorrect_initial_capacity.txt} | 2 +- library/psa_crypto.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) rename ChangeLog.d/{fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt => fix_kdf_incorrect_initial_capacity.txt} (92%) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_incorrect_initial_capacity.txt similarity index 92% rename from ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt rename to ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_incorrect_initial_capacity.txt index 6eeffd7777..10e2795bba 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_correct_initial_capacity.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_kdf_incorrect_initial_capacity.txt @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ Bugfix - * Correct initial capacities for key derivation algorithms:TLS12_PRF, + * Correct initial capacities for key derivation algorithms:TLS12_PRF, TLS12_PSK_TO_MS, PBKDF2-HMAC, PBKDF2-CMAC diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index a116beff69..672a97d1a2 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -6076,9 +6076,10 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { #if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) - operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * PSA_MAC_LENGTH(PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, - 128U, - PSA_ALG_CMAC); + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * (size_t)PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, + 128U, + PSA_ALG_CMAC); #else operation->capacity = SIZE_MAX; #endif @@ -6090,6 +6091,9 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( * invalid or meaningless but it does not affect this function */ psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(kdf_alg); size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_LENGTH(hash_alg); + if (hash_size == 0) { + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; + } /* Make sure that hash_alg is a supported hash algorithm. Otherwise * we might fail later, which is somewhat unfriendly and potentially @@ -6138,6 +6142,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( } else #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC */ { + (void) hash_size; status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } return status; From f4351c1a619859fe7215c9a5e7efd6dbfe6a1b18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 16:20:47 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 129/551] correct test data Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 36f48f28db..71f5b8e426 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -5185,7 +5185,7 @@ derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation setup: algorithm from bad hash depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 -derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +derive_setup:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH):PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED PSA key derivation setup: bad algorithm depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 @@ -6329,25 +6329,28 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT # This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines -#PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity -#depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 -#erive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:UINT32_MAX * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):SIZE_MAX:PSA_SUCCESS +# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):UINT32_MAX * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS +# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:UINT32_MAX * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 @@ -7078,7 +7081,7 @@ key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA PSA key agreement setup: ECDH, unknown KDF depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +key_agreement_setup:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(0)):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED PSA key agreement setup: bad key agreement algorithm depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 From 7d4db631cf7396e71473e690b9bd24d9aee4ff4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 16:17:46 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 130/551] add depends on for capacity tests and fix code style Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- library/psa_crypto.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 20 ++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 672a97d1a2..8e6a758343 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -6076,7 +6076,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_set_maximum_capacity( #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) if (kdf_alg == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128) { #if (SIZE_MAX > UINT32_MAX) - operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * (size_t)PSA_MAC_LENGTH( + operation->capacity = UINT32_MAX * (size_t) PSA_MAC_LENGTH( PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES, 128U, PSA_ALG_CMAC); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 71f5b8e426..7f9fa3c7fd 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6328,28 +6328,24 @@ PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines -PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +#PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity +#depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff +#derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines -PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +#PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity +#depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff +#derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):SIZE_MAX:PSA_SUCCESS -# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request maximum capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS -# This test case will work correctly on 64-bit machines PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request maximum capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1 From 179f33a1ea356f5bec04896efbdda8a6d5c8f2f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:48:38 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 131/551] add test cases with different hash algs Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 85 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 7f9fa3c7fd..bc35d32a05 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -5452,19 +5452,19 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY derive_input:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE PSA key derivation: TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS, good input, output too short -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"04aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_SUCCESS:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation: TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS, input[0]=0x02 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"02aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE PSA key derivation: TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS, input too short -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"04aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE PSA key derivation: TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS, input too long -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_input:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:"04aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:0:UNUSED:"":UNUSED:PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE:PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, good case, direct output @@ -6320,33 +6320,52 @@ PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-1, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1 derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_1):255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_1) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, request too much capacity +# TLS 1.2 PRF does not have a maximum capacity therefore +# derive_set_capacity negative test case is not added + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-256, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):48U + 1U:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-384, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):48U + 1U:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS, request too much capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -#PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity -#depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -#derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -#PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity -#depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -#derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF, request maximum capacity +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * 16 + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):SIZE_MAX:PSA_SUCCESS +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-384, request maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384 +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):SIZE_MAX:PSA_SUCCESS + PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS +PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, request maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_SUCCESS + PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_MAX_SIZE:PSA_SUCCESS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * 16:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 @@ -6544,36 +6563,68 @@ PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-512, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) - 1 + PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, read maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-512, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-512, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) - 1 + PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-256, read maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Extract SHA-512, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"000102030405060708090a0b0c":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) - 1 +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-512, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) - 1 + PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-256, read maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) -PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, read maximum capacity minus 1 +PSA key derivation: HKDF-Expand SHA-512, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512 +derive_full:PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):"0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b0b":"":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9":255 * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-256, read maximum capacity minus 1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":47 -PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS, read maximum capacity +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-384, read maximum capacity minus 1 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":47 + +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-256, read maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":48 +PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-384, read maximum capacity +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":48 + PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS, read maximum capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:"deadbeef":"0409fc1accc230a205e4a208e64a8f204291f581a12756392da4b8c0cf5ef02b950000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"":PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) PSA key derivation: HKDF SHA-256, exercise AES128-CTR From a7c55d5a1484db6eb502712e5171043a1e395a75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 00:43:48 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 132/551] fix depends on condition Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index bc35d32a05..660b73d5d4 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6361,7 +6361,7 @@ derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_SUCCESS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff @@ -6612,7 +6612,7 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":47 PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-384, read maximum capacity minus 1 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":47 PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-256, read maximum capacity @@ -6620,7 +6620,7 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":48 PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PSK-to-MS SHA-384, read maximum capacity -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS derive_full:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):"01020304":"5bc0b19b4a8b24b07afe7ec65c471e94a7d518fcef06c3574315255c52afe21b5bc0b19b872b9b26508458f03603744d575f463a11ae7f1b090c012606fd3e9f":"6d617374657220736563726574":48 PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS, read maximum capacity From 4cfd6a6bc6ca35f8debc069c2a1ff026756c303b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:15:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 133/551] Fix dependencies in pkcs5 aes-128-cbc tests These tests do not specify a hash function. This is an optional parameter with default value hmacWithSHA1, so these test cases are dependant on SHA-1 and not SHA-256 Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index 3bd6b49f09..453ee231cc 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIP pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ncrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e" PBES2 Encrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_ pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) From ae0b4bd04c10df2ca397844359c5a93f1c65e327 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:19:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 134/551] Add more details to comments Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- include/mbedtls/oid.h | 4 +++- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/oid.h b/include/mbedtls/oid.h index 3a7f740c99..de8e4545e1 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/oid.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/oid.h @@ -300,7 +300,9 @@ #define MBEDTLS_OID_HMAC_RIPEMD160 MBEDTLS_OID_INTERNET "\x05\x05\x08\x01\x04" /**< id-hmacWithSHA1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) iso-identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) ipsec(8) isakmpOakley(1) hmacRIPEMD160(4)} */ /* - * Encryption algorithms + * Encryption algorithms, + * the following standardized object identifiers are specified at + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8018#appendix-C. */ #define MBEDTLS_OID_DES_CBC MBEDTLS_OID_ISO_IDENTIFIED_ORG \ MBEDTLS_OID_OIW_SECSIG_ALG "\x07" /**< desCBC OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 7 } */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index 453ee231cc..790a31ba01 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -142,27 +142,27 @@ PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding enabled) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ncrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) +PBES2 Encrypt AES-128-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e" -PBES2 Encrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) +PBES2 Encrypt AES-192-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94" -PBES2 Encrypt AES-256-CBC (OK) +PBES2 Encrypt AES-256-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" -PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK) +PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" -PBES2 Decrypt AES-192-CBC (OK) +PBES2 Decrypt AES-192-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" -PBES2 Decrypt AES-256-CBC (OK) +PBES2 Decrypt AES-256-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" From 1f935f50270f759c4223ef08dffb1f09312c516e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 19:26:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 135/551] Add AES tests to test_suite_pkparse Test data generated using openssl: openssl genpkey -algorithm rsa -out $OUT -$ALG Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- ..._pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ ..._pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ ..._pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data | 12 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..276c613135 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIFLTBXBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wSjApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQIV3y5ahakUYYCAggA +MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIJBQAwHQYJYIZIAWUDBAECBBCcu2VAdIWUQawcrlhFDgV+BIIE +0JMB3FUnHGs5otXZJvxOkiIrliuQiDjy8AuctQdVNhArYeTfTxW6wZZxacDOAJT/ +JvxbpKRANBSCp+TOf5jMAHl11L8Pr7Z22HumPjJXyuTwntG/lYpWzHKLo+V2GGFo +8E5Q0uya0A+4sL80JQMKa6G4BZGdnOwD1krUPxrxsNXVRbsHcsewUc1nKshPlj0X +1A4Fe6IqgichLPODluJcJo6tWCrhKdDxyDzCdZ0ZiJpUgH7SPo3XZ6GO68nlSKz6 +vwChjrkUsmgDbeGr8yFP4kuaagRngMovGQXcYyNBDWZQYKM7uMqz6zuh4VJuvAJk +h/d8WDkFz6fJAEpqYYDBqVj5vGH3Xq0e4LzErJ0s8jQuOy66noiQIXF5U9V6sLvk +irbIyEVcBUWUIs2QCgEVbKRTNAzo3+V690etqVYx5mW8m3CenJ4TrrtsQJwOZlF5 +tz6a+RNjj5EZKRx5WoOQ/ZyQK77+dg4lO0MbaUptBawsLifCQANmJ7hOIl/aG8ae +8ZnBUFYR4Cmomkcb/OjabGv5iyizZ3esf5kfmhvaRDQN+V7Vx7Dy6lzzpJ3vhxoo ++VRCFAVIS+XPvGLynUvawHiSWlzYFKeX6t9ZriIDomVxZE/+zFbw6iQmE4pM6jS7 +mgwuVeKFeD0zVOI3I3pXN0NBZYZgkO3gdly6QbmETxkZB2ccv+Bqe/DdAi4Zq/JO +prW8x4o5wogfn5heVGB++Kh8l9jXxqqh8f8txNwfR0oli/TQdT78FgXcaWbQh+e+ +vFtIAIHlGK+u+FGPJm4DuyW5LY+lYE0aJMD9Bre8yWVy3aF4IZ9KQz4gxObQS/mu +CXHqPCiuwnjaiGFwf6IuTvX3hD+9j9XvGKZn8Y7U42iwzKdYD6qRAXn4+v1G9KIV +cPB1XBCpnEk8E+whjaht5EnAk2I/vesT3akfemgRxEegKS1Ziu/bwTId5mFLx3oV +ql0Nb8dAlIkpDTwxGK7FgRhUwutml6HvvYKtG10OqvrFV026pyQnkVMBGCUMRKvO +ddNAKOr8Mz0qrme0osCxVBdLxnVjvIwsiPBsX2INV86xW7DUe50u+mbCxu4eXCsA +zIJps5WP+ol4z04oZEUp9DEFxILO65MBmWd8y43UqRaaAOXYU+IZ5Tyx0wPcSAbb +iLMFwZ5uA3rIXSvzesgdiX5oJOY1+Y4hpBB6148u2YmKQsNLC0FLodEdXrrDacS4 +jJbc/Zlw2Q2u+YXBzec9hLGsA63qGybc8gmrYYoutwv4fYwSFx8N5AiENFYughBv +EyYXx/gjsSUJOZpI7VDcTS5YiqxRy8VBGXM/ewcvsNxjLTiyQz2Dv8PvGdCzJHbE +CelmFM+RKa/NzkIv/SwM5hXKCO8wpXT5HApXiTxCjonX/f4Uqu0JxiHYqvV7ih3p +k+9kE2eo3GzXWPG4DvcKpDd8pz0aAV02+AGZatRceg0wpOVzo+EC7c8V0SU4De9V +gLyYzY53HLbeqhPm3Yb0yt6fIBfcRxLi7A86K9c2+Na4BFLJPvf7pMQLmLlcdp1M +wKQhQw8DFxxstrup98H29r2n+XzPukhZawQfTEJwfx8y1Kp1UvJOeg/wL1PayyNv +0CQRRMZ0UEb3o6GjSyb3j98oGNe1LAvoykqc8QsBlP6f +-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..06bcd28028 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIFLTBXBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wSjApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQIw3sKoAeJu8kCAggA +MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIJBQAwHQYJYIZIAWUDBAEWBBB/MRVI6fUEUiqwEb+tcClNBIIE +0JH3R2rIt9cTB0FcsWjoHKFtVy1DTtHZUwk5FlHXm00ngB46gIDzAbTdow6WpspV +H3wJgwU//AAE4bwuZ/AcQlRz2M+OuO3GT47EhjKvXiS3OjrIvkXp24LCS3lSbFV+ +dGc6A2CXlSHF9c/umrKlRtVpSXsnBlVhggVyI/1RidBmCeF2i2205bt/Z2mjODo3 +SlSZjZ8GeFOnm/0zSBxgltbemgfsNMo1QOFRTXblzRE9Ldc5DCPgyCNDHOVUugO3 +lrf9Wyak2oiUtCG5cApaeDTedQv61YK+Zt/ptJmXps/N0nskb3X40ngs+buDuAVP +7uUTxP8ZkvQdVcWD/FNweAPssAGxDcWhacVxeuXdDb+ktjZuHnYJ06lC5nTdJAi3 +zRuvXpYNPQNBfU2MwYV4P4g67ltqdtfZcOiqMIqtb0rWu+dfS0cVPUZHBhHATFbA +Tvo0GtUKuhLzGP4Zr6RSJVlxkjbNtfrE3lS1b5HwaE04F6iagRdH1b6f00FfFXAr +oTFz4/ykkY9q7w3yTLfX/8B5EUbcXLzJBZrAWA1RmsV6aiAvgh94587QprRrL6dD +gcCTjLeVIFw4QNQvzkroErWQbEsZ33cAFB/qJDSEd1FgEMh4LsbHwGP8M/iQNaV1 +WWgh43j3XjwAC2f17okd/+1WxhwpugEJ8EeSfY3oONtyE8sAXRhPLpR1eouRqTmY +5032TNhf9hzNIvJ1eYwehCZfZkvuqJxGe6rXbV579qSThzUpfz6BYylS+xcf6nJP +JniG1RodX/AkkicmKja4fNcp7JDDsmBPU9pLOfr8SodUlimGEQ8PGNNYIrOjKbHe +BICi0ZDSxgt+pPUfjeF9VIcYHF7vUj15ovbd7uJSshmEIIxdX2YDzOjoJHYevsyZ +uZm2ONA90R9szgJMWP2ChKXaNF0UySaG3hueWDRa7GJMPRjpCvcwhAw29YHSvNOq +MbQmyyjFDAk07BFXvXSahSXODe0HPVTbyT8eP2SO7VMPuOWdxH9+adOl8KPCx0L7 +kwiPgnRhAGaevOZs8M80EEOC6JLR9hM9LVCHWnXD41NvGgCSmu8SwzKzKB3KBVas +aSb8XW7IuNFZh2o6FfmDKUp0uXoifWVWe96ertJrHckRbTd4ZpjK2bWChh3WxE9s +0EYG8PAu/NSW7ARPgXZ43f/nYieSQd01zty8Vj4io2gVpQDm0YtZrv/a+gW3HSQj +mBmdDOsQmpP9gfCnOJOILlE/+ouVYiGeSMFbKc1tde1FBtwt0RGQVM7KoRb7itNe +AntBerIDERzq83iXvalzYdB2qw9yzZwvf5hGvNn+rDCD3aZTrr6if9QrrVeDYcTd +TTOVeQx2RgtXv4xdiV4epS8e7xOgLZphC52E4WTRoBz1qEJRHGj1HX8REJ7Q47HK +cZr5IZdLuIulvPPWcY/KLw437h7njAMM2rT0HqL5yZA5Bcnpj/SCQGRHew7OacSK +p1WKw2C/R6MTGDFplefr/f3NUT4quWybfHQG3L3zqjSbKBS0pVPlA4SPwhSgev3P +v+sShYuWwLTiVfzep/nBRcz2W3CHtHI2oahjEI9Vm/7WSdjxl7tSrHlsy7JbVuOA +3PF6QbG2JWgnyfmmgtK86iTchMlxBgWe5S5lz6kZNUXN +-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb2ee1456a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIFLTBXBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wSjApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQIcVlPn8HF5kcCAggA +MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIJBQAwHQYJYIZIAWUDBAEqBBA6UHwbVfKyYQwiCmyTPE/QBIIE +0Na0hdMyQvJvRUKDvR9Gds0VrwRjHq+WBCDcHfJJRS5RiSCWnOCifZHA/zYoYZ4j +rHnuzmheOuGZWjUkdZQ8kVKFGGCKQjHKHTlfDhVv/SQzwYYWVRyaubDC2SKYORKf +zCFzLjr8RCwBo0ubh9q+QvPrmvy/jZYHYruU7vGseS4vKnWwnXey0ii8L2qD71Fo +uH6WAMRc6xHzm1W2WSnFZvZFLwCmGg/LlHc34TdCgXyX8dhJsIAwlwuCStFWs194 +A5h5ZrLiDdpGCThn47H0jx8kzVcoY+dwuJXgNfzAbzDgbRyzCpQx7Fulzf36iyPO +fq1OrF0+DUSrEv1GJTXT4/1xlpaZgR2RT7in7jCSE7XyATBLRrL9nKAQCmLAARnb +ITLWUPMmxJJDLLn9faBt7ZpyRzLRqGMT6nRNBouAg8DWqqcRvBLfi3TxoQ/KS2BJ +HMtyTfSQpghAsUUqraquSfyLoA1+b47gO+H/grQIMMnfThGiUx9MLOGFAvQ3Um8R +aoTm8X8RuAH3BALA0m9isRww/yA/dw/03jtByDYMeQ/NAHAgL1proXqsojHIYN5v +6vesHcATHGiFnPY0kqKVyIN1G8n5Gji5P875GPq00WN2kPMLiBG9woq9yZ+l5HYu +ofpdtpQRgJJSmEBJgpvwxoJKTUa9mYN29klYiv97AwWj2D2VsJvjG+IlfVybUB26 +mkenc3Hve2V2JueYh8Oijl1j+plc61tYJ0WQloZHQWHSqCJkXEMqUX6DZZyxREix +8kUuWabSkxSq1uRxf7iG442oaer5mhktpbEMWyA22mJLfXBwNaULqlhZGdeqKz4N +zwE0vg1rug1ooLX/s85n6h0FMD+ANbbNU18hQaxmjiCETPp0txAVWpaGAQZsYkW2 +ff+Aj5Mer/qB/K/TBh+7c5PkwcpTTCF/HQ2XF3B30lsBhFmsbXBkvxThhgZkGHfO +EQrxsgc9pwQrM3WT70ZI3uMrN5DfK7Dp+AVwIIBlEeai6FEMpZkg/4tPYK4GkwWP +ZEzSBoUETO9up3NwKuYWS3VOAmsOO8qRXw9bynV2WxMZ8NTWDmSKX+MqYz28ejjK +/5EYX3uW1NVjz608QbzT3XxNtX9B/FTPT9OlK8IxeiOjfDG2fqe3k7bYBZGVC2/M +aCaVPTND8xHsodxIoYbEbF29YSV/FLtw1eQ3LpwDN5OCzXpiZ65A4PxnB3iPHoNl +8o76h2dcksN+NKsdjnRH95b9V8CVlc8QwLBSCWk5bkfTXLeSkDM14jpJ0+BCuAyD +bdCo+R32ItDlke/L6d+CtVbyhDJigdl9w9XKBJ3f9XKw6Q4RnuCNQf3fqo1h+vVs +Ia4Mau6XSKyyZtEH5F0mO0iwpYBxPz6S9u36WnI6ot2Ep8AlfjBTRbH0g/luPjaz +9Jiah0i9p79L3wMNJHfqkdkUvJyLKu0rTy23L0sw3Eg9rx2TErrlIWugoAi0peia +36sC82X78xIzOCq1XwaIojnyB0fqxJDn93BI9dKhnBzWP54oY/ckq+ixb1oBQ0Kx +sLWcOwbT/yprpo36ZMy1DcxjjVyEfRmzwJJ65qFk48XJ4JIswdmaFfYbZ8yQyRiy +coJGwITg1bspV4krBAspArmqN3D4LviHXojUMxD6Sx8R +-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data index f82dcb5e23..67723c91f1 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -890,6 +890,18 @@ Parse RSA Key #99.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT +Parse RSA Key #99.3 (Generated with OpenSSL, PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #99.4 (Generated with OpenSSL, PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-192-CBC hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #99.5 (Generated with OpenSSL, PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + Parse Public RSA Key #1 (PKCS#8 wrapped) depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem":0 From e83be5f639311adcd8bead731786cdaa49d920d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 23:39:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 136/551] Change renegotiation tests to work with TLS 1.2 only Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 10d75a77f2..5f0daaa1e7 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -5530,7 +5530,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server strict, client-initiated" \ "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ - "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ 0 \ -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ -c "found renegotiation extension" \ @@ -5649,7 +5649,7 @@ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server strict, client default" \ "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ - "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ + "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3" \ 0 \ -c "found renegotiation extension" \ -C "error" \ From 19ec9e4f66eabb8e8fa71f0cca69b1fb74095c4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 13:45:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 137/551] psa_crypto_ecp: remove support for secp224k1 Since this curve is not supported in PSA (and it will not ever be in the future), we save a few bytes. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ecp.c | 7 +------ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c index 4d9a59baa9..61c941479a 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ecp.c @@ -77,14 +77,9 @@ static int check_ecc_parameters(psa_ecc_family_t family, size_t *bits) case PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1: switch (*bits) { case 192: + /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). */ case 256: return PSA_SUCCESS; - /* secp224k1 is not and will not be supported in PSA (#3541). - * Note: secp224k1 has 224-bit coordinates but 225-bit private - * keys which are rounded up to 232 for their representation. */ - case 224: - case 232: - return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } break; } From 85ddd43656b420d1812aaa1c68c8bc280193c209 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 11:07:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 138/551] Improve record size limit changelog wording Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt index ca1a7c268d..bc954003ab 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt @@ -1,2 +1,5 @@ Features - * Add support for sending and receiving Record Size Limit extension. + * Add support for Record Size Limit extension as defined by RFC 8449 + and configured with MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT. + Application data sent and received will be fragmented according to + Record size limits negotiated during handshake. From d00a138075dd2032faeabb6a40b8196053b97a89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 17:23:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 139/551] Change test data for pkparse aes Test data generated using openSSL with: openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 $ENC -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $IN -outform PEM -out $OUT -passout "pass:PolarSSLTest" Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/data_files/Makefile | 24 ++++++++ ...sa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem | 56 +++++++++--------- ..._pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem | 30 ---------- ...cs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.der | Bin 0 -> 1329 bytes ...cs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem | 30 ++++++++++ ..._pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem | 30 ---------- ...cs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.der | Bin 0 -> 1329 bytes ...cs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem | 30 ++++++++++ ..._pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem | 30 ---------- ...cs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der | Bin 0 -> 1329 bytes ...cs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem | 30 ++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data | 30 +++++++--- 12 files changed, 163 insertions(+), 127 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.der create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem delete mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.der create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem delete mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der create mode 100644 tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem diff --git a/tests/data_files/Makefile b/tests/data_files/Makefile index 21ca489c1e..cb4a683f73 100644 --- a/tests/data_files/Makefile +++ b/tests/data_files/Makefile @@ -1045,6 +1045,30 @@ rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_3des_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 aes-128-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 aes-128-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 aes-192-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 aes-192-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem + +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 aes-256-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der +rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem + $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 aes-256-cbc -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform PEM -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" +all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem +keys_rsa_enc_pkcs8_v2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384: rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem + rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der: rsa_pkcs1_2048_clear.pem $(OPENSSL) pkcs8 -topk8 -v2 des -v2prf hmacWithSHA384 -inform PEM -in $< -outform DER -out $@ -passout "pass:$(keys_rsa_pkcs8_pwd)" all_final += rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_des_sha384.der diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem index 0d1b587f5b..f917af2a4c 100644 --- a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem +++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem @@ -1,30 +1,30 @@ -----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- -MIIFHDBOBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wQTApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQIYFcs8Uhn2poCAggA -MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIKBQAwFAYIKoZIhvcNAwcECKCBLl+C+3nCBIIEyEnIPlXdh1e3 -+cnyhX7dCRzR/NsygcRBJUPdwRUMAaOo/t+oZxFmHnblchxQ+pFoHrI9GVwg8uID -meEHlzSSKt8kOTvJ3C148jRFJy61YH6k5GEN+z5ihS9uTszaXRUlEsGfP1/SzWY9 -ME+pX+0kwJ4az87mYKyNUwK4U5d65Ic30pvRJc4unvFtRz6wtwqU+EV283pXHfyc -VNgQFjb1IPHEz/PSuE9p94mQvdIbVmuK2dRiMag/HcABvVhxzLldKyEHHhrHR0pa -gc41+3HVjz0b6RPE24zNrxA9bU+1URGwlkIlh7Jpc/ZuYRj6LQ33xUdYZcMZw0b4 -pSFJcUgX+GUXLyWLqhIxxc+GIeL2Vt5G0ea5KEqxOvSj2bJV2/JA0KtmrcIjX5Kz -d/9bAvxatcqIikVNVkQpUc1glKiIBfVrmyJ4XUlX9i5F3cgl18zrYUI4zPSBn8o5 -yxSfCuIMx+3zS4BiyugGNOclIbpLMjQuMrXxrt7S+QlXfdbXvyNfxa3qfqf7/P2k -ykxl0z1bjvkck6XoFGXdb13isUEtY2NjujZKZe55BLGqr7FsIIQSTAHilwMpK+CV -fA1EL4ck1+7FV+l8fJ0nN1Li1xOnDeAFuO2m91uibNMYPvRSoX9c+HQKXCdGfiuk -5tfNaq8bbXeIJ/P8wTjMZqI2l6HZRuXvvmRHN2zZ4BSsT3+61xtvSTISEimDSm5T -hYY583LG5lpFoOC0Y4EUw/ltmQpKW7AGkLg7SyC9oKvoeWM4c2t8HrL3iKPXtkwd -A/iEfZTxzmR57u+ZMlbws0evPiZQml8voJnuT6qwbos7g7V/Pc3Rj+b84JZcI2Jz -D89/VudIHfFDTXC/gcSRG4bd0glILJHT9FOCAlX5TEuRyeWasoVOV+m3Pi8vQM1u -tCsjE9UdoIdhoI5j94VhzHApdD4fePcQW9DysYa2R10gWIZKUvhUHH3FWLR2X2gK -Wiz5YkhEGXBRtDHd4cx8EM1bJMKwFyYXjXTPGfGlGiPt8b9u4F++IlsKcgGgPIvh -2rIm4jHuN3LRRlFkJ5B0kuOOxZ6GBfxasS+Ix4DZoIfqZsGNI5Wu2ikGZOKxX7Ij -G9RvcdpVV8C2Y+M9qI2+x93WAtQ+NRJo4/+gJ0O9bVUhjjAmIHu2bMtbvr9aPJhd -OpB9VQxB3c5mEXkNOV52oOGnIGVjbJMb4e3/MRpWtTFVcX6r200Gn6Hn3MnWZXdd -H7pOpAowTcTlFcbJ0WWjfZygj5HKKUOFzPYNnXKizjzQhF6yK0mphKFY+8tpFQqB -mV/1HlWJTSsAmh/FN21B2qq+KRiwMdpzKIEKC47mK+dzzo1mrTqmExvbiaLG8upr -KMb/lEnSCasiZKTh71J3+5vUE+Nw73rYNZcdh7fj+GBK9KJ3hdKwYc/9yyQx1Lua -4aXnUM6vQAsV+OLYNQE8vXMRtuftbPbV9sqiBLPIc/0P2EJ9mbEye8FM+koHUCKo -xtJe5SK36DMwAas6tjimouVgWTcAdbq9r8jQlCJ1WxXPUcCJdv6pFQUGKQ+34TMK -uWOhErUNRdqel9DthU5ig5dZs2DqlzbRzWYosZc1B6Q4/nua2JiBi8IeqtPILr2a -JYJ9DNzxn07lcFHiVgrJuA== +MIIFHDBOBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wQTApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQI11AY9mDsg8QCAggA +MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIKBQAwFAYIKoZIhvcNAwcECDzvZWW4smTrBIIEyG/U2B5LazZZ +rzLUN7V38xI1ZR6rcBJreOk0QmVOSk9QMh+Kq+LmFwnY2NY+xikAfRJKWUsjk+h4 +DzCWn+nsrvU2wK582XThWYwJ79BIwkweUWV9l1Nfw0vyx/FkcTHE+eGPdABBL4BO +o4uajZso7tYY2+jyPobqSn18j2TInKbHR7lB5l6OAX9FsV0pGKYBgKxa9LTj7ufD +70G5WLHJAfnTX/6+wWktDOMMCPTXij3qA0fyu835shMUWQ+KUx0Dyp2A6qeprV1Z +nklRzevWsA4pbNMe+GG3WrRj52YRVuwDJjgTeq5rIfyoyLGv0ZUZsa/KEP/oToe9 +CmFPHWA2RDpK4zD8lscsjsOj+B0UREcSw9CdL91rFZkr++PuI3A1/T+3M8DkjLiB +CvSVziZLyZaqUVd0UdXrHyGeFxIMAx8xfYGiLi/EEay2zEScGbQ2kU+N1Vpuyu39 +PoEmqNOchoEkLeMVTYTQDfK3LgYQXpvdLCQQG76AqRIbuY+ZfYYw8eWyJhm78Qwx +fAenH4i5AjgJcV/5xiLpj+1trdefaCSp0Z8XY7ng/xyNCOOdSbBOPl4JnD6snYaT +06dtpowP7gcN3bZQo/r2XsH8F1VPvjG2wZ38R7aHlF8vjCZ1gUtCuraoM9AAdVoW +zWiptA4Lc5CAp+kDa2Nf5gyL0lvN/IbWYE23/OMTECmwG+O/HNtvltmdmYB8Ze6A +pdlkftjf/NvFsHloJS76SreR0tpWM8rGnSqQdecWLutgWP7HiK6C77UYv3b71SVj +ga5uv2l67UAj9EPTizZvLJjn0ubylfCW4eaPkEJBaYW4uG/3BcWzpLRnGyq6csMC +/tly2Y1L9dBqyZMIMW/ZFm8/64K8IRaSu/8mMGxjQ7VHeU6JSDk3G4by8jdYjLA2 +Y3tWYaelX8oE02jrwv47PPFWft/P+3Gjwo8lFq0zQTAk2C1vHs44jLzsOxfizo6s +mzmGh54JFsdE1tlYoa515Id2I27vjCvK6XbbgguinHaIsRgaRnCyyqEjO22z2zP3 +RpJD7FdugvZDepLfII1H8+JlbyBEd2zByMIPehIeM/HWWN0ukAgIz6yardrCYiuU +hXTqTz6bzaZMRJauPt/gpSvAx8kTKr9nXH2VRiToUs3ABjT9DN1/mQ1RlA0NmK1i +qfsMRXWzckaKgmJ8fglxEY7UR6fOqt3325yVQ/x49AKBxBDO9wmfpHEO3aQY7+H5 +hP/5tuc81226VFbyTERtTaEb/I+7iiImcWtVW4bB/1DgCu1NTlay6XaHOoclxcEE +N+d/3wDjSrsUhAKcK42wNPa74eSZy9ElJ+33xC56tqxhvo6YdG7VFu3S8qnhaXf1 +ijcRCw7vr2ShGMAhnloz4T+IX3ZGrzkVSXQG+rpaFag0b1QxeS6w/V7F8u+wljnq +1BzIfEjnE3lpR1eiZ8Ygu/n4kb7n5gHZqd1C8QiFZOGczX3uKFbH3/HOS20A+/6R +3rkjCQ+Uyxl3+wVdyOSpUCqtLfJBx69CM/6lDBPrliQ6DE94xKFrNEogG3IE36rW +oSCJcveg3cdbrHSqc+3m36FbQl2YKy8hgBwhrym2xHZ/ZS+acUQsN/V3VvEym3N6 +QXFLn3yqnmpr1g+yqXfQwA== -----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem deleted file mode 100644 index 276c613135..0000000000 --- a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem +++ /dev/null @@ -1,30 +0,0 @@ ------BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- -MIIFLTBXBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wSjApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQIV3y5ahakUYYCAggA -MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIJBQAwHQYJYIZIAWUDBAECBBCcu2VAdIWUQawcrlhFDgV+BIIE -0JMB3FUnHGs5otXZJvxOkiIrliuQiDjy8AuctQdVNhArYeTfTxW6wZZxacDOAJT/ -JvxbpKRANBSCp+TOf5jMAHl11L8Pr7Z22HumPjJXyuTwntG/lYpWzHKLo+V2GGFo -8E5Q0uya0A+4sL80JQMKa6G4BZGdnOwD1krUPxrxsNXVRbsHcsewUc1nKshPlj0X -1A4Fe6IqgichLPODluJcJo6tWCrhKdDxyDzCdZ0ZiJpUgH7SPo3XZ6GO68nlSKz6 -vwChjrkUsmgDbeGr8yFP4kuaagRngMovGQXcYyNBDWZQYKM7uMqz6zuh4VJuvAJk -h/d8WDkFz6fJAEpqYYDBqVj5vGH3Xq0e4LzErJ0s8jQuOy66noiQIXF5U9V6sLvk -irbIyEVcBUWUIs2QCgEVbKRTNAzo3+V690etqVYx5mW8m3CenJ4TrrtsQJwOZlF5 -tz6a+RNjj5EZKRx5WoOQ/ZyQK77+dg4lO0MbaUptBawsLifCQANmJ7hOIl/aG8ae -8ZnBUFYR4Cmomkcb/OjabGv5iyizZ3esf5kfmhvaRDQN+V7Vx7Dy6lzzpJ3vhxoo -+VRCFAVIS+XPvGLynUvawHiSWlzYFKeX6t9ZriIDomVxZE/+zFbw6iQmE4pM6jS7 -mgwuVeKFeD0zVOI3I3pXN0NBZYZgkO3gdly6QbmETxkZB2ccv+Bqe/DdAi4Zq/JO -prW8x4o5wogfn5heVGB++Kh8l9jXxqqh8f8txNwfR0oli/TQdT78FgXcaWbQh+e+ -vFtIAIHlGK+u+FGPJm4DuyW5LY+lYE0aJMD9Bre8yWVy3aF4IZ9KQz4gxObQS/mu -CXHqPCiuwnjaiGFwf6IuTvX3hD+9j9XvGKZn8Y7U42iwzKdYD6qRAXn4+v1G9KIV -cPB1XBCpnEk8E+whjaht5EnAk2I/vesT3akfemgRxEegKS1Ziu/bwTId5mFLx3oV -ql0Nb8dAlIkpDTwxGK7FgRhUwutml6HvvYKtG10OqvrFV026pyQnkVMBGCUMRKvO -ddNAKOr8Mz0qrme0osCxVBdLxnVjvIwsiPBsX2INV86xW7DUe50u+mbCxu4eXCsA -zIJps5WP+ol4z04oZEUp9DEFxILO65MBmWd8y43UqRaaAOXYU+IZ5Tyx0wPcSAbb -iLMFwZ5uA3rIXSvzesgdiX5oJOY1+Y4hpBB6148u2YmKQsNLC0FLodEdXrrDacS4 -jJbc/Zlw2Q2u+YXBzec9hLGsA63qGybc8gmrYYoutwv4fYwSFx8N5AiENFYughBv -EyYXx/gjsSUJOZpI7VDcTS5YiqxRy8VBGXM/ewcvsNxjLTiyQz2Dv8PvGdCzJHbE -CelmFM+RKa/NzkIv/SwM5hXKCO8wpXT5HApXiTxCjonX/f4Uqu0JxiHYqvV7ih3p -k+9kE2eo3GzXWPG4DvcKpDd8pz0aAV02+AGZatRceg0wpOVzo+EC7c8V0SU4De9V -gLyYzY53HLbeqhPm3Yb0yt6fIBfcRxLi7A86K9c2+Na4BFLJPvf7pMQLmLlcdp1M 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-bdCo+R32ItDlke/L6d+CtVbyhDJigdl9w9XKBJ3f9XKw6Q4RnuCNQf3fqo1h+vVs -Ia4Mau6XSKyyZtEH5F0mO0iwpYBxPz6S9u36WnI6ot2Ep8AlfjBTRbH0g/luPjaz -9Jiah0i9p79L3wMNJHfqkdkUvJyLKu0rTy23L0sw3Eg9rx2TErrlIWugoAi0peia -36sC82X78xIzOCq1XwaIojnyB0fqxJDn93BI9dKhnBzWP54oY/ckq+ixb1oBQ0Kx -sLWcOwbT/yprpo36ZMy1DcxjjVyEfRmzwJJ65qFk48XJ4JIswdmaFfYbZ8yQyRiy -coJGwITg1bspV4krBAspArmqN3D4LviHXojUMxD6Sx8R ------END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..136cfb95e32e5143abc65618e79f96451fd28030 GIT binary patch literal 1329 zcmV-11&LNQU&90UlPFNBb^`2A)A z0tf&w3kOAoM$#BWCe;yF90r!C6437^Gmkxb z6=IPvb6A~Dmmx@3E=cXmLHrw}eg&2zHndfJC0t%@gyF4xb`}?B_i(Mdw^FRcKTBte zU*^b607){JM%gpYJEWzju79RR@x(2k^puv&OD_abvLlZlHE%T@#)9A%W6t*UAh>gGbdPAQYC6!JHqky;<0Ozm 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+MIIFLTBXBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wSjApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQIhWg0Xe90dAcCAggA +MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIKBQAwHQYJYIZIAWUDBAEqBBCRE60k0URZBki+hlzaxgZgBIIE +0Hffn1sg3qNNUkFDHdbvU9E3+aaMJKWqDS4bUqGguT7Tz36TPM1drUZSFyWvPgNY +dXonxu+2h6jzRny0clPyp3kCbJEqgvyj0laKNAfV1fmJRVkIFiCMs0iBLQnyjAJb +IJ8hGxsnotdvmL3oTvHq0YawPXRXVDC4qeO+PzcDjSZ62E+Bz1bE2/tLif1BKd0k +QbccsD9pCyF8pauCAxgN2AWWdus3IzH+hWUf4DTT7AhCdYNijY+ZmBgKGkJoJWwl +aIZrPGJ7tNIDecQt86xLffKifI/b2dO5e3Q1NgNzHM77ncoeLr9nFSlsc2W3qA/A +gEDcuGj1ujchKK70Phfz50HMfnP3pCqLk8jDI78/TSvHDiblF68hsUbAsvbtHNu6 ++AXlDdSU2bcRyQRsjvaf2lMLt+qkUX+P640SKnXIYa1o9dv4+alE4XTZaimmOnao +DjYm6bTHAYcE//DW/LXt7V+q1KCPqpoHMR140vyjIRN8uEcPXyTka6lU34ypIhUb +N7ggLrXrCjh3nJo+nCtXOIMf9O9eD9I/0i8dktZFuTRj1sO/z9J/xFxHTdBG/BB5 +1MEmwriRubrw5Ud+uXnRq+lg5rW3n4+5TBvwYq/GLfyj36ojegbE8OdMfJJqCdd4 +zywMXwYiMi76gYAwEL60DWRn+3vud02QwY8hBXfiOPq2kxazvZM5SWy/1bPgStkn +fG9uzE8n/ABZA0XWuV8hNAcxYlS+0s3IguvvHogQtQMYTTg/D3OODpc0f/+y3O8N +qI5Iym1SrWpnF8vVFZsMblMDr+tbeCvYQ+HuaTc0L5cpAozoY7iCzuqwDHFrYTzC +rSZ70V+FQ956m4xkCBu6TrzqzhA8zfDFs3z9LfV62v9zLgUS8uCKSKWxznM0IdiE +ZnNrwaE1xsO5QN8LfvlO4NVVxN/ATie5tmlLndS4c2ZkswcR3WM6cW1buVaIPsz7 +lU7sbd/I9pWpzd3eZNkVrWpyWxvFQxBUNNC5IXcgRBZsGgVGRw35LBlWXKluKrVi +Z/FAf23dt3n2S4dtJ+Fd2+YL/YiK0lqtrm+GkSjmMvVQ57PJn8QvW359e4QsxDyN +wv6iEQDUqZcQ89ggdGdoSFFgBtFACc9iCKsu5AjTJl+Tql/A3FV7SwYDfZwQuT4e +gc4dZPuSSVd8cttUeFUmtrPCMx2nP7ZDVYFrZyK07eAIL89gv3bYWu8R/wMKNvzr +g0Ao0+AnfLJg11C8pAhJea1dxwu7g6LSpA+oCZov4RpqUnLKMCpPbypyFhSizZtF +evDMf+5aUAbe0+ZsCjUT+RftpzYCPV9uGhYhLMIFRP/7FCcHMrDn7CbAektm063U +EwP2O1rUrMhPWqRztx71cGBloeVPE8Ddwnsorr4M7EXihZcvNsLfz3N9NUopkU3M +sM2fEAnq2KMyrrwVGRSHvm70gUDpJeFanRBsI9z1Tr4r3utHIIQ+0u9pFPbQln0Q +4X4U7KbKC4leTYGMPMFOPXihiMTazNcs232stAYUYe6/DmVX/p2dJHvHux5qBGIW +Rbv7OuwazOsDqNfrqZTesENIGl/KPoNXiolp/YtG3DHQ1vDjEj/XTOVWWkBDXVgP +ut4Pi20hvFBwvEBtypAgi1VLcad5+dlrEwryewlLLw5h +-----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data index 67723c91f1..a8d6536e9a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -890,17 +890,29 @@ Parse RSA Key #99.2 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 DES hmacWithSHA512 DER, 4096-bit depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -Parse RSA Key #99.3 (Generated with OpenSSL, PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC -pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 +Parse RSA Key #99.3 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 -Parse RSA Key #99.4 (Generated with OpenSSL, PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-192-CBC hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH -pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 +Parse RSA Key #99.4 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-192-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 -Parse RSA Key #99.5 (Generated with OpenSSL, PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA256, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH -pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256_sha256.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 +Parse RSA Key #99.5 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #99.6 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #99.7 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-192-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 + +Parse RSA Key #99.8 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse Public RSA Key #1 (PKCS#8 wrapped) depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C From 153586a3d56ea1ef19d24b899a7f9eac018b4ae0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kusumit Ghoderao Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 11:19:16 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 140/551] change values to ULL Signed-off-by: Kusumit Ghoderao --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 660b73d5d4..cd60333089 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6337,15 +6337,15 @@ derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS:PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256 PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295ULL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295ULL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request too much capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * 16 + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295ULL * 16 + 1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA key derivation: TLS 1.2 PRF SHA-256, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PRF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 @@ -6357,15 +6357,15 @@ derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_384):SIZE_MAX:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):4294967295ULL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA512, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295UL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_SUCCESS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):4294967295ULL * PSA_HASH_LENGTH(PSA_ALG_SHA_512):PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128, request maximum capacity depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:PSA_WANT_ALG_CMAC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES:SIZE_MAX>=0xffffffffffffffff -derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295UL * 16:PSA_SUCCESS +derive_set_capacity:PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128:4294967295ULL * 16:PSA_SUCCESS PSA key derivation: over capacity 42: output 42+1 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 From a90378c425a56af060f29ee1c9bdb6788e174ba6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 10:24:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 141/551] Restore previous version of rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- ...sa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem | 56 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem index f917af2a4c..0d1b587f5b 100644 --- a/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem +++ b/tests/data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_3des_sha384.pem @@ -1,30 +1,30 @@ -----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- -MIIFHDBOBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wQTApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQI11AY9mDsg8QCAggA -MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIKBQAwFAYIKoZIhvcNAwcECDzvZWW4smTrBIIEyG/U2B5LazZZ -rzLUN7V38xI1ZR6rcBJreOk0QmVOSk9QMh+Kq+LmFwnY2NY+xikAfRJKWUsjk+h4 -DzCWn+nsrvU2wK582XThWYwJ79BIwkweUWV9l1Nfw0vyx/FkcTHE+eGPdABBL4BO -o4uajZso7tYY2+jyPobqSn18j2TInKbHR7lB5l6OAX9FsV0pGKYBgKxa9LTj7ufD -70G5WLHJAfnTX/6+wWktDOMMCPTXij3qA0fyu835shMUWQ+KUx0Dyp2A6qeprV1Z -nklRzevWsA4pbNMe+GG3WrRj52YRVuwDJjgTeq5rIfyoyLGv0ZUZsa/KEP/oToe9 -CmFPHWA2RDpK4zD8lscsjsOj+B0UREcSw9CdL91rFZkr++PuI3A1/T+3M8DkjLiB -CvSVziZLyZaqUVd0UdXrHyGeFxIMAx8xfYGiLi/EEay2zEScGbQ2kU+N1Vpuyu39 -PoEmqNOchoEkLeMVTYTQDfK3LgYQXpvdLCQQG76AqRIbuY+ZfYYw8eWyJhm78Qwx -fAenH4i5AjgJcV/5xiLpj+1trdefaCSp0Z8XY7ng/xyNCOOdSbBOPl4JnD6snYaT -06dtpowP7gcN3bZQo/r2XsH8F1VPvjG2wZ38R7aHlF8vjCZ1gUtCuraoM9AAdVoW -zWiptA4Lc5CAp+kDa2Nf5gyL0lvN/IbWYE23/OMTECmwG+O/HNtvltmdmYB8Ze6A -pdlkftjf/NvFsHloJS76SreR0tpWM8rGnSqQdecWLutgWP7HiK6C77UYv3b71SVj -ga5uv2l67UAj9EPTizZvLJjn0ubylfCW4eaPkEJBaYW4uG/3BcWzpLRnGyq6csMC -/tly2Y1L9dBqyZMIMW/ZFm8/64K8IRaSu/8mMGxjQ7VHeU6JSDk3G4by8jdYjLA2 -Y3tWYaelX8oE02jrwv47PPFWft/P+3Gjwo8lFq0zQTAk2C1vHs44jLzsOxfizo6s -mzmGh54JFsdE1tlYoa515Id2I27vjCvK6XbbgguinHaIsRgaRnCyyqEjO22z2zP3 -RpJD7FdugvZDepLfII1H8+JlbyBEd2zByMIPehIeM/HWWN0ukAgIz6yardrCYiuU -hXTqTz6bzaZMRJauPt/gpSvAx8kTKr9nXH2VRiToUs3ABjT9DN1/mQ1RlA0NmK1i -qfsMRXWzckaKgmJ8fglxEY7UR6fOqt3325yVQ/x49AKBxBDO9wmfpHEO3aQY7+H5 -hP/5tuc81226VFbyTERtTaEb/I+7iiImcWtVW4bB/1DgCu1NTlay6XaHOoclxcEE -N+d/3wDjSrsUhAKcK42wNPa74eSZy9ElJ+33xC56tqxhvo6YdG7VFu3S8qnhaXf1 -ijcRCw7vr2ShGMAhnloz4T+IX3ZGrzkVSXQG+rpaFag0b1QxeS6w/V7F8u+wljnq -1BzIfEjnE3lpR1eiZ8Ygu/n4kb7n5gHZqd1C8QiFZOGczX3uKFbH3/HOS20A+/6R -3rkjCQ+Uyxl3+wVdyOSpUCqtLfJBx69CM/6lDBPrliQ6DE94xKFrNEogG3IE36rW -oSCJcveg3cdbrHSqc+3m36FbQl2YKy8hgBwhrym2xHZ/ZS+acUQsN/V3VvEym3N6 -QXFLn3yqnmpr1g+yqXfQwA== +MIIFHDBOBgkqhkiG9w0BBQ0wQTApBgkqhkiG9w0BBQwwHAQIYFcs8Uhn2poCAggA +MAwGCCqGSIb3DQIKBQAwFAYIKoZIhvcNAwcECKCBLl+C+3nCBIIEyEnIPlXdh1e3 ++cnyhX7dCRzR/NsygcRBJUPdwRUMAaOo/t+oZxFmHnblchxQ+pFoHrI9GVwg8uID +meEHlzSSKt8kOTvJ3C148jRFJy61YH6k5GEN+z5ihS9uTszaXRUlEsGfP1/SzWY9 +ME+pX+0kwJ4az87mYKyNUwK4U5d65Ic30pvRJc4unvFtRz6wtwqU+EV283pXHfyc +VNgQFjb1IPHEz/PSuE9p94mQvdIbVmuK2dRiMag/HcABvVhxzLldKyEHHhrHR0pa +gc41+3HVjz0b6RPE24zNrxA9bU+1URGwlkIlh7Jpc/ZuYRj6LQ33xUdYZcMZw0b4 +pSFJcUgX+GUXLyWLqhIxxc+GIeL2Vt5G0ea5KEqxOvSj2bJV2/JA0KtmrcIjX5Kz +d/9bAvxatcqIikVNVkQpUc1glKiIBfVrmyJ4XUlX9i5F3cgl18zrYUI4zPSBn8o5 +yxSfCuIMx+3zS4BiyugGNOclIbpLMjQuMrXxrt7S+QlXfdbXvyNfxa3qfqf7/P2k +ykxl0z1bjvkck6XoFGXdb13isUEtY2NjujZKZe55BLGqr7FsIIQSTAHilwMpK+CV +fA1EL4ck1+7FV+l8fJ0nN1Li1xOnDeAFuO2m91uibNMYPvRSoX9c+HQKXCdGfiuk +5tfNaq8bbXeIJ/P8wTjMZqI2l6HZRuXvvmRHN2zZ4BSsT3+61xtvSTISEimDSm5T +hYY583LG5lpFoOC0Y4EUw/ltmQpKW7AGkLg7SyC9oKvoeWM4c2t8HrL3iKPXtkwd +A/iEfZTxzmR57u+ZMlbws0evPiZQml8voJnuT6qwbos7g7V/Pc3Rj+b84JZcI2Jz +D89/VudIHfFDTXC/gcSRG4bd0glILJHT9FOCAlX5TEuRyeWasoVOV+m3Pi8vQM1u +tCsjE9UdoIdhoI5j94VhzHApdD4fePcQW9DysYa2R10gWIZKUvhUHH3FWLR2X2gK +Wiz5YkhEGXBRtDHd4cx8EM1bJMKwFyYXjXTPGfGlGiPt8b9u4F++IlsKcgGgPIvh +2rIm4jHuN3LRRlFkJ5B0kuOOxZ6GBfxasS+Ix4DZoIfqZsGNI5Wu2ikGZOKxX7Ij +G9RvcdpVV8C2Y+M9qI2+x93WAtQ+NRJo4/+gJ0O9bVUhjjAmIHu2bMtbvr9aPJhd +OpB9VQxB3c5mEXkNOV52oOGnIGVjbJMb4e3/MRpWtTFVcX6r200Gn6Hn3MnWZXdd +H7pOpAowTcTlFcbJ0WWjfZygj5HKKUOFzPYNnXKizjzQhF6yK0mphKFY+8tpFQqB +mV/1HlWJTSsAmh/FN21B2qq+KRiwMdpzKIEKC47mK+dzzo1mrTqmExvbiaLG8upr +KMb/lEnSCasiZKTh71J3+5vUE+Nw73rYNZcdh7fj+GBK9KJ3hdKwYc/9yyQx1Lua +4aXnUM6vQAsV+OLYNQE8vXMRtuftbPbV9sqiBLPIc/0P2EJ9mbEye8FM+koHUCKo +xtJe5SK36DMwAas6tjimouVgWTcAdbq9r8jQlCJ1WxXPUcCJdv6pFQUGKQ+34TMK +uWOhErUNRdqel9DthU5ig5dZs2DqlzbRzWYosZc1B6Q4/nua2JiBi8IeqtPILr2a +JYJ9DNzxn07lcFHiVgrJuA== -----END ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY----- From 86d5347930557f2d0de6d30292d100a08968e757 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 10:31:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 142/551] Mention PK parse in changelog Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt index e00c1e0a6c..7f0fbc7e96 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-aes-cbc-to-pkcs5-pbes2.txt @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ Features * Add support for using AES-CBC 128, 192, and 256 bit schemes - with PKCS#5 PBES2. + with PKCS#5 PBES2. Keys encrypted this way can now be parsed by PK parse. From 4b09dcd19c68c24a07bd81be88606e665f7ddfeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 10:50:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 143/551] Change renegotiation test to use G_NEXT_SRV Change renegotiation test to use G_NEXT_SRV to avoid problems when sending TLS 1.3 extensions since we exceed the extension limit in G_SRV. Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 24 ++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 5f0daaa1e7..e5637e3e55 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -5199,6 +5199,10 @@ run_test "Record Size Limit: TLS 1.3 m->m: both peer comply with record size # Tests for renegotiation +# G_NEXT_SRV is used in renegotiation tests becuase of the increased +# extensions limit since we exceed the limit in G_SRV when we send +# TLS 1.3 extensions in the initial handshake. + # Renegotiation SCSV always added, regardless of SSL_RENEGOTIATION run_test "Renegotiation: none, for reference" \ "$P_SRV debug_level=3 exchanges=2 auth_mode=optional" \ @@ -5529,8 +5533,8 @@ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server strict, client-initiated" \ - "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ - "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ 0 \ -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ -c "found renegotiation extension" \ @@ -5543,7 +5547,7 @@ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server unsafe, client-initiated default" \ - "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ 1 \ -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ @@ -5557,7 +5561,7 @@ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server unsafe, client-inititated no legacy" \ - "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ allow_legacy=0" \ 1 \ @@ -5572,7 +5576,7 @@ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renegotiation: gnutls server unsafe, client-inititated legacy" \ - "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1 \ allow_legacy=1" \ 0 \ @@ -5633,7 +5637,7 @@ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renegotiation: DTLS, gnutls server, client-initiated" \ - "$G_SRV -u --mtu 4096" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV -u --mtu 4096" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 dtls=1 exchanges=1 renegotiation=1 renegotiate=1" \ 0 \ -c "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" \ @@ -5648,8 +5652,8 @@ run_test "Renegotiation: DTLS, gnutls server, client-initiated" \ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server strict, client default" \ - "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ - "$P_CLI force_version=tls12 debug_level=3" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ 0 \ -c "found renegotiation extension" \ -C "error" \ @@ -5658,7 +5662,7 @@ run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server strict, client default" \ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server unsafe, client default" \ - "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=3" \ 0 \ -C "found renegotiation extension" \ @@ -5668,7 +5672,7 @@ run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server unsafe, client default" \ requires_gnutls requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 run_test "Renego ext: gnutls server unsafe, client break legacy" \ - "$G_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ + "$G_NEXT_SRV --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.2:%DISABLE_SAFE_RENEGOTIATION" \ "$P_CLI debug_level=3 allow_legacy=-1" \ 1 \ -C "found renegotiation extension" \ From f0ccf467139a023b4fb7edabc21339ac49057c19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Waleed Elmelegy Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 10:52:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 144/551] Add minor cosmetic changes to record size limit changelog and comments Signed-off-by: Waleed Elmelegy --- ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt | 2 +- library/ssl_misc.h | 3 +-- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt b/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt index bc954003ab..3562b85044 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/add-record-size-limit-extension-support.txt @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ Features - * Add support for Record Size Limit extension as defined by RFC 8449 + * Add support for record size limit extension as defined by RFC 8449 and configured with MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT. Application data sent and received will be fragmented according to Record size limits negotiated during handshake. diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 2e621be89d..b0cdd5d789 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2704,8 +2704,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_server_name_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT) #define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_EXTENSION_DATA_LENGTH (2) -/* This value is defined by RFC 8449 */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT_MIN (64) /* As defined in RFC 8449 */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_parse_record_size_limit_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, From 67223bb50178bab8138f5633f88fa366bb340179 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 16:37:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 145/551] add support for AES-CTR to benchmark Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- programs/test/benchmark.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/programs/test/benchmark.c b/programs/test/benchmark.c index 755a7311a3..6f7f69bda0 100644 --- a/programs/test/benchmark.c +++ b/programs/test/benchmark.c @@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ typedef struct { char md5, ripemd160, sha1, sha256, sha512, sha3_224, sha3_256, sha3_384, sha3_512, des3, des, - aes_cbc, aes_cfb128, aes_cfb8, aes_gcm, aes_ccm, aes_xts, chachapoly, + aes_cbc, aes_cfb128, aes_cfb8, aes_ctr, aes_gcm, aes_ccm, aes_xts, chachapoly, aes_cmac, des3_cmac, aria, camellia, chacha20, poly1305, @@ -571,6 +571,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) todo.aes_cfb128 = 1; } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "aes_cfb8") == 0) { todo.aes_cfb8 = 1; + } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "aes_ctr") == 0) { + todo.aes_ctr = 1; } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "aes_xts") == 0) { todo.aes_xts = 1; } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "aes_gcm") == 0) { @@ -774,6 +776,31 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) mbedtls_aes_free(&aes); } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR) + if (todo.aes_ctr) { + int keysize; + mbedtls_aes_context aes; + + uint8_t stream_block[16]; + size_t nc_off; + + mbedtls_aes_init(&aes); + for (keysize = 128; keysize <= 256; keysize += 64) { + mbedtls_snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "AES-CTR-%d", keysize); + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memset(stream_block, 0, sizeof(stream_block)); + nc_off = 0; + + CHECK_AND_CONTINUE(mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&aes, tmp, keysize)); + + TIME_AND_TSC(title, mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&aes, BUFSIZE, &nc_off, tmp, stream_block, + buf, buf)); + } + mbedtls_aes_free(&aes); + } +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_XTS) if (todo.aes_xts) { int keysize; From f202c2968b9c83ffe948ad5af788a7d035acc87a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 10:42:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 146/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: test asymmetric encryption/decryption also with opaque keys Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 20 +++++++++++-------- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 22 ++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 1bd8b65002..e6acfb20f8 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -1025,35 +1025,39 @@ aead_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_ PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, encrypt | decrypt depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0 PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, wrong algorithm (v1.5/OAEP) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, wrong algorithm (OAEP with different hash) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_224):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, alg=0 in policy depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0 PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, ANY_HASH in policy is not meaningful depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_OAEP:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH):PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):0 PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, encrypt but not decrypt depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"3082013b020100024100ee2b131d6b1818a94ca8e91c42387eb15a7c271f57b89e7336b144d4535b16c83097ecdefbbb92d1b5313b5a37214d0e8f25922dca778b424b25295fc8a1a7070203010001024100978ac8eadb0dc6035347d6aba8671215ff21283385396f7897c04baf5e2a835f3b53ef80a82ed36ae687a925380b55a0c73eb85656e989dcf0ed7fb4887024e1022100fdad8e1c6853563f8b921d2d112462ae7d6b176082d2ba43e87e1a37fc1a8b33022100f0592cf4c55ba44307b18981bcdbda376c51e590ffa5345ba866f6962dca94dd02201995f1a967d44ff4a4cd1de837bc65bf97a2bf7eda730a9a62cea53254591105022027f96cf4b8ee68ff8d04062ec1ce7f18c0b74e4b3379b29f9bfea3fc8e592731022100cefa6d220496b43feb83194255d8fb930afcf46f36606e3aa0eb7a93ad88c10c":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0 PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, decrypt but not encrypt depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0 PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, neither encrypt nor decrypt depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT -asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:0 + +PSA key policy: asymmetric encryption, opaque key, encrypt | decrypt +depends_on:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +asymmetric_encryption_key_policy:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:"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":PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:1 PSA key policy: asymmetric signature, sign | verify hash, PKCS#1v1.5 SHA-256 depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index 4c08a9017c..f67508c5f2 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -2107,7 +2107,8 @@ void asymmetric_encryption_key_policy(int policy_usage_arg, int policy_alg, int key_type, data_t *key_data, - int exercise_alg) + int exercise_alg, + int use_opaque_key) { mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; @@ -2124,6 +2125,11 @@ void asymmetric_encryption_key_policy(int policy_usage_arg, psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, policy_alg); psa_set_key_type(&attributes, key_type); + if (use_opaque_key) { + psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( + PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION)); + } + PSA_ASSERT(psa_import_key(&attributes, key_data->x, key_data->len, &key)); @@ -2142,8 +2148,11 @@ void asymmetric_encryption_key_policy(int policy_usage_arg, NULL, 0, buffer, buffer_length, &output_length); - if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && - (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT) != 0) { + if (use_opaque_key) { + /* Encryption/decryption is opaque keys is currently not supported. */ + TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } else if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && + (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT) != 0) { PSA_ASSERT(status); } else { TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED); @@ -2157,8 +2166,11 @@ void asymmetric_encryption_key_policy(int policy_usage_arg, NULL, 0, buffer, buffer_length, &output_length); - if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && - (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) != 0) { + if (use_opaque_key) { + /* Encryption/decryption is opaque keys is currently not supported. */ + TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); + } else if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && + (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) != 0) { TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING); } else { TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED); From 5bb454aace1db636dc7128a48eb5d7328b018639 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 10:43:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 147/551] psa_crypto: allow asymmetric encryption/decryption also with opaque keys Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index a8baa6b6f5..e4ecdd08c9 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -3080,7 +3080,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_encrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, alg); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; @@ -3132,7 +3132,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_asymmetric_decrypt(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } - status = psa_get_and_lock_transparent_key_slot_with_policy( + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, alg); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; From c4f984f2a579307dbffeda22e7b5a96d606fd34d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 18:29:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 148/551] Iterate in 16-byte chunks Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/aes.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c index f4b9739f7f..ced8a32639 100644 --- a/library/aes.c +++ b/library/aes.c @@ -1441,36 +1441,42 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output) { - int c, i; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; - n = *nc_off; + size_t offset = *nc_off; - if (n > 0x0F) { + if (offset > 0x0F) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - while (length--) { - if (n == 0) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < length;) { + size_t n = 16; + if (offset == 0) { ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, nonce_counter, stream_block); if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - - for (i = 16; i > 0; i--) { - if (++nonce_counter[i - 1] != 0) { + for (int j = 16; j > 0; j--) { + if (++nonce_counter[j - 1] != 0) { break; } } + } else { + n -= offset; } - c = *input++; - *output++ = (unsigned char) (c ^ stream_block[n]); - n = (n + 1) & 0x0F; + if (n > (length - i)) { + n = (length - i); + } + mbedtls_xor(&output[i], &input[i], &stream_block[offset], n); + // offset might be non-zero for the last block, but in that case, we don't use it again + offset = 0; + i += n; } - *nc_off = n; + // capture offset for future resumption + *nc_off = (*nc_off + length) % 16; + ret = 0; exit: From 4755e6bda47e8722ade10b0a86d1e94e89c312f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 16:35:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 149/551] Relax psa_wipe_key_slot to allow states other than SLOT_PENDING_DELETION psa_wipe_key_slot can now be called on a slot in any state, if the slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION then there must be exactly 1 registered reader. Remove the state changing calls that are no longer necessary. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 14 +++----------- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 7 ++----- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 25 ++++++------------------- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 2 +- 4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index da5e5be778..1f64500258 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -983,10 +983,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * Persistent storage is not affected. */ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) { - if (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - psa_status_t status = psa_remove_key_data_from_memory(slot); /* @@ -998,7 +994,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. */ - if (slot->registered_readers != 1) { + if (((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) || + (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) && + (slot->registered_readers != 1)) { MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1); status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } @@ -1828,12 +1826,6 @@ static void psa_fail_key_creation(psa_key_slot_t *slot, * itself. */ (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ - - /* Prepare the key slot to be wiped, and then wipe it. */ - slot->registered_readers = 1; - psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FILLING, - PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); - psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 3b5c634975..f11df9f36c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ typedef struct { * Number of functions registered as reading the material in the key slot. * * Library functions must not write directly to registered_readers - * (unless the slot's state is PSA_SLOT_FILLING and the slot needs to be - * wiped following a failed key creation). * * A function must call psa_register_read(slot) before reading the current * contents of the slot for an operation. @@ -191,9 +189,8 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * The slot has been successfully wiped. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED - * The amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE - * The slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * The slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, and + * the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. */ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index ef76dcb897..e7ea8efb46 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -189,10 +189,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, (unused_persistent_key_slot != NULL)) { selected_slot = unused_persistent_key_slot; psa_register_read(selected_slot); - /* If the state is not changed then psa_wipe_key_slot - * will report an error. */ - psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, - PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); status = psa_wipe_key_slot(selected_slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto error; @@ -394,12 +390,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - /* Prepare the key slot to be wiped, and then wipe it. - * Don't overwrite status as a BAD_STATE error here - * can be reported in the psa_wipe_key_slot call. */ - (*p_slot)->registered_readers = 1; - psa_key_slot_state_transition((*p_slot), PSA_SLOT_FILLING, - PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); psa_wipe_key_slot(*p_slot); if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { @@ -544,13 +534,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) return status; } if (slot->registered_readers == 1) { - status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, - PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } + return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } else { + return psa_unregister_read(slot); } - return psa_unregister_read(slot); } psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) @@ -565,10 +552,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { - psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, - PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + } else { + return psa_unregister_read(slot); } - return psa_unregister_read(slot); } void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index 5858b18514..9b8e89132c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one. * If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, * and there is only one registered reader (the caller), - * this function will call psa_wipe_slot(). + * this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot(). * * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns From dfe8bf86a8957cf93795584cba2eb5603d40f84c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 17:45:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 150/551] Return CORRUPTION_DETECTED instead of BAD_SLOT when the slot's state is wrong These error codes are only returned if the program has been tampered with, so they should be CORRUPTION_DETECTED. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- include/psa/crypto.h | 8 ++------ include/psa/crypto_compat.h | 4 +--- library/psa_crypto.c | 1 - library/psa_crypto_core.h | 2 +- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 2 +- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 29 ++++++++++++---------------- 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto.h b/include/psa/crypto.h index fd1928a656..fe10ee0e44 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto.h @@ -415,9 +415,7 @@ void psa_reset_key_attributes(psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize - * results in this error code. Or, - * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in - * an invalid state for the operation. + * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); @@ -557,9 +555,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_copy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t source_key, * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize - * results in this error code. Or, - * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in - * an invalid state for the operation. + * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key); diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h index bfc00164b5..f896fae1c9 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_compat.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_compat.h @@ -142,9 +142,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(). * It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize - * results in this error code. Or, - * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in - * an invalid state for the operation. + * results in this error code. */ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle); diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 1f64500258..2a8183e048 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1718,7 +1718,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_start_key_creation( * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription * * \return If this function fails, the key slot is an invalid state. * You must call psa_fail_key_creation() to wipe and free the slot. diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index f11df9f36c..376337e16f 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ typedef struct { * The state variable is used to help determine whether library functions * which operate on the slot succeed. For example, psa_finish_key_creation, * which transfers the state of a slot from PSA_SLOT_FILLING to - * PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * PSA_SLOT_FULL, must fail with error code PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * if the state of the slot is not PSA_SLOT_FILLING. * * Library functions which traverse the array of key slots only consider diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index e7ea8efb46..3accacff0a 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) } if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) && (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } /* If we are the last reader and the slot is marked for deletion, diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index 9b8e89132c..0b0d7b320e 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -68,9 +68,7 @@ static inline int psa_key_id_is_volatile(psa_key_id_t key_id) * description of the key identified by \p key. * The key slot counter has been incremented. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE - * The library has not been initialized. Or, - * this call was operating on a key slot and found the slot in - * an invalid state for the operation. + * The library has not been initialized. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE * \p key is not a valid key identifier. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY @@ -114,7 +112,8 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS \emptydescription * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY * There were no free key slots. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE \emptydescription + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * This function attempted to operate on a key slot which was in an * unexpected state. */ @@ -133,7 +132,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS The key slot's state variable is new_state. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE + * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * The slot's state was not expected_state. */ static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( @@ -141,7 +140,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( psa_key_slot_state_t new_state) { if (slot->state != expected_state) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; + return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } slot->state = new_state; return PSA_SUCCESS; @@ -157,16 +156,12 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( The key slot registered reader counter was incremented. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * The reader counter already reached its maximum value and was not - * increased. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE - * The slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL. + * increased, or the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_FULL. */ static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) { - if (slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) { - return PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE; - } - if (slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX) { + if ((slot->state != PSA_SLOT_FULL) || + (slot->registered_readers >= SIZE_MAX)) { return PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } slot->registered_readers++; @@ -190,11 +185,11 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * \p slot is NULL or the key slot reader counter has been * decremented (and potentially wiped) successfully. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED - * registered_readers was equal to 0. - * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE * The slot's state was neither PSA_SLOT_FULL nor - * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, or a wipe was attempted and - * the slot's state was not PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or a wipe was attempted and the slot's state was not + * PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION. + * Or registered_readers was equal to 0. */ psa_status_t psa_unregister_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot); From 709120a9ceb73dd02578d487caebee0a51491767 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:19:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 151/551] Revert change to return behaviour in psa_reserve_free_key_slot This change was a mistake, we still need to wipe the pointers here. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 3accacff0a..8d7ff908e1 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(selected_slot, PSA_SLOT_EMPTY, PSA_SLOT_FILLING); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; + goto error; } *volatile_key_id = PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN + From 1d32a577645cc188793ffd1401d84a05fa39e0ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:27:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 152/551] Revert change to psa_destroy_key documentation Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 2a8183e048..d15ace5595 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1126,7 +1126,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) exit: status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); - /* Prioritize an error from wiping over a storage error */ + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; } From b49cf1019d32e204c13839fba9ac329d623a1105 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2024 16:40:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 153/551] Introduce mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/ctr.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) create mode 100644 library/ctr.h diff --git a/library/ctr.h b/library/ctr.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a6b84cdeb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ctr.h @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +/** + * \file ctr.h + * + * \brief This file contains common functionality for counter algorithms. + * + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ + +#include "common.h" + +/** + * \brief Increment a big-endian 16-byte value. + * This is quite performance-sensitive for AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG. + * + * \param n A 16-byte value to be incremented. + */ +static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16]) +{ + // The 32-bit version seems to perform about the same as a 64-bit version + // on 64-bit architectures, so no need to define a 64-bit version. + for (int i = 3;; i--) { + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(n, i << 2); + x += 1; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, n, i << 2); + if (x != 0 || i == 0) { + break; + } + } +} From ae730348e9c983410d343c14940e08550bcb58b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2024 17:31:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 154/551] Add tests for mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data | 45 ++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 118 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data index 028a07f80d..89dfb9792a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.data @@ -1105,3 +1105,48 @@ ctr_drbg_threads:"B10A961F2EA39927B4C48AEDDD299026":1:5 CTR_DRBG self test ctr_drbg_selftest: + +Increment counter rollover +ctr_increment_rollover + +Increment counter 00 +ctr_increment:"00" + +Increment counter ff00 +ctr_increment:"ff00" + +Increment counter ff0000 +ctr_increment:"ff0000" + +Increment counter ff000000 +ctr_increment:"ff000000" + +Increment counter ff00000000 +ctr_increment:"ff00000000" + +Increment counter ff0000000000 +ctr_increment:"ff0000000000" + +Increment counter ff000000000000 +ctr_increment:"ff000000000000" + +Increment counter 01 +ctr_increment:"01" + +Increment counter ff01 +ctr_increment:"ff01" + +Increment counter ff0001 +ctr_increment:"ff0001" + +Increment counter ff000001 +ctr_increment:"ff000001" + +Increment counter ff00000001 +ctr_increment:"ff00000001" + +Increment counter ff0000000001 +ctr_increment:"ff0000000001" + +Increment counter ff000000000001 +ctr_increment:"ff000000000001" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function index 1f0a072c7c..425c43ef11 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #include "string.h" +#include "ctr.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) #include "mbedtls/threading.h" @@ -443,3 +444,75 @@ void ctr_drbg_selftest() AES_PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_increment_rollover() +{ + uint8_t c[16]; + uint8_t r[16]; + + // test all increments from 2^n - 1 to 2^n (i.e. where we roll over into the next bit) + for (int n = 0; n <= 128; n++) { + memset(c, 0, 16); + memset(r, 0, 16); + + // set least significant (highest address) n bits to 1, i.e. generate (2^n - 1) + for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) { + int bit = i % 8; + int byte = (i / 8); + c[15 - byte] |= 1 << bit; + } + // increment to get 2^n + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(c); + + // now generate a reference result equal to 2^n - i.e. set only bit (n + 1) + // if n == 127, this will not set any bits (i.e. wraps to 0). + int bit = n % 8; + int byte = n / 8; + if (byte < 16) { + r[15 - byte] = 1 << bit; + } + + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(c, 16, r, 16); + } + + uint64_t lsb = 10, msb = 20; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(msb, c, 0); + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT64_BE(lsb, c, 8); + memcpy(r, c, 16); + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(c); + for (int i = 15; i >= 0; i--) { + r[i] += 1; + if (r[i] != 0) { + break; + } + } + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(c, 16, r, 16); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ctr_increment(data_t *x) +{ + uint8_t c[16]; + uint8_t r[16]; + + // initialise c and r from test argument + memset(c, 0, 16); + memcpy(c, x->x, x->len); + memcpy(r, c, 16); + + // increment c + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(c); + // increment reference + for (int i = 15; i >= 0; i--) { + r[i] += 1; + if (r[i] != 0) { + break; + } + } + + // test that mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter behaviour matches reference + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(c, 16, r, 16); +} +/* END_CASE */ From 591ff05384f36658022f3c67f408dbc903ec8897 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2024 16:42:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 155/551] Use optimised counter increment in AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/aes.c | 7 ++----- library/ctr_drbg.c | 17 +++++------------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/aes.c b/library/aes.c index ced8a32639..b1a5c3ed10 100644 --- a/library/aes.c +++ b/library/aes.c @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ #endif #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#include "ctr.h" /* * This is a convenience shorthand macro to check if we need reverse S-box and @@ -1456,11 +1457,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aes_context *ctx, if (ret != 0) { goto exit; } - for (int j = 16; j > 0; j--) { - if (++nonce_counter[j - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(nonce_counter); } else { n -= offset; } diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c index da34f950b8..f3995f709c 100644 --- a/library/ctr_drbg.c +++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) +#include "ctr.h" #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -333,7 +334,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, { unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char *p = tmp; - int i, j; + int j; int ret = 0; #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) psa_status_t status; @@ -346,11 +347,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, /* * Increase counter */ - for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); /* * Crypt counter block @@ -652,13 +649,9 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, while (output_len > 0) { /* - * Increase counter + * Increase counter (treat it as a 128-bit big-endian integer). */ - for (i = MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; i > 0; i--) { - if (++ctx->counter[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(ctx->counter); /* * Crypt counter block From 174eeff235f2d3c8290a5709811669332521685b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2024 16:43:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 156/551] Save 14 bytes in CTR-DRBG Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/ctr_drbg.c | 26 ++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c index f3995f709c..30574679f9 100644 --- a/library/ctr_drbg.c +++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -369,9 +369,7 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal(mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx, p += MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE; } - for (i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN; i++) { - tmp[i] ^= data[i]; - } + mbedtls_xor(tmp, tmp, data, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); /* * Update key and counter @@ -614,10 +612,11 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, { int ret = 0; mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx = (mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *) p_rng; - unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; unsigned char *p = output; - unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; - int i; + struct { + unsigned char add_input[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN]; + unsigned char tmp[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE]; + } locals; size_t use_len; if (output_len > MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST) { @@ -628,7 +627,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, return MBEDTLS_ERR_CTR_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG; } - memset(add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); + memset(locals.add_input, 0, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN); if (ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval || ctx->prediction_resistance) { @@ -639,10 +638,10 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, } if (add_len > 0) { - if ((ret = block_cipher_df(add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = block_cipher_df(locals.add_input, additional, add_len)) != 0) { goto exit; } - if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { goto exit; } } @@ -658,7 +657,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) if ((ret = mbedtls_aes_crypt_ecb(&ctx->aes_ctx, MBEDTLS_AES_ENCRYPT, - ctx->counter, tmp)) != 0) { + ctx->counter, locals.tmp)) != 0) { goto exit; } #else @@ -678,20 +677,19 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, /* * Copy random block to destination */ - memcpy(p, tmp, use_len); + memcpy(p, locals.tmp, use_len); p += use_len; output_len -= use_len; } - if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, add_input)) != 0) { + if ((ret = ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, locals.add_input)) != 0) { goto exit; } ctx->reseed_counter++; exit: - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(add_input, sizeof(add_input)); - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&locals, sizeof(locals)); return ret; } From 46697da5b3b555148c7e5a46aaf70393c6a48eb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2024 12:59:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 157/551] Make gcm counter increment more efficient Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/gcm.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c index 20d55c0a89..c677ca4d70 100644 --- a/library/gcm.c +++ b/library/gcm.c @@ -401,12 +401,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, /* Increment the counter. */ static void gcm_incr(unsigned char y[16]) { - size_t i; - for (i = 16; i > 12; i--) { - if (++y[i - 1] != 0) { - break; - } - } + uint32_t x = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_BE(y, 12); + x++; + MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE(x, y, 12); } /* Calculate and apply the encryption mask. Process use_len bytes of data, From 66a827fc8394f67096f6f3ea7eb11ddbe8ad6616 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 15:00:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 158/551] test_driver_key_management: make opaque [un]wrapping functions public Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h | 8 ++++++++ tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h index 526adbb91b..9a68777ecd 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h +++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h @@ -67,6 +67,14 @@ void mbedtls_test_transparent_free(void); psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_init(void); void mbedtls_test_opaque_free(void); +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( + const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, uint8_t *wrapped_key_buffer, + size_t wrapped_key_buffer_size, size_t *wrapped_key_buffer_length); + +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key( + const uint8_t *wrapped_key, size_t wrapped_key_length, uint8_t *key_buffer, + size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); + psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_generate_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, uint8_t *key, size_t key_size, size_t *key_length); diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c index d522ebfe8d..4188c25c18 100644 --- a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c +++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static size_t mbedtls_test_opaque_get_base_size() * The argument wrapped_key_buffer_length is filled with the wrapped * key_size on success. * */ -static psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, uint8_t *wrapped_key_buffer, @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ static psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( * The argument key_buffer_length is filled with the unwrapped(clear) * key_size on success. * */ -static psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key( +psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key( const uint8_t *wrapped_key, size_t wrapped_key_length, uint8_t *key_buffer, From 62b6f10f64f8454b3aba38fda05257356cd56541 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 15:03:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 159/551] test_driver_asymmetric_encryption: implement opaque [en/de]cryption functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- .../test_driver_asymmetric_encryption.c | 78 +++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_asymmetric_encryption.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_asymmetric_encryption.c index ff46387d58..4fc8c9d34b 100644 --- a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_asymmetric_encryption.c +++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_asymmetric_encryption.c @@ -13,11 +13,15 @@ #include "psa_crypto_rsa.h" #include "string.h" #include "test/drivers/asymmetric_encryption.h" +#include "test/drivers/key_management.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) #include "libtestdriver1/library/psa_crypto_rsa.h" #endif +#define PSA_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE \ + PSA_KEY_EXPORT_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE(PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) + mbedtls_test_driver_asymmetric_encryption_hooks_t mbedtls_test_driver_asymmetric_encryption_hooks = MBEDTLS_TEST_DRIVER_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION_INIT; @@ -104,7 +108,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_test_transparent_asymmetric_decrypt( } /* - * opaque versions - TODO + * opaque versions */ psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_encrypt( const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, const uint8_t *key, @@ -112,17 +116,31 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_encrypt( size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) { - (void) attributes; - (void) key; - (void) key_length; - (void) alg; - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - (void) salt; - (void) salt_length; - (void) output; - (void) output_size; - (void) output_length; + unsigned char unwrapped_key[PSA_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t unwrapped_key_length; + psa_status_t status; + + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key(key, key_length, + unwrapped_key, sizeof(unwrapped_key), + &unwrapped_key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT)) + return libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *) attributes, + unwrapped_key, unwrapped_key_length, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); +#else + return mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_encrypt( + attributes, unwrapped_key, unwrapped_key_length, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); +#endif + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } @@ -132,17 +150,31 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_asymmetric_decrypt( size_t input_length, const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length, uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length) { - (void) attributes; - (void) key; - (void) key_length; - (void) alg; - (void) input; - (void) input_length; - (void) salt; - (void) salt_length; - (void) output; - (void) output_size; - (void) output_length; + unsigned char unwrapped_key[PSA_RSA_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t unwrapped_key_length; + psa_status_t status; + + status = mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key(key, key_length, + unwrapped_key, sizeof(unwrapped_key), + &unwrapped_key_length); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return status; + } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_LIBTESTDRIVER1) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT)) + return libtestdriver1_mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt( + (const libtestdriver1_psa_key_attributes_t *) attributes, + unwrapped_key, unwrapped_key_length, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); +#else + return mbedtls_psa_asymmetric_decrypt( + attributes, unwrapped_key, unwrapped_key_length, + alg, input, input_length, salt, salt_length, + output, output_size, output_length); +#endif + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } From 4860a6c7acc281bf581f972147d09c0407bebbe1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 15:05:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 160/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: revert known failing checks for [en|de]cryption with opaque keys Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function | 14 ++++---------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index f67508c5f2..60c4f30d80 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -2148,11 +2148,8 @@ void asymmetric_encryption_key_policy(int policy_usage_arg, NULL, 0, buffer, buffer_length, &output_length); - if (use_opaque_key) { - /* Encryption/decryption is opaque keys is currently not supported. */ - TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); - } else if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && - (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT) != 0) { + if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && + (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT) != 0) { PSA_ASSERT(status); } else { TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED); @@ -2166,11 +2163,8 @@ void asymmetric_encryption_key_policy(int policy_usage_arg, NULL, 0, buffer, buffer_length, &output_length); - if (use_opaque_key) { - /* Encryption/decryption is opaque keys is currently not supported. */ - TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED); - } else if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && - (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) != 0) { + if (policy_alg == exercise_alg && + (policy_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) != 0) { TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING); } else { TEST_EQUAL(status, PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED); From 4cc6fb90393e3d271e8e00a28410f4904095a411 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2024 18:13:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 161/551] add test for multipart AES-CTR Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function | 72 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 191 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6ce7c01fc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 2 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:2:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 2 2 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:2:2 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 4 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:4:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 4 2 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:4:2 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 15 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:15:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 15 2 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:15:2 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 15 8 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:15:8 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 15 15 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:15:15 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 16 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:16:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 16 2 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:16:2 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 16 8 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:16:8 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 16 15 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:16:15 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 16 16 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:16:16 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 17 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:17:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 17 2 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:17:2 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 17 8 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:17:8 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 17 15 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:17:15 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 17 16 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:17:16 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 63 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:63:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 63 2 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:63:2 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 63 8 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:63:8 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 63 15 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:63:15 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 63 16 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:63:16 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 63 17 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:63:17 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 64 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:64:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 64 2 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:64:2 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 64 8 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:64:8 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 64 15 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:64:15 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 64 16 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:64:16 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 64 17 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:64:17 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 1 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:1 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 10 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:10 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 15 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:15 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 16 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:16 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 63 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:63 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 64 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:64 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 65 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:65 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 1023 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:1023 + +AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1024 1024 +aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1024:1024 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function index 2ca3f7f20f..f4950a0834 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function @@ -88,6 +88,78 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +void aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart(int length, int step_size) +{ + unsigned char key[16]; + unsigned char ctr_a[16]; + unsigned char ctr_b[16]; + unsigned char stream_block_a[16]; + unsigned char stream_block_b[16]; + unsigned char *input = NULL; + unsigned char *output_a = NULL; + unsigned char *output_b = NULL; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + size_t nc_off_a, nc_off_b; + + TEST_ASSERT(length >= 0); + TEST_ASSERT(step_size > 0); + + TEST_CALLOC(input, length); + TEST_CALLOC(output_a, length); + TEST_CALLOC(output_b, length); + + // set up a random key + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand(NULL, key, sizeof(key)); + + // random input + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand(NULL, input, sizeof(input)); + + + // complete encryption in one call + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, sizeof(key) * 8) == 0); + memset(ctr_a, 0, sizeof(ctr_a)); + memset(stream_block_a, 0, sizeof(stream_block_a)); + nc_off_a = 0; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, length, &nc_off_a, ctr_a, + stream_block_a, input, output_a), 0); + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); + + + // encrypt in multiple steps of varying size + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key, sizeof(key) * 8) == 0); + memset(ctr_b, 0, sizeof(ctr_b)); + memset(stream_block_b, 0, sizeof(stream_block_b)); + nc_off_b = 0; + size_t remaining = length; + unsigned char *ip = input, *op = output_b; + while (remaining != 0) { + size_t l = MIN(remaining, (size_t) step_size); + step_size *= 2; + remaining -= l; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, l, &nc_off_b, ctr_b, stream_block_b, ip, op), 0); + ip += l; + op += l; + } + + // finally, validate that multiple steps produced same result as single-pass + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(output_a, length, output_b, length); + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(ctr_a, sizeof(ctr_a), ctr_b, sizeof(ctr_b)); + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(stream_block_a, sizeof(stream_block_a), + stream_block_b, sizeof(stream_block_b)); + TEST_EQUAL(nc_off_a, nc_off_b); + +exit: + mbedtls_free(input); + mbedtls_free(output_a); + mbedtls_free(output_b); + + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT */ void aes_decrypt_ecb(data_t *key_str, data_t *src_str, data_t *dst, int setkey_result) From 24ad1b59e884df644d872149bb662b9c0cb9eb87 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2024 23:52:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 162/551] Add NIST AES-CTR test vectors Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data | 16 ++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data index 6ce7c01fc4..85c4c96452 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data @@ -1,3 +1,19 @@ +# Test vectors from NIST Special Publication 800-38A 2001 Edition +# Recommendation for Block Edition Cipher Modes of Operation + +# as below, but corrupt the key to check the test catches it +AES-CTR NIST 128 bad +aes_ctr:"00000000000000000000000000000000":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee":1 + +AES-CTR NIST 128 +aes_ctr:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee":0 + +AES-CTR NIST 192 +aes_ctr:"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e941e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf74f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050":0 + +AES-CTR NIST 256 +aes_ctr:"603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c52b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988ddfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6":0 + AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1 1 aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart:1:1 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function index f4950a0834..7b1306a824 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function @@ -88,6 +88,52 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ +void aes_ctr(data_t *key, data_t *ictr, data_t *pt, data_t *ct, int expected) +{ + unsigned char *output = NULL; + unsigned char ctr[16]; + unsigned char stream_block[16]; + mbedtls_aes_context ctx; + + // sanity checks on test input + TEST_ASSERT(pt->len == ct->len); + TEST_ASSERT(key->len == 16 || key->len == 24 || key->len == 32); + + TEST_CALLOC(output, pt->len); + + // expected result is always success on zero-length input, so skip len == 0 if expecting failure + for (size_t len = (expected == 0 ? 0 : 1); len <= pt->len; len++) { + for (int i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + mbedtls_aes_init(&ctx); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_aes_setkey_enc(&ctx, key->x, key->len * 8) == 0); + + memcpy(ctr, ictr->x, 16); + memset(stream_block, 0, 16); + memset(output, 0, pt->len); + + size_t nc_off = 0; + + if (i == 0) { + // encrypt + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &nc_off, ctr, + stream_block, pt->x, output), 0); + TEST_ASSERT(!!memcmp(output, ct->x, len) == expected); + } else { + // decrypt + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_aes_crypt_ctr(&ctx, len, &nc_off, ctr, + stream_block, ct->x, output), 0); + TEST_ASSERT(!!memcmp(output, pt->x, len) == expected); + } + } + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free(output); + mbedtls_aes_free(&ctx); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CTR */ void aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart(int length, int step_size) { From 9f97566c0442066e01fedd28e5ce47b24baf158b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Sun, 14 Jan 2024 23:55:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 163/551] Add Changelog Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- ChangeLog.d/ctr-perf.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/ctr-perf.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/ctr-perf.txt b/ChangeLog.d/ctr-perf.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..bc04080bfa --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/ctr-perf.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Features + * Improve performance of AES-GCM, AES-CTR and CTR-DRBG when + hardware accelerated AES is not present (around 13-23% on 64-bit Arm). From 333ca8fdfc0c41852aadbf55e60100a6db5d09ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Bence=20Sz=C3=A9pk=C3=BAti?= Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 17:05:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 164/551] Migrate to new RTD redirect format MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Migrate to the new redirect format introduced by ReadTheDocs in readthedocs/readthedocs.org#10881 Signed-off-by: Bence Szépkúti --- docs/redirects.yaml | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/redirects.yaml b/docs/redirects.yaml index 7ea1d95504..969ffe43cc 100644 --- a/docs/redirects.yaml +++ b/docs/redirects.yaml @@ -7,5 +7,5 @@ # expose it. - type: exact - from_url: /projects/api/en/latest/$rest - to_url: /projects/api/en/development/ + from_url: /projects/api/en/latest/* + to_url: /projects/api/en/development/:splat From b7778b2388c2bdae733a7d702432faf41b718d80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 16:27:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 165/551] Fix ASAN error in test Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function index 7b1306a824..9118a98655 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.function @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart(int length, int step_size) mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand(NULL, key, sizeof(key)); // random input - mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand(NULL, input, sizeof(input)); + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand(NULL, input, length); // complete encryption in one call From 7e5b7f91ca8efd5252a36765502ce9115ba73e61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 17:28:25 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 166/551] Fix error in ctr_drbg Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/ctr_drbg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/ctr_drbg.c b/library/ctr_drbg.c index 30574679f9..66d9d28c58 100644 --- a/library/ctr_drbg.c +++ b/library/ctr_drbg.c @@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(void *p_rng, size_t tmp_len; status = psa_cipher_update(&ctx->psa_ctx.operation, ctx->counter, sizeof(ctx->counter), - tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); + locals.tmp, MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_BLOCKSIZE, &tmp_len); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { ret = psa_generic_status_to_mbedtls(status); goto exit; From 9039ba572b102f32fd1418c1ab6d6cd8edc30dbc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 18:38:55 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 167/551] Fix test dependencies Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data index 85c4c96452..a14823666c 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aes.ctr.data @@ -9,9 +9,11 @@ AES-CTR NIST 128 aes_ctr:"2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"874d6191b620e3261bef6864990db6ce9806f66b7970fdff8617187bb9fffdff5ae4df3edbd5d35e5b4f09020db03eab1e031dda2fbe03d1792170a0f3009cee":0 AES-CTR NIST 192 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH aes_ctr:"8e73b0f7da0e6452c810f32b809079e562f8ead2522c6b7b":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"1abc932417521ca24f2b0459fe7e6e0b090339ec0aa6faefd5ccc2c6f4ce8e941e36b26bd1ebc670d1bd1d665620abf74f78a7f6d29809585a97daec58c6b050":0 AES-CTR NIST 256 +depends_on:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH aes_ctr:"603deb1015ca71be2b73aef0857d77811f352c073b6108d72d9810a30914dff4":"f0f1f2f3f4f5f6f7f8f9fafbfcfdfeff":"6bc1bee22e409f96e93d7e117393172aae2d8a571e03ac9c9eb76fac45af8e5130c81c46a35ce411e5fbc1191a0a52eff69f2445df4f9b17ad2b417be66c3710":"601ec313775789a5b7a7f504bbf3d228f443e3ca4d62b59aca84e990cacaf5c52b0930daa23de94ce87017ba2d84988ddfc9c58db67aada613c2dd08457941a6":0 AES-CTR aes_encrypt_ctr_multipart 1 1 From 584dc80d965541e1e93301d4e9b1d7f719168c32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 16:43:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 168/551] add changelog Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8461.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/8461.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8461.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8461.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..459e47bd27 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8461.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Bugfix + * Fix unsupported PSA asymmetric encryption and dectryption + (psa_asymmetric_[en|de]crypt) with opaque keys. + Resolves #8461. From 32294044e14cf166e77b3d4e3bbaac156700808c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 10:07:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 169/551] Generalize mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque beyond MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO It's useful in applications that want to use some PSA opaque keys regardless of whether all pk operations go through PSA. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 064b7d2788..738e0ab2f3 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ There is a function `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` that mostly does this. However, it * It creates a PK key of type `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE` that wraps the PSA key. This is good enough in some scenarios, but not others. For example, it's ok for pkwrite, because we've upgraded the pkwrite code to handle `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That doesn't help users of third-party libraries that haven't yet been upgraded. * It ties the lifetime of the PK object to the PSA key, which is error-prone: if the PSA key is destroyed but the PK object isn't, there is no way to reliably detect any subsequent misuse of the PK object. -* It is only available under `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. (Not a priority concern: we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA.) +* It is only available under `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO`. This is not a priority concern, since we generally expect people to activate `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` at an early stage of their migration to PSA. However, this function is useful to use specific PSA keys in X.509/TLS regardless of whether X.509/TLS use the PSA API for all cryptographic operations, so this is a wart in the current API. It therefore appears that we need two ways to “convert” a PSA key to PK: @@ -305,6 +305,8 @@ Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-psa-key-as-a-pk-context): [ACTION] Clarify the documentation of `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` regarding which algorithms the resulting key will perform with `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt`. +[ACTION] Provide `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` whenever `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` is enabled, not just when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled. This is nice-to-have, not critical. Update `use-psa-crypto.md` accordingly. + [OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`? #### API to convert between signature formats From 89ca6c7e72b351cf63f321031b94661d7185f4fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 10:08:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 170/551] typo Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 738e0ab2f3..79b08aa149 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, * `pk` must be initialized, but not set up. * It is an error if the key is neither a key pair nor a public key. * It is an error if the key is not exportable. -* The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That's `MBEDTLS_PK_RSA` for RSA keys (since pk objects don't use `MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS)` as a type, and `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` for ECC keys (following the example of pkparse). +* The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That's `MBEDTLS_PK_RSA` for RSA keys (since pk objects don't use `MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS` as a type), and `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` for ECC keys (following the example of pkparse). * Once this function returns, the pk object is completely independent of the PSA key. * Calling `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt` on the resulting pk context will perform an algorithm that is compatible with the PSA key's primary algorithm policy (`psa_get_key_algorithm`), but with no restriction on the hash (as if the policy had `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` instead of a specific hash, and with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW` merged with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)`). For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will be based on the compile-time setting `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC`, like `mbedtls_pk_sign` today. * The primary intent of this requirement is to allow an application to switch to PSA for creating the key material (for example to benefit from a PSA accelerator driver, or to start using a secure element), without modifying the code that consumes the key. For RSA keys, the PSA primary algorithm policy is how one conveys the same information as RSA key padding information in the legacy API. [ACTION] Convey this in the documentation. From 5a64c426936997fb0128635548e147af977ae1b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 10:09:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 171/551] Reference ongoing work Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 79b08aa149..e37f50ff49 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ Since there is no algorithm that can be used with multiple types, and PSA keys h This means converting between an `mbedtls_ecp_group_id` and a pair of `{psa_ecc_family_t; size_t}`. - This is fulfilled by `mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa` and `mbedtls_ecc_group_of_psa`, which were introduced into the public API after Mbed TLS 3.5. + This is fulfilled by `mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa` and `mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa`, which were introduced into the public API between Mbed TLS 3.5 and 3.6 ([#8664](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8664)). * Selecting A **DHM group**. From bbff303fe13a070e630353ac3e1658f584119fe0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 11:47:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 172/551] crypto_config: define feature macros for DH keys Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/psa/crypto_config.h | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_config.h b/include/psa/crypto_config.h index 5bf00f4027..36e937ad35 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_config.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_config.h @@ -109,6 +109,12 @@ #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384 1 #define PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 + #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH 1 From 885248c8ee824fafabd56a915ce0b941e4380631 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 11:06:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 173/551] Add header guards Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/ctr.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/ctr.h b/library/ctr.h index a6b84cdeb5..aa48fb9e70 100644 --- a/library/ctr.h +++ b/library/ctr.h @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_CTR_H +#define MBEDTLS_CTR_H + #include "common.h" /** @@ -28,3 +31,5 @@ static inline void mbedtls_ctr_increment_counter(uint8_t n[16]) } } } + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_CTR_H */ From 42a025dc9cc26e5f185e3edf6811268c7702a30c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:35:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 174/551] Reference filed issues All PK-related actions are now covered. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index e37f50ff49..873fc39bec 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ To allow the full flexibility around policies, and make the creation of a persis This is close to the existing function `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`, but does not bake in the implementation-specific consideration that a PSA key has exactly two algorithms, and also allows the caller to benefit from default for the policy in more cases. -[ACTION] Implement `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` and `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` as described below. These functions are available whenever `MBEDTLS_PK_C` and `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` are both defined. Deprecate `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`. +[ACTION] [#8708](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8708) Implement `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` and `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` as described below. These functions are available whenever `MBEDTLS_PK_C` and `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` are both defined. Deprecate `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`. ``` int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-psa-key-as-a-pk-context): -[ACTION] Implement `mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa` as described below. +[ACTION] [#8709](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8709) Implement `mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa` as described below. ``` int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, * The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That's `MBEDTLS_PK_RSA` for RSA keys (since pk objects don't use `MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS` as a type), and `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` for ECC keys (following the example of pkparse). * Once this function returns, the pk object is completely independent of the PSA key. * Calling `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt` on the resulting pk context will perform an algorithm that is compatible with the PSA key's primary algorithm policy (`psa_get_key_algorithm`), but with no restriction on the hash (as if the policy had `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` instead of a specific hash, and with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW` merged with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)`). For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will be based on the compile-time setting `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC`, like `mbedtls_pk_sign` today. - * The primary intent of this requirement is to allow an application to switch to PSA for creating the key material (for example to benefit from a PSA accelerator driver, or to start using a secure element), without modifying the code that consumes the key. For RSA keys, the PSA primary algorithm policy is how one conveys the same information as RSA key padding information in the legacy API. [ACTION] Convey this in the documentation. + * The primary intent of this requirement is to allow an application to switch to PSA for creating the key material (for example to benefit from a PSA accelerator driver, or to start using a secure element), without modifying the code that consumes the key. For RSA keys, the PSA primary algorithm policy is how one conveys the same information as RSA key padding information in the legacy API. Convey this in the documentation. * [OPEN] How do we distinguish between signature-only and encryption-only RSA keys? Do we just allow both (e.g. a PSS key gets generalized into a PSS/OAEP key)? * [OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`? @@ -303,9 +303,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, Based on the [gap analysis](#using-a-psa-key-as-a-pk-context): -[ACTION] Clarify the documentation of `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` regarding which algorithms the resulting key will perform with `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt`. +[ACTION] [#8712](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8712) Clarify the documentation of `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` regarding which algorithms the resulting key will perform with `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt`. -[ACTION] Provide `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` whenever `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` is enabled, not just when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled. This is nice-to-have, not critical. Update `use-psa-crypto.md` accordingly. +[ACTION] [#8710](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/8710) Provide `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` whenever `MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT` is enabled, not just when `MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` is enabled. This is nice-to-have, not critical. Update `use-psa-crypto.md` accordingly. [OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`? From 7ed542e0f1aea1673f2b8bb3079c294e04777558 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 11:39:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 175/551] Implement delayed deletion in psa_destroy_key and some cleanup Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index d15ace5595..565b5e14ce 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -987,18 +987,41 @@ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot) /* * As the return error code may not be handled in case of multiple errors, - * do our best to report an unexpected amount of registered readers. - * Assert with MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that registered_readers is - * equal to one: + * do our best to report an unexpected amount of registered readers or + * an unexpected state. + * Assert with MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT that the slot is valid for + * wiping. * if the MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS configuration option is enabled and the * function is called as part of the execution of a test suite, the * execution of the test suite is stopped in error if the assertion fails. */ - if (((slot->state == PSA_SLOT_FULL) || - (slot->state == PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION)) && - (slot->registered_readers != 1)) { - MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1); - status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + switch (slot->state) { + case PSA_SLOT_FULL: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + case PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION: + /* In this state psa_wipe_key_slot() must only be called if the + * caller is the last reader. */ + if (slot->registered_readers != 1) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 1); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_FILLING: + /* In this state registered_readers must be 0. */ + if (slot->registered_readers != 0) { + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->registered_readers == 0); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + } + break; + case PSA_SLOT_EMPTY: + /* The slot is already empty, it cannot be wiped. */ + MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOK_TEST_ASSERT(slot->state != PSA_SLOT_EMPTY); + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + break; + default: + /* The slot's state is invalid. */ + status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; } /* Multipart operations may still be using the key. This is safe @@ -1028,29 +1051,25 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) } /* - * Get the description of the key in a key slot. In case of a persistent - * key, this will load the key description from persistent memory if not - * done yet. We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if + * Get the description of the key in a key slot, and register to read it. + * In the case of a persistent key, this will load the key description + * from persistent memory if not done yet. + * We cannot avoid this loading as without it we don't know if * the key is operated by an SE or not and this information is needed by - * the current implementation. - */ + * the current implementation. */ status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(key, &slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { return status; } - /* - * If the key slot containing the key description is under access by the - * library (apart from the present access), the key cannot be destroyed - * yet. For the time being, just return in error. Eventually (to be - * implemented), the key should be destroyed when all accesses have - * stopped. - */ - if (slot->registered_readers > 1) { - psa_unregister_read(slot); - return PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; - } - + /* Set the key slot containing the key description's state to + * PENDING_DELETION. This stops new operations from registering + * to read the slot. Current readers can safely continue to access + * the key within the slot; the last registered reader will + * automatically wipe the slot when they call psa_unregister_read(). + * If the key is persistent, we can now delete the copy of the key + * from memory. If the key is opaque, we require the driver to + * deal with the deletion. */ slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(slot->attr.lifetime)) { @@ -1099,6 +1118,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { + /* Destroy the copy of the persistent key from memory. + * The slot will still hold a copy of the key until the last reader + * unregisters. */ status = psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; @@ -1125,8 +1147,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ exit: - status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); - /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from wiping over a storage error */ + /* Unregister from reading the slot. If we are the last active reader + * then this will wipe the slot. */ + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering over + * a storage error. */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; } @@ -1825,6 +1850,7 @@ static void psa_fail_key_creation(psa_key_slot_t *slot, * itself. */ (void) psa_crypto_stop_transaction(); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ + psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } From 38a2b7a6a3215b2d062da23b9945bbecd889e277 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 11:45:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 176/551] Extend psa_wipe_key_slot documentation Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 376337e16f..b5b9c54515 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -190,7 +190,10 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( * The slot has been successfully wiped. * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED * The slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FULL or PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, and - * the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. + * the amount of registered readers was not equal to 1. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. Or, + * the slot's state was PSA_SLOT_FILLING, and the amount + * of registered readers was not equal to 0. */ psa_status_t psa_wipe_key_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot); From 702d9f65f681f9b493c774a0fdd61ccf9e23a305 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:58:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 177/551] Resolve several open questions as nothing special to do Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- .../psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 17 ++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 873fc39bec..7fe03d7798 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -81,7 +81,11 @@ Based on “[Where mixing happens](#where-mixing-happens)”, we focus the gap a #### Need for error code conversion -[OPEN] Do we need public functions to convert between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` error codes? We have such functions for internal use. +Do we need public functions to convert between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` error codes? We have such functions for internal use. + +Mbed TLS needs these conversions because it has many functions that expose one API (legacy/API) but are implemented on top of the other API. Most applications would convert legacy and PSA error code to their own error codes, and converting between `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx` error codes and `PSA_ERROR_xxx` is not particularly helpful for that. Application code might need such conversion functions when implementing an X.509 or TLS callback (returning `MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx`) on top of PSA functions, but this is a very limited use case. + +Conclusion: no need for public error code conversion functions. ### Hash gap analysis @@ -172,7 +176,7 @@ It therefore appears that we need two ways to “convert” a PSA key to PK: Gap: a way to copy a PSA key into a PK context. This can only be expected to work if the PSA key is exportable. -[OPEN] Is `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque` ok or do we want to tweak it? +After some discussion, have not identified anything we want to change in the behavior of `mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque`. We only want to generalize it to non-`MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO` and to document it better. #### Signature formats @@ -238,6 +242,7 @@ Based on the [gap analysis](#asymmetric-cryptography-metadata): * No further work is needed about ECC specifically. We have just added adequate functions. * No further work is needed about DHM specifically. There is no good way to translate the relevant information. * [OPEN] Is there a decent way to convert between `mbedtls_pk_type_t` plus extra information, and `psa_key_type_t` plus policy information? The two APIs are different in crucial ways, with different splits between key type, policy information and operation algorithm. + Thinking so far: there isn't really a nice way to present this conversion. For a specific key, `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` and `mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa` do the job. #### API to create a PSA key from a PK context @@ -292,12 +297,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_copy_from_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, * It is an error if the key is not exportable. * The resulting pk object has a transparent type, not `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. That's `MBEDTLS_PK_RSA` for RSA keys (since pk objects don't use `MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS` as a type), and `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` for ECC keys (following the example of pkparse). * Once this function returns, the pk object is completely independent of the PSA key. -* Calling `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt` on the resulting pk context will perform an algorithm that is compatible with the PSA key's primary algorithm policy (`psa_get_key_algorithm`), but with no restriction on the hash (as if the policy had `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` instead of a specific hash, and with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW` merged with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)`). For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will be based on the compile-time setting `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC`, like `mbedtls_pk_sign` today. +* Calling `mbedtls_pk_sign`, `mbedtls_pk_verify`, `mbedtls_pk_encrypt`, `mbedtls_pk_decrypt` on the resulting pk context will perform an algorithm that is compatible with the PSA key's primary algorithm policy (`psa_get_key_algorithm`) if that is a matching operation type (sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt), but with no restriction on the hash (as if the policy had `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` instead of a specific hash, and with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW` merged with `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)`). + * For ECDSA, the choice of deterministic vs randomized will be based on the compile-time setting `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC`, like `mbedtls_pk_sign` today. + * For an RSA key, the output key will allow both encrypt/decrypt and sign/verify regardless of the original key's policy. The original key's policy determines the output key's padding mode. * The primary intent of this requirement is to allow an application to switch to PSA for creating the key material (for example to benefit from a PSA accelerator driver, or to start using a secure element), without modifying the code that consumes the key. For RSA keys, the PSA primary algorithm policy is how one conveys the same information as RSA key padding information in the legacy API. Convey this in the documentation. - * [OPEN] How do we distinguish between signature-only and encryption-only RSA keys? Do we just allow both (e.g. a PSS key gets generalized into a PSS/OAEP key)? - * [OPEN] What about `mbedtls_pk_sign_ext` and `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext`? - -[OPEN] Should there be a way to use a different algorithm? This can be resolved by `psa_copy_key` on the input to tweak the policy if needed. #### API to create a PK object that wraps a PSA key From d5b04a0c639f7f148f33c3e224b0731fea3f1dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 14:29:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 178/551] Add a usage parameter to mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes Let the user specify whether to use the key as a sign/verify key, an encrypt/decrypt key or a key agreement key. Also let the user indicate if they just want the public part when the input is a key pair. Based on a discussion in https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8682#discussion_r1444936480 Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- .../psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 7fe03d7798..3039968b3d 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ This is close to the existing function `mbedtls_pk_wrap_as_opaque`, but does not ``` int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_flags_t usage, psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes, @@ -271,11 +272,21 @@ int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, ``` * `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` does not change the id/lifetime fields of the attributes (which indicate a volatile key by default). + * [OPEN] Or should it reset them to 0? Resetting is more convenient for the case where the pk key is a `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`. But that's an uncommon use case. It's probably less surprising if this function leaves the lifetime-related alone, since its job is to set the type-related and policy-related attributes. * `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the type and size based on what's in the pk context. - * The key type is a key pair if the context contains a private key, and a public key if the context only contains a public key. -* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets all the potentially applicable usage flags: `EXPORT`, `COPY`; `VERIFY_HASH | VERIFY_MESSAGE` or `ENCRYPT` as applicable for both public keys and key pairs; `SIGN` or `DECRYPT` as applicable for a key pair. -* [OPEN] What is the default algorithm for `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes`? Suggestion: assume signature by default. For RSA, either `PSA_RSA_PKCS1_V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` or `PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg)` depending on the RSA context's padding mode. For ECC, `PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` if `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC` is enabled and `PSA_ALG_ECDSA` otherwise. -* [OPEN] Or does `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` need an extra argument that conveys some kind of policy for RSA keys and, independently, some kind of policy for ECC keys? + * The key type is a key pair if the context contains a private key and the indicated usage is a private-key usage. The key type is a public key if the context only contains a public key, in which case a private-key usage is an error. +* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the usage flags based on the `usage` parameter. It extends the usage to other usage that is possible: + * `EXPORT` and `COPY` are always set. + * If `SIGN_{HASH,MESSAGE}` is set then so is `VERIFY_{HASH,MESSAGE}`. + * If `DECRYPT` is set then so is `ENCRYPT`. + * It is an error if `usage` has more than one flag set, or has a usage that is incompatible with the key type. +* `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the algorithm usage policy based on information in the key object and on `usage`. + * For an RSA key with the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15` padding mode, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` for a sign/verify usage, and `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT` for an encrypt/decrypt usage. + * For an RSA key with the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15` padding mode, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` for a sign/verify usage, and `PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash)` for an encrypt/decrypt usage where `hash` is from the RSA key's parameters. (Note that `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` is only allowed in signature algorithms.) + * For an `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` or `MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA` with a sign/verify usage, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` if `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC` is enabled and `PSA_ALG_ECDSA` otherwise. In either case, the hash policy is `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH`. + * For an `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` or `MBEDTLS_PK_ECDKEY_DH` with the usage `PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE`, the algorithm is `PSA_ALG_ECDH`. + * For a `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`, this function reads the attributes of the existing PK key and copies them (without overriding the lifetime and key identifier in `attributes`), then applies a public-key restriction if needed. + * Public-key restriction: if `usage` is a public-key usage, change the type to the corresponding public-key type, and remove private-key usage flags from the usage flags read from the existing key. * `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` checks that the type field in the attributes is consistent with the content of the `mbedtls_pk_context` object (RSA/ECC, and availability of the private key). * The key type can be a public key even if the private key is available. * `mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa` does not need to check the bit-size in the attributes: `psa_import_key` will do enough checks. From dd77343381161e09a63b4694001da3957e27d3a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 14:33:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 179/551] Open question for ECDSA signature that can be resolved during implementation Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index 3039968b3d..fb00705971 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -339,3 +339,5 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, * These functions convert between the signature format used by `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}{,_ext}` and the signature format used by `psa_{sign,verify}_{hash,message}`. * The input and output buffers can overlap. + +[OPEN] Should these functions rely on the ASN.1 module? To be decided when implementing. From 4a0ba80bdbf9b2ef1f44071cdabc733962870d69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett <144035422+Ryan-Everett-arm@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 14:12:33 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 180/551] Clarify psa_destroy_key documentation Co-authored-by: Janos Follath Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett <144035422+Ryan-Everett-arm@users.noreply.github.com> --- library/psa_crypto.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 565b5e14ce..56265c1977 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) if (!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) { - /* Destroy the copy of the persistent key from memory. + /* Destroy the copy of the persistent key from storage. * The slot will still hold a copy of the key until the last reader * unregisters. */ status = psa_destroy_persistent_key(slot->attr.id); From fecef8bc8ed50051463a901f544c02095a9f72ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:06:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 181/551] config_adjust: fix adjustments between legacy and PSA Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ .../mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h | 11 +++++- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h index 691fed6e5a..3d2293d342 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -440,6 +440,41 @@ /* End of ECC section */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 +#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h index b841875cf8..3456615943 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_from_legacy.h @@ -81,13 +81,22 @@ #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 #define PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH 1 -#define PSA_WANT_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 #endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_GCM_C) From 4ed8daa929c9ccf6a401fb39caa8c41c31154a35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:16:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 182/551] psa_crypto_ffdh: add guards for enabled domain parameters Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c index a57f02e5eb..6cc086ef60 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c @@ -35,58 +35,78 @@ static psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(size_t key_size, return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) static const unsigned char dhm_P_2048[] = MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_P_BIN; - static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN; - static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN; - static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN; - static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] = - MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN; static const unsigned char dhm_G_2048[] = MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE2048_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_3072[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_P_BIN; static const unsigned char dhm_G_3072[] = MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE3072_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_4096[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_P_BIN; static const unsigned char dhm_G_4096[] = MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE4096_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_6144[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_P_BIN; static const unsigned char dhm_G_6144[] = MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE6144_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) + static const unsigned char dhm_P_8192[] = + MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_P_BIN; static const unsigned char dhm_G_8192[] = MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHE8192_G_BIN; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ switch (key_size) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) case sizeof(dhm_P_2048): dhm_P = dhm_P_2048; dhm_G = dhm_G_2048; dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_2048); dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_2048); break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) case sizeof(dhm_P_3072): dhm_P = dhm_P_3072; dhm_G = dhm_G_3072; dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_3072); dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_3072); break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) case sizeof(dhm_P_4096): dhm_P = dhm_P_4096; dhm_G = dhm_G_4096; dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_4096); dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_4096); break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) case sizeof(dhm_P_6144): dhm_P = dhm_P_6144; dhm_G = dhm_G_6144; dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_6144); dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_6144); break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) case sizeof(dhm_P_8192): dhm_P = dhm_P_8192; dhm_G = dhm_G_8192; dhm_size_P = sizeof(dhm_P_8192); dhm_size_G = sizeof(dhm_G_8192); break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ default: return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } From de504130090b952e3eb4e95522b057b36fb32ca0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:21:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 183/551] crypto_sizes: adjust PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS based on the supported groups Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/psa/crypto_sizes.h | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h index 836c28cc23..635ee98f80 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_sizes.h @@ -224,10 +224,20 @@ #endif /* The maximum size of an DH key on this implementation, in bits. - * - * Note that an implementation may set different size limits for different - * operations, and does not need to accept all key sizes up to the limit. */ + * This is a vendor-specific macro.*/ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) #define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 8192u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 6144u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 4096u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 3072u +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 2048u +#else +#define PSA_VENDOR_FFDH_MAX_KEY_BITS 0u +#endif /* The maximum size of an ECC key on this implementation, in bits. * This is a vendor-specific macro. */ From ecaf7c5690b7a82e73f8803b04fb9c2266451d65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:30:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 184/551] ssl_tls: add guards for enabled DH key types Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index 47fa65c188..a20e28a2c1 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -1539,26 +1539,36 @@ static psa_status_t mbedtls_ssl_get_psa_ffdh_info_from_tls_id( uint16_t tls_id, size_t *bits, psa_key_type_t *key_type) { switch (tls_id) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048: *bits = 2048; *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072: *bits = 3072; *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096: *bits = 4096; *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144: *bits = 6144; *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) case MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192: *bits = 8192; *key_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919); return PSA_SUCCESS; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ default: return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } From e8683ce9eff13f054d602e9c60023f09420e9396 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 12:34:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 185/551] ssl_test_lib: add guards for enabled DH groups Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c index b49dd67c26..650fbfb1eb 100644 --- a/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c +++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_test_lib.c @@ -515,17 +515,31 @@ static const struct { #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048, "ffdhe2048", 1 }, - { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, "ffdhe3072", 1 }, - { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, "ffdhe4096", 1 }, - { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, "ffdhe6144", 1 }, - { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, "ffdhe8192", 1 }, -#else +#else /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048, "ffdhe2048", 0 }, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, "ffdhe3072", 1 }, +#else /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072, "ffdhe3072", 0 }, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, "ffdhe4096", 1 }, +#else /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096, "ffdhe4096", 0 }, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, "ffdhe6144", 1 }, +#else /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144, "ffdhe6144", 0 }, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, "ffdhe8192", 1 }, +#else /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192, "ffdhe8192", 0 }, +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED && PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ { 0, NULL, 0 }, }; From 504a10254c3867d3241052e251a4820e2580d92e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:19:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 186/551] psa_crypto: do not validate DH groups which are not enabled Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index a8baa6b6f5..9173757780 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -129,12 +129,30 @@ int psa_can_do_cipher(psa_key_type_t key_type, psa_algorithm_t cipher_alg) defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) static int psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(size_t bits) { - if (bits != 2048 && bits != 3072 && bits != 4096 && - bits != 6144 && bits != 8192) { - return 0; + switch (bits) { +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) + case 2048: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) + case 3072: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) + case 4096: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) + case 6144: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) + case 8192: + return 1; +#endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ + default: + return 0; } - - return 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT || MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY || @@ -577,7 +595,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_import_key_into_slot( defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)) { if (psa_is_dh_key_size_valid(PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(data_length)) == 0) { - return PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; } return mbedtls_psa_ffdh_import_key(attributes, data, data_length, From 6bed64ec75599106f9aff9326f1a2d8080b15bde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:21:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 187/551] all.sh: add new component with only DH 2048 bits. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 44930d28b5..0b2a36aa39 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -2374,6 +2374,26 @@ component_test_depends_py_pkalgs_psa () { tests/scripts/depends.py pkalgs } +component_test_psa_crypto_config_ffdh_2048_only () { + msg "build: full config - only DH 2048" + + scripts/config.py full + + # Disable all DH groups other than 2048. + scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 + scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 + scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 + scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 + + make CFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS -Werror" LDFLAGS="$ASAN_CFLAGS" + + msg "test: full config - only DH 2048" + make test + + msg "ssl-opt: full config - only DH 2048" + tests/ssl-opt.sh -f "ffdh" +} + component_build_no_pk_rsa_alt_support () { msg "build: !MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT" # ~30s From 48a847afb7d34b26050904fc3155a55852e45cb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:22:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 188/551] tests: add guards for DH groups Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_information.py | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 132 ++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_information.py b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_information.py index b21a0cfc23..60803864f2 100644 --- a/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_information.py +++ b/scripts/mbedtls_dev/psa_information.py @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ def automatic_dependencies(*expressions: str) -> List[str]: """ used = set() for expr in expressions: - used.update(re.findall(r'PSA_(?:ALG|ECC_FAMILY|KEY_TYPE)_\w+', expr)) + used.update(re.findall(r'PSA_(?:ALG|ECC_FAMILY|DH_FAMILY|KEY_TYPE)_\w+', expr)) used.difference_update(SYMBOLS_WITHOUT_DEPENDENCY) return sorted(psa_want_symbol(name) for name in used) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index 1bd8b65002..b1bc678346 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -507,167 +507,167 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:P import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 key pair: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 public key: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 3072 key pair: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 3072 public key: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 4096 key pair: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:4096:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 4096 public key: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 6144 key pair: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 6144 public key: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 8192 key pair: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 8192 public key: good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_export:"3D1EB2C023E54A123420B9587F6985AFFCF6FE75A2F1768866CBAA10ABD5B7448409EFCE8786C0BD1D325FBAC47119A846C63103DAA8BC5FAF427C69D07AFE2FA0064A8BE9C33E30E6926A57850248EAAD8F0FA887452FF1467064DBE4041950CBFF55763AB58E1F2300C9B133E5D0FBD18604B93EC16BEA9CE340AC92B18DC188629A5D7FEC64601334CDBFEBD8126BE4743440C9A48F03F37298548C2EF226D44C296F440EB1E5F1128F203120ACE6C45D3CA992998CCF68C301CC4A32CF852FA4C2968C62D4016AF526FCD61A56F2BF479743D1EB62AD21120563BC1CE0D0791920BB89D82473F4DE75BCF6A728490F071899F683FCA10DCF6D9605749810A901F1FAAF96DC6AA0AF1CAFCF61E8A51E9E7A1BF5D9E5FDD6D63ED824CFD4016EF0782946F44E44B1B72B4CF9D4CE5E57A93EB738AEC084F02BBA52C385BCC013C720B0B98B78580AFFA84B0D204866B3FA39D73EECF1E0E6921D5484D929C1ADC7975741A308BCB060A43DF556F278F56CBDBDCE07F7CC8292FB27B3CDDB286E4B5A92552308DD8001F4BABC67C56B8DC6E5C4ED8FC4724A89441433EDD58C68E513E1940F5E6DB512574D7A37974E5739E28C03FECA3134AD8817E1A52BEBDCF2EE1F7DC66B09742005902A977DB0D617B8F6CFD75508F00225BE362D53BCA0AF4BE0D2DAD0A64054CA1204E31217F82D4F95315E54AEBF3BF98E2667A35A0017799C5479F369D8692317CABBB78C07D8314153D22110EA7617091ED755041A6E201F1FD76BC258DF84260369BBB2A1A13B5D266844A25E9A8F1D1279C349E0113CAAAB0A3D4510367E754980328B937CF7BEAABDBA39F4EA3CDE5C9BB6ECDA5BC44CC9EB6BEE6F2FF3698FA393DD4F85507415622CD7C0802240F7CE22F75F2DBA7CB7217352B34C57921B975BF2E73B6DA6A34C11192338C80B986AA3707DA64324056FE7EE2C0754045C7BC596B68FFCB501C186F89D618A76144C9CB35B59370D1D3E668F10A9EF6C851F6AD3FA9FA776E9391F3F143D7928F816EE4F56F756BF450E1B4F87A7B19EFB02850C45F6F7BCC87AA8FF27C474269EB53F3F1E28DD4D6BF1C6B16AD97F10418596D1A3EC5F664773FCA1E93743005C7230D5F8549DAEE3472418A648B91834BA7A19834B48D7E6DB57F7BD92887C366D78532A2497D9B9F35D598E79026F586D4DC1577FDA2B9DD5877A521EB9F3C87DFD77F5EC690519E04E702CE3A5203920A7B891F764CB0B2DDEE7EB01CC55EB45F1BECD4514540F10F03ABBA3E4D627DCEF89F1FADF26034C2D7C36E6776C7163D99BF5CADEFDB142A6CD631D3B58269F0116B1016633B7CD4752E2F636614ABDD27592734B8BFF08E155C350808C6072C42E46F2AEDD83EA6FFBF3EA5AA809B0F9DABF6CD8E2E0E1BC998AAAA0698F44B1819B0D7A19C2067F071A932D10F0281187":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):0:PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:8192:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 key pair: export not permitterd -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 2040 key pair: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_with_data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import/export FFDH RFC7919 2040 public key: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_with_data:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):2048:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 3064 key pair: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_with_data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import/export FFDH RFC7919 3064 public key: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_with_data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import/export FFDH RFC7919 4088 key pair: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_with_data:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):4096:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 4088 public key: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_with_data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import/export FFDH RFC7919 6136 key pair: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_with_data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import/export FFDH RFC7919 6136 public key: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_with_data:"201757BBAC6FF53E1966C29822B5154F56E332DCE1370D3A117B380D9C63FBD98F027F434EFBE530581BB1A0ACEDF30D749854F6BFC3E2E9F24A75B9109DB1FC787BB2D1DEF56414E6585757C5F84394AE9D7DB98AAADB5BCE0E4E55397B54E5DFAEDFB8CA87E6CAF0FC40E77421129F8D020287E7BD0330F60A7B01257FE36E1270B27D39F96AA464AF60C9DF47979517D7E9F0F68F93138BDC06E8F6F0AB39C90DA731925D26E48C24383425B22244D092BB9D6E3192467A91B27F0073C507D0615C3042F7432903E83494C2214089BACEF60A2D670E9D0EA0DC2F882E6AB90EC26A0CC4F9ED3DAF3912304079AA2447573AC51AAD69F4DFA07A03780922B4C7BACB286767EF758454526319C92F1486FA75E63E8EB2CBCA2A11938FE0BC5A9B50584505E16A3C8E2A599F8E2192BEC986DA602AD980190955B4AC8EF86EAF6EAFCFF7438ACD4DF64E407E675C0A114E04A9360A4431B6C0AB249B023BE89A41DA36FDFAB0FA3247DD9280EC538F724C6AF8CECD22DA87E91959AC12B690175937B7DB09B12FEE5D018802A4E561AE4F671C5569C73E928BBD66A494BBEF7F0DE8F00FED7546068E7F82F6317106885F0138AFD399DF9A8FB83C345840129B485EAD2C570BDAC992515663FCF86769808DFEFB9426D6938E5799104F197D3A3BDFFF8C4BF5E736E8B78FDB01D6C61DEAC56BC9BC8073FD4BABCCFC6D15253CA7F9FBD06F41D3F490965671F778812F5237791223FF9A1E6DBE2DD318570786051A74E58FCD0AA1BAC8CEF0656A1AD230E0578F6EC60C275C7FBAF01053DFE093DF049531282BFE7E459236D9B7315DFDB72105BD2A1509238F1CC488F3CE8907C4F931EF89FAC9D6C7D624D6BE70169A283C97E95E28DA1B90A2311733565BB082BA845BE97EDAB6698EE25E35988149B61ED64F1F41D54CD2EECB8224A22C118666551067F607B5B5C569DC8AF082D3CF0782FFC638F149765F9BE50CC52C157A58936B3E0CAA89891C71F5B960A46020AC8B7F449C8753561812B9CE313A932D3F7FD7AEF526E6BA47FE569A180CB96C5C3081A73407B52D53C6FEE688":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):6144:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 8184 key pair: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_with_data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import/export FFDH RFC7919 8184 public key: import invalid key length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_with_data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import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 key pair: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 public key: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):0:PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:2048:0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1 PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 3072 key pair: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 3072 public key: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 4096 key pair: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:4096:0:PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL:1 PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 4096 public key: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 6144 key pair: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 6144 public key: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 8192 key pair: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 8192 public key: export buffer to small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_export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import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 public key 2048 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export_public_key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import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 key pair 2048 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export_public_key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import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 public key 3072 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_export_public_key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import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 key pair 3072 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"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" PSA import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 public key 4096 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_export_public_key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import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 key pair 4096 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 import_export_public_key:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"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" PSA import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 public key 6144 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_export_public_key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import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 key pair 6144 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 import_export_public_key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import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 public key 8192 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_export_public_key:"3D1EB2C023E54A123420B9587F6985AFFCF6FE75A2F1768866CBAA10ABD5B7448409EFCE8786C0BD1D325FBAC47119A846C63103DAA8BC5FAF427C69D07AFE2FA0064A8BE9C33E30E6926A57850248EAAD8F0FA887452FF1467064DBE4041950CBFF55763AB58E1F2300C9B133E5D0FBD18604B93EC16BEA9CE340AC92B18DC188629A5D7FEC64601334CDBFEBD8126BE4743440C9A48F03F37298548C2EF226D44C296F440EB1E5F1128F203120ACE6C45D3CA992998CCF68C301CC4A32CF852FA4C2968C62D4016AF526FCD61A56F2BF479743D1EB62AD21120563BC1CE0D0791920BB89D82473F4DE75BCF6A728490F071899F683FCA10DCF6D9605749810A901F1FAAF96DC6AA0AF1CAFCF61E8A51E9E7A1BF5D9E5FDD6D63ED824CFD4016EF0782946F44E44B1B72B4CF9D4CE5E57A93EB738AEC084F02BBA52C385BCC013C720B0B98B78580AFFA84B0D204866B3FA39D73EECF1E0E6921D5484D929C1ADC7975741A308BCB060A43DF556F278F56CBDBDCE07F7CC8292FB27B3CDDB286E4B5A92552308DD8001F4BABC67C56B8DC6E5C4ED8FC4724A89441433EDD58C68E513E1940F5E6DB512574D7A37974E5739E28C03FECA3134AD8817E1A52BEBDCF2EE1F7DC66B09742005902A977DB0D617B8F6CFD75508F00225BE362D53BCA0AF4BE0D2DAD0A64054CA1204E31217F82D4F95315E54AEBF3BF98E2667A35A0017799C5479F369D8692317CABBB78C07D8314153D22110EA7617091ED755041A6E201F1FD76BC258DF84260369BBB2A1A13B5D266844A25E9A8F1D1279C349E0113CAAAB0A3D4510367E754980328B937CF7BEAABDBA39F4EA3CDE5C9BB6ECDA5BC44CC9EB6BEE6F2FF3698FA393DD4F85507415622CD7C0802240F7CE22F75F2DBA7CB7217352B34C57921B975BF2E73B6DA6A34C11192338C80B986AA3707DA64324056FE7EE2C0754045C7BC596B68FFCB501C186F89D618A76144C9CB35B59370D1D3E668F10A9EF6C851F6AD3FA9FA776E9391F3F143D7928F816EE4F56F756BF450E1B4F87A7B19EFB02850C45F6F7BCC87AA8FF27C474269EB53F3F1E28DD4D6BF1C6B16AD97F10418596D1A3EC5F664773FCA1E93743005C7230D5F8549DAEE3472418A648B91834BA7A19834B48D7E6DB57F7BD92887C366D78532A2497D9B9F35D598E79026F586D4DC1577FDA2B9DD5877A521EB9F3C87DFD77F5EC690519E04E702CE3A5203920A7B891F764CB0B2DDEE7EB01CC55EB45F1BECD4514540F10F03ABBA3E4D627DCEF89F1FADF26034C2D7C36E6776C7163D99BF5CADEFDB142A6CD631D3B58269F0116B1016633B7CD4752E2F636614ABDD27592734B8BFF08E155C350808C6072C42E46F2AEDD83EA6FFBF3EA5AA809B0F9DABF6CD8E2E0E1BC998AAAA0698F44B1819B0D7A19C2067F071A932D10F0281187":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:0:PSA_SUCCESS:"3D1EB2C023E54A123420B9587F6985AFFCF6FE75A2F1768866CBAA10ABD5B7448409EFCE8786C0BD1D325FBAC47119A846C63103DAA8BC5FAF427C69D07AFE2FA0064A8BE9C33E30E6926A57850248EAAD8F0FA887452FF1467064DBE4041950CBFF55763AB58E1F2300C9B133E5D0FBD18604B93EC16BEA9CE340AC92B18DC188629A5D7FEC64601334CDBFEBD8126BE4743440C9A48F03F37298548C2EF226D44C296F440EB1E5F1128F203120ACE6C45D3CA992998CCF68C301CC4A32CF852FA4C2968C62D4016AF526FCD61A56F2BF479743D1EB62AD21120563BC1CE0D0791920BB89D82473F4DE75BCF6A728490F071899F683FCA10DCF6D9605749810A901F1FAAF96DC6AA0AF1CAFCF61E8A51E9E7A1BF5D9E5FDD6D63ED824CFD4016EF0782946F44E44B1B72B4CF9D4CE5E57A93EB738AEC084F02BBA52C385BCC013C720B0B98B78580AFFA84B0D204866B3FA39D73EECF1E0E6921D5484D929C1ADC7975741A308BCB060A43DF556F278F56CBDBDCE07F7CC8292FB27B3CDDB286E4B5A92552308DD8001F4BABC67C56B8DC6E5C4ED8FC4724A89441433EDD58C68E513E1940F5E6DB512574D7A37974E5739E28C03FECA3134AD8817E1A52BEBDCF2EE1F7DC66B09742005902A977DB0D617B8F6CFD75508F00225BE362D53BCA0AF4BE0D2DAD0A64054CA1204E31217F82D4F95315E54AEBF3BF98E2667A35A0017799C5479F369D8692317CABBB78C07D8314153D22110EA7617091ED755041A6E201F1FD76BC258DF84260369BBB2A1A13B5D266844A25E9A8F1D1279C349E0113CAAAB0A3D4510367E754980328B937CF7BEAABDBA39F4EA3CDE5C9BB6ECDA5BC44CC9EB6BEE6F2FF3698FA393DD4F85507415622CD7C0802240F7CE22F75F2DBA7CB7217352B34C57921B975BF2E73B6DA6A34C11192338C80B986AA3707DA64324056FE7EE2C0754045C7BC596B68FFCB501C186F89D618A76144C9CB35B59370D1D3E668F10A9EF6C851F6AD3FA9FA776E9391F3F143D7928F816EE4F56F756BF450E1B4F87A7B19EFB02850C45F6F7BCC87AA8FF27C474269EB53F3F1E28DD4D6BF1C6B16AD97F10418596D1A3EC5F664773FCA1E93743005C7230D5F8549DAEE3472418A648B91834BA7A19834B48D7E6DB57F7BD92887C366D78532A2497D9B9F35D598E79026F586D4DC1577FDA2B9DD5877A521EB9F3C87DFD77F5EC690519E04E702CE3A5203920A7B891F764CB0B2DDEE7EB01CC55EB45F1BECD4514540F10F03ABBA3E4D627DCEF89F1FADF26034C2D7C36E6776C7163D99BF5CADEFDB142A6CD631D3B58269F0116B1016633B7CD4752E2F636614ABDD27592734B8BFF08E155C350808C6072C42E46F2AEDD83EA6FFBF3EA5AA809B0F9DABF6CD8E2E0E1BC998AAAA0698F44B1819B0D7A19C2067F071A932D10F0281187" PSA import/export-public FFDH RFC7919 key pair 8192 good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_export_public_key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import: reject raw data key of length 0 @@ -7080,35 +7080,35 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE:PSA_WANT_ECC_ raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY):"1c306a7ac2a0e2e0990b294470cba339e6453772b075811d8fad0d1d6927c120bb5ee8972b0d3e21374c9c921b09d1b0366f10b65173992d":"9b08f7cc31b7e3e67d22d5aea121074a273bd2b83de09c63faa73d2c22c5d9bbc836647241d953d40c5b12da88120d53177f80e532c41fa0":"07fff4181ac6cc95ec1c16a94a0f74d12da232ce40a77552281d282bb60c0b56fd2464c335543936521c24403085d59a449a5037514a879d" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 2048 bits -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"6d34e084b8d0e253a894237be9977e1a821b556ed4bc01cda691a927885979b59e55a30daa2a707769474b760e9f1c10544b2ce74b26efa4f069e05ce70471bf6b7e6c08a16fa880930790204e8b482478de0682ce3f58450a4e15abc14d05e13ef773a10a3e8bf2219f8ab556c88dc2a301b362c2d4e94bf2f0006bb36d15a5096ed1342f3f111ccf123ceae9bdc7bc0cde5edc9f0203f35f8a98aff6d75975357733a429364ed3aca32acaf9f857ef751e0e246140eebdfc2b403b644e42c48922f7f6cdaa6a2ef9ddfa54fb83657492f9f9a2c8aa4831601f9b11663e94d968d8be6e121aee2c79156e44aaa650bb26083983a76cc5883538d4794855ded1":"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" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 2048 bits (shared secred with leading zeros) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 3072 bits -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 3072 bits (shared secred with leading zeros) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"17ec74c211f655be646c2f006056230208dcff38644efc429591562f3869f867e7b79cdfb3e426fef60ca77d9fc80ea39e21ec060321bab3c7820177eba4242d0cd9f0301e4da7146608409add169ed05dfda2702a437f3e2b8cd162a0e50da2682433d50c37cc1aeabc5c7cd8fdd359381a8d192af00d7f41b8c049b1e552b832224b40f9d85c4307f0b76b0e2605858fb33e594ac1d0c04d358209ad47133e76fa8dafd0f2370b1944a4780138618eaf66f6d4961c584aa7a34bcc1c78bbd15e7f5a2b8beaa8f66819dc04eabe08b24cabfe69e2b78a12470162ba6703bbbcf34890b8af761d36c33e3b72f631dbc5dd6f1fbafca18a8498623ea00bd9aa6b426da30e2ebc27075eb589b237d1dc54e215a6b6ec40220f14e320b72c5f702ee496b53a63edd5620294d9be88a862544c561b4e175ff3c094ab3adacc579334cb95fa2d29b17fa483ba50d6270b6478ce4f26b564bec6ae82a60e2c15456c4610b6567ba7d91218b59a670c517179d30d743751ae3c3e777ec1f29af890b2ec":"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" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 4096 bits -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 4096 bits (shared secred with leading zeros) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 6144 bits -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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" PSA raw key agreement: FFDH 6144 bits (shared secred with leading zeros) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 raw_key_agreement:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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" PSA key agreement: ECDH SECP256R1 (RFC 5903) + HKDF-SHA-256: capacity=8160 @@ -7140,51 +7140,51 @@ depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_ECDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):"c88f01f510d9ac3f70a292daa2316de544e9aab8afe84049c62a9c57862d1433":"04d12dfb5289c8d4f81208b70270398c342296970a0bccb74c736fc7554494bf6356fbf3ca366cc23e8157854c13c58d6aac23f046ada30f8353e74f33039872ab":"3bf511eebadf44c1f7b0282a1262fe4ddd9da23bb1555cfda591ac46b088c4417883c010f6e37cd6942c63bd8a65d8648c736bf8330b539760e18db13888d992":"" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 2048 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 256+0 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"6d34e084b8d0e253a894237be9977e1a821b556ed4bc01cda691a927885979b59e55a30daa2a707769474b760e9f1c10544b2ce74b26efa4f069e05ce70471bf6b7e6c08a16fa880930790204e8b482478de0682ce3f58450a4e15abc14d05e13ef773a10a3e8bf2219f8ab556c88dc2a301b362c2d4e94bf2f0006bb36d15a5096ed1342f3f111ccf123ceae9bdc7bc0cde5edc9f0203f35f8a98aff6d75975357733a429364ed3aca32acaf9f857ef751e0e246140eebdfc2b403b644e42c48922f7f6cdaa6a2ef9ddfa54fb83657492f9f9a2c8aa4831601f9b11663e94d968d8be6e121aee2c79156e44aaa650bb26083983a76cc5883538d4794855ded1":"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":"" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 2048 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 255+1 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"8f6f6b349b2c11a941882de0d6bd0dfde68d596c1f0b85d15cf94d651f99e1527e829d95fec5ffac32da6c5367785e735f126e1f2a326e8edcd6192452ce0ef7a11c541feb6b7b81bcb8c15a5db04ab407e8776426227ec335c2840c2a909d7914b158754dde8980dbdf607d63f0b9778f81df82836529b2e27f4a81a390bdbf848ee16817fa80d745bf93626ad0e19930fcde46a034a25f168c14e006a7d4e3cb2fce48797b5b2edb0a6c4995cf1ec0dc32d218a4b52d929ff1fa50b63af9b2c0e7045bbb7f7a0f976d1da8a2617294a67cd0f763e5bc50e1037ba5b49a02f3b1b5b6509bb0e2cfd67ff49da0e6fec01c06a219cb943151fa095bf5dda27a":"da" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 2048 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 1+255 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"8f":"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" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 3072 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 256+0 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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":"" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 3072 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 255+1 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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":"c6" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 3072 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 1+255 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"d9":"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" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 4096 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 256+0 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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":"" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 4096 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 255+1 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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":"87" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 4096 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 1+255 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"01":"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" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 6144 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 256+0 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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":"" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 6144 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 255+1 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"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":"8c" PSA key agreement: FFDH RFC7919 6144 key + HKDF-SHA256: read 1+255 -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 key_agreement_output:PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(PSA_ALG_FFDH, PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)):PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):"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":"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":"10":"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" PSA generate random: 0 bytes @@ -7345,23 +7345,23 @@ PSA generate key: RSA, e=2 generate_key_rsa:PSA_VENDOR_RSA_GENERATE_MIN_KEY_BITS:"02":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT PSA generate key: FFDH, 2048 bits, good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):2048:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0 PSA generate key: FFDH, 3072 bits, good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):3072:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0 PSA generate key: FFDH, 4096 bits, good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):4096:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0 PSA generate key: FFDH, 6144 bits, good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):6144:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0 PSA generate key: FFDH, 8192 bits, good -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 generate_key:PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):8192:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:PSA_SUCCESS:0 PSA generate key: FFDH, 1024 bits, invalid bits From 1161b44981deb1d12203bb68453a42c61b0702b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:53:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 189/551] crypto_config_test_driver_extension: support accelaration of DH groups Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- .../crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h index 768a9a69f3..dac07acd33 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h +++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/crypto_config_test_driver_extension.h @@ -192,6 +192,46 @@ #endif #endif +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144 +#endif +#endif + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192 +#else +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192 +#endif +#endif + #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) #undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH From 78aa0bc1d93aae9c326c2fc20f90983f2798139a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 15:53:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 190/551] all.sh: fix tests with accelerated FFDH Explicitly accelerate also DH groups in those tests. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 0b2a36aa39..d2c927327d 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -907,6 +907,18 @@ helper_get_psa_curve_list () { echo "$loc_list" } +# Helper returning the list of supported DH groups from CRYPTO_CONFIG_H, +# without the "PSA_WANT_" prefix. This becomes handy for accelerating DH groups +# in the following helpers. +helper_get_psa_dh_group_list () { + loc_list="" + for item in $(sed -n 's/^#define PSA_WANT_\(DH_RFC7919_[0-9]*\).*/\1/p' <"$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H"); do + loc_list="$loc_list $item" + done + + echo "$loc_list" +} + # Get the list of uncommented PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_xxx_ from CRYPTO_CONFIG_H. This # is useful to easily get a list of key type symbols to accelerate. # The function accepts a single argument which is the key type: ECC, DH, RSA. @@ -2573,7 +2585,8 @@ component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ffdh () { # Algorithms and key types to accelerate loc_accel_list="ALG_FFDH \ - $(helper_get_psa_key_type_list "DH")" + $(helper_get_psa_key_type_list "DH") \ + $(helper_get_psa_dh_group_list)" # Configure # --------- @@ -3105,6 +3118,7 @@ config_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_ffdh_no_bignum() { # PSA sides, and also disable the key exchanges that depend on DHM. scripts/config.py -f include/psa/crypto_config.h unset PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset-all "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_[0-9A-Z_a-z]*" + scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset-all "PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_[0-9]*" scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_DHM_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED @@ -3159,7 +3173,8 @@ common_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_ffdh_no_bignum () { if [ "$test_target" = "ECC_DH" ]; then loc_accel_list="$loc_accel_list \ ALG_FFDH \ - $(helper_get_psa_key_type_list "DH")" + $(helper_get_psa_key_type_list "DH") \ + $(helper_get_psa_dh_group_list)" fi # Configure From 43ff242a8b0e2a6d7488e502eb70c55e31a057c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 08:42:38 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 191/551] changelog: fix typo Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8461.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8461.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8461.txt index 459e47bd27..d6a65f0702 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/8461.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8461.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ Bugfix - * Fix unsupported PSA asymmetric encryption and dectryption + * Fix unsupported PSA asymmetric encryption and decryption (psa_asymmetric_[en|de]crypt) with opaque keys. Resolves #8461. From 4f34b155f52fa1015cfe3f1177ed5739e7d07dc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 08:44:13 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 192/551] test_driver_key_management: keep mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key() private Only mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key() is actually needed by other test drivers to deal with opaque keys. mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key() can be kept private to test_driver_key_management.c. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h | 4 ---- tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h index 9a68777ecd..7b5c4c7bf1 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h +++ b/tests/include/test/drivers/key_management.h @@ -67,10 +67,6 @@ void mbedtls_test_transparent_free(void); psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_init(void); void mbedtls_test_opaque_free(void); -psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( - const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, uint8_t *wrapped_key_buffer, - size_t wrapped_key_buffer_size, size_t *wrapped_key_buffer_length); - psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_unwrap_key( const uint8_t *wrapped_key, size_t wrapped_key_length, uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size, size_t *key_buffer_length); diff --git a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c index 4188c25c18..a3d532d51a 100644 --- a/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c +++ b/tests/src/drivers/test_driver_key_management.c @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static size_t mbedtls_test_opaque_get_base_size() * The argument wrapped_key_buffer_length is filled with the wrapped * key_size on success. * */ -psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( +static psa_status_t mbedtls_test_opaque_wrap_key( const uint8_t *key, size_t key_length, uint8_t *wrapped_key_buffer, From 05754d8e85ca3cfa896fe59d28302e9dbabf7861 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 09:47:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 193/551] ssl-opt: add DH groups requirements in test cases using FFDH Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/ssl-opt.sh | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/ssl-opt.sh b/tests/ssl-opt.sh index 26c5a796fb..fd2fc0a1b1 100755 --- a/tests/ssl-opt.sh +++ b/tests/ssl-opt.sh @@ -13614,6 +13614,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -13638,6 +13639,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe3072,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE3072:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe3072" \ @@ -13656,6 +13658,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -13680,6 +13683,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe4096,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE4096:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe4096" \ @@ -13698,6 +13702,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -13721,6 +13726,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe6144,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE6144:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe6144" \ @@ -13739,6 +13745,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -13763,6 +13770,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 client_needs_more_time 4 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe8192,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE8192:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ From 18371ee08f8438f1412cae4739b0985fda7890e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 09:49:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 194/551] generate_tls13_compat_tests: add DH group dependency when FFDH is used "tls13-compat.sh" is also updated in this commit using the python script. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/opt-testcases/tls13-compat.sh | 165 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/scripts/generate_tls13_compat_tests.py | 16 +- 2 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-compat.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-compat.sh index 1190a87eef..9cf2550a06 100755 --- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-compat.sh +++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-compat.sh @@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -380,6 +381,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -397,6 +399,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -415,6 +418,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -777,6 +781,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -794,6 +799,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -811,6 +817,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -829,6 +836,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1191,6 +1199,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1208,6 +1217,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1225,6 +1235,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1243,6 +1254,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1605,6 +1617,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1622,6 +1635,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1639,6 +1653,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -1657,6 +1672,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -2019,6 +2035,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -2036,6 +2053,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -2053,6 +2071,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -2071,6 +2090,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -2473,6 +2493,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -2492,6 +2513,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -2511,6 +2533,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -2531,6 +2554,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -2935,6 +2959,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -2954,6 +2979,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -2973,6 +2999,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -2993,6 +3020,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3397,6 +3425,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3416,6 +3445,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3435,6 +3465,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3455,6 +3486,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3859,6 +3891,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3878,6 +3911,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3897,6 +3931,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -3917,6 +3952,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -4321,6 +4357,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -4340,6 +4377,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -4359,6 +4397,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -4379,6 +4418,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -4764,6 +4804,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -4782,6 +4823,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -4800,6 +4842,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -4819,6 +4862,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -sigalgs rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5202,6 +5246,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5220,6 +5265,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5238,6 +5284,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5257,6 +5304,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -sigalgs rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5640,6 +5688,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5658,6 +5707,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5676,6 +5726,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -5695,6 +5746,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key -ciphersuites TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -sigalgs rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6078,6 +6130,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6096,6 +6149,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6114,6 +6168,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6133,6 +6188,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 -sigalgs rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6516,6 +6572,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6534,6 +6591,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6552,6 +6610,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 -sigalgs ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6571,6 +6630,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/server2-sha256.crt -key data_files/server2.key -ciphersuites TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256 -sigalgs rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -6996,6 +7056,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7016,6 +7077,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP384R1-SHA384:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7036,6 +7098,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7057,6 +7120,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-GCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7482,6 +7546,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-256-GCM:+SHA384:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7502,6 +7567,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-256-GCM:+SHA384:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP384R1-SHA384:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7522,6 +7588,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-256-GCM:+SHA384:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7543,6 +7610,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-256-GCM:+SHA384:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7968,6 +8036,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CHACHA20-POLY1305:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -7988,6 +8057,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key --priority=NONE:+CHACHA20-POLY1305:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP384R1-SHA384:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8008,6 +8078,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key --priority=NONE:+CHACHA20-POLY1305:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8029,6 +8100,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+CHACHA20-POLY1305:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8454,6 +8526,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8474,6 +8547,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP384R1-SHA384:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8494,6 +8568,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8515,6 +8590,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8940,6 +9016,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM-8:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP256R1-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8960,6 +9037,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM-8:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP384R1-SHA384:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -8980,6 +9058,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM-8:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-ECDSA-SECP521R1-SHA512:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -9001,6 +9080,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/server2-sha256.crt --x509keyfile data_files/server2.key --priority=NONE:+AES-128-CCM-8:+SHA256:+AEAD:+SIGN-RSA-PSS-RSAE-SHA256:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -9548,11 +9628,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -9574,11 +9656,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -9600,11 +9684,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -9627,12 +9713,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_GCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-GCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10184,11 +10272,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10210,11 +10300,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10236,11 +10328,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10263,12 +10357,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_256_GCM_SHA384,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10820,11 +10916,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10846,11 +10944,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10872,11 +10972,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -10899,12 +11001,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-CHACHA20-POLY1305-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -11456,11 +11560,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -11482,11 +11588,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -11508,11 +11616,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -11535,12 +11645,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -12092,11 +12204,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -12118,11 +12232,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp384r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -12144,11 +12260,13 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp521r1.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -12171,12 +12289,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256,ffdhe2048,rsa_pss_rsae_sha256" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/server2-sha256.crt key_file=data_files/server2.key debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca_cat12.crt debug_level=4 force_ciphersuite=TLS1-3-AES-128-CCM-8-SHA256 sig_algs=rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048" \ @@ -12258,6 +12378,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: HRR secp256r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -12333,6 +12454,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: HRR secp384r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -12408,6 +12530,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: HRR secp521r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -12483,6 +12606,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: HRR x25519 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -12558,6 +12682,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_openssl_tls1_3_with_ffdh run_test "TLS 1.3 O->m: HRR x448 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ @@ -12716,6 +12841,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -12801,6 +12927,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -12886,6 +13013,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -12971,6 +13099,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -13056,6 +13185,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_gnutls_tls1_3 requires_gnutls_next_no_ticket requires_gnutls_next_disable_tls13_compat @@ -13232,6 +13362,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR secp256r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp256r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -13323,6 +13454,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR secp384r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp384r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -13414,6 +13546,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR secp521r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp521r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -13505,6 +13638,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR x25519 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x25519,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -13596,6 +13730,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR x448 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups ffdhe2048 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x448,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -13615,6 +13750,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp256r1" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups P-256 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp256r1" \ @@ -13634,6 +13770,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp384r1" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups P-384 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp384r1" \ @@ -13653,6 +13790,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp521r1" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups P-521 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp521r1" \ @@ -13672,6 +13810,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR ffdhe2048 -> x25519" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups X25519 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,x25519" \ @@ -13691,6 +13830,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->O: HRR ffdhe2048 -> x448" \ "$O_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT -cert data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt -key data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key -groups X448 -msg -tls1_3 -num_tickets 0 -no_resume_ephemeral -no_cache" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,x448" \ @@ -13792,6 +13932,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR secp256r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp256r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -13893,6 +14034,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR secp384r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp384r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -13994,6 +14136,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR secp521r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp521r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14095,6 +14238,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR x25519 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x25519,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14196,6 +14340,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR x448 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-FFDHE2048:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x448,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14217,6 +14362,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp256r1" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-SECP256R1:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp256r1" \ @@ -14238,6 +14384,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp384r1" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-SECP384R1:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp384r1" \ @@ -14259,6 +14406,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp521r1" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-SECP521R1:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp521r1" \ @@ -14280,6 +14428,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR ffdhe2048 -> x25519" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-X25519:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,x25519" \ @@ -14301,6 +14450,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->G: HRR ffdhe2048 -> x448" \ "$G_NEXT_SRV_NO_CERT --http --disable-client-cert --debug=4 --x509certfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt --x509keyfile data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key --priority=NONE:+CIPHER-ALL:+MAC-ALL:+SIGN-ALL:+GROUP-X448:+VERS-TLS1.3:%NO_TICKETS" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,x448" \ @@ -14418,12 +14568,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR secp256r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp256r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14544,12 +14696,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR secp384r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp384r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14670,12 +14824,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR secp521r1 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp521r1,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14796,12 +14952,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR x25519 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x25519,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14922,12 +15080,14 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR x448 -> ffdhe2048" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x448,ffdhe2048" \ @@ -14954,6 +15114,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp256r1" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp256r1 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp256r1" \ @@ -14980,6 +15141,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp384r1" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp384r1 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp384r1" \ @@ -15006,6 +15168,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR ffdhe2048 -> secp521r1" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=secp521r1 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,secp521r1" \ @@ -15032,6 +15195,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR ffdhe2048 -> x25519" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x25519 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,x25519" \ @@ -15058,6 +15222,7 @@ requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH +requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 run_test "TLS 1.3 m->m: HRR ffdhe2048 -> x448" \ "$P_SRV crt_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.crt key_file=data_files/ecdsa_secp256r1.key debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=x448 tls13_kex_modes=ephemeral cookies=0 tickets=0" \ "$P_CLI ca_file=data_files/test-ca2.crt debug_level=4 sig_algs=ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 groups=ffdhe2048,x448" \ diff --git a/tests/scripts/generate_tls13_compat_tests.py b/tests/scripts/generate_tls13_compat_tests.py index fdb264d7ba..8b28590b87 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/generate_tls13_compat_tests.py +++ b/tests/scripts/generate_tls13_compat_tests.py @@ -353,6 +353,19 @@ class MbedTLSBase(TLSProgram): ret += ["groups={named_groups}".format(named_groups=named_groups)] return ret + #pylint: disable=missing-function-docstring + def add_ffdh_group_requirements(self, requirement_list): + if 'ffdhe2048' in self._named_groups: + requirement_list.append('requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048') + if 'ffdhe3072' in self._named_groups: + requirement_list.append('requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048') + if 'ffdhe4096' in self._named_groups: + requirement_list.append('requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048') + if 'ffdhe6144' in self._named_groups: + requirement_list.append('requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048') + if 'ffdhe8192' in self._named_groups: + requirement_list.append('requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048') + def pre_checks(self): ret = ['requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C', 'requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED'] @@ -365,13 +378,14 @@ class MbedTLSBase(TLSProgram): 'requires_config_enabled MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT') ec_groups = ['secp256r1', 'secp384r1', 'secp521r1', 'x25519', 'x448'] - ffdh_groups = ['ffdhe2048'] + ffdh_groups = ['ffdhe2048', 'ffdhe3072', 'ffdhe4096', 'ffdhe6144', 'ffdhe8192'] if any(x in ec_groups for x in self._named_groups): ret.append('requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH') if any(x in ffdh_groups for x in self._named_groups): ret.append('requires_config_enabled PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH') + self.add_ffdh_group_requirements(ret) return ret From 491f7e5ac3f03e247571f3c5088619bf8a807051 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 11:04:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 195/551] Define key_slot_mutex Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 8d7ff908e1..2d24e6deb9 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -23,10 +23,27 @@ #include #include #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif typedef struct { psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; uint8_t key_slots_initialized; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* + * A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe. + * + * key_slot_mutex protects key_slots[i].registered_readers and + * key_slots[i].state for all valid i. + * + * This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or + * registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions: + * psa_key_slot_state_transition, psa_register_read, psa_unregister_read, + * psa_key_slot_has_readers and psa_wipe_key_slot. */ + mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_slot_mutex); +#endif } psa_global_data_t; static psa_global_data_t global_data; From 846889355c0863e4b16745c535e425b66050f4cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 11:10:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 196/551] Initialize and free the key slot mutex Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 2d24e6deb9..180aecb584 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -147,7 +147,14 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void) { - /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Initialize the global key slot mutex. */ + if (!global_data.key_slots_initialized) { + mbedtls_mutex_init(&global_data.key_slot_mutex); + } +#endif + + /* Program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. */ global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; @@ -164,6 +171,14 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Free the global key slot mutex. */ + if (global_data.key_slots_initialized) { + mbedtls_mutex_free(&global_data.key_slot_mutex); + } +#endif + global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index 0b0d7b320e..01778f899e 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -85,6 +85,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); /** Initialize the key slot structures. + * If multi-threading is enabled then initialize the key slot mutex. + * This function is not thread-safe, + * if called by competing threads the key slot mutex may be initialized + * more than once. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Currently this function always succeeds. @@ -92,6 +96,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void); /** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * If multi-threading is enabled then free the key slot mutex. + * This function is not thread-safe, + * if called by competing threads the key slot mutex may be freed + * more than once. * * This does not affect persistent storage. */ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); From 0e3b677cf4600bec736020715f85909f4534c5dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 11:11:39 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 197/551] Support PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE To be returned in the case where mbedtls_mutex_lock and mbedtls_mutex_unlock fail. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- include/psa/crypto_values.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h index 8d30bf0fb9..90d98fdb79 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -279,6 +279,11 @@ * to read from a resource. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA ((psa_status_t)-143) +/** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly. + * For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or + * a mutex operation failed. */ +#define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-144) + /** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`. */ #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE ((psa_status_t)-136) From fb02d57de790dc4cc27b5f9a43c4433c13a5ed60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 11:13:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 198/551] Document the thread safety of the primitive key slot functions Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 4 ++++ library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 10 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 1edd63e256..7b167248e8 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -117,6 +117,8 @@ typedef struct { 0) /** Test whether a key slot has any registered readers. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * * \param[in] slot The key slot to test. * @@ -195,6 +197,8 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( * * Persistent storage is not affected. * Sets the slot's state to PSA_SLOT_EMPTY. + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * * \param[in,out] slot The key slot to wipe. * diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index 01778f899e..fc46257f21 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -134,6 +134,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, * new state. If the state of the slot was not expected_state, the state is * unchanged. * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. + * * \param[in] slot The key slot. * \param[in] expected_state The current state of the slot. * \param[in] new_state The new state of the slot. @@ -157,7 +160,8 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( /** Register as a reader of a key slot. * * This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one. - * + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * \param[in] slot The key slot. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS @@ -182,7 +186,9 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one. * If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, * and there is only one registered reader (the caller), - * this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot(). + * this function will call psa_wipe_slot(). + * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the + * global key slot mutex. * * \note To ease the handling of errors in retrieving a key slot * a NULL input pointer is valid, and the function returns From d929106f361297a9a495545307f0e6183aa88b12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 09:48:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 199/551] ssl_ciphersuites: move internal functions declarations to a private header Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h | 139 ------------------------- library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/ssl_misc.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 139 deletions(-) create mode 100644 library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h index 8cecbb6254..f755ef3042 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h @@ -463,18 +463,6 @@ const int *mbedtls_ssl_list_ciphersuites(void); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_string(const char *ciphersuite_name); const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(int ciphersuite_id); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -#endif -mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -#endif - -int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); - static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_name(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) { return info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(name); @@ -482,133 +470,6 @@ static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_name(const mbedtls_ssl_cip size_t mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_get_cipher_key_bitlen(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} - -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) -static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( - const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) -{ - switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: - case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: - return 1; - - default: - return 0; - } -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif diff --git a/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h b/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..27ff72106e --- /dev/null +++ b/library/ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +/** + * \file ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "ssl_ciphersuites.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_C) +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +psa_algorithm_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +psa_key_usage_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_psa_usage(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +mbedtls_pk_type_t mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_alg(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C */ + +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); +int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_has_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_no_pfs(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_NON_PFS_ENABLED */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_ENABLED */ + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_srv_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_dhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_DHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ecdhe(const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDHE_ENABLED) */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED) +static inline int mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( + const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *info) +{ + switch (info->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_exchange)) { + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA: + case MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA: + return 1; + + default: + return 0; + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CIPHERSUITES_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 96afe7628d..7cbc6af60c 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ #endif #include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h" #include "pk_internal.h" #include "common.h" From a184fd0516b5a059d9e9a0ab3912345385ff9b72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 10:05:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 200/551] programs/dh_client/server: Replaced mbedtls_sha1 with mbedtls_sha256 Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/dh_client.c | 16 ++++++++-------- programs/pkey/dh_server.c | 15 +++++++-------- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c index 0cb1562680..d8fc86fa0b 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c @@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" @@ -30,18 +29,19 @@ #define SERVER_NAME "localhost" #define SERVER_PORT "11999" +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE 32 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) + int main(void) { mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_DHM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " "and/or MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " "MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C not defined.\n"); + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); mbedtls_exit(0); } @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ int main(void) unsigned char *p, *end; unsigned char buf[2048]; - unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE]; const char *pers = "dh_client"; mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; @@ -187,13 +187,13 @@ int main(void) goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1(buf, (int) (p - 2 - buf), hash)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256(buf, (int) (p - 2 - buf), hash, 0)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1 returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - 32, hash, p)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE, hash, p)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c index adddbf2fb9..11c2b28c69 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -14,8 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) + defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" @@ -30,18 +29,18 @@ #define SERVER_PORT "11999" #define PLAINTEXT "==Hello there!==" +#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE 32 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) + !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) int main(void) { mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_DHM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " "and/or MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " "MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C not defined.\n"); + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); mbedtls_exit(0); } #else @@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ int main(void) mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; unsigned char buf[2048]; - unsigned char hash[32]; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char buf2[2]; const char *pers = "dh_server"; @@ -186,7 +185,7 @@ int main(void) /* * 5. Sign the parameters and send them */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_sha1(buf, n, hash)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256(buf, n, hash, 0)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1 returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } @@ -195,7 +194,7 @@ int main(void) buf[n + 1] = (unsigned char) (rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len)); if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - 32, hash, buf + n + 2)) != 0) { + MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE, hash, buf + n + 2)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } From f4dfd1c8a5282ea0a9d0641d2fd6dd0649a5c92f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 16:06:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 201/551] programs/dh_client/server: Added entropy source to `mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign()` Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/dh_server.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c index 11c2b28c69..7d7618be18 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -193,8 +193,9 @@ int main(void) buf[n] = (unsigned char) (rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len) >> 8); buf[n + 1] = (unsigned char) (rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len)); - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, NULL, NULL, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE, hash, buf + n + 2)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE, + hash, buf + n + 2)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } From b6a96195fb188d9e0e0bc4b4e2c70a78db116d03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 14:34:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 202/551] programs_dh_client/server: Updated programs to use `mbedtls_rsa_get_len()` Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/dh_client.c | 16 +++++++++------- programs/pkey/dh_server.c | 7 ++++--- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c index d8fc86fa0b..774051c5d6 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ int main(void) unsigned char *p, *end; unsigned char buf[2048]; unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE]; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; const char *pers = "dh_client"; mbedtls_entropy_context entropy; @@ -78,6 +79,8 @@ int main(void) mbedtls_dhm_init(&dhm); mbedtls_aes_init(&aes); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); /* * 1. Setup the RNG @@ -106,16 +109,13 @@ int main(void) } mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); - - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N), 16, f)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(E), 16, f)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&N, 16, f)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&E, 16, f)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E) != 0)) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", ret); fclose(f); goto exit; } - - rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len) = (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N)) + 7) >> 3; - fclose(f); /* @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ int main(void) p += 2; - if ((n = (size_t) (end - p)) != rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len)) { + if ((n = (size_t) (end - p)) != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&rsa)) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! Invalid RSA signature size\n\n"); goto exit; } @@ -273,6 +273,8 @@ exit: mbedtls_dhm_free(&dhm); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_free(&ctr_drbg); mbedtls_entropy_free(&entropy); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_exit(exit_code); } diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c index 7d7618be18..0c6cebc103 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -190,8 +190,9 @@ int main(void) goto exit; } - buf[n] = (unsigned char) (rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len) >> 8); - buf[n + 1] = (unsigned char) (rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len)); + const size_t rsa_key_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&rsa); + buf[n] = (unsigned char) (rsa_key_len >> 8); + buf[n + 1] = (unsigned char) (rsa_key_len); if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE, @@ -200,7 +201,7 @@ int main(void) goto exit; } - buflen = n + 2 + rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); + buflen = n + 2 + rsa_key_len; buf2[0] = (unsigned char) (buflen >> 8); buf2[1] = (unsigned char) (buflen); From ee757d35dfaf370792408b7232d31783e9f94653 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 15:06:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 203/551] programs_rsa_encrypt/decrypt: Updated programs to use `mbedtls_rsa_get_len()` Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c | 2 +- programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c b/programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c index 76bfddf5c0..a84af50d78 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c +++ b/programs/pkey/rsa_decrypt.c @@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) fclose(f); - if (i != rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len)) { + if (i != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&rsa)) { mbedtls_printf("\n ! Invalid RSA signature format\n\n"); goto exit; } diff --git a/programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c b/programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c index 4bbb54e7db..6538f8a999 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c +++ b/programs/pkey/rsa_encrypt.c @@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) goto exit; } - for (i = 0; i < rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&rsa); i++) { mbedtls_fprintf(f, "%02X%s", buf[i], (i + 1) % 16 == 0 ? "\r\n" : " "); } From 992f0b8427d88dd3dd6e232406cc8271c3b32407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 15:07:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 204/551] programs_rsa_rsa_sign: Updated program to use `mbedtls_rsa_get_len()` Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c b/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c index 9d8ebe39a5..e14953bc3f 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c +++ b/programs/pkey/rsa_sign.c @@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) goto exit; } - for (i = 0; i < rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len); i++) { + for (i = 0; i < mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&rsa); i++) { mbedtls_fprintf(f, "%02X%s", buf[i], (i + 1) % 16 == 0 ? "\r\n" : " "); } From 6e92df12c272a6a8ba328e1de1f5290442345989 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 15:13:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 205/551] programs_rsa_rsa_verify: Updated program to use `mbedtls_rsa_get_len()` Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c | 15 +++++++++------ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c b/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c index e7d72fd52b..4a9af77faa 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c +++ b/programs/pkey/rsa_verify.c @@ -37,11 +37,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; size_t i; mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; + mbedtls_mpi N, E; unsigned char hash[32]; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; char filename[512]; mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); if (argc != 2) { mbedtls_printf("usage: rsa_verify \n"); @@ -62,15 +65,13 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) goto exit; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N), 16, f)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(E), 16, f)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&N, 16, f)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&E, 16, f)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(&rsa, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E) != 0)) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_mpi_read_file returned %d\n\n", ret); fclose(f); goto exit; } - - rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len) = (mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(N)) + 7) >> 3; - fclose(f); /* @@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) fclose(f); - if (i != rsa.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(len)) { + if (i != mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&rsa)) { mbedtls_printf("\n ! Invalid RSA signature format\n\n"); goto exit; } @@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) exit: mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_exit(exit_code); } From 7c8448842dd461e69290c794e70662ab2e25c5f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 17:03:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 206/551] programs_dh_client/server: Updated to query digest size using `mbedtls_md_info_from_type()`. Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/dh_client.c | 13 +++++++++---- programs/pkey/dh_server.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c index 774051c5d6..1b5ba407e9 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ #define SERVER_NAME "localhost" #define SERVER_PORT "11999" -#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE 32 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ @@ -60,12 +59,12 @@ int main(void) int ret = 1; int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; - size_t n, buflen; + size_t n, buflen, mdlen; mbedtls_net_context server_fd; unsigned char *p, *end; unsigned char buf[2048]; - unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; mbedtls_mpi N, E; const char *pers = "dh_client"; @@ -187,13 +186,19 @@ int main(void) goto exit; } + mdlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256)); + if (mdlen == 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! Invalid digest type\n\n"); + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256(buf, (int) (p - 2 - buf), hash, 0)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1 returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&rsa, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, - MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE, hash, p)) != 0) { + mdlen, hash, p)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c index 0c6cebc103..11c28fb516 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ #define SERVER_PORT "11999" #define PLAINTEXT "==Hello there!==" -#define MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE 32 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ @@ -52,11 +51,11 @@ int main(void) int ret = 1; int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; - size_t n, buflen; + size_t n, buflen, mdlen; mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; unsigned char buf[2048]; - unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char buf2[2]; const char *pers = "dh_server"; @@ -185,6 +184,13 @@ int main(void) /* * 5. Sign the parameters and send them */ + + mdlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256)); + if (mdlen == 0) { + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! Invalid digest type\n\n"); + goto exit; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256(buf, n, hash, 0)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1 returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; @@ -195,7 +201,7 @@ int main(void) buf[n + 1] = (unsigned char) (rsa_key_len); if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(&rsa, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, - MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256_MAX_SIZE, + MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, mdlen, hash, buf + n + 2)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; From b4f5076270c4636934aa1114d08ba19eca9b673d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 10:24:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 207/551] debug: move internal functions declarations to an internal header file Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/debug.h | 159 +---------------------- library/debug.c | 2 +- library/debug_internal.h | 172 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/ssl_client.c | 2 +- library/ssl_msg.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls12_client.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls12_server.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_keys.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function | 2 +- 13 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 169 deletions(-) create mode 100644 library/debug_internal.h diff --git a/include/mbedtls/debug.h b/include/mbedtls/debug.h index 922e5bec52..424ed4b3fd 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/debug.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/debug.h @@ -149,165 +149,8 @@ extern "C" { */ void mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(int threshold); -/** - * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used - * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl - * context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the message has occurred in - * \param line line number the message has occurred at - * \param format format specifier, in printf format - * \param ... variables used by the format specifier - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); - -/** - * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This - * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text the name of the function that returned the error - * \param ret the return code value - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, int ret); - -/** - * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function - * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the - * variable or buffer name - * \param buf the buffer to be outputted - * \param len length of the buffer - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, const char *text, - const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) -/** - * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always - * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the - * ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the - * variable name - * \param X the MPI variable - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) -/** - * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always - * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the - * ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the - * variable name - * \param X the ECP point - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X); -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) -/** - * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This - * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, - * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output - * \param crt X.509 certificate structure - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); -#endif - -/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function - only works for the built-in implementation. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) -typedef enum { - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, - MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, -} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; - -/** - * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug - * output. This function is always used through the - * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file - * and line number parameters. - * - * \param ssl SSL context - * \param level error level of the debug message - * \param file file the error has occurred in - * \param line line number the error has occurred in - * \param ecdh the ECDH context - * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output - * - * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the - * library only. - */ -void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, - const char *file, int line, - const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, - mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && - MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ - #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif -#endif /* debug.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_H */ diff --git a/library/debug.c b/library/debug.c index a9d58e55b1..c36ed3c5c2 100644 --- a/library/debug.c +++ b/library/debug.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include diff --git a/library/debug_internal.h b/library/debug_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..4523b4633a --- /dev/null +++ b/library/debug_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/** + * \file debug_internal.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "debug.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H + +#include "mbedtls/debug.h" + +/** + * \brief Print a message to the debug output. This function is always used + * through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG() macro, which supplies the ssl + * context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the message has occurred in + * \param line line number the message has occurred at + * \param format format specifier, in printf format + * \param ... variables used by the format specifier + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_msg(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *format, ...) MBEDTLS_PRINTF_ATTRIBUTE(5, 6); + +/** + * \brief Print the return value of a function to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text the name of the function that returned the error + * \param ret the return code value + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ret(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, int ret); + +/** + * \brief Output a buffer of size len bytes to the debug output. This function + * is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the buffer being dumped. Normally the + * variable or buffer name + * \param buf the buffer to be outputted + * \param len length of the buffer + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_buf(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, const char *text, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) +/** + * \brief Print a MPI variable to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the MPI being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the MPI variable + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_mpi(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_mpi *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) +/** + * \brief Print an ECP point to the debug output. This function is always + * used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP() macro, which supplies the + * ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the ECP point being output. Normally the + * variable name + * \param X the ECP point + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_ecp(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_ecp_point *X); +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +/** + * \brief Print a X.509 certificate structure to the debug output. This + * function is always used through the MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT() macro, + * which supplies the ssl context, file and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param text a name or label for the certificate being output + * \param crt X.509 certificate structure + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_print_crt(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const char *text, const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt); +#endif + +/* Note: the MBEDTLS_ECDH_C guard here is mandatory because this debug function + only works for the built-in implementation. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) +typedef enum { + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP, + MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z, +} mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr; + +/** + * \brief Print a field of the ECDH structure in the SSL context to the debug + * output. This function is always used through the + * MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH() macro, which supplies the ssl context, file + * and line number parameters. + * + * \param ssl SSL context + * \param level error level of the debug message + * \param file file the error has occurred in + * \param line line number the error has occurred in + * \param ecdh the ECDH context + * \param attr the identifier of the attribute being output + * + * \attention This function is intended for INTERNAL usage within the + * library only. + */ +void mbedtls_debug_printf_ecdh(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int level, + const char *file, int line, + const mbedtls_ecdh_context *ecdh, + mbedtls_debug_ecdh_attr attr); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED && + MBEDTLS_ECDH_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/ssl_client.c b/library/ssl_client.c index d585ca5246..6d988a837c 100644 --- a/library/ssl_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_client.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 6579c9686d..5753cf9f04 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/version.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 8c1e37251b..bd1380aa72 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ #include "ssl_debug_helpers.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/version.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c index 0c5af87f42..c3a8037064 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "ssl_client.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c index 5a9f6ca4e5..f242faa1e5 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls12_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls12_server.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" #include "ssl_misc.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index 5c668bdf29..86dd0ec597 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ #include -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index 47fa65c188..202631fe6b 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ #include #include "mbedtls/error.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c index 9b775ec954..d79e70c0eb 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_keys.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #include #include "mbedtls/hkdf.h" -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 6e2866a112..29c9f6c6b1 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/platform.h" #include "mbedtls/constant_time.h" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function index b9610406bb..eeefc95974 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_debug.function @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* BEGIN_HEADER */ -#include "mbedtls/debug.h" +#include "debug_internal.h" #include "string.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" From 25b282ebfe5cb84e73d6194e83dc8d6c5d9a25e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 10:55:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 208/551] x509: move internal functions declarations to a private header Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h | 1 - include/mbedtls/x509.h | 197 +------------------ library/pkcs7.c | 2 +- library/ssl_misc.h | 1 + library/x509.c | 2 +- library/x509_create.c | 2 +- library/x509_crl.c | 1 + library/x509_crt.c | 1 + library/x509_csr.c | 1 + library/x509_internal.h | 213 +++++++++++++++++++++ library/x509write.c | 1 + library/x509write_crt.c | 1 + library/x509write_csr.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function | 1 + tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function | 1 + tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function | 1 + 16 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 200 deletions(-) create mode 100644 library/x509_internal.h diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h b/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h index 70b25a9c60..e9b482208e 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/pkcs7.h @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" /** diff --git a/include/mbedtls/x509.h b/include/mbedtls/x509.h index e2e06679be..be6361285b 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/x509.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/x509.h @@ -307,6 +307,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_x509_san_list { mbedtls_x509_san_list; /** \} name Structures for parsing X.509 certificates, CRLs and CSRs */ +/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ /** * \brief Store the certificate DN in printable form into buf; @@ -321,201 +322,7 @@ mbedtls_x509_san_list; */ int mbedtls_x509_dn_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_name *dn); -/** - * \brief Return the next relative DN in an X509 name. - * - * \note Intended use is to compare function result to dn->next - * in order to detect boundaries of multi-valued RDNs. - * - * \param dn Current node in the X509 name - * - * \return Pointer to the first attribute-value pair of the - * next RDN in sequence, or NULL if end is reached. - */ -static inline mbedtls_x509_name *mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next( - mbedtls_x509_name *dn) -{ - while (dn->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged) && dn->next != NULL) { - dn = dn->next; - } - return dn->next; -} - -/** - * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf; - * no more than size characters will be written. - * - * \param buf Buffer to write to - * \param size Maximum size of buffer - * \param serial The X509 serial to represent - * - * \return The length of the string written (not including the - * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); - -/** - * \brief Compare pair of mbedtls_x509_time. - * - * \param t1 mbedtls_x509_time to compare - * \param t2 mbedtls_x509_time to compare - * - * \return < 0 if t1 is before t2 - * 0 if t1 equals t2 - * > 0 if t1 is after t2 - */ -int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, const mbedtls_x509_time *t2); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) -/** - * \brief Fill mbedtls_x509_time with provided mbedtls_time_t. - * - * \param tt mbedtls_time_t to convert - * \param now mbedtls_x509_time to fill with converted mbedtls_time_t - * - * \return \c 0 on success - * \return A non-zero return value on failure. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ - -/** - * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time - * and tell if it's in the past. - * - * \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR". - * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. - * - * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check - * - * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred, - * 0 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to); - -/** - * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time - * and tell if it's in the future. - * - * \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR". - * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. - * - * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check - * - * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred, - * 0 otherwise. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from); - -/** - * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames - * extension. Please note that this function might allocate - * additional memory for a subject alternative name, thus - * mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name has to be called - * to dispose of this additional memory afterwards. - * - * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject - * alternative name. - * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation - * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf. - * - * \note Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280: - * "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "directoryName", - * "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name" - * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108. - * - * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of - * subject alternative name. For example, after successful - * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the - * \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to - * this function. - * - * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the - * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the - * lifetime of the certificate. - * - * \return \c 0 on success - * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported - * SAN type. - * \return Another negative value for any other failure. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, - mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); -/** - * \brief Unallocate all data related to subject alternative name - * - * \param san SAN structure - extra memory owned by this structure will be freed - */ -void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); - -/** \} addtogroup x509_module */ - -/* - * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you - * know you do. - */ -int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_name *cur); -int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *alg); -int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) -int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, - int *salt_len); -#endif -int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig); -int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, - mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, - void **sig_opts); -int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_time *t); -int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); -int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag); -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) -int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, - const void *sig_opts); -#endif -int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name); int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name); -int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - int critical, const unsigned char *val, - size_t val_len); -int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); -int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); -int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const char *oid, size_t oid_len, - unsigned char *sig, size_t size, - mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg); -int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *ns_cert_type); -int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - unsigned int *key_usage); -int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); -int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); -int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, - const mbedtls_x509_sequence - *subject_alt_name, - const char *prefix); -int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned char ns_cert_type); -int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, - unsigned int key_usage); - -int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, - const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); /** * \brief This function parses a CN string as an IP address. @@ -547,4 +354,4 @@ size_t mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_cn_inet_pton(const char *cn, void *dst); } #endif -#endif /* x509.h */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_H */ diff --git a/library/pkcs7.c b/library/pkcs7.c index 0869c2e077..3aac662ba6 100644 --- a/library/pkcs7.c +++ b/library/pkcs7.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/build_info.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C) #include "mbedtls/pkcs7.h" -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 7cbc6af60c..101b2046e7 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/pk.h" #include "ssl_ciphersuites_internal.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "pk_internal.h" #include "common.h" diff --git a/library/x509.c b/library/x509.c index b7b71f33ca..f97fb44589 100644 --- a/library/x509.c +++ b/library/x509.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" diff --git a/library/x509_create.c b/library/x509_create.c index f7a17e712d..839b5df226 100644 --- a/library/x509_create.c +++ b/library/x509_create.c @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" diff --git a/library/x509_crl.c b/library/x509_crl.c index fdbad238a6..7901992e20 100644 --- a/library/x509_crl.c +++ b/library/x509_crl.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" diff --git a/library/x509_crt.c b/library/x509_crt.c index 4e7672e374..730f6ef992 100644 --- a/library/x509_crt.c +++ b/library/x509_crt.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" diff --git a/library/x509_csr.c b/library/x509_csr.c index 79b1589644..813d64466c 100644 --- a/library/x509_csr.c +++ b/library/x509_csr.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_PARSE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" diff --git a/library/x509_internal.h b/library/x509_internal.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e1be393b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/library/x509_internal.h @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +/** + * \file x509.h + * + * \brief Internal part of the public "x509.h". + */ +/* + * Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors + * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later + */ +#ifndef MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#define MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H +#include "mbedtls/private_access.h" + +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" + +#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" +#include "mbedtls/pk.h" + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#endif + +/** + * \brief Return the next relative DN in an X509 name. + * + * \note Intended use is to compare function result to dn->next + * in order to detect boundaries of multi-valued RDNs. + * + * \param dn Current node in the X509 name + * + * \return Pointer to the first attribute-value pair of the + * next RDN in sequence, or NULL if end is reached. + */ +static inline mbedtls_x509_name *mbedtls_x509_dn_get_next( + mbedtls_x509_name *dn) +{ + while (dn->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_merged) && dn->next != NULL) { + dn = dn->next; + } + return dn->next; +} + +/** + * \brief Store the certificate serial in printable form into buf; + * no more than size characters will be written. + * + * \param buf Buffer to write to + * \param size Maximum size of buffer + * \param serial The X509 serial to represent + * + * \return The length of the string written (not including the + * terminated nul byte), or a negative error code. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_serial_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); + +/** + * \brief Compare pair of mbedtls_x509_time. + * + * \param t1 mbedtls_x509_time to compare + * \param t2 mbedtls_x509_time to compare + * + * \return < 0 if t1 is before t2 + * 0 if t1 equals t2 + * > 0 if t1 is after t2 + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_cmp(const mbedtls_x509_time *t1, const mbedtls_x509_time *t2); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) +/** + * \brief Fill mbedtls_x509_time with provided mbedtls_time_t. + * + * \param tt mbedtls_time_t to convert + * \param now mbedtls_x509_time to fill with converted mbedtls_time_t + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return A non-zero return value on failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_gmtime(mbedtls_time_t tt, mbedtls_x509_time *now); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE */ + +/** + * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time + * and tell if it's in the past. + * + * \note Intended usage is "if( is_past( valid_to ) ) ERROR". + * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. + * + * \param to mbedtls_x509_time to check + * + * \return 1 if the given time is in the past or an error occurred, + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_past(const mbedtls_x509_time *to); + +/** + * \brief Check a given mbedtls_x509_time against the system time + * and tell if it's in the future. + * + * \note Intended usage is "if( is_future( valid_from ) ) ERROR". + * Hence the return value of 1 if on internal errors. + * + * \param from mbedtls_x509_time to check + * + * \return 1 if the given time is in the future or an error occurred, + * 0 otherwise. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_time_is_future(const mbedtls_x509_time *from); + +/** + * \brief This function parses an item in the SubjectAlternativeNames + * extension. Please note that this function might allocate + * additional memory for a subject alternative name, thus + * mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name has to be called + * to dispose of this additional memory afterwards. + * + * \param san_buf The buffer holding the raw data item of the subject + * alternative name. + * \param san The target structure to populate with the parsed presentation + * of the subject alternative name encoded in \p san_buf. + * + * \note Supported GeneralName types, as defined in RFC 5280: + * "rfc822Name", "dnsName", "directoryName", + * "uniformResourceIdentifier" and "hardware_module_name" + * of type "otherName", as defined in RFC 4108. + * + * \note This function should be called on a single raw data of + * subject alternative name. For example, after successful + * certificate parsing, one must iterate on every item in the + * \c crt->subject_alt_names sequence, and pass it to + * this function. + * + * \warning The target structure contains pointers to the raw data of the + * parsed certificate, and its lifetime is restricted by the + * lifetime of the certificate. + * + * \return \c 0 on success + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE for an unsupported + * SAN type. + * \return Another negative value for any other failure. + */ +int mbedtls_x509_parse_subject_alt_name(const mbedtls_x509_buf *san_buf, + mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); +/** + * \brief Unallocate all data related to subject alternative name + * + * \param san SAN structure - extra memory owned by this structure will be freed + */ +void mbedtls_x509_free_subject_alt_name(mbedtls_x509_subject_alternative_name *san); + +int mbedtls_x509_get_name(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_name *cur); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg_null(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_alg(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *alg, mbedtls_x509_buf *params); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_RSASSA_PSS_SUPPORT) +int mbedtls_x509_get_rsassa_pss_params(const mbedtls_x509_buf *params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t *mgf_md, + int *salt_len); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, mbedtls_x509_buf *sig); +int mbedtls_x509_get_sig_alg(const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_params, + mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg, mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg, + void **sig_opts); +int mbedtls_x509_get_time(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_time *t); +int mbedtls_x509_get_serial(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *serial); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ext(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_buf *ext, int tag); +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_REMOVE_INFO) +int mbedtls_x509_sig_alg_gets(char *buf, size_t size, const mbedtls_x509_buf *sig_oid, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, + const void *sig_opts); +#endif +int mbedtls_x509_key_size_helper(char *buf, size_t buf_size, const char *name); +int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + int critical, const unsigned char *val, + size_t val_len); +int mbedtls_x509_write_extensions(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_names(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first); +int mbedtls_x509_write_sig(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const char *oid, size_t oid_len, + unsigned char *sig, size_t size, + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg); +int mbedtls_x509_get_ns_cert_type(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned char *ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_get_key_usage(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + unsigned int *key_usage); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_get_subject_alt_name_ext(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_x509_sequence *subject_alt_name); +int mbedtls_x509_info_subject_alt_name(char **buf, size_t *size, + const mbedtls_x509_sequence + *subject_alt_name, + const char *prefix); +int mbedtls_x509_info_cert_type(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned char ns_cert_type); +int mbedtls_x509_info_key_usage(char **buf, size_t *size, + unsigned int key_usage); + +int mbedtls_x509_write_set_san_common(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **extensions, + const mbedtls_x509_san_list *san_list); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/x509write.c b/library/x509write.c index d434df507a..4704900d38 100644 --- a/library/x509write.c +++ b/library/x509write.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" diff --git a/library/x509write_crt.c b/library/x509write_crt.c index 44b6b1781e..2a1a5e2196 100644 --- a/library/x509write_crt.c +++ b/library/x509write_crt.c @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" diff --git a/library/x509write_csr.c b/library/x509write_csr.c index 254da69a9f..0a36202573 100644 --- a/library/x509write_csr.c +++ b/library/x509write_csr.c @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) -#include "mbedtls/x509.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function index 65384a8550..4c8bf233ef 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs7.function @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "sys/types.h" #include "sys/stat.h" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function index c2a2f556d2..66477e0d16 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/base64.h" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function index 503d9764cb..765866bb22 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/bignum.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h" #include "mbedtls/x509_csr.h" +#include "x509_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" From 639d5678b5466bff184b9fc3199fea2202d2dc73 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2024 11:04:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 209/551] pk: move mbedtls_pk_load_file to pk_internal Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/pk.h | 8 -------- library/pk_internal.h | 4 ++++ library/x509_internal.h | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function | 2 +- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h index 27768bd35a..2fdcaefd30 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -1042,14 +1042,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, const mbedtls_pk_context *key); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C */ -/* - * Internal module functions. You probably do not want to use these unless you - * know you do. - */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) -int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n); -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /** * \brief Turn an EC or RSA key into an opaque one. diff --git a/library/pk_internal.h b/library/pk_internal.h index 025ee8b019..9cab6a5bb6 100644 --- a/library/pk_internal.h +++ b/library/pk_internal.h @@ -144,4 +144,8 @@ MBEDTLS_STATIC_TESTABLE int mbedtls_pk_parse_key_pkcs8_encrypted_der( int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) +int mbedtls_pk_load_file(const char *path, unsigned char **buf, size_t *n); +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_INTERNAL_H */ diff --git a/library/x509_internal.h b/library/x509_internal.h index e1be393b40..15e097a15a 100644 --- a/library/x509_internal.h +++ b/library/x509_internal.h @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/x509.h" #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" -#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function index 733909ebc8..c7600903f1 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkwrite.function @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* BEGIN_HEADER */ -#include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "pk_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "psa/crypto_sizes.h" From 558da2ffd3f414ba221d907fb026f716a29b5f09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 12:59:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 210/551] Move key_slot_mutex to threading.h Make this a global mutex so that we don't have to init and free it. Also rename the mutex to follow the convention Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- include/mbedtls/threading.h | 14 +++++++++++++ library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 31 +--------------------------- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 10 +-------- library/threading.c | 9 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/threading.h b/include/mbedtls/threading.h index b504233bdc..b4e050241b 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/threading.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/threading.h @@ -100,6 +100,20 @@ extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex; extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex; #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/* + * A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe. + * + * key_slot_mutex protects the registered_readers and + * state variable for all key slots in &global_data.key_slots. + * + * This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or + * registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions: + * psa_key_slot_state_transition(), psa_register_read(), psa_unregister_read(), + * psa_key_slot_has_readers() and psa_wipe_key_slot(). */ +extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex; +#endif + #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ #ifdef __cplusplus diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 180aecb584..47ace359d7 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -30,20 +30,6 @@ typedef struct { psa_key_slot_t key_slots[MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT]; uint8_t key_slots_initialized; - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - /* - * A mutex used to make the PSA subsystem thread safe. - * - * key_slot_mutex protects key_slots[i].registered_readers and - * key_slots[i].state for all valid i. - * - * This mutex must be held when any read from or write to a state or - * registered_readers field is performed, i.e. when calling functions: - * psa_key_slot_state_transition, psa_register_read, psa_unregister_read, - * psa_key_slot_has_readers and psa_wipe_key_slot. */ - mbedtls_threading_mutex_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_slot_mutex); -#endif } psa_global_data_t; static psa_global_data_t global_data; @@ -147,14 +133,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory( psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - /* Initialize the global key slot mutex. */ - if (!global_data.key_slots_initialized) { - mbedtls_mutex_init(&global_data.key_slot_mutex); - } -#endif - - /* Program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both + /* Nothing to do: program startup and psa_wipe_all_key_slots() both * guarantee that the key slots are initialized to all-zero, which * means that all the key slots are in a valid, empty state. */ global_data.key_slots_initialized = 1; @@ -171,14 +150,6 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - /* Free the global key slot mutex. */ - if (global_data.key_slots_initialized) { - mbedtls_mutex_free(&global_data.key_slot_mutex); - } -#endif - global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index fc46257f21..4c0721d3be 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -85,10 +85,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot); /** Initialize the key slot structures. - * If multi-threading is enabled then initialize the key slot mutex. - * This function is not thread-safe, - * if called by competing threads the key slot mutex may be initialized - * more than once. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS * Currently this function always succeeds. @@ -96,10 +92,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void); /** Delete all data from key slots in memory. - * If multi-threading is enabled then free the key slot mutex. - * This function is not thread-safe, - * if called by competing threads the key slot mutex may be freed - * more than once. * * This does not affect persistent storage. */ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); @@ -186,7 +178,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_register_read(psa_key_slot_t *slot) * This function decrements the key slot registered reader counter by one. * If the state of the slot is PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION, * and there is only one registered reader (the caller), - * this function will call psa_wipe_slot(). + * this function will call psa_wipe_key_slot(). * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the * global key slot mutex. * diff --git a/library/threading.c b/library/threading.c index 873b5077b8..94404acb8c 100644 --- a/library/threading.c +++ b/library/threading.c @@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt(void (*mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *), #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutext_init(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif } /* @@ -161,6 +164,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt(void) #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_mutex_free(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */ @@ -176,5 +182,8 @@ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT; #if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME) mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex MUTEX_INIT; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ From 7aeacc1ec4b832b43c512067323156705e686fe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 13:02:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 211/551] Add empty line in register_read comment Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index 4c0721d3be..002429b933 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static inline psa_status_t psa_key_slot_state_transition( * This function increments the key slot registered reader counter by one. * If multi-threading is enabled, the caller must hold the * global key slot mutex. + * * \param[in] slot The key slot. * * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS From 63952b7de5f1ef0e18b9c7ada084a9a7a64d452b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 13:45:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 212/551] Fix typo Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/threading.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/threading.c b/library/threading.c index 94404acb8c..c28290fb76 100644 --- a/library/threading.c +++ b/library/threading.c @@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt(void (*mutex_init)(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *), mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex); #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) - mbedtls_mutext_init(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_init(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); #endif } From 69b5a860644510e0315b9ec65991d5e111e81f15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 14:02:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 213/551] Improve mbedtls_xor for IAR Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/common.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h index e532777e78..5c73e8a665 100644 --- a/library/common.h +++ b/library/common.h @@ -191,21 +191,30 @@ inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2); vst1q_u8(r + i, x); } + // This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + // where n is a constant multiple of 16. + // It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time + // constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. + if (n % 16 != 0) #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); } + if (n % 8 != 0) #else for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); } + if (n % 4 != 0) #endif #endif - for (; i < n; i++) { - r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + { + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } } } @@ -236,15 +245,23 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); } + // This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + // where n is a constant multiple of 8. + // It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time + // constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. + if (n % 8 != 0) #else for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); } + if (n % 4 != 0) #endif #endif - for (; i < n; i++) { - r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + { + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; + } } } From 7d8c99abb08a9e0716cd9bb9747cffce1a7d235a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 14:02:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 214/551] Move MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC defn into alignment.h Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 8 ++++++++ library/common.h | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index 9e1e044ec6..219f4f0af5 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -15,6 +15,14 @@ #include #include +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ + && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) +/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */ +#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC +#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \ + (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__) +#endif + /* * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for architectures where unaligned memory * accesses are known to be efficient. diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h index 5c73e8a665..faefd64ea8 100644 --- a/library/common.h +++ b/library/common.h @@ -27,15 +27,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_HAVE_NEON_INTRINSICS #endif - -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ - && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) -/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */ -#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC -#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \ - (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__) -#endif - /** Helper to define a function as static except when building invasive tests. * * If a function is only used inside its own source file and should be From db8915287e183e642254565f9058ace93aabcf8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 13:32:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 215/551] programs_dh_client/server: Changed mdlen type to unsigned integer. Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/dh_client.c | 5 +++-- programs/pkey/dh_server.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c index 1b5ba407e9..e8469141aa 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c @@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ int main(void) int ret = 1; int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; - size_t n, buflen, mdlen; + unsigned int mdlen; + size_t n, buflen; mbedtls_net_context server_fd; unsigned char *p, *end; @@ -186,7 +187,7 @@ int main(void) goto exit; } - mdlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256)); + mdlen = (unsigned int) mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256)); if (mdlen == 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! Invalid digest type\n\n"); goto exit; diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c index 11c28fb516..c08b0dc396 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -51,7 +51,8 @@ int main(void) int ret = 1; int exit_code = MBEDTLS_EXIT_FAILURE; - size_t n, buflen, mdlen; + unsigned int mdlen; + size_t n, buflen; mbedtls_net_context listen_fd, client_fd; unsigned char buf[2048]; @@ -185,7 +186,7 @@ int main(void) * 5. Sign the parameters and send them */ - mdlen = mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256)); + mdlen = (unsigned int) mbedtls_md_get_size(mbedtls_md_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256)); if (mdlen == 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! Invalid digest type\n\n"); goto exit; From 42151380aff54e6f76ee428a2bc57ec825bd3a6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 13:36:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 216/551] programs_dh_client/server: Updated config guards. Adjusted to use `MBEDTLS_SHA256_C` instead of `MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256` since the former is being used in accelerated driver configurations. Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/dh_client.c | 11 +++++------ programs/pkey/dh_server.c | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c index e8469141aa..165cee2406 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_client.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_client.c @@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" @@ -32,15 +32,14 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) - int main(void) { mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_DHM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " "and/or MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " "MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C not defined.\n"); mbedtls_exit(0); } @@ -194,7 +193,7 @@ int main(void) } if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256(buf, (int) (p - 2 - buf), hash, 0)) != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1 returned %d\n\n", ret); + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha256 returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c index c08b0dc396..91bac0ef43 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -13,13 +13,13 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) #include "mbedtls/net_sockets.h" #include "mbedtls/aes.h" #include "mbedtls/dhm.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" -#include "mbedtls/sha1.h" +#include "mbedtls/sha256.h" #include "mbedtls/entropy.h" #include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h" @@ -32,14 +32,14 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) int main(void) { mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_AES_C and/or MBEDTLS_DHM_C and/or MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C " "and/or MBEDTLS_NET_C and/or MBEDTLS_RSA_C and/or " "MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " - "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C not defined.\n"); + "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C and/or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C not defined.\n"); mbedtls_exit(0); } #else @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int main(void) } if ((ret = mbedtls_sha256(buf, n, hash, 0)) != 0) { - mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha1 returned %d\n\n", ret); + mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_sha256 returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; } From c581264977e2b0309697fddc4a345ba1c4d02544 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 14:04:28 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 217/551] Fix unaligned access on old compilers Add an alternative implementation of unaligned access that is efficient for IAR and old versions of gcc. Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index 219f4f0af5..e7318c2ac3 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -45,6 +45,46 @@ #define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS #endif +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) && \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM32) \ + || defined(__ICCRX__) || defined(__ICCRL78__) || defined(__ICCRISCV__)) +#pragma language=save +#pragma language=extended +#define MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA +/* IAR recommend this technique for accessing unaligned data in + * https://www.iar.com/knowledge/support/technical-notes/compiler/accessing-unaligned-data + * This results in a single load / store instruction (if unaligned access is supported). + * According to that document, this is only supported on certain architectures. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED +typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; +#elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \ + ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 90300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))) +/* + * Old versions of gcc, depending on how the target is specified, may generate a branch to memcpy + * for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than generating some LDR or LDRB instructions + * (similar for stores). + * Recent versions where unaligned access is not enabled also do this. + * + * For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate + * some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size. + * + * The manual states: + * "The aligned attribute specifies a minimum alignment for the variable or structure field, + * measured in bytes." + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Variable-Attributes.html + * + * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 9.3.0 + * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. + */ + #define UINT_UNALIGNED +typedef uint16_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef uint32_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef uint64_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; + #endif + /** * Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not * be aligned. @@ -55,7 +95,12 @@ inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) { uint16_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p16; +#else memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif return r; } @@ -68,7 +113,12 @@ inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) */ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) { +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + *p16 = x; +#else memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif } /** @@ -81,7 +131,12 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) { uint32_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p32; +#else memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif return r; } @@ -94,7 +149,12 @@ inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) */ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) { +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + *p32 = x; +#else memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif } /** @@ -107,7 +167,12 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) { uint64_t r; +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = *p64; +#else memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); +#endif return r; } @@ -120,9 +185,18 @@ inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) */ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) { +#if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + *p64 = x; +#else memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); +#endif } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_POP_IAR_LANGUAGE_PRAGMA) +#pragma language=restore +#endif + /** Byte Reading Macros * * Given a multi-byte integer \p x, MBEDTLS_BYTE_n retrieves the n-th From 55b5dd2cfc3c751368ddf262d7fb1b8ba7540bdc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 14:06:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 218/551] Make unaligned accessors always inline Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ library/platform_util.c | 12 ----------- 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index e7318c2ac3..b61301922e 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -85,6 +85,12 @@ typedef uint32_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; typedef uint64_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; #endif +/* + * We try to force mbedtls_(get|put)_unaligned_uintXX to be always inline, because this results + * in code that is both smaller and faster. IAR and gcc both benefit from this when optimising + * for size. + */ + /** * Read the unsigned 16 bits integer from the given address, which need not * be aligned. @@ -92,7 +98,12 @@ typedef uint64_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data * \return Data at the given address */ -inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) { uint16_t r; #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) @@ -111,7 +122,12 @@ inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) * \param p pointer to 2 bytes of data * \param x data to write */ -inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) { #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; @@ -128,7 +144,12 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data * \return Data at the given address */ -inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) { uint32_t r; #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) @@ -147,7 +168,12 @@ inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) * \param p pointer to 4 bytes of data * \param x data to write */ -inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) { #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; @@ -164,7 +190,12 @@ inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data * \return Data at the given address */ -inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) { uint64_t r; #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) @@ -183,7 +214,12 @@ inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) * \param p pointer to 8 bytes of data * \param x data to write */ -inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif +static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) { #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c index 63643d26fc..e79fc5c8e9 100644 --- a/library/platform_util.c +++ b/library/platform_util.c @@ -226,18 +226,6 @@ extern inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *b, size_t n); -extern inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p); - -extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x); - -extern inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p); - -extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x); - -extern inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p); - -extern inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) #include From 18d90d75195fb56834360c42a4f06318afa3cccc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 14:08:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 219/551] Make mbedtls_xor always inline Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/common.h | 18 +++++++++++++++++- library/platform_util.c | 9 --------- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h index faefd64ea8..760dff49e7 100644 --- a/library/common.h +++ b/library/common.h @@ -158,6 +158,12 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; } +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd. */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif /** * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n @@ -169,7 +175,10 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) * \param n Number of bytes to process. */ -inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned char *b, size_t n) +static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, + const unsigned char *a, + const unsigned char *b, + size_t n) { size_t i = 0; #if defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) @@ -209,6 +218,13 @@ inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, const unsigned } } +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get + * inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */ +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) +#pragma inline = forced +#elif defined(__GNUC__) +__attribute__((always_inline)) +#endif /** * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c index e79fc5c8e9..9f5dcb8748 100644 --- a/library/platform_util.c +++ b/library/platform_util.c @@ -217,15 +217,6 @@ struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r(const mbedtls_time_t *tt, void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *, int, const char *); #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ -/* - * Provide external definitions of some inline functions so that the compiler - * has the option to not inline them - */ -extern inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, - const unsigned char *a, - const unsigned char *b, - size_t n); - #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MS_TIME_ALT) #include From 2143a4ad1fc79e3e601e078f86aafcb6fbabcc71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 14:08:17 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 220/551] Improve mbedtls_xor docs Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/common.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h index 760dff49e7..3b1c7e1e7a 100644 --- a/library/common.h +++ b/library/common.h @@ -174,6 +174,14 @@ __attribute__((always_inline)) * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) * \param n Number of bytes to process. + * + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, @@ -238,6 +246,14 @@ __attribute__((always_inline)) * \param a Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) * \param n Number of bytes to process. + * + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd (these are functionally equivalent). + * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in + * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor may be faster. + * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, const unsigned char *a, From 85ea3e623b0f9f9d84928cc3b191f345dfdf0e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 15:57:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 221/551] Set preferences before finding Threads in CMake Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/random/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/test/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/util/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ tests/CMakeLists.txt | 2 ++ 13 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt index 457a0fc26f..81741020f5 100644 --- a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(executables diff --git a/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt index c047dd69e8..b497e8a48d 100644 --- a/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(executables diff --git a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt index a0eba0fd0f..97b8fd2ebc 100644 --- a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(libs diff --git a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt index 3d6989cca5..504a4052f0 100644 --- a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(executables diff --git a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt index e2fb404029..2f55c61224 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(executables_mbedtls diff --git a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt index d86f29e2c2..dd1b1a2a8c 100644 --- a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(executables diff --git a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt index a4c99f5613..c1184d1186 100644 --- a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(executables diff --git a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt index 8ffa854647..8047b9f157 100644 --- a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ set(THREADS_USE_PTHREADS_WIN32 true) +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(libs diff --git a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt index a7260452fc..3709276f54 100644 --- a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(libs diff --git a/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt index dd23d6165f..2f8ab2a3af 100644 --- a/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.5.1) +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) # Test the target renaming support by adding a prefix to the targets built diff --git a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt index 920f69e880..6a8659e9b4 100644 --- a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(libs diff --git a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt index c507de2a74..e41b4069ef 100644 --- a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(libs diff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt index 68bc57f5a5..cb54ea4086 100644 --- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(libs From 7470557855e5eecb74064a7e1773995e03bd622a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 14:29:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 222/551] Add changelog entry Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- ChangeLog.d/iar-gcc-perf.txt | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/iar-gcc-perf.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/iar-gcc-perf.txt b/ChangeLog.d/iar-gcc-perf.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fb0fbb10d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/iar-gcc-perf.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Features + * Improve performance for gcc (versions older than 9.3.0) and IAR. From 00b4eeb0b3b8569ee371dd91a0a6fac6ebc0ee34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 16:06:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 223/551] Improve comments Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/common.h | 38 +++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h index 3b1c7e1e7a..2eb9170374 100644 --- a/library/common.h +++ b/library/common.h @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static inline const unsigned char *mbedtls_buffer_offset_const( return p == NULL ? NULL : p + n; } -/* Always inline mbedtls_xor for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd. */ +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor() for similar reasons as mbedtls_xor_no_simd(). */ #if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) #pragma inline = forced #elif defined(__GNUC__) @@ -175,12 +175,12 @@ __attribute__((always_inline)) * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) * \param n Number of bytes to process. * - * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor or - * mbedtls_xor_no_simd (these are functionally equivalent). + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar - * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd may be faster. In other cases where - * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor may be faster. + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, @@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2); vst1q_u8(r + i, x); } - // This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case - // where n is a constant multiple of 16. - // It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time - // constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 16. + * It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time + * constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. */ if (n % 16 != 0) #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, } } -/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get +/* Always inline mbedtls_xor_no_simd() as we see significant perf regressions when it does not get * inlined (e.g., observed about 3x perf difference in gcm_mult_largetable with gcc 7 - 12) */ #if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) #pragma inline = forced @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ __attribute__((always_inline)) * Perform a fast block XOR operation, such that * r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i] where 0 <= i < n * - * In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor (e.g., it's about 5% + * In some situations, this can perform better than mbedtls_xor() (e.g., it's about 5% * better in AES-CBC). * * \param r Pointer to result (buffer of at least \p n bytes). \p r @@ -247,12 +247,12 @@ __attribute__((always_inline)) * \param b Pointer to input (buffer of at least \p n bytes) * \param n Number of bytes to process. * - * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor or - * mbedtls_xor_no_simd (these are functionally equivalent). + * \note Depending on the situation, it may be faster to use either mbedtls_xor() or + * mbedtls_xor_no_simd() (these are functionally equivalent). * If the result is used immediately after the xor operation in non-SIMD code (e.g, in * AES-CBC), there may be additional latency to transfer the data from SIMD to scalar - * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd may be faster. In other cases where - * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor may be faster. + * registers, and in this case, mbedtls_xor_no_simd() may be faster. In other cases where + * the result is not used immediately (e.g., in AES-CTR), mbedtls_xor() may be faster. * For targets without SIMD support, they will behave the same. */ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, @@ -268,10 +268,10 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); } - // This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case - // where n is a constant multiple of 8. - // It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time - // constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. + /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case + * where n is a constant multiple of 16. + * It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time + * constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. */ if (n % 8 != 0) #else for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { From 336efeec50cc237a7c1e03a0744d3188a7f805fd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 16:38:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 224/551] Move MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC & MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION into build_info Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- include/mbedtls/build_info.h | 8 ++++++++ library/alignment.h | 8 +------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h index 7a70e2543e..c0b724c835 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h @@ -83,6 +83,14 @@ #endif #endif +#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ + && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) +/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */ +#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC +#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \ + (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__) +#endif + #if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE) #define _CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE 1 #endif diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index b61301922e..26f15261cd 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -15,13 +15,7 @@ #include #include -#if defined(__GNUC__) && !defined(__ARMCC_VERSION) && !defined(__clang__) \ - && !defined(__llvm__) && !defined(__INTEL_COMPILER) -/* Defined if the compiler really is gcc and not clang, etc */ -#define MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC -#define MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION \ - (__GNUC__ * 10000 + __GNUC_MINOR__ * 100 + __GNUC_PATCHLEVEL__) -#endif +#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" /* * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for architectures where unaligned memory From a8f6192f9a382d93b8418be29bfccef1ec9bd6f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 16:41:05 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 225/551] Remove unneeded lines from fuzz/Makefile Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- programs/fuzz/Makefile | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/fuzz/Makefile b/programs/fuzz/Makefile index afe80b7d58..828e5184a6 100644 --- a/programs/fuzz/Makefile +++ b/programs/fuzz/Makefile @@ -1,11 +1,8 @@ MBEDTLS_TEST_PATH:=../../tests -LOCAL_CFLAGS = $(WARNING_CFLAGS) -I../../tests/include -I../../include -D_FILE_OFFSET_BITS=64 MBEDTLS_PATH := ../.. include ../../scripts/common.make -LOCAL_CFLAGS += $(patsubst -I../%,-I../../%,$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES)) - DEP=${MBEDLIBS} ifdef FUZZINGENGINE From ed3ba3cc8e23c0776ca23293a25d747b7183e10e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 16:44:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 226/551] Fix documentation typos. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h index 9b7ced519b..ba965c8775 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h @@ -40,16 +40,16 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_test_thread_t { /** * \brief Set your alternate threading implementation - * function pointers fgr test threads. If used, - * this function must be called once in the main thread + * function pointers for test threads. If used, this + * function must be called once in the main thread * before any other MbedTLS function is called. * * \note These functions are part of the testing API only and * thus not considered part of the public API of * MbedTLS and thus may change without notice. * - * \param thread_create The thread create function implementation - * \param thread_join The thread join function implementation + * \param thread_create The thread create function implementation. + * \param thread_join The thread join function implementation. */ void mbedtls_test_thread_set_alt(int (*thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, From 075f8797ac35925089116959c98366ccd2cb00e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 16:48:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 227/551] Remove include of build_info.h Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index 26f15261cd..248f29bc72 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -15,8 +15,6 @@ #include #include -#include "mbedtls/build_info.h" - /* * Define MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS for architectures where unaligned memory * accesses are known to be efficient. From e2f66620211cc16f54183d5b230c90ada22330ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 20:22:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 228/551] Make test data static now it has accessors Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/helpers.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 1bad819acf..724fb59de6 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ static mbedtls_platform_context platform_ctx; #endif -mbedtls_test_info_t mbedtls_test_info; +static mbedtls_test_info_t mbedtls_test_info; #ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_test_info_mutex; From 3d2db89d5cd878d59be8edaab87e177f11e0ac00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 20:42:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 229/551] Access the test data mutex via accessor Remove the use of extern and instead use an accessor to get the address of the test info mutex (defined only if MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE is defined, to hopefully stop more general usage) Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 16 +++++++++++++++- tests/src/helpers.c | 10 +++++++++- tests/src/threading_helpers.c | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index 73459d992f..f2fb62d935 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" #define MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE #endif @@ -230,8 +231,21 @@ void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step); */ void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void); +#ifdef MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE /** - * \brief Record the current test case as a failure if two integers + * \brief Get the test info data mutex. + * + * \note This is designed only to be used by threading_helpers to avoid a + * deadlock, not for general access to this mutex. + * + * \return The test info data mutex. + */ +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mbedtls_test_get_info_mutex(void); + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ + +/** + * \brief Record the current test case as a failure if two integers * have a different value. * * This function is usually called via the macro diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 724fb59de6..d0c75b08d1 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -288,7 +288,15 @@ void mbedtls_test_increment_case_uses_negative_0(void) #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C */ + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE +mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mbedtls_test_get_info_mutex(void) +{ + return &mbedtls_test_info_mutex; +} + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE */ /*----------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ /* Helper Functions */ diff --git a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c index 0894700a31..165e3508bc 100644 --- a/tests/src/threading_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/threading_helpers.c @@ -117,8 +117,6 @@ static void mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_error(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex, * mbedtls_test_mutex_usage_check() will mark it as failed. */ } -extern mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_test_info_mutex; - static int mbedtls_test_mutex_can_test(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) { /* If we attempt to run tests on this mutex then we are going to run into a @@ -127,7 +125,7 @@ static int mbedtls_test_mutex_can_test(mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex) * reporting that failure, as we already hold the mutex at that point. * 2. Given the 'global' position of the initialization and free of this * mutex, it will be shown as leaked on the first test run. */ - if (mutex == &mbedtls_test_info_mutex) { + if (mutex == mbedtls_test_get_info_mutex()) { return 0; } From 297c6089159e0a8c0195ca18777ce904b83fedcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 08:15:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 230/551] tls13: cli: Fix setting of early data transform Fix setting of early data transform when we do not send dummy CCS for middlebox compatibility. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index a3d33a34f8..76f0f18962 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -1236,10 +1236,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) { -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( - ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO); -#endif MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk")); @@ -1294,6 +1290,15 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( + ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO); +#else + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); + mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( + ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); +#endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ return 0; @@ -3067,19 +3072,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } break; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); if (ret == 0) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); -#endif } break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) From 77abfe67db1ff1bdae3ff1c93e7878e8ee0826f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 11:17:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 231/551] ssl_helpers.c: Add ticket write/parse test functions Add ticket write/parse test functions as defined by mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write/parse_t. They are intended to be used in negative testing involving tickets. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h | 10 ++++++++++ tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h index d03c62414b..1f41966d66 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h @@ -589,6 +589,16 @@ int mbedtls_test_tweak_tls13_certificate_msg_vector_len( int *expected_result, mbedtls_ssl_chk_buf_ptr_args *args); #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +int mbedtls_test_ticket_write( + void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end, + size_t *tlen, uint32_t *ticket_lifetime); + +int mbedtls_test_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + #define ECJPAKE_TEST_PWD "bla" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index 2368a7654f..b13d7e38b9 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -2419,4 +2419,34 @@ int mbedtls_test_tweak_tls13_certificate_msg_vector_len( return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ + +/* Functions for session ticket tests */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +int mbedtls_test_ticket_write( + void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *start, const unsigned char *end, + size_t *tlen, uint32_t *lifetime) +{ + int ret; + ((void) p_ticket); + + if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_save(session, start, end - start, + tlen)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Maximum ticket lifetime as defined in RFC 8446 */ + *lifetime = 7 * 24 * 3600; + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_test_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_session *session, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + ((void) p_ticket); + + return mbedtls_ssl_session_load(session, buf, len); +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ From d903a86e52f21a65b45fa27699aabfe2d9a8cd81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 15:57:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 232/551] tests: tls13: Add session resume with ticket unit test This aims to provide a basis for negative testing around TLS 1.3 ticket, replacing eventually the negative tests done in ssl-opt.sh using the dummy_ticket option. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 3 + tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index de998e3fff..37895f0b71 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3270,3 +3270,6 @@ ssl_ecjpake_set_password:1 Test Elliptic curves' info parsing elliptic_curve_get_properties + +TLS 1.3 resume session with ticket +tls13_resume_session_with_ticket diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 8a03d1b970..9ca2058b48 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3519,3 +3519,96 @@ exit: MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() +{ + int ret = -1; + unsigned char buf[64]; + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep; + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options; + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; + mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; + + /* + * Test set-up + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep)); + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options); + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&saved_session); + + MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + + client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, + mbedtls_test_ticket_write, + mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, + NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket), + &(server_ep.socket), 1024); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Run initial handshake: ephemeral key exchange mode, certificate with + * RSA key, signed with PKCS15, verified with PKCS21. Then, get the ticket + * sent by the server at the end of its handshake sequence. + */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) == 0); + + do { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)); + } while (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + + /* + * Save client session and reset the SSL context of the two endpoints. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(client_ep.ssl)); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl)); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Set saved session on client side and handshake using the ticket + * included in that session. + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP) == 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->resume, 1); + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->new_session_tickets_count, 1); + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->key_exchange_mode, + MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL); + +exit: + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL); + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep, NULL); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session); + MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ From ec3408d70769163b890ac7bc0c628dde8cc9ae7a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 17:50:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 233/551] tests: ssl: Move setting of debug callback Move the setting of the debug callback to the endpoint initialization function. That way, no need to repeat it in various testing scenarios. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index b13d7e38b9..51957463c5 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -841,6 +841,23 @@ int mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init( } #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + if (endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && + options->srv_log_fun != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&(ep->conf), options->srv_log_fun, + options->srv_log_obj); + } +#endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + if (endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT && + options->cli_log_fun != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&(ep->conf), options->cli_log_fun, + options->cli_log_obj); + } +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */ + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_certificate_init(ep, options->pk_alg, options->opaque_alg, options->opaque_alg2, @@ -1977,6 +1994,12 @@ void mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_handshake( mbedtls_test_message_socket_init(&server_context); mbedtls_test_message_socket_init(&client_context); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) + if (options->cli_log_fun || options->srv_log_fun) { + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(4); + } +#endif + /* Client side */ if (options->dtls != 0) { TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client, @@ -2000,14 +2023,6 @@ void mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_handshake( set_ciphersuite(&client.conf, options->cipher, forced_ciphersuite); } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - if (options->cli_log_fun) { - mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(4); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&client.conf, options->cli_log_fun, - options->cli_log_obj); - } -#endif - /* Server side */ if (options->dtls != 0) { TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server, @@ -2072,14 +2087,6 @@ void mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_handshake( } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) - if (options->srv_log_fun) { - mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(4); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&server.conf, options->srv_log_fun, - options->srv_log_obj); - } -#endif - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client.socket), &(server.socket), BUFFSIZE) == 0); From a8dd81b4dee78a4063f33e76702362740298813c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 17:50:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 234/551] tests: tls13: Add early data unit test This aims to provide a basis for negative testing around TLS 1.3 early data. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 3 + tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 157 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 160 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index 37895f0b71..c06c0a746a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3273,3 +3273,6 @@ elliptic_curve_get_properties TLS 1.3 resume session with ticket tls13_resume_session_with_ticket + +TLS 1.3 early data +tls13_early_data diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 9ca2058b48..a8982495d6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -12,6 +12,48 @@ #define SSL_MESSAGE_QUEUE_INIT { NULL, 0, 0, 0 } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) +/* + * The implementation of the function should be based on + * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() eventually. The current version aims at + * removing the dependency on mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() for the + * development and testing of reading early data. + */ +static int write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(ssl); + + TEST_ASSERT(ret > 0); + TEST_ASSERT(len <= (size_t) ret); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output(ssl); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + TEST_EQUAL(ssl->out_left, 0); + + ssl->out_msglen = len; + ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA; + if (len > 0) { + memcpy(ssl->out_msg, buf, len); + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, 1); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = len; + +exit: + return ret; +} +#endif + /* END_HEADER */ /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES @@ -3612,3 +3654,118 @@ exit: MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +void tls13_early_data() +{ + int ret = -1; + unsigned char buf[64]; + const char *early_data = "This is early data."; + size_t early_data_len = strlen(early_data); + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep; + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options; + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; + mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; + mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern server_pattern = { NULL, 0 }; + + /* + * Test set-up + */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep)); + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options); + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&saved_session); + + MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + + client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); + + server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer; + server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern; + server_pattern.pattern = early_data; + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, + mbedtls_test_ticket_write, + mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, + NULL); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); + + ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket), + &(server_ep.socket), 1024); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Run initial handshake: ephemeral key exchange mode, certificate with + * RSA key, signed with PKCS15, verified with PKCS21. Then, get the ticket + * sent by the server at the end of its handshake sequence. + */ + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) == 0); + + do { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)); + } while (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + + /* + * Save client session and reset the SSL context of the two endpoints. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(client_ep.ssl)); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl)); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Set saved session on client side and start handshake using the ticket + * included in that session. + */ + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO) == 0); + + TEST_ASSERT(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status != + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 0); + + ret = write_early_data(&(client_ep.ssl), (unsigned char *) early_data, + early_data_len); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, early_data_len); + + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED) == 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED); + TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1); + +exit: + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL); + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep, NULL); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session); + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(0); + MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ From f8fdbb517457c5a90d9011a68467da7e8bdf7a22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 09:13:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 235/551] tests: tls13: Run early data test only in TLS 1.3 only config Temporary workaround to not run the early data test in Windows-2013 where there is an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf(). Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index a8982495d6..234181d765 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ #define SSL_MESSAGE_QUEUE_INIT { NULL, 0, 0, 0 } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ @@ -3655,7 +3656,7 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ void tls13_early_data() { int ret = -1; From 3c129dd6aa54cd83cbeb8c7bb13f8c75752a00dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: v1gnesh Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 15:59:49 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 236/551] Update entropy_poll.c Signed-off-by: v1gnesh --- library/entropy_poll.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/entropy_poll.c b/library/entropy_poll.c index de2e0387a0..bd21e2d226 100644 --- a/library/entropy_poll.c +++ b/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #if !defined(unix) && !defined(__unix__) && !defined(__unix) && \ !defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(_WIN32) && !defined(__QNXNTO__) && \ - !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) + !defined(__HAIKU__) && !defined(__midipix__) && !defined(__MVS__) #error \ "Platform entropy sources only work on Unix and Windows, see MBEDTLS_NO_PLATFORM_ENTROPY in mbedtls_config.h" #endif From 6425a188dfeeb831c71d47a835006fce8dad08ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio de Angelis Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 11:39:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 237/551] Add a client view of the multipart contexts In case MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is defined and MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is not, a client view of the multipart operation contexts is provided through an handle object that allows mapping to the corresponding service side data structures. Signed-off-by: Antonio de Angelis --- include/psa/crypto_platform.h | 10 ++++++++++ include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_platform.h b/include/psa/crypto_platform.h index 4d03435474..a871ee1246 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_platform.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_platform.h @@ -89,4 +89,14 @@ typedef struct { } mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/** The type of the client handle used in context structures + * + * When a client view of the multipart context structures is required, + * this handle is used to keep a mapping with the service side of the + * context which contains the actual data. + */ +typedef uint32_t mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t; +#endif + #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_PLATFORM_H */ diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h index 3a196182a4..b43215ded5 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ extern "C" { #include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_primitives.h" struct psa_hash_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. @@ -76,6 +79,7 @@ struct psa_hash_operation_s { * any driver (i.e. the driver context is not active, in use). */ unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); psa_driver_hash_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; #define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } @@ -86,6 +90,9 @@ static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void) } struct psa_cipher_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. @@ -100,6 +107,7 @@ struct psa_cipher_operation_s { uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(default_iv_length); psa_driver_cipher_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; #define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } @@ -114,6 +122,9 @@ static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void) #include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_composites.h" struct psa_mac_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. @@ -124,6 +135,7 @@ struct psa_mac_operation_s { uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mac_size); unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_sign) : 1; psa_driver_mac_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; #define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } @@ -134,7 +146,9 @@ static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void) } struct psa_aead_operation_s { - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. @@ -156,6 +170,7 @@ struct psa_aead_operation_s { unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(is_encrypt) : 1; psa_driver_aead_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; #define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } @@ -170,10 +185,14 @@ static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void) #include "psa/crypto_driver_contexts_key_derivation.h" struct psa_key_derivation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg); unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(can_output_key) : 1; size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(capacity); psa_driver_key_derivation_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); +#endif }; /* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ From d0b55edea39b3da311ecb384d7c4d49dd924feb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: v1gnesh Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 17:13:56 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 238/551] Create 8726.txt changelog entry Signed-off-by: v1gnesh --- ChangeLog.d/8726.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/8726.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8726.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8726.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..dc789b4344 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8726.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Features + * Add platform support for z/OS. + From bf4b5ed7a4e02358cb008bb43c20f5f3c309b7c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chien Wong Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 20:43:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 239/551] Add back restriction on AD length of GCM Fixes: bd513bb53d80276431161e5a64a2ae61740c4e68 Signed-off-by: Chien Wong --- library/gcm.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c index c677ca4d70..b31003f835 100644 --- a/library/gcm.c +++ b/library/gcm.c @@ -354,9 +354,12 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, { const unsigned char *p; size_t use_len, offset; + uint64_t new_add_len; - /* IV is limited to 2^64 bits, so 2^61 bytes */ - if ((uint64_t) add_len >> 61 != 0) { + /* AD is limited to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes + * Also check for possible overflow */ + new_add_len = ctx->add_len + add_len; + if (new_add_len < ctx->add_len || new_add_len >> 61 != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } From 858bc65d7485b8af9c49e96d0cf0bf803606a120 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chien Wong Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 20:47:26 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 240/551] Add comment on impossible overflows Signed-off-by: Chien Wong --- library/gcm.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c index b31003f835..337145b718 100644 --- a/library/gcm.c +++ b/library/gcm.c @@ -542,6 +542,9 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_finish(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, (void) output_size; *output_length = 0; + /* Total length is restricted to 2^39 - 256 bits, ie 2^36 - 2^5 bytes + * and AD length is restricted to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes so neither of + * the two multiplications would overflow. */ orig_len = ctx->len * 8; orig_add_len = ctx->add_len * 8; From 90d18343ceb1e74c3284bcc0870d6f3d3914503e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio de Angelis Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 13:15:37 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 241/551] Update the initialization macros The initializatio macros need to be updated to support the case where the crypto client view of the structures is being initialized Signed-off-by: Antonio de Angelis --- include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h index b43215ded5..cc7731abc4 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -81,8 +81,11 @@ struct psa_hash_operation_s { psa_driver_hash_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); #endif }; - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_hash_operation_s psa_hash_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_hash_operation_s v = PSA_HASH_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -110,7 +113,11 @@ struct psa_cipher_operation_s { #endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_cipher_operation_s psa_cipher_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_cipher_operation_s v = PSA_CIPHER_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -138,7 +145,11 @@ struct psa_mac_operation_s { #endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_mac_operation_s psa_mac_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_mac_operation_s v = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -173,7 +184,11 @@ struct psa_aead_operation_s { #endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_aead_operation_s psa_aead_operation_init(void) { const struct psa_aead_operation_s v = PSA_AEAD_OPERATION_INIT; @@ -195,8 +210,12 @@ struct psa_key_derivation_s { #endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else /* This only zeroes out the first byte in the union, the rest is unspecified. */ #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_OPERATION_INIT { 0, 0, 0, { 0 } } +#endif static inline struct psa_key_derivation_s psa_key_derivation_operation_init( void) { From 8eb310c7e6663d28154b3de838d81cee6e61daa9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:22:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 242/551] all.sh: add accelerated and reference components for HMAC Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 44930d28b5..63f6129eb2 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -3655,6 +3655,68 @@ component_test_psa_crypto_config_reference_hash_use_psa() { tests/ssl-opt.sh } +# Auxiliary function to build config for hashes with and without drivers +config_psa_crypto_hmac_use_psa () { + driver_only="$1" + # start with config full for maximum coverage (also enables USE_PSA) + helper_libtestdriver1_adjust_config "full" + + # Direct dependencies of MD_C. We disable them also in the reference + # component to work with the same set of features. + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_HKDF_C + # Dependencies of HMAC_DRBG + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC + scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hmac() { + msg "test: full with accelerated hmac" + + loc_accel_list="ALG_HMAC KEY_TYPE_HMAC \ + ALG_MD5 ALG_RIPEMD160 ALG_SHA_1 \ + ALG_SHA_224 ALG_SHA_256 ALG_SHA_384 ALG_SHA_512 \ + ALG_SHA3_224 ALG_SHA3_256 ALG_SHA3_384 ALG_SHA3_512" + + # Configure + # --------- + + config_psa_crypto_hmac_use_psa 1 + + # Disable MD_C in order to disable the builtin support for HMAC. MD_LIGHT + # is still enabled though. + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD_C + + # Build + # ----- + + helper_libtestdriver1_make_drivers "$loc_accel_list" + + helper_libtestdriver1_make_main "$loc_accel_list" + + # Ensure that built-in support for HMAC is disabled. + not grep mbedtls_md_hmac library/md.o + + # Run the tests + # ------------- + + msg "test: full with accelerated hmac" + make test +} + +component_test_psa_crypto_config_reference_hmac() { + msg "test: full without accelerated hmac" + + config_psa_crypto_hmac_use_psa 0 + + make + + msg "test: full without accelerated hmac" + make test +} + component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_des () { msg "test: MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG with accelerated DES" From 20cea94fd405c2d321f2fe305f4f340d35e370e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:23:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 243/551] analyze_outcomes: add task for HMAC coverage Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py index 6503f9a27b..9d441c7d3f 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py +++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py @@ -240,6 +240,41 @@ KNOWN_TASKS = { } } }, + 'analyze_driver_vs_reference_hmac': { + 'test_function': do_analyze_driver_vs_reference, + 'args': { + 'component_ref': 'test_psa_crypto_config_reference_hmac', + 'component_driver': 'test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hmac', + 'ignored_suites': [ + # This suite tests builtins directly, but these are missing + # in the accelerated case. + 'psa_crypto_low_hash.generated', + ], + 'ignored_tests': { + 'test_suite_md': [ + # Builtin HMAC is not supported in the accelerate component. + re.compile('.*HMAC.*'), + # Following tests make use of functions which are not available + # when MD_C is disabled, as it happens in the accelerated + # test component. + re.compile('generic .* Hash file .*'), + 'MD list', + ], + 'test_suite_md.psa': [ + # "legacy only" tests require hash algorithms to be NOT + # accelerated, but this of course false for the accelerated + # test component. + re.compile('PSA dispatch .* legacy only'), + ], + 'test_suite_platform': [ + # Incompatible with sanitizers (e.g. ASan). If the driver + # component uses a sanitizer but the reference component + # doesn't, we have a PASS vs SKIP mismatch. + 'Check mbedtls_calloc overallocation', + ], + } + } + }, 'analyze_driver_vs_reference_cipher_aead_cmac': { 'test_function': do_analyze_driver_vs_reference, 'args': { From e35117640dbf171ca482646c393e03889d6724a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:28:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 244/551] cert_[req/write]: add MD_C dependency Both programs use mbedtls_md_info_from_string() which is only available as long as MBEDTLS_MD_C is enabled. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- programs/x509/cert_req.c | 3 ++- programs/x509/cert_write.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_req.c b/programs/x509/cert_req.c index 6ae43a9d94..dcfd1765c3 100644 --- a/programs/x509/cert_req.c +++ b/programs/x509/cert_req.c @@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) + !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) int main(void) { mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_FS_IO and/or " diff --git a/programs/x509/cert_write.c b/programs/x509/cert_write.c index bf25c4cbdd..0b2575e84a 100644 --- a/programs/x509/cert_write.c +++ b/programs/x509/cert_write.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ !defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_C) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_ERROR_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) + !defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) int main(void) { mbedtls_printf("MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_WRITE_C and/or MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C and/or " From 1626cc767bee7eeee9913a8bea47cfa74f2b9ae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 16:29:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 245/551] test_suite_entropy: relax MD_C dependency to MD_LIGHT Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function index ed9f3ac3cc..5ac65fcf5e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_entropy.function @@ -447,7 +447,7 @@ void entropy_nv_seed_std_io() } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_C:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT:MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED:MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NV_SEED_ALT */ void entropy_nv_seed(data_t *read_seed) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_SHA512_ACCUMULATOR) From 1c7629c1c03fcc74781bc448d5b4d5d6ffd7219c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Winzig Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 15:19:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 246/551] Add tests for Issue #8687 Signed-off-by: Jonathan Winzig --- tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data | 6 ++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data index 0f190286bc..f1d4e34a56 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data @@ -265,3 +265,9 @@ mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10.234.532=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=P Check max serial length x509_set_serial_check: + +Check max extension length (Max-1) +x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFE + +Check max extension length (Max) +x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFF \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function index a7ed26295e..7ec6557271 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function @@ -750,3 +750,24 @@ exit: USE_PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void x509_set_extension_length_check(int val_len) +{ + int ret = 0; + + mbedtls_x509write_csr ctx; + mbedtls_x509write_csr_init(&ctx); + + unsigned char buf[EXT_KEY_USAGE_TMP_BUF_MAX_LENGTH] = { 0 }; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); + + ret = mbedtls_x509_set_extension(&(ctx.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extensions)), + MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, + MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), + 0, + p, + val_len); + TEST_ASSERT(ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED); +} +/* END_CASE */ From 63b5e216f8fcaff0f6b87bb05ffd5631158ac3c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Winzig Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 15:20:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 247/551] Fix Issue #8687 Signed-off-by: Jonathan Winzig --- library/x509_create.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/x509_create.c b/library/x509_create.c index 5e732d67f8..2c17cb10c8 100644 --- a/library/x509_create.c +++ b/library/x509_create.c @@ -380,6 +380,10 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, { mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; + if (0xFFFFFFFF == (uint32_t) val_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + if ((cur = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, oid, oid_len, NULL, val_len + 1)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; From a0c9448beaa6df9d4305c6d85fc659f10eb4ee80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Winzig Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 16:41:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 248/551] Update fix to be more platform-independent Co-authored-by: David Horstmann Signed-off-by: Jonathan Winzig --- library/x509_create.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/x509_create.c b/library/x509_create.c index 2c17cb10c8..751ee08ed4 100644 --- a/library/x509_create.c +++ b/library/x509_create.c @@ -380,7 +380,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, { mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; - if (0xFFFFFFFF == (uint32_t) val_len) { + if (val_len > (SIZE_MAX - 1)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } From 93f5240ae594a5f88907a57264a1a73ee1886189 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Winzig Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 16:47:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 249/551] Add missing newline at the end of test_suite_x509write.data Signed-off-by: Jonathan Winzig --- tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data index f1d4e34a56..6aa0dadb64 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data @@ -270,4 +270,4 @@ Check max extension length (Max-1) x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFE Check max extension length (Max) -x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFF \ No newline at end of file +x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFF From 144bfde1cd10ab6e1647628fe10ead0057395648 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Winzig Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 17:39:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 250/551] Update test-data to use SIZE_MAX Co-authored-by: David Horstmann Signed-off-by: Jonathan Winzig --- tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data index 6aa0dadb64..e41de849b7 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data @@ -270,4 +270,4 @@ Check max extension length (Max-1) x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFE Check max extension length (Max) -x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFF +x509_set_extension_length_check:SIZE_MAX From acd35a55c849ea0de8ffac164801cc75f286a7bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Winzig Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 17:47:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 251/551] Remove unneeded testcase Signed-off-by: Jonathan Winzig --- tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data | 7 ++----- tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data index e41de849b7..f63ae2bea3 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.data @@ -266,8 +266,5 @@ mbedtls_x509_string_to_names:"C=NL, 2.5.4.10.234.532=#0C084F6666737061726B, OU=P Check max serial length x509_set_serial_check: -Check max extension length (Max-1) -x509_set_extension_length_check:0xFFFFFFFE - -Check max extension length (Max) -x509_set_extension_length_check:SIZE_MAX +Check max extension length +x509_set_extension_length_check: diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function index 7ec6557271..11b5f2a024 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function @@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ -void x509_set_extension_length_check(int val_len) +void x509_set_extension_length_check() { int ret = 0; @@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ void x509_set_extension_length_check(int val_len) MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE(MBEDTLS_OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE), 0, p, - val_len); - TEST_ASSERT(ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA || ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED); + SIZE_MAX); + TEST_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret); } /* END_CASE */ From af553bf719be37876abe20fbb057fb44b4a6a6e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jonathan Winzig Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 18:31:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 252/551] Add required dependency to the testcase Co-authored-by: Paul Elliott <62069445+paul-elliott-arm@users.noreply.github.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Winzig --- tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function index 11b5f2a024..c557ee00ee 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509write.function @@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_X509_CSR_WRITE_C */ void x509_set_extension_length_check() { int ret = 0; From 968a92865966b35334655e65547da5f288722769 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 11:16:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 253/551] Add Changelog for #8687 Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension b/ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a679284f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +Security + * Fix a failure to validate input when writing x509 extensions lengths which + could result in an integer overflow, causing a zero-length buffer to be + allocated to hold the extension. The extension would then be copied into + the buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow. + + + From d6b096532c936390d9a085dedb6444cee069a3ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 09:33:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 254/551] Make RSA unblinding constant flow Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- library/rsa.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index db0b0f74f1..32a26500ed 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" #include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -969,6 +970,40 @@ cleanup: return ret; } +/* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ +int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi* T, mbedtls_mpi* Vf, mbedtls_mpi* N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + const size_t nlimbs = N->n; + const size_t tlimbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(nlimbs); + mbedtls_mpi RR, M_T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&M_T); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&M_T, tlimbs)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Vf, nlimbs)); + + // T = T * R mod N + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p); + // T = T * Vf mod N + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&M_T); + + return ret; +} + /* * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, @@ -1160,8 +1195,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * Unblind * T = T * Vf mod N */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vf)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E, From 6bcbc925bfe6f56c2d9871e34126cde37181ee14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 09:46:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 255/551] Extend blinding to RSA result check Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- library/rsa.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 32a26500ed..5b6bf404ab 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -1113,8 +1113,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T)); - /* * Blinding * T = T * Vi mod N @@ -1123,6 +1121,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T)); + /* * Exponent blinding */ @@ -1191,12 +1191,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - /* - * Unblind - * T = T * Vf mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); - /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); @@ -1205,6 +1199,12 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); + olen = ctx->len; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen)); From a865fc951ead31a8f85bbee5d7d11bfa1a28de27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 09:57:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 256/551] Add Changelog for the Marvin attack fix Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f729304eef --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +Security + * Fix a timing side channel in RSA private operations. This side channel + could be sufficient for a local attacker to recover the plaintext. It + requires the attecker to send a large number of messages for decryption. + For details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. + Reported by Hubert Kario, Red Hat. From 100dcddfca3c10179bc55e3c3dd82b4a468c6809 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 12:48:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 257/551] Make local function static Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- library/rsa.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 5b6bf404ab..2dc6dae8d1 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ cleanup: * Unblind * T = T * Vf mod N */ -int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi* T, mbedtls_mpi* Vf, mbedtls_mpi* N) +static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi* T, mbedtls_mpi* Vf, mbedtls_mpi* N) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); From a62a554071a0599bb7522d08c4c605588715e508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 14:20:08 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 258/551] Fix style Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- library/rsa.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 2dc6dae8d1..97e7228da0 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ cleanup: * Unblind * T = T * Vf mod N */ -static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi* T, mbedtls_mpi* Vf, mbedtls_mpi* N) +static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, mbedtls_mpi *N) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); From e6750b2a0bf750d35172bdef12c2dcfc28213207 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2023 10:22:59 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 259/551] RSA: document Montgomery trick in unblind Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- library/rsa.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 97e7228da0..f57909b71b 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -991,9 +991,14 @@ static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, mbedtls_mpi *N) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Vf, nlimbs)); - // T = T * R mod N + /* T = T * Vf mod N + * Reminder: montmul(A, B, N) = A * B * R^-1 mod N + * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand (by calling + * `to_mont_rep()` on them), yielding a result that's also * R mod N (aka + * "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we only multiply one operand by R mod + * N, so the result is directly what we want - no need to call + * `from_mont_rep()` on it. */ mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p); - // T = T * Vf mod N mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p); cleanup: From 47ee7708123347a925aac44709e53a13d1c486e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2023 10:33:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 260/551] RSA: remove unneeded temporaries Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- library/rsa.c | 21 +++------------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index f57909b71b..111af680ff 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -1056,18 +1056,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; - - /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; - mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; #else /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi D_blind; - - /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double @@ -1143,8 +1134,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); - - D = &D_blind; #else /* * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP @@ -1155,8 +1144,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, &ctx->DP)); - DP = &DP_blind; - /* * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ */ @@ -1165,12 +1152,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, &ctx->DQ)); - - DQ = &DQ_blind; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &D_blind, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); #else /* * Faster decryption using the CRT @@ -1179,8 +1164,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, &DP_blind, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, &DQ_blind, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); /* * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P From b4b8f3df3b88fec865d4c2698b94b7f3c08229c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2023 10:44:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 261/551] RSA: improve readability Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- library/rsa.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 111af680ff..0ca0bfead4 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -974,7 +974,7 @@ cleanup: * Unblind * T = T * Vf mod N */ -static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, mbedtls_mpi *N) +static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); @@ -1063,7 +1063,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ - mbedtls_mpi I, C; + mbedtls_mpi input_blinded, check_result_blinded; if (f_rng == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -1098,8 +1098,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ); #endif - mbedtls_mpi_init(&I); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&C); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&input_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&check_result_blinded); /* End of MPI initialization */ @@ -1117,7 +1117,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); /* * Exponent blinding @@ -1182,9 +1182,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E, + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&check_result_blinded, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&C, &I) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&check_result_blinded, &input_blinded) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; goto cleanup; } @@ -1222,8 +1222,8 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ); #endif - mbedtls_mpi_free(&C); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&I); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&check_result_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&input_blinded); if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret); From 16ab76bbe774806079e2d5cab0c4209a4f7b0602 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2023 10:47:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 262/551] Fix typo Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt index f729304eef..017f7b1f80 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Security * Fix a timing side channel in RSA private operations. This side channel could be sufficient for a local attacker to recover the plaintext. It - requires the attecker to send a large number of messages for decryption. + requires the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. Reported by Hubert Kario, Red Hat. From 393df9c99512337b403bbe80a3a3cee30f277fc6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Fri, 29 Dec 2023 11:14:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 263/551] Add warning for PKCS 1.5 decryption Any timing variance dependant on the output of this function enables a Bleichenbacher attack. It is extremely difficult to use safely. In the Marvin attack paper (https://people.redhat.com/~hkario/marvin/marvin-attack-paper.pdf) the author suggests that implementations of PKCS 1.5 decryption that don't include a countermeasure should be considered inherently dangerous. They suggest that all libraries implement the same countermeasure, as implementing different countermeasures across libraries enables the Bleichenbacher attack as well. This is extremely fragile and therefore we don't implement it. The use of PKCS 1.5 in Mbed TLS implements the countermeasures recommended in the TLS standard (7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246) and is not vulnerable. Add a warning to PKCS 1.5 decryption to warn users about this. Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- include/mbedtls/rsa.h | 9 +++++++++ include/psa/crypto_values.h | 7 +++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h index df665240d1..be831f19dc 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -684,6 +684,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * It is the generic wrapper for performing a PKCS#1 decryption * operation. * + * \warning When \p ctx->padding is set to #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, + * mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() is called, which is an + * inherently dangerous function (CWE-242). + * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N (for example, * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used) to be able to hold an @@ -720,6 +724,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * \brief This function performs a PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption * operation (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-DECRYPT). * + * \warning This is an inherently dangerous function (CWE-242). Unless + * it is used in a side channel free and safe way (eg. + * implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of RFC 5246), + * the calling code is vulnerable. + * * \note The output buffer length \c output_max_len should be * as large as the size \p ctx->len of \p ctx->N, for example, * 128 Bytes if RSA-1024 is used, to be able to hold an diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_values.h b/include/psa/crypto_values.h index 5e33f6bd50..a17879b948 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_values.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_values.h @@ -1736,6 +1736,13 @@ 0) /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption. + * + * \warning Calling psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with this algorithm as a + * parameter is considered an inherently dangerous function + * (CWE-242). Unless it is used in a side channel free and safe + * way (eg. implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of + * RFC 5246), the calling code is vulnerable. + * */ #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200) From 0d57f1034e2ebd1b29e1adb8620b1f0b16b6fe80 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Janos Follath Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 14:24:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 264/551] Update Marvin fix Changelog entry Upon further consideration we think that a remote attacker close to the victim might be able to have precise enough timing information to exploit the side channel as well. Update the Changelog to reflect this. Signed-off-by: Janos Follath --- ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt index 017f7b1f80..763533c25c 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ Security - * Fix a timing side channel in RSA private operations. This side channel - could be sufficient for a local attacker to recover the plaintext. It - requires the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. - For details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. - Reported by Hubert Kario, Red Hat. + * Fix a timing side channel in private key RSA operations. This side channel + could be sufficient for an attacker to recover the plaintext. A local + attacker or a remote attacker who is close to the victim on the network + might have precise enough timing measurements to exploit this. It requires + the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For + details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. Reported + by Hubert Kario, Red Hat. From 6ba416968b0c14336141501b90ef9b34ec3a3eff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 15:40:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 265/551] Assemble Changelog Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- ChangeLog | 15 +++++++++++++++ ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt | 8 -------- ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension | 8 -------- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt delete mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 28c45f718f..28f2654b41 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,5 +1,20 @@ Mbed TLS ChangeLog (Sorted per branch, date) += Mbed TLS 3.5.2 branch released 2024-01-26 + +Security + * Fix a timing side channel in private key RSA operations. This side channel + could be sufficient for an attacker to recover the plaintext. A local + attacker or a remote attacker who is close to the victim on the network + might have precise enough timing measurements to exploit this. It requires + the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For + details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. Reported + by Hubert Kario, Red Hat. + * Fix a failure to validate input when writing x509 extensions lengths which + could result in an integer overflow, causing a zero-length buffer to be + allocated to hold the extension. The extension would then be copied into + the buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow. + = Mbed TLS 3.5.1 branch released 2023-11-06 Changes diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt b/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt deleted file mode 100644 index 763533c25c..0000000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/fix-Marvin-attack.txt +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -Security - * Fix a timing side channel in private key RSA operations. This side channel - could be sufficient for an attacker to recover the plaintext. A local - attacker or a remote attacker who is close to the victim on the network - might have precise enough timing measurements to exploit this. It requires - the attacker to send a large number of messages for decryption. For - details, see "Everlasting ROBOT: the Marvin Attack", Hubert Kario. Reported - by Hubert Kario, Red Hat. diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension b/ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension deleted file mode 100644 index 2a679284f8..0000000000 --- a/ChangeLog.d/fix_int_overflow_x509_extension +++ /dev/null @@ -1,8 +0,0 @@ -Security - * Fix a failure to validate input when writing x509 extensions lengths which - could result in an integer overflow, causing a zero-length buffer to be - allocated to hold the extension. The extension would then be copied into - the buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow. - - - From e23d6479cc5925fa6221d3ca010334ad18302f4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 15:45:49 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 266/551] Bump version ./scripts/bump_version.sh --version 3.5.1 Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- CMakeLists.txt | 2 +- doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h | 2 +- doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile | 2 +- include/mbedtls/build_info.h | 8 ++++---- library/CMakeLists.txt | 6 +++--- tests/suites/test_suite_version.data | 4 ++-- 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt index 87a41d75cb..4321db8c55 100644 --- a/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/CMakeLists.txt @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ if(NOT DISABLE_PACKAGE_CONFIG_AND_INSTALL) write_basic_package_version_file( "cmake/MbedTLSConfigVersion.cmake" COMPATIBILITY SameMajorVersion - VERSION 3.5.1) + VERSION 3.5.2) install( FILES "${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/cmake/MbedTLSConfig.cmake" diff --git a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h index c391c59cef..17762d7264 100644 --- a/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h +++ b/doxygen/input/doc_mainpage.h @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ */ /** - * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.1 API Documentation + * @mainpage Mbed TLS v3.5.2 API Documentation * * This documentation describes the internal structure of Mbed TLS. It was * automatically generated from specially formatted comment blocks in diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile index 89048f2217..cbbb7597f3 100644 --- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile +++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.5.1" +PROJECT_NAME = "Mbed TLS v3.5.2" OUTPUT_DIRECTORY = ../apidoc/ FULL_PATH_NAMES = NO OPTIMIZE_OUTPUT_FOR_C = YES diff --git a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h index c4fab1205c..87e3c2ea1e 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/build_info.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/build_info.h @@ -26,16 +26,16 @@ */ #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR 3 #define MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR 5 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 1 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH 2 /** * The single version number has the following structure: * MMNNPP00 * Major version | Minor version | Patch version */ -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03050100 -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.5.1" -#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.5.1" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_NUMBER 0x03050200 +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING "3.5.2" +#define MBEDTLS_VERSION_STRING_FULL "Mbed TLS 3.5.2" /* Macros for build-time platform detection */ diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt index eeda06aeeb..fcd00a0ab5 100644 --- a/library/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) set(CMAKE_LIBRARY_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}) add_library(${mbedcrypto_target} SHARED ${src_crypto}) - set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 15) + set_target_properties(${mbedcrypto_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 15) target_link_libraries(${mbedcrypto_target} PUBLIC ${libs}) if(TARGET ${everest_target}) @@ -308,11 +308,11 @@ if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) endif() add_library(${mbedx509_target} SHARED ${src_x509}) - set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 6) + set_target_properties(${mbedx509_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 6) target_link_libraries(${mbedx509_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedcrypto_target}) add_library(${mbedtls_target} SHARED ${src_tls}) - set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.1 SOVERSION 20) + set_target_properties(${mbedtls_target} PROPERTIES VERSION 3.5.2 SOVERSION 20) target_link_libraries(${mbedtls_target} PUBLIC ${libs} ${mbedx509_target}) endif(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data index faa31662a3..6290331c12 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_version.data @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ Check compile time library version -check_compiletime_version:"3.5.1" +check_compiletime_version:"3.5.2" Check runtime library version -check_runtime_version:"3.5.1" +check_runtime_version:"3.5.2" Check for MBEDTLS_VERSION_C check_feature:"MBEDTLS_VERSION_C":0 From fd49a46a36dff40be6ceff28bc500d6d541a532f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 08:35:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 267/551] pkparse: rename RSA key and pubkey parsing functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pkparse.c | 26 +++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index 5f95545af6..4dd327640c 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -764,9 +764,9 @@ static int pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, * publicExponent INTEGER -- e * } */ -static int pk_get_rsapubkey(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) +static int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; @@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(p, end, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, end); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) @@ -976,9 +976,9 @@ static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, /* * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key */ -static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) +static int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + const unsigned char *key, + size_t keylen) { int ret, version; size_t len; @@ -1348,7 +1348,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - if ((ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); return ret; } @@ -1538,8 +1538,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, if (ret == 0) { pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || - (ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), - pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1679,7 +1679,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && - pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1754,7 +1754,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - if ((ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + pem.buflen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx))) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); } @@ -1801,7 +1801,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, } p = (unsigned char *) key; - ret = pk_get_rsapubkey(&p, p + keylen, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx)); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + keylen); if (ret == 0) { return ret; } From 429cd50ac8ce62351e26da900f7f610005fd929f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 09:10:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 268/551] pkwrite: split pk_write_rsa_der() with a dedicated function for non-opaque RSA key Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pkwrite.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pkwrite.c b/library/pkwrite.c index 1f0d3990ed..89305250ef 100644 --- a/library/pkwrite.c +++ b/library/pkwrite.c @@ -62,13 +62,12 @@ * publicExponent INTEGER -- e * } */ -static int pk_write_rsa_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +static int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len = 0; mbedtls_mpi T; - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); @@ -100,16 +99,99 @@ end_of_export: return (int) len; } -static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, - const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +static int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, + const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) { size_t len = 0; int ret; + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export QP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, + const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) +{ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE) { uint8_t tmp[PSA_EXPORT_KEY_PAIR_MAX_SIZE]; - size_t tmp_len = 0; + size_t len = 0, tmp_len = 0; if (psa_export_key(pk->priv_id, tmp, sizeof(tmp), &tmp_len) != PSA_SUCCESS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -118,94 +200,11 @@ static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, memcpy(*p, tmp, tmp_len); len += tmp_len; mbedtls_platform_zeroize(tmp, sizeof(tmp)); - } else -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - { - mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ - mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); - /* - * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. - */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - /* Export QP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DQ */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export Q */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export P */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, - NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export D */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, - NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, buf, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - -end_of_export: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, buf, 0)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, buf, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, - buf, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + return (int) len; } - - return (int) len; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + return mbedtls_rsa_key_write(p, buf, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ @@ -543,7 +542,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, pk_write_rsa_pubkey(p, start, key)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(p, start, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key))); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) From 00b530e3957061a06663e1785dc923ee0b7e7c95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 09:36:34 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 269/551] Limit compiler hint to compilers that are known to benefit from it Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/common.h | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h index 2eb9170374..937c80284c 100644 --- a/library/common.h +++ b/library/common.h @@ -199,30 +199,40 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor(unsigned char *r, uint8x16_t x = veorq_u8(v1, v2); vst1q_u8(r + i, x); } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case * where n is a constant multiple of 16. - * It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time - * constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. */ - if (n % 16 != 0) + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 16 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif #elif defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_X64) || defined(MBEDTLS_ARCH_IS_ARM64) /* This codepath probably only makes sense on architectures with 64-bit registers */ for (; (i + 8) <= n; i += 8) { uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); } - if (n % 8 != 0) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif #else for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); } - if (n % 4 != 0) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; + } #endif #endif - { - for (; i < n; i++) { - r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; - } +#endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; } } @@ -268,23 +278,29 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, uint64_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(r + i, x); } +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case * where n is a constant multiple of 16. - * It makes no difference for others (e.g. recent gcc and clang) if n is a compile-time - * constant, and very little difference if n is not a compile-time constant. */ - if (n % 8 != 0) + * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time + * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ + if (n % 8 == 0) { + return; + } +#endif #else for (; (i + 4) <= n; i += 4) { uint32_t x = mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(a + i) ^ mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(b + i); mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(r + i, x); } - if (n % 4 != 0) +#if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) + if (n % 4 == 0) { + return; + } #endif #endif - { - for (; i < n; i++) { - r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; - } +#endif + for (; i < n; i++) { + r[i] = a[i] ^ b[i]; } } From 468c02cf617234626c4008aae821f7245ec14117 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: v1gnesh Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 15:29:40 +0530 Subject: [PATCH 270/551] Update ChangeLog.d/8726.txt Co-authored-by: Janos Follath Signed-off-by: v1gnesh --- ChangeLog.d/8726.txt | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8726.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8726.txt index dc789b4344..c1e5a40158 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/8726.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8726.txt @@ -1,3 +1,2 @@ Features - * Add platform support for z/OS. - + * Add partial platform support for z/OS. From c64280a2d71f6e88835787b2121857f063af7029 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 10:03:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 271/551] Fix comment typo Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/common.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/common.h b/library/common.h index 937c80284c..3936ffdfe1 100644 --- a/library/common.h +++ b/library/common.h @@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static inline void mbedtls_xor_no_simd(unsigned char *r, } #if defined(__IAR_SYSTEMS_ICC__) /* This if statement helps some compilers (e.g., IAR) optimise out the byte-by-byte tail case - * where n is a constant multiple of 16. + * where n is a constant multiple of 8. * For other compilers (e.g. recent gcc and clang) it makes no difference if n is a compile-time * constant, and is a very small perf regression if n is not a compile-time constant. */ if (n % 8 == 0) { From 019c2a7817c702f5d7826bc14badf2a5c7a36c4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chien Wong Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 21:38:06 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 272/551] Handle sizeof(size_t) > sizeof(uint64_t) Signed-off-by: Chien Wong --- library/gcm.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/gcm.c b/library/gcm.c index 337145b718..033cb59017 100644 --- a/library/gcm.c +++ b/library/gcm.c @@ -358,7 +358,12 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, /* AD is limited to 2^64 bits, ie 2^61 bytes * Also check for possible overflow */ - new_add_len = ctx->add_len + add_len; +#if SIZE_MAX > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL + if (add_len > 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; + } +#endif + new_add_len = ctx->add_len + (uint64_t) add_len; if (new_add_len < ctx->add_len || new_add_len >> 61 != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT; } From b328c449329e92fe4bbc92890f81dbc363c01ad4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 10:48:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 273/551] pk/rsa: move RSA parse/write private/public key functions to rsa module These functions are meant to be used internally, so their prototype declaration is kept into rsa_internal.h. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pkparse.c | 252 +--------------------------- library/pkwrite.c | 136 +-------------- library/rsa.c | 373 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/rsa_internal.h | 43 +++++ 4 files changed, 422 insertions(+), 382 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index 4dd327640c..2708c8c754 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ /* Key types */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif /* Extended formats */ @@ -757,68 +758,6 @@ static int pk_parse_key_rfc8410_der(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } - */ -static int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, - unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); - } - - if (*p + len != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; - } - - *p += len; - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; - } - - *p += len; - - if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || - mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; - } - - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - - return 0; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - /* Get a PK algorithm identifier * * AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { @@ -944,195 +883,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, return ret; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. - * - * The value zero is: - * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter - * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). - * - * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to - * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. - */ -static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_mpi *X) -{ - int ret; - - ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key - */ -static int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, - const unsigned char *key, - size_t keylen) -{ - int ret, version; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p, *end; - - mbedtls_mpi T; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - p = (unsigned char *) key; - end = p + keylen; - - /* - * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) - * - * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * version Version, - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e - * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d - * prime1 INTEGER, -- p - * prime2 INTEGER, -- q - * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) - * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) - * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p - * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL - * } - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - end = p + len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } - - if (version != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION; - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import D */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - &T, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import P */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import Q */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - /* - * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in - * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by - * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid - * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading - * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which - * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q - * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a - * description of one such attack. - */ - - /* Import DP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import DQ */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import QP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#else - /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } -#endif - - /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default - * implementation but is still called: - * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to - * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) - * - as is also sanity-checks the key - * - * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with - * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (p != end) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - - if (ret != 0) { - /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ - if ((ret & 0xff80) == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - } - - return ret; -} -#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) /* * Parse a SEC1 encoded private EC key diff --git a/library/pkwrite.c b/library/pkwrite.c index 89305250ef..91529eb752 100644 --- a/library/pkwrite.c +++ b/library/pkwrite.c @@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C) #include "mbedtls/pem.h" #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +#include "rsa_internal.h" +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa/crypto.h" @@ -56,135 +59,6 @@ * Internal functions for RSA keys. ******************************************************************************/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -/* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } - */ -static int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - mbedtls_mpi T; - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - -end_of_export: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - return (int) len; -} - -static int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa) -{ - size_t len = 0; - int ret; - - mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ - - /* - * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. - */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - /* Export QP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DQ */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export Q */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export P */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export D */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - -end_of_export: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - return (int) len; -} - static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, const mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { @@ -204,7 +78,7 @@ static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, return (int) len; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return mbedtls_rsa_key_write(p, buf, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk)); + return mbedtls_rsa_key_write(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), buf, p); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ @@ -542,7 +416,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(p, start, mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key))); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key), start, p)); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 2b9f85b739..a18c4b1b0e 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" #include "rsa_internal.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "constant_time_internal.h" @@ -659,6 +660,378 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) return ctx->len; } +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + end = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } + + if (version != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import D */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import P */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import Q */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import DQ */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import QP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + if (ret != 0) { + /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ + if ((ret & 0xff80) == 0) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } + + *p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } + + *p += len; + + if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export QP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h index 4081ac6398..dee787f330 100644 --- a/library/rsa_internal.h +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -16,6 +16,49 @@ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +/** + * \brief + * + * \param rsa + * \param key + * \param keylen + * \return int + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); + +/** + * \brief + * + * \param rsa + * \param p + * \param end + * \return int + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end); + +/** + * \brief + * + * \param p + * \param start + * \param rsa + * \return int + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + +/** + * \brief + * + * \param p + * \param start + * \param rsa + * \return int + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) /** * \brief This function is analogue to \c mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign(). From 8e6093dd9f54f1278ee4df1472376ef2e5d01386 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 15:19:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 274/551] test_suite_rsa: add some basic testing of new parse/write priv/pub keys Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 12 +++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index 0a60f314ed..de5e5699a6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -615,3 +615,15 @@ rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_bad_rng:"4E636AF98E40F3ADCFCCB698F4E80B9F":MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V1 RSA Selftest depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST rsa_selftest: + +RSA parse/write PKCS#1 private key - 1024 bits +rsa_import_pkcs1_key:0:"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" + +RSA parse/write PKCS#1 public key - 1024 bits +rsa_import_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001" + +RSA parse/write PKCS#1 private key - 2048 bits +rsa_import_pkcs1_key:0:"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" + +RSA parse/write PKCS#1 public key - 2048 bits +rsa_import_pkcs1_key:1:"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" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 37bed6dcd8..315d4f6bb1 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ /* BEGIN_HEADER */ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" /* END_HEADER */ /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES @@ -1371,6 +1372,36 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_import_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; + unsigned char *input_start = input->x; + unsigned char *input_end = input->x + input->len; + unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; + unsigned char *output_start; + unsigned char *output_end; + + TEST_CALLOC(output_buf, input->len); + output_start = output_buf; + output_end = output_buf + input->len; + + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); + + if (is_public) { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(&rsa_ctx, &input_start, input_end), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_write(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free(output_buf); + mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa_ctx); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ void rsa_selftest() { From b054e449c9fa3af059cac13f5028855d401e9a3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:12:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 275/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: remove tests for importing an RSA key in PEM format This feature was an unofficial extension which was never documented. Now that we are removing the PK dependency in order to use only functions from RSA module, PEM support is unavailable. Therefore we explicitly remove it. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index eda6f5d8c2..45cb83980a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -496,16 +496,6 @@ PSA import/export RSA keypair: policy forbids export (sign), opaque depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TEST import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION( PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE, TEST_DRIVER_LOCATION ):1024:0:PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED:1 -# Test PEM import. Note that this is not a PSA feature, it's an Mbed TLS -# extension which we may drop in the future. -PSA import/export RSA public key: import PEM -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 - -PSA import/export RSA keypair: import PEM -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C -import_export:"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":PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:0:1024:0:PSA_SUCCESS:0 - PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 key pair: good depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT import_export:"2A45292441157B3C25572F76A5CDF960A7BDBF06731D783C5BF8920FB94CCC3D5DCCF86A3CB66B4E3AEDD23106222458ACF3F72C753CB67C2E19AD399566866FEBC16C3B4DC72773B4709047AE1AEC2D9107C2041B06B86A8F604465B26E0E753D6B10772798B3797232D950A36F2D4B33B04B36DE73AC6B8A7365015DF5745A1F892728B0CA947702C36E3BC646E72E23E80C345DBB014B7F93B36C80B4051F9A716D19B980861E86D62977466565462FBD3C1BB4EFD630DCCBEB351A7FA95602B7FE23903C7C7DC999950493BEC028AC42346858FAD969452DCF1DE9AD445F7F928D63B75FA86E8C1D722AB242D91995D3545A1791D72B0F384E74B45C7C01":PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919):PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_FFDH:0:2048:0:PSA_SUCCESS:1 From 7b7ffd3bb9cf91d944b00d13d75cd69dd357452d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 16:14:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 276/551] psa_crypt_rsa: remove dependency from the PK module Use new functions from the RSA module to parse and write private and public keys in PKCS#1 format. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 48 ++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c index 7b58ea22a5..7da6012c9f 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -24,8 +24,7 @@ #include #include -#include -#include "pk_wrap.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_OAEP) || \ @@ -62,50 +61,40 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( mbedtls_rsa_context **p_rsa) { psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context ctx; size_t bits; - mbedtls_pk_init(&ctx); + + *p_rsa = mbedtls_calloc(1, sizeof(mbedtls_rsa_context)); + if (*p_rsa == NULL) { + return PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY; + } + mbedtls_rsa_init(*p_rsa); /* Parse the data. */ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_pk_parse_key(&ctx, data, data_length, NULL, 0, - mbedtls_psa_get_random, MBEDTLS_PSA_RANDOM_STATE)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); } else { - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error( - mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(&ctx, data, data_length)); + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) data; + unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) (data + data_length); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(*p_rsa, &p, end)); } if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } - /* We have something that the pkparse module recognizes. If it is a - * valid RSA key, store it. */ - if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(&ctx) != MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto exit; - } - /* The size of an RSA key doesn't have to be a multiple of 8. Mbed TLS * supports non-byte-aligned key sizes, but not well. For example, * mbedtls_rsa_get_len() returns the key size in bytes, not in bits. */ - bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx))); + bits = PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(*p_rsa)); if (bits > PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS) { status = PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED; goto exit; } - status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx)); + status = psa_check_rsa_key_byte_aligned(*p_rsa); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; } - /* Copy out the pointer to the RSA context, and reset the PK context - * such that pk_free doesn't free the RSA context we just grabbed. */ - *p_rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx); - ctx.pk_info = NULL; - exit: - mbedtls_pk_free(&ctx); return status; } #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT) || @@ -168,20 +157,15 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, size_t *data_length) { int ret; - mbedtls_pk_context pk; - uint8_t *pos = data + data_size; - - mbedtls_pk_init(&pk); - pk.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; - pk.pk_ctx = rsa; + uint8_t *end = data + data_size; /* PSA Crypto API defines the format of an RSA key as a DER-encoded * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - ret = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&pk, data, data_size); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_key_write(rsa, data, &end); } else { - ret = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(&pos, data, &pk); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(rsa, data, &end); } if (ret < 0) { From d6d6a76e46526a396bc2fb4a2b0ab239b26db5d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 18:24:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 277/551] Add ..._GOTO_RETURN macro Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 7b167248e8..85eeb1a6d8 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ #include "psa/crypto.h" #include "psa/crypto_se_driver.h" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#include "mbedtls/threading.h" +#endif /** * Tell if PSA is ready for this hash. @@ -111,6 +114,50 @@ typedef struct { } key; } psa_key_slot_t; +typedef enum { + PSA_MUTEX_LOCK = 0, + PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK, +} psa_mutex_operation_t; + +/** If threading is enabled: perform a lock or unlock operation on the + * key slot mutex. + * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_LOCK to perform a lock operation. + * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK to perform an unlock operation. + * Returns PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if the operation fails + * and status was PSA_SUCCESS. + * If threading is not enabled, do nothing. + * + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * op is PSA_MUTEX_LOCK or PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_RETURN(op) \ + do \ + { \ + if (op == PSA_MUTEX_LOCK) { \ + if (mbedtls_mutex_lock( \ + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + return status; \ + } \ + } \ + if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock( \ + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + return status; \ + } \ + } \ + } while (0); +#else +#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_RETURN(op) do { } while (0) +#endif + /* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally. * Currently there aren't any. */ #define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \ From 90afb132e067b57a2bbc12c986ac5112e91fc201 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 18:24:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 278/551] Add ..._GOTO_EXIT macro Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 85eeb1a6d8..8b5ac26c6e 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -158,6 +158,46 @@ typedef enum { #define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_RETURN(op) do { } while (0) #endif +/** If threading is enabled: perform a lock or unlock operation on the + * key slot mutex. + * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_LOCK to perform a lock operation. + * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK to perform an unlock operation. + * This will goto the exit label if the operation fails, + * setting status to PSA_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. + * If threading is not enabled, do nothing. + * + * Assumptions: + * psa_status_t status exists. + * Label exit: exists. + * op is PSA_MUTEX_LOCK or PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK. + */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) +#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_GOTO_EXIT(op) \ + do \ + { \ + if (op == PSA_MUTEX_LOCK) { \ + if (mbedtls_mutex_lock( \ + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } \ + if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ + if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock( \ + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + goto exit; \ + } \ + } \ + } while (0); +#else +#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_GOTO_EXIT(op) do { } while (0) +#endif + /* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally. * Currently there aren't any. */ #define PSA_KA_MASK_INTERNAL_ONLY ( \ From 0b17255da123b0b8717534d25c1c1adcb9ba5cab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:11:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 279/551] Introduce mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes Follow the specification in https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8657 as of dd77343381161e09a63b4694001da3957e27d3a7, i.e. https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/dd77343381161e09a63b4694001da3957e27d3a7/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md#api-to-create-a-psa-key-from-a-pk-context This commit introduces the function declaration, its documentation, the definition without the interesting parts and a negative unit test function. Subsequent commits will add RSA, ECC and PK_OPAQUE support. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/pk.h | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++- library/pk.c | 26 ++++++- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 5 ++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 62 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h index 27768bd35a..a43b94955c 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) #include "psa/crypto.h" #endif @@ -484,6 +484,120 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_usage_t usage); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +/** + * \brief Determine valid PSA attributes that can be used to + * import a key into PSA. + * + * The attributes determined by this function are suitable + * for calling mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() to create + * a PSA key with the same key material. + * + * The typical flow of operations involving this function is + * ``` + * psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + * int ret = mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(pk, &attributes); + * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted + * // Tweak attributes if desired + * psa_key_id_t key_id = 0; + * ret = mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(pk, &attributes, &key_id); + * if (ret != 0) ...; // error handling omitted + * ``` + * + * \note This function does not support RSA-alt contexts + * (set up with mbedtls_pk_setup_rsa_alt()). + * + * \param[in] pk The PK context to use. It must have been set up. + * It can either contain a key pair or just a public key. + * \param usage A single `PSA_KEY_USAGE_xxx` flag among the following: + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: \p pk must contain a + * key pair. The output \p attributes will contain a + * key pair type, and the usage policy will allow + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE as well as + * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * - #PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: The output + * \p attributes will contain a public key type. + * \param[out] attributes + * On success, valid attributes to import the key into PSA. + * - The lifetime and key identifier are unchanged. If the + * attribute structure was initialized or reset before + * calling this function, this will result in a volatile + * key. Call psa_set_key_identifier() before or after this + * function if you wish to create a persistent key. Call + * psa_set_key_lifetime() before or after this function if + * you wish to import the key in a secure element. + * - The key type and bit-size are determined by the contents + * of the PK context. If the PK context contains a key + * pair, the key type can be either a key pair type or + * the corresponding public key type, depending on + * \p usage. If the PK context contains a public key, + * the key type is a public key type. + * - The key's policy is determined by the key type and + * the \p usage parameter. The usage always allows + * \p usage, exporting and copying the key, and + * possibly other permissions as documented for the + * \p usage parameter. + * The permitted algorithm is determined as follows + * based on the #mbedtls_pk_type_t type of \p pk, + * the chosen \p usage and other factors: + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA with whose underlying + * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA with whose underlying + * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode + * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 and the digest type + * corresponding to the PSA algorithm \c hash: + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and + * #PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(\c hash) + * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: not supported. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY + * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY: + * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + * if #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC is enabled, + * otherwise #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH). + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY + * if \p usage is DERIVE: + * #PSA_ALG_ECDH. + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: same as the algorithm policy + * set for the underlying PSA key, except that + * sign/decrypt flags are removed if the type is + * set to a public key type. + * Note that the enrollment algorithm set with + * psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm() is not copied. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH if \p pk does not contain + * a key of the type identified in \p attributes. + * Another error code on other failures. + */ +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ + /** * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). * diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 61ac0dfab0..bde561a1ea 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/ecdsa.h" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) #include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "md_psa.h" #endif @@ -378,6 +378,30 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) +{ + mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + + switch (pk_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ + + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, usage); + + return 0; +} +#endif + /* * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index af1e20c46a..e8ffff43f1 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -680,3 +680,8 @@ pk_psa_wrap_sign_ext:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:2048:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 PSA wrapped sign ext: RSA2048, PK_RSASSA_PSS, MD_SHA512 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512:MBEDTLS_RSA_C pk_psa_wrap_sign_ext:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:2048:MBEDTLS_PK_RSASSA_PSS:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512 + +PSA attributes for pk: NONE (bad) +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +# There is a (negative) test for pk_type=MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT in pk_rsa_alt(). diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 226598c724..0ac84a2f8a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -162,6 +162,33 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func(void *ctx) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, + mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_type_t *psa_type) +{ + int ok = 0; + + if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { + return 1; + } + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_type)), 0); + + switch (pk_type) { + default: + TEST_FAIL("Unknown PK type in test data"); + break; + } + + if (!want_pair) { + *psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(*psa_type); + } + ok = 1; + +exit: + return ok; +} +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) /* @@ -1263,6 +1290,14 @@ void pk_rsa_alt() TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_get_type(&alt) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT); TEST_ASSERT(strcmp(mbedtls_pk_get_name(&alt), "RSA-alt") == 0); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&alt, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + &attributes), + MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + /* Test signature */ #if SIZE_MAX > UINT_MAX TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_sign(&alt, MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, hash, SIZE_MAX, @@ -1569,3 +1604,30 @@ exit: PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +void pk_get_psa_attributes_fail(int pk_type, int from_pair, + int usage_arg, + int expected_ret) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_pk_init(&pk); + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + + MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + + psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type; + if (!pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { + goto exit; + } + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), + expected_ret); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ From 1f97e73114a37bab4655100890680592cdba8204 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:14:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 280/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: force enrollment algorithm off This avoids a possible gotcha when if the application code reuses an existing attribute structure. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index bde561a1ea..706d5d38c1 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -397,6 +397,12 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, usage); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + /* Assume that we have all Mbed TLS attributes. When + * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is enabled but not MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, + * we only assume standard PSA functions. */ + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(attributes, PSA_ALG_NONE); +#endif return 0; } From 6ea18361dfcedd70e8cf3e2bb9925b0cfd73428e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 14:16:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 281/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: RSA support Add code and unit tests for MBEDTLS_PK_RSA in mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(). Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 64 ++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 104 +++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 317 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 706d5d38c1..1485bd76e4 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -379,6 +379,27 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) +static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, + int want_crypt) +{ + if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { + if (want_crypt) { + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa); + return PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type)); + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } else { + if (want_crypt) { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT; + } else { + return PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } + } +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_usage_t usage, psa_key_attributes_t *attributes) @@ -386,6 +407,49 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); switch (pk_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + int want_crypt = 0; + int want_private = 0; + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + want_private = 1; + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + want_private = 1; + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + want_private = 1; + want_crypt = 1; + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + want_crypt = 1; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + /* Detect the presence of a private key in a way that works both + * in CRT and non-CRT configurations. */ + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); + int has_private = (mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa) == 0); + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&rsa->N)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, + psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt)); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index e8ffff43f1..bc0de71b28 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -685,3 +685,107 @@ PSA attributes for pk: NONE (bad) pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA # There is a (negative) test for pk_type=MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT in pk_rsa_alt(). + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair DECRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair DECRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-512 pair DECRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair->public ENCRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair->public ENCRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-512 pair->public ENCRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public ENCRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 public ENCRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-512 public ENCRYPT +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair SIGN_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair SIGN_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair->public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair->public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public SIGN_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair DERIVE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public DERIVE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 0ac84a2f8a..d6902b4d0d 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -174,6 +174,30 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_type)), 0); switch (pk_type) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) + case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { + *psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR; + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); + if (want_pair) { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( + rsa, + mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, + MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS, 65537), 0); + } else { + unsigned char N[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS)] = { 0xff }; + N[sizeof(N) - 1] = 0x03; + const unsigned char E[1] = {0x03}; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, + N, sizeof(N), + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + E, sizeof(E)), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa), 0); + } + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ + default: TEST_FAIL("Unknown PK type in test data"); break; @@ -1605,6 +1629,131 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +void pk_get_psa_attributes(int pk_type, int from_pair, + int usage_arg, + int to_pair, int expected_alg) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_pk_init(&pk); + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + + MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + + psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = 0; + if (!pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { + goto exit; + } + if (!to_pair) { + expected_psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(expected_psa_type); + } + + psa_key_lifetime_t lifetime = PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE; //TODO: diversity + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; //TODO: diversity + psa_set_key_id(&attributes, key_id); + psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, lifetime); + + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = usage; + /* Usage implied universally */ + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } + /* Usage implied by mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() */ + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_lifetime(&attributes), lifetime); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(psa_get_key_id(&attributes), + key_id)); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_type(&attributes), expected_psa_type); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_bits(&attributes), + mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk)); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes), expected_usage); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes), expected_alg); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes), PSA_ALG_NONE); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +void pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes(int md_type, int from_pair, + int usage_arg, + int to_pair, int expected_alg) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_pk_init(&pk); + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + + MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + + psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = 0; + if (!pk_setup_for_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { + goto exit; + } + mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_type), 0); + if (!to_pair) { + expected_psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(expected_psa_type); + } + + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = usage; + /* Usage implied universally */ + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } + /* Usage implied by mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() */ + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_lifetime(&attributes), PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(psa_get_key_id(&attributes), + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT)); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_type(&attributes), expected_psa_type); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_bits(&attributes), + mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk)); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes), expected_usage); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes), expected_alg); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes), PSA_ALG_NONE); + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ void pk_get_psa_attributes_fail(int pk_type, int from_pair, int usage_arg, From ace7c7721ef30ae1bf1e218f1ff69720277f2f9d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 17:47:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 282/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: ECC support Add code and unit tests for MBEDTLS_PK_ECxxx in mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(). This commit only supports built-in ECC (MBEDTLS_ECP_C). A subsequent commit will handle driver-only ECC. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 72 ++++++++++-- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 30 ++++- 3 files changed, 262 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 1485bd76e4..432fbcff61 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -406,22 +406,28 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, { mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk); + psa_key_usage_t more_usage = usage; + if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } else if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + switch (pk_type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: + { int want_crypt = 0; int want_private = 0; switch (usage) { case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: - usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; - want_private = 1; - break; case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: - usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; want_private = 1; break; case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: - usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; want_private = 1; want_crypt = 1; break; @@ -448,8 +454,61 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt)); break; + } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH); + int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); + int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0); + size_t bits = 0; + psa_ecc_family_t family = + mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); + int want_private = 0; + psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + want_private = 1; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!sign_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#else + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); +#endif + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + want_private = 1; + alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; + if (!derive_ok) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + if (want_private && !has_private) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(family) : + PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(family))); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, bits); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, alg); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT) case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT: return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; @@ -459,8 +518,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; - psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, usage); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, more_usage); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) /* Assume that we have all Mbed TLS attributes. When * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is enabled but not MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index bc0de71b28..f0903e33c2 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -789,3 +789,171 @@ pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public DERIVE (bad) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair ENCRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair ENCRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair ENCRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public ENCRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public ENCRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public ENCRYPT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair DERIVE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair DERIVE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair DERIVE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public DERIVE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public DERIVE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public DERIVE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair SIGN_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair SIGN_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair->public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair->public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public SIGN_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public SIGN_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair SIGN_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair VERIFY_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair VERIFY_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public SIGN_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public VERIFY_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public VERIFY_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index d6902b4d0d..90c5044d2b 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, } else { unsigned char N[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS)] = { 0xff }; N[sizeof(N) - 1] = 0x03; - const unsigned char E[1] = {0x03}; + const unsigned char E[1] = { 0x03 }; TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, N, sizeof(N), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, @@ -198,6 +198,23 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: + case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: + { + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list()[0]; + size_t bits; + *psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &bits)); + TEST_EQUAL(pk_genkey(pk, grp_id), 0); + if (!want_pair) { + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&ec->d); + } + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ + default: TEST_FAIL("Unknown PK type in test data"); break; @@ -1674,6 +1691,17 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes(int pk_type, int from_pair, } expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) + /* When the resulting algorithm is ECDSA, the compile-time configuration + * can cause it to be either deterministic or randomized ECDSA. + * Rather than have two near-identical sets of test data depending on + * the configuration, always use randomized in the test data and + * tweak the expected result here. */ + if (expected_alg == PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)) { + expected_alg = PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); + } +#endif + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), 0); TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_lifetime(&attributes), lifetime); From 94e3a873ce061b51f54746629ad9ce529fa5222e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 19:23:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 283/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: test bad usage value Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index f0903e33c2..ee348a34b6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -686,6 +686,36 @@ pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ # There is a (negative) test for pk_type=MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT in pk_rsa_alt(). +# Bad usage due to not specifying sign/crypt/derive. +PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=0 (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +# Bad usage due to not specifying sign/crypt/derive. +PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=EXPORT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +# This usage could make sense, but is not currently supported. +PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=DECRYPT|EXPORT (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +# Bad usage due to not specifying more than one of sign/crypt/derive. +PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=DECRYPT|SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +# This usage could make sense, but is not currently supported. +PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=SIGN_MESSAGE|SIGN_HASH (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +# This usage could make sense, but is not currently supported. +PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=SIGN_MESSAGE|VERIFY_MESSAGE (bad) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair DECRYPT depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT From 758d8c7631ce0d9a737a586add0e6c26f0872e5c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 20:53:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 284/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: support MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 52 +++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 54 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 220 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 432fbcff61..783b48866d 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -514,6 +514,58 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_ALT_SUPPORT */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) + case MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: + { + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + switch (usage) { + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type) || + old_type == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: + if (old_type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: + if (!(PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(old_type))) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + break; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + psa_key_type_t new_type = old_type; + /* Opaque keys are always key pairs, so we don't need a check + * on the input if the required usage is private. We just need + * to adjust the type correctly if the required usage is public. */ + if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT) { + new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type); + } + more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes); + psa_set_key_type(attributes, new_type); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes)); + psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_get_key_algorithm(&old_attributes)); + break; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ + default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index ee348a34b6..55350b67b6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -987,3 +987,117 @@ pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:MB PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public VERIFY_HASH (bad) depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_MESSAGE & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN|VERIFY & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN|DECRYPT & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN|... & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT + +# For a PK_OPAQUE key, mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() ignores the input +# key's algorithm policy. Just this time, test with a few different algorithms. +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [0] +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [raw] +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [v15] +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [PSS] +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, DECRYPT & DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, DECRYPT|... & DECRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, ... & DERIVE (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, ... & EXPORT (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & ENCRYPT +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:0:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN_MESSAGE & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN|VERIFY & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN|DECRYPT & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN|... & SIGN_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & DERIVE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & DECRYPT (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & EXPORT (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_MESSAGE +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_HASH +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:0 + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, 0 & ENCRYPT (bad) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:0:0 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 90c5044d2b..930d015dd4 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -1808,3 +1808,57 @@ exit: MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +void pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque(int o_type_arg, int o_bits_arg, + int o_usage_arg, int o_alg_arg, + int usage_arg, + int expected_ret, + int to_pair, int expected_usage_arg) +{ + mbedtls_pk_context pk; + mbedtls_pk_init(&pk); + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + psa_key_type_t o_type = o_type_arg; + size_t bits = o_bits_arg; + psa_key_usage_t o_usage = o_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = o_alg_arg; + psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg; + + USE_PSA_INIT(); + + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, o_type); + psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, o_usage); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes, 42); + //TODO: test with persistent key + PSA_ASSERT(psa_generate_key(&attributes, &key_id)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(&pk, key_id), 0); + + psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = + to_pair ? o_type : PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(o_type); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), + expected_ret); + + if (expected_ret == 0) { + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_lifetime(&attributes), PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(psa_get_key_id(&attributes), + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT)); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_type(&attributes), expected_psa_type); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_bits(&attributes), bits); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes), expected_usage); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_algorithm(&attributes), alg); + TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes), PSA_ALG_NONE); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); + psa_destroy_key(key_id); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + USE_PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ From 7354f1e17870e528361f274aa4634441719e4b70 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 11:06:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 285/551] Allow building with MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA && MBEDTLS_ECP_C This isn't officially supported, but it's convenient to build the library this way for quick testing. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/ssl_tls12_client.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c index 0c5af87f42..b4b5781a19 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls12_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls12_client.c @@ -2005,9 +2005,9 @@ static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*peer_pk); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ +#endif /* !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) uint16_t tls_id = 0; From f3dbc98d967289f9de9b5f89c2e187e6d6468a35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 11:05:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 286/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: support MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 13 +++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++--------- 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 783b48866d..c34da9974d 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -464,11 +464,24 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, { int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH); int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); + int has_private = PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(old_type); + size_t bits = psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes); + psa_ecc_family_t family = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(old_type); +#else mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0); size_t bits = 0; psa_ecc_family_t family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); +#endif int want_private = 0; psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; switch (usage) { diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 930d015dd4..e522ea747b 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -111,7 +111,14 @@ static int pk_genkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int curve_or_keybits) mbedtls_pk_get_type(pk) == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA) { int ret; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + ret = pk_genkey_ec(pk, curve_or_keybits); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + return 0; +#else ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk)->grp, curve_or_keybits); if (ret != 0) { return ret; @@ -120,16 +127,7 @@ static int pk_genkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int curve_or_keybits) &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk)->d, &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk)->Q, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */ - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) - ret = pk_genkey_ec(pk, curve_or_keybits); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ @@ -208,8 +206,24 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, *psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &bits)); TEST_EQUAL(pk_genkey(pk, grp_id), 0); if (!want_pair) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + psa_key_attributes_t pub_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + psa_set_key_type(&pub_attributes, + PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(*psa_type)); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&pub_attributes, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); + psa_set_key_algorithm(&pub_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY); + PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(pk->priv_id)); + PSA_ASSERT(psa_import_key(&pub_attributes, + pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, + &pk->priv_id)); +#else mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ec->d); +#endif } break; } From c09df2f24c85623a426501f0fa6ef659cb57fbd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 17:03:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 287/551] Unify want_private detection This commit makes the code arguably slightly simpler and fixes the build with clang -Wimplicit-fallthrough. No intended semantic change. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 23 ++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index c34da9974d..60891a07e2 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -416,24 +416,23 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } more_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + int want_private = !(usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH || + usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT); + switch (pk_type) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: { - int want_crypt = 0; - int want_private = 0; + int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: encrypt/decrypt; 1: sign/verify */ switch (usage) { case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: - want_private = 1; - break; - case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: - want_private = 1; - want_crypt = 1; - break; case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: + /* Nothing to do. */ break; + case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT: case PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT: want_crypt = 1; break; @@ -482,13 +481,10 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_ecc_family_t family = mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(ec->grp.id, &bits); #endif - int want_private = 0; psa_algorithm_t alg = 0; switch (usage) { case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: - want_private = 1; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE: case PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH: if (!sign_ok) { @@ -501,7 +497,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, #endif break; case PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE: - want_private = 1; alg = PSA_ALG_ECDH; if (!derive_ok) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; @@ -566,9 +561,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, /* Opaque keys are always key pairs, so we don't need a check * on the input if the required usage is private. We just need * to adjust the type correctly if the required usage is public. */ - if (usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE || - usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH || - usage == PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT) { + if (!want_private) { new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type); } more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes); From 51860149f4c3b1bf2d7f9be0b4de9304f41d0a61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 17:45:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 288/551] Allow context types with an ALT version to be linked in Doxygen In our tests, we run `tests/scripts/doxygen.sh`, which checks that `doxygen` runs without warnings after `scripts/config.py realfull`. In this configuration, alternative implementations such as `MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT` are enabled, which allows the documentation to contain references to the `MBEDTLS_xxx_ALT` symbol itself. However, this disables context types that alternative implementations must define in their header, such as `mbedtls_rsa_context`. See https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/4518 As a partial fix, allow `tests/scripts/doxygen.sh` to see dummy definitions of the context type. This way, we can use both `#MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT` and `#mbedtls_rsa_context` cross-references in our documentation. This is not ideal, because `doxygen.sh` isn't testing for errors in the documentation of the affected context types, but it's cheap progress. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile index 89048f2217..b64c89202f 100644 --- a/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile +++ b/doxygen/mbedtls.doxyfile @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ EXTRACT_ALL = YES EXTRACT_PRIVATE = YES EXTRACT_STATIC = YES CASE_SENSE_NAMES = NO -INPUT = ../include input +INPUT = ../include input ../tests/include/alt-dummy FILE_PATTERNS = *.h RECURSIVE = YES EXCLUDE_SYMLINKS = YES From 55effd9456aef0648ceacc0812164a98d4d5ce29 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 18:07:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 289/551] Fix the build with MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 60891a07e2..191132553d 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_set_key_type(attributes, (want_private ? PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR : PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)); - psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&rsa->N)); + psa_set_key_bits(attributes, mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(pk)); psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_algorithm_for_rsa(rsa, want_crypt)); break; From cb05ce30e990f7e60c47b18af95cf21c8213a614 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 19:25:10 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 290/551] Minor fixes to locking macros Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 8b5ac26c6e..0e9f83faee 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ typedef enum { return status; \ } \ } \ - if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ + else if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock( \ &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ typedef enum { * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_LOCK to perform a lock operation. * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK to perform an unlock operation. * This will goto the exit label if the operation fails, - * setting status to PSA_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. + * setting status to PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. * If threading is not enabled, do nothing. * * Assumptions: @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ typedef enum { goto exit; \ } \ } \ - if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ + else if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock( \ &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ From 00f3085163a22318b3122c640cbf2b9bc2a2f5a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 20:25:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 291/551] Missing dependency for MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index 55350b67b6..8951e72170 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -829,7 +829,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public DECRYPT (bad) @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair ENCRYPT (bad) @@ -853,7 +853,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public ENCRYPT (bad) @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair DERIVE @@ -877,7 +877,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public DERIVE (bad) @@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair SIGN_MESSAGE @@ -897,7 +897,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair SIGN_HASH @@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair SIGN_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair->public VERIFY_HASH @@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair->public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public VERIFY_MESSAGE @@ -929,7 +929,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public VERIFY_HASH @@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) @@ -945,7 +945,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public SIGN_HASH (bad) @@ -953,7 +953,7 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public SIGN_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) From 64996c3be901c62636cfa2d88e92f2c31118bef5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 20:25:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 292/551] Disable MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT in no-PSA builds When building without PSA crypto functions, disable MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT as well as MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C. With just MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT, PSA crypto API functions are supposed to exist at link time but be provided by a third party. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 44930d28b5..13338d4cda 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -1552,6 +1552,7 @@ component_test_full_no_cipher_no_psa_crypto () { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_CMAC_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_NIST_KW_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_TICKET_C # Disable features that depend on PSA_CRYPTO_C @@ -2430,11 +2431,12 @@ component_build_dhm_alt () { make CFLAGS='-Werror -Wall -Wextra -I../tests/include/alt-dummy' lib } -component_test_no_use_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan() { - # full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO: run the same set of tests as basic-build-test.sh - msg "build: cmake, full config minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, ASan" +component_test_no_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan() { + # full minus MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C: run the same set of tests as basic-build-test.sh + msg "build: cmake, full config minus PSA crypto, ASan" scripts/config.py full scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C @@ -2445,7 +2447,7 @@ component_test_no_use_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan() { CC=$ASAN_CC cmake -D CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE:String=Asan . make - msg "test: main suites (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + msg "test: main suites (full minus PSA crypto)" make test # Note: ssl-opt.sh has some test cases that depend on From daca7a3979c22da155ec9dce49ab1abf3b65d3a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 09:49:11 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 293/551] Update BRANCHES.md Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- BRANCHES.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/BRANCHES.md b/BRANCHES.md index c085b16168..b71247f3eb 100644 --- a/BRANCHES.md +++ b/BRANCHES.md @@ -106,6 +106,6 @@ The following branches are currently maintained: - [`development`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/) - [`mbedtls-2.28`](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/tree/mbedtls-2.28) maintained until at least the end of 2024, see - . + . Users are urged to always use the latest version of a maintained branch. From dccfd3612dece912f4e0d7c59add685642154fae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 17:07:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 294/551] rsa: update return values of priv/pub parse/write functions The goal is to remove usage of PK return values in order to completely eliminate that dependency. This commit also updates pkparse and test_suite_x509parse to align with this change in return values. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pkparse.c | 3 +- library/rsa.c | 36 ++++++++-------------- tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data | 10 +++--- tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function | 1 + 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index 2708c8c754..17df101f01 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -1556,8 +1556,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); - if (ret != (MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG))) { + if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { return ret; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index a18c4b1b0e..4ff7afacfd 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -682,7 +682,7 @@ static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, } if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } return 0; @@ -721,17 +721,17 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, si */ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + return ret; } end = p + len; if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); + return ret; } if (version != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_VERSION; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } /* Import N */ @@ -823,8 +823,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, si } if (p != end) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } cleanup: @@ -832,13 +831,6 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); if (ret != 0) { - /* Wrap error code if it's coming from a lower level */ - if ((ret & 0xff80) == 0) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT, ret); - } else { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT; - } - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); } @@ -859,46 +851,44 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + return ret; } if (*p + len != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } /* Import N */ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + return ret; } if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } *p += len; /* Import E */ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + return ret; } if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } *p += len; if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, - MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } return 0; diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data index 261c220ee6..6e201259cf 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data @@ -1774,15 +1774,15 @@ x509parse_crt:"307d3068a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c3 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring length) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring tag) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400310000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400310000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv RSA modulus) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0302ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0302ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, total length mismatch) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 @@ -1790,11 +1790,11 @@ x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, check failed) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY +x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, check failed, expanded length notation) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA # We expect an extension parsing error here because the IssuerID is optional. # Hence, if we find an ASN.1 tag doesn't match the IssuerID, we assume the diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function index c2a2f556d2..a54c165e14 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/base64.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" +#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "string.h" #if MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA > 19 From 2ddabb34d60a4e5b674db573fb68228bd81ec913 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 17:11:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 295/551] config_adjust_legacy: do not auto-enable PK when RSA is enabled in PSA Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h | 9 --------- include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 3 --- 2 files changed, 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h index 696266c6fb..818a8c6443 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h @@ -324,15 +324,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ -/* The PK wrappers need pk_write/pk_parse functions to format RSA key objects - * when they are dispatching to the PSA API. This happens under MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO, - * and even under just MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C in psa_crypto_rsa.c. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PK_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#endif - /* Helpers to state that each key is supported either on the builtin or PSA side. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) || defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) #define MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP521R1 diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h index 691fed6e5a..e3980e95c6 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -671,9 +671,6 @@ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_C #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #define MBEDTLS_OID_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C -#define MBEDTLS_PK_C #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C #define MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY */ From c6d7f53adca48df0ca4e3894d09c89874cf30dc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 17:12:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 296/551] all.sh: update common_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_some_curves() Do not disable RSA_C and related modules because now it does not automatically re-enable PK module. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 44930d28b5..f0a0058c98 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -2752,12 +2752,6 @@ common_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_ecc_some_curves () { scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PK_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PK_WRITE_C - # We need to disable RSA too or PK will be re-enabled. - scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset-all "PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_[0-9A-Z_a-z]*" - scripts/config.py -f "$CRYPTO_CONFIG_H" unset-all "PSA_WANT_ALG_RSA_[0-9A-Z_a-z]*" - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_RSA_C - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 # Disable modules that are accelerated - some will be re-enabled scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C From 18dd00052e37f315f865e04861521c89e2b502bb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 17:59:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 297/551] pk_wrap: use RSA module functions to write priv/pub key in RSA wrappers Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pk_wrap.c | 36 +++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c index c232650229..ff8eeb14cc 100644 --- a/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "pkwrite.h" +#include "rsa_internal.h" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME) @@ -69,9 +70,9 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context key; int key_len; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); psa_algorithm_t psa_alg_md = PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)); size_t rsa_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); @@ -86,11 +87,7 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } - /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() expects a full PK context; - * re-construct one to make it happy */ - key.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; - key.pk_ctx = rsa; - key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf)); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(rsa, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -172,14 +169,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context key; int key_len; unsigned char *buf = NULL; + unsigned char *p; + buf = mbedtls_calloc(1, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); if (buf == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED; } - mbedtls_pk_info_t pk_info = mbedtls_rsa_info; + p = buf + MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES; *sig_len = mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa_ctx); if (sig_size < *sig_len) { @@ -187,11 +185,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - /* mbedtls_pk_write_key_der() expects a full PK context; - * re-construct one to make it happy */ - key.pk_info = &pk_info; - key.pk_ctx = rsa_ctx; - key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&key, buf, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_key_write(rsa_ctx, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { mbedtls_free(buf); return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -282,9 +276,9 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context key; int key_len; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PRV_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); ((void) f_rng); ((void) p_rng); @@ -299,11 +293,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - /* mbedtls_pk_write_key_der() expects a full PK context; - * re-construct one to make it happy */ - key.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; - key.pk_ctx = rsa; - key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_key_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf)); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_key_write(rsa, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -368,9 +358,9 @@ static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_status_t status; - mbedtls_pk_context key; int key_len; unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_PK_RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES]; + unsigned char *p = buf + sizeof(buf); ((void) f_rng); ((void) p_rng); @@ -385,11 +375,7 @@ static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; } - /* mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der() expects a full PK context; - * re-construct one to make it happy */ - key.pk_info = &mbedtls_rsa_info; - key.pk_ctx = rsa; - key_len = mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der(&key, buf, sizeof(buf)); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(rsa, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } From a5f36fcaae40c0b2b3723781cbde77095b485284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 10:49:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 298/551] rsa: write documentation of new functions for parse/writing RSA priv/pub keys Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/rsa.c | 16 ++++----- library/rsa_internal.h | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 4ff7afacfd..e0c38c3bcf 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -688,9 +688,6 @@ static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, return 0; } -/* - * Parse a PKCS#1 encoded private RSA key - */ int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { int ret, version; @@ -837,18 +834,19 @@ cleanup: return ret; } -/* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } - */ int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; + /* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { return ret; diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h index dee787f330..62972c6345 100644 --- a/library/rsa_internal.h +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -17,44 +17,77 @@ #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" /** - * \brief + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. * - * \param rsa - * \param key - * \param keylen - * \return int + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. + * + * \return 0 in success + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case of invalid version. */ int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); /** - * \brief + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. * - * \param rsa - * \param p - * \param end - * \return int + * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. + * \param p Beginning of the buffer containing the key to be parsed. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the end of the parsed data. + * \param end End of the buffer containing the key to be parsed. + * + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case of importing or + * priv/pub validation errors. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end); /** - * \brief + * \brief Write a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. * - * \param p - * \param start - * \param rsa - * \return int + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA is the RSA context does not + * cointain valid. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. */ int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, unsigned char **p); /** - * \brief + * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. * - * \param p - * \param start - * \param rsa - * \return int + * \param rsa The RSA context which contains the data to be written. + * \param start Beginning of the buffer that will be filled with the + * private key. + * \param p End of the buffer that will be filled with the private key. + * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be + * updated in order to point to the beginning of written data. + * + * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer + * (i.e. a value > 0). + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA is the RSA context does not + * cointain valid. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the + * output buffer. + * + * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its + * end and moving toward its start. */ int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, unsigned char **p); From 99ff1f505b706006c75c3d2047e7b19ed5f6ac81 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chien Wong Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 20:44:01 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 299/551] Add test cases on GCM AD, input, IV length Signed-off-by: Chien Wong --- tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data | 12 +++ 2 files changed, 119 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function index 599c9266e0..07a6e4593b 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function @@ -153,6 +153,20 @@ exit: mbedtls_free(output); } +static void gcm_reset_ctx(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const uint8_t *key, + size_t key_bits, const uint8_t *iv, size_t iv_len, + int starts_ret) +{ + int mode = MBEDTLS_GCM_ENCRYPT; + mbedtls_cipher_id_t valid_cipher = MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ID_AES; + + mbedtls_gcm_init(ctx); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_setkey(ctx, valid_cipher, key, key_bits), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(starts_ret, mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)); +exit: + /* empty */ +} + /* END_HEADER */ /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES @@ -478,6 +492,99 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void gcm_invalid_iv_len(void) +{ + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, 0, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + +#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT64_MAX + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, 1ULL << 61, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); +#endif + + goto exit; /* To suppress error that exit is defined but not used */ +exit: + /* empty */ +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +/* + * Test if GCM rejects total ad_len >= 2^61 bytes. + * Also test if GCM handles potential total ad_len overflow properly. + + * Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8. + */ +void gcm_add_len_too_long(void) +{ +#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT64_MAX + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, 1ULL << 61), + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, 1), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, (1ULL << 61) - 1), + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, 1), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, UINT64_MAX), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + +exit: + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); +#endif +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +/* + * Test if GCM rejects total input length > 2^36 - 32 bytes. + * Also test if GCM handles potential total input length overflow properly. + + * Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8. + */ +void gcm_input_len_too_long(void) +{ +#if SIZE_MAX >= UINT64_MAX + mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + size_t out_len; + uint64_t len_max = (1ULL << 36) - 32; + + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, len_max + 1, b16, len_max + 1, + &out_len), + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, 1, b16, 1, &out_len), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, len_max, b16, len_max, &out_len), + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + + gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, 1, b16, 1, &out_len), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, UINT64_MAX, b16, UINT64_MAX, + &out_len), + MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); + +exit: + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); +#endif +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST:MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES */ void gcm_selftest() { diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data index f22b7a3b79..57f05caf5f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data @@ -1,2 +1,14 @@ GCM - Invalid parameters gcm_invalid_param: + +GCM - Invalid IV length +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +gcm_invalid_iv_len: + +GCM - Additional data length too long +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +gcm_add_len_too_long: + +GCM - Input length too long +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +gcm_input_len_too_long: From cd89b0b536741f6ad91e2884988abba47be88554 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 14:24:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 300/551] all.sh: disable legacy hash support in test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hmac() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 15 +++++++++++---- tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 63f6129eb2..e2b44d8e82 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -3661,6 +3661,17 @@ config_psa_crypto_hmac_use_psa () { # start with config full for maximum coverage (also enables USE_PSA) helper_libtestdriver1_adjust_config "full" + if [ "$driver_only" -eq 1 ]; then + # Disable MD_C in order to disable the builtin support for HMAC. MD_LIGHT + # is still enabled though (for ENTROPY_C among others). + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD_C + # Disable also the builtin hashes since they are supported by the driver + # and MD module is able to perform PSA dispathing. + scripts/config.py unset-all MBEDTLS_SHA + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD5_C + scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C + fi + # Direct dependencies of MD_C. We disable them also in the reference # component to work with the same set of features. scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C @@ -3685,10 +3696,6 @@ component_test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hmac() { config_psa_crypto_hmac_use_psa 1 - # Disable MD_C in order to disable the builtin support for HMAC. MD_LIGHT - # is still enabled though. - scripts/config.py unset MBEDTLS_MD_C - # Build # ----- diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py index 9d441c7d3f..b6e26d4cca 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py +++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py @@ -246,6 +246,9 @@ KNOWN_TASKS = { 'component_ref': 'test_psa_crypto_config_reference_hmac', 'component_driver': 'test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hmac', 'ignored_suites': [ + # These suites require legacy hash support, which is disabled + # in the accelerate component. + 'shax', 'mdx', # This suite tests builtins directly, but these are missing # in the accelerated case. 'psa_crypto_low_hash.generated', From 3877d4858b666b6596743a8fcfdb7b1c6ea54ec5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 13:26:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 301/551] Refactor macros Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_core.h | 93 +++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 0e9f83faee..dc376d7ebf 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -114,88 +114,47 @@ typedef struct { } key; } psa_key_slot_t; -typedef enum { - PSA_MUTEX_LOCK = 0, - PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK, -} psa_mutex_operation_t; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -/** If threading is enabled: perform a lock or unlock operation on the - * key slot mutex. - * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_LOCK to perform a lock operation. - * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK to perform an unlock operation. +/** Perform a mutex operation and return immediately upon failure. + * * Returns PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if the operation fails * and status was PSA_SUCCESS. - * If threading is not enabled, do nothing. * * Assumptions: * psa_status_t status exists. - * op is PSA_MUTEX_LOCK or PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_RETURN(op) \ - do \ - { \ - if (op == PSA_MUTEX_LOCK) { \ - if (mbedtls_mutex_lock( \ - &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ - return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ - } \ - return status; \ - } \ - } \ - else if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ - if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock( \ - &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ - return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ - } \ - return status; \ - } \ - } \ +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + return PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + return status; \ + } \ } while (0); -#else -#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_RETURN(op) do { } while (0) -#endif -/** If threading is enabled: perform a lock or unlock operation on the - * key slot mutex. - * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_LOCK to perform a lock operation. - * Call with parameter PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK to perform an unlock operation. - * This will goto the exit label if the operation fails, - * setting status to PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. - * If threading is not enabled, do nothing. +/** Perform a mutex operation and goto exit on failure. + * + * Sets status to PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE if status was PSA_SUCCESS. * * Assumptions: * psa_status_t status exists. * Label exit: exists. - * op is PSA_MUTEX_LOCK or PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK. + * f is a mutex operation which returns 0 upon success. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) -#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_GOTO_EXIT(op) \ - do \ - { \ - if (op == PSA_MUTEX_LOCK) { \ - if (mbedtls_mutex_lock( \ - &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ - status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ - } \ - goto exit; \ - } \ - } \ - else if (op == PSA_MUTEX_UNLOCK) { \ - if (mbedtls_mutex_unlock( \ - &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex) != 0) { \ - if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ - status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ - } \ - goto exit; \ - } \ - } \ +#define PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(f) \ + do \ + { \ + if ((f) != 0) { \ + if (status == PSA_SUCCESS) { \ + status = PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE; \ + } \ + goto exit; \ + } \ } while (0); -#else -#define PSA_KEY_SLOT_MUTEX_LOCKFUNC_GOTO_EXIT(op) do { } while (0) #endif /* A mask of key attribute flags used only internally. From 667cad5b81a448c08daaebee6a96ce1bad833ee5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio de Angelis Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 13:34:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 302/551] Put the id field at the end of the psa_key_attributes_s structure Putting the id at the of the psa_key_attributes_s structure allows for a more efficient marshalling of the parameters around a transport channel which provides separation between a client view and a service view of the key parameters. Signed-off-by: Antonio de Angelis --- include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h index 3a196182a4..606d282df2 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -239,18 +239,17 @@ typedef struct { psa_key_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(type); psa_key_bits_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(bits); psa_key_lifetime_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); psa_key_policy_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy); psa_key_attributes_flag_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); } psa_core_key_attributes_t; #define PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE, 0, \ PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE, \ - MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, \ - PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0 } + PSA_KEY_POLICY_INIT, 0, \ + MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT } struct psa_key_attributes_s { - psa_core_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) psa_key_slot_number_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */ @@ -268,12 +267,13 @@ struct psa_key_attributes_s { */ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters); size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters_size); + psa_core_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core); }; #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C) -#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, 0, NULL, 0 } +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { 0, NULL, 0, PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT } #else -#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT, NULL, 0 } +#define PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT { NULL, 0, PSA_CORE_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT } #endif static inline struct psa_key_attributes_s psa_key_attributes_init(void) From 9f521056bc39533621f3f6b1a1986675035942b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 15:44:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 303/551] driver-only-builds: add documentation for HMAC acceleration Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- docs/driver-only-builds.md | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/driver-only-builds.md b/docs/driver-only-builds.md index f59420e3d1..e4c30bd338 100644 --- a/docs/driver-only-builds.md +++ b/docs/driver-only-builds.md @@ -105,7 +105,26 @@ provided by a driver or built-in, you should use the following macros: - for code that uses only the PSA Crypto API: `PSA_WANT_ALG_xxx` from `psa/crypto.h`; - for code that uses non-PSA crypto APIs: `MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_xxx` from - `mbedtls/md.h`. + `mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h`. + +### HMAC + +In addition to accelerated hash operations, it is also possible to accelerate +HMAC by enabling and accelerating: +- HMAC algorithm and key type, i.e. `[PSA_WANT|MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL]_ALG_HMAC` and + `[PSA_WANT|MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL]KEY_TYPE_HMAC`. +- Required hash algorithm(s) as explained in [Hashes](#hashes) section. + +In such a build it is possible to disable legacy HMAC support by disabling +`MBEDTLS_MD_C` and still getting crypto operations, X.509 and TLS to work as +usual. Exceptions are: +- [Hashes](#hashes) are obviously valid here for the accelerated algorithms. +- Legacy HMAC support (`mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx()`) won't be possible. +- `MBEDTLS_PKCS[5|7]_C`, `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C` and `MBEDTLS_HKDF_C` since they + depend on the legacy implementation of HMAC. + - disabling HMAC_DRBG_C cause deterministic ECDSA (i.e. + `MBEDTLS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` on the legacy side and + `PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` on the PSA one) to be not available. Elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) --------------------------------- From b0498ef9955d378392701c5b14c83e47c644b9bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 15:55:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 304/551] adjust_legacy_from_psa: use intermediate symbol to enable builtin support Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h index 3d2293d342..9e6163f2da 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -443,40 +443,40 @@ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 -#define MBEDTLS_DHM_C +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH */ From 724a2abf0105a2d623a15bf9e59400517dd35e99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 15:57:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 305/551] test_suite_psa_crypto: fix typo in description Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index b1bc678346..a8c38db010 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 8192 public key: good depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 import_export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import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 key pair: export not permitterd +PSA import/export FFDH RFC7919 2048 key pair: export not permitted depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT:PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 import_export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rom 75501f5ede68cbcc9651ed17c5eaee2bf31d6a00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 16:49:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 306/551] psa_util: add raw<->DER ECDSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 36 +++++++ library/psa_util.c | 205 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 241 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 47724c633f..912179ba8c 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -176,6 +176,42 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 one. + * + * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. + * \param raw_len Length of raw buffer in bytes + * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER + * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. + * \param der_size Size of the output der buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data + * (in bytes) written to der buffer. It's undefined + * in case of failure. + * \param bits Size of each raw coordinate in bits. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, + size_t bits); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw. + * + * \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format. + * \param der_len Size of the der buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw + * signature. It can overlap with der buffer. + * \param raw_size Size of the raw buffer in bytes. + * \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid + * data (in bytes) written to raw buffer. It's undefined + * in case of failure. + * \param bits Size of each raw coordinate in bits. + */ +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, + size_t bits); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + /**@}*/ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 41586e262c..2c35db0106 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -40,6 +40,10 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) #include #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#include +#include +#endif /* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since * it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */ @@ -330,4 +334,205 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, } #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +/* + * Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. + * Note: this function is similar to mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(), but it doesn't + * depend on BIGNUM_C. + * Note: this function fills der_buf backward. + */ +static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der_buf_start, + unsigned char *der_buf_end) +{ + unsigned char *p = der_buf_end; + int len = raw_len; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + /* Copy the raw coordinate to the end of der_buf. */ + if ((p - der_buf_start) < len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + p -= len; + memcpy(p, raw_buf, len); + + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Provided input MPIs should not be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still + * detect that and return error in case. */ + while (*p == 0x00) { + ++p; + --len; + if (len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + + /* If MSb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. */ + if (*p & 0x80) { + if ((p - der_buf_start) < 1) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + --p; + *p = 0x00; + ++len; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der_buf_start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der_buf_start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); + + return len; +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, + size_t bits) +{ + unsigned char r[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + unsigned char s[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; + const size_t coordinate_len = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + size_t len = 0; + unsigned char *p = der + der_size; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + + if (raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + + /* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting + * the conversion. */ + memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); + memcpy(r, raw, coordinate_len); + memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); + memcpy(s, raw + coordinate_len, coordinate_len); + + /* der buffer will initially be written starting from its end so we pick s + * first and then r. */ + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(s, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + ret = convert_raw_to_der_single_int(r, coordinate_len, der, p); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p -= ret; + len += ret; + + /* Add ASN.1 header (len + tag). */ + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, der, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, der, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + /* memmove the content of der buffer to its beginnig. */ + memmove(der, p, len); + *der_len = len; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/* + * Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw. + * Note: der and raw buffers are not overlapping here. + */ +static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + size_t coordinate_size) +{ + unsigned char *p = der; + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t unpadded_len, padding_len = 0; + + /* Get the length of ASN.1 element (i.e. the integer we need to parse). */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + der_len, &unpadded_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + /* Skip leading zeros */ + while (*p == 0x00) { + p++; + unpadded_len--; + /* It should never happen that the input number is all zeros. */ + if (unpadded_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + } + + if (raw_len < coordinate_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + if (unpadded_len < coordinate_size) { + padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; + memset(raw, 0x00, padding_len); + } + memcpy(raw + padding_len, p, unpadded_len); + p += unpadded_len; + + return (int) (p - der); +} + +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, + size_t bits) +{ + unsigned char raw_tmp[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) der; + size_t data_len; + size_t coordinate_size = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits); + int ret; + + /* The output raw buffer should be at least twice the size of a raw + * coordinate in order to store r and s. */ + if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + + /* Check that the provided input DER buffer has the right header. */ + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, der + der_len, &data_len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + memset(raw_tmp, 0, sizeof(raw_tmp)); + + /* Extract r */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, sizeof(raw_tmp), + coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Extract s */ + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp + coordinate_size, + sizeof(raw_tmp) - coordinate_size, + coordinate_size); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ret; + data_len -= ret; + + /* Check that we consumed all the input der data. */ + if ((p - der) != (int) der_len) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + memcpy(raw, raw_tmp, 2 * coordinate_size); + *raw_len = 2 * coordinate_size; + + return 0; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ From bd5b9c61fec431c305416cf851d2ac31ac69df6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 16:49:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 307/551] pk_wrap: use PSA util functions for ECDSA conversion instead of PK ones Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pk_wrap.c | 175 ++++++---------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 154 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c index c232650229..9a29d929e8 100644 --- a/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) #include "psa_util_internal.h" #include "psa/crypto.h" +#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h" #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "pkwrite.h" @@ -536,66 +537,6 @@ static size_t eckey_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/* - * An ASN.1 encoded signature is a sequence of two ASN.1 integers. Parse one of - * those integers and convert it to the fixed-length encoding expected by PSA. - */ -static int extract_ecdsa_sig_int(unsigned char **from, const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *to, size_t to_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t unpadded_len, padding_len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(from, end, &unpadded_len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - while (unpadded_len > 0 && **from == 0x00) { - (*from)++; - unpadded_len--; - } - - if (unpadded_len > to_len || unpadded_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - - padding_len = to_len - unpadded_len; - memset(to, 0x00, padding_len); - memcpy(to + padding_len, *from, unpadded_len); - (*from) += unpadded_len; - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Convert a signature from an ASN.1 sequence of two integers - * to a raw {r,s} buffer. Note: the provided sig buffer must be at least - * twice as big as int_size. - */ -static int extract_ecdsa_sig(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, - unsigned char *sig, size_t int_size) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t tmp_size; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &tmp_size, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - /* Extract r */ - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig, int_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - /* Extract s */ - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig_int(p, end, sig + int_size, int_size)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - return 0; -} - /* Common helper for ECDSA verify using PSA functions. */ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, psa_ecc_family_t curve, size_t curve_bits, @@ -607,6 +548,7 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; psa_algorithm_t psa_sig_md = PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY; size_t signature_len = PSA_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_SIZE(curve_bits); + size_t converted_sig_len; unsigned char extracted_sig[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *p; psa_status_t status; @@ -631,11 +573,15 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, } p = (unsigned char *) sig; - /* extract_ecdsa_sig's last parameter is the size - * of each integer to be parsed, so it's actually half - * the size of the signature. */ - if ((ret = extract_ecdsa_sig(&p, sig + sig_len, extracted_sig, - signature_len/2)) != 0) { + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(p, sig_len, extracted_sig, + sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len, + curve_bits); + if (ret != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (converted_sig_len != signature_len) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; goto cleanup; } @@ -646,10 +592,6 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, goto cleanup; } - if (p != sig + sig_len) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH; - goto cleanup; - } ret = 0; cleanup: @@ -751,90 +693,6 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -/* - * Simultaneously convert and move raw MPI from the beginning of a buffer - * to an ASN.1 MPI at the end of the buffer. - * See also mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(). - * - * p: pointer to the end of the output buffer - * start: start of the output buffer, and also of the mpi to write at the end - * n_len: length of the mpi to read from start - */ -static int asn1_write_mpibuf(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, - size_t n_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - - if ((size_t) (*p - start) < n_len) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - - len = n_len; - *p -= len; - memmove(*p, start, len); - - /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. - * Neither r nor s should be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still detect - * that rather than overflowing the buffer in case of a PSA error. */ - while (len > 0 && **p == 0x00) { - ++(*p); - --len; - } - - /* this is only reached if the signature was invalid */ - if (len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED; - } - - /* if the msb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. - * Neither r nor s can be 0, so we can assume len > 0 at all times. */ - if (**p & 0x80) { - if (*p - start < 1) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - - *--(*p) = 0x00; - len += 1; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)); - - return (int) len; -} - -/* Transcode signature from PSA format to ASN.1 sequence. - * See ecdsa_signature_to_asn1 in ecdsa.c, but with byte buffers instead of - * MPIs, and in-place. - * - * [in/out] sig: the signature pre- and post-transcoding - * [in/out] sig_len: signature length pre- and post-transcoding - * [int] buf_len: the available size the in/out buffer - */ -static int pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len, - size_t buf_len) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - const size_t rs_len = *sig_len / 2; - unsigned char *p = sig + buf_len; - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig + rs_len, rs_len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, asn1_write_mpibuf(&p, sig, rs_len)); - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(&p, sig, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(&p, sig, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - memmove(sig, p, len); - *sig_len = len; - - return 0; -} - /* Common helper for ECDSA sign using PSA functions. * Instead of extracting key's properties in order to check which kind of ECDSA * signature it supports, we try both deterministic and non-deterministic. @@ -845,6 +703,15 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_status_t status; + psa_key_attributes_t key_attr = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + size_t key_bits = 0; + + status = psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &key_attr); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + return PSA_PK_ECDSA_TO_MBEDTLS_ERR(status); + } + key_bits = psa_get_key_bits(&key_attr); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&key_attr); status = psa_sign_hash(key_id, PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_alg)), @@ -863,7 +730,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, } done: - ret = pk_ecdsa_sig_asn1_from_psa(sig, sig_len, sig_size); + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(sig, sig_size, sig, sig_size, sig_len, key_bits); return ret; } From aed21640bdc3a6a4c3ddbbfe7bbb24e60544ee8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 16:50:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 308/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: add test function and data for ECDSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 71 +++++++++++++++++++ .../test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 44 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 115 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data create mode 100644 tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ce942c841a --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Raw data too short +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, DER buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30340218010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Null r +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Null s +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, r with MSb set +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"810101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30350219008101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, s with MSb set +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101820202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30350218010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101021900820202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Raw buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong sequence tag +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"403402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Invalid sequence length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"30FF02180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong integer tag +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303401180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong r integer length (too small) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402170101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402190101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010217020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010219020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30440220010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010102200202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010102200202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a990733f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* BEGIN_HEADER */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +enum { + ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER = 0, + ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW, +}; +/* END_HEADER */ + +/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES + * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C + * END_DEPENDENCIES + */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int direction, int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) +{ + unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; + size_t tmp_buf_len = exp_result->len; + size_t ret_len; + + TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); + + if (direction == ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER) { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, + key_bits), exp_ret); + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, + key_bits), exp_ret); + } + + if (exp_ret == 0) { + ASSERT_COMPARE(exp_result->x, exp_result->len, tmp_buf, ret_len); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); +} +/* END_CASE */ From 84890c9be29e58bc3b7b9d3ed187bc64fa56e450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 14:20:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 309/551] psa_util: improve description for ECDSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 6 +++-- library/psa_util.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 912179ba8c..ea0d5bb0dd 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa } #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) -/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 one. +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format (used by PSA APIs) to DER ASN.1 + * format (used by legacy crypto APIs). * * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. * \param raw_len Length of raw buffer in bytes @@ -195,7 +196,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw. +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format (used by legacy crypto + * APIs) to raw format (used by PSA APIs). * * \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format. * \param der_len Size of the der buffer in bytes. diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 2c35db0106..e16971bc53 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -335,11 +335,25 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) -/* - * Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. - * Note: this function is similar to mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(), but it doesn't - * depend on BIGNUM_C. - * Note: this function fills der_buf backward. +/** + * \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der + * buffer is filled backward (i.e. starting from its end). + * + * \param raw_buf Buffer containing the raw coordinate to be + * converted. + * \param raw_len Length of raw_buf in bytes. + * \param der_buf_start Pointer to the beginning of the buffer which + * will be filled with the DER converted data. + * \param der_buf_end End of the buffer used to store the DER output. + * + * \return On success, the amount of data (in bytes) written to + * the DER buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL if the provided der + * buffer is too small to contain all the converted data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA if the input raw + * coordinate is null (i.e. all zeros). + * + * \warning Raw and der buffer must not be overlapping. */ static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t raw_len, unsigned char *der_buf_start, @@ -436,9 +450,28 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) -/* - * Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw. - * Note: der and raw buffers are not overlapping here. +/** + * \brief Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw. + * + * \param der Buffer containing the DER integer value to be + * converted. + * \param der_len Length of the der buffer in bytes. + * \param raw Output buffer that will be filled with the + * converted data. This should be at least + * coordinate_size bytes. + * \param raw_len Size (in bytes) of the output raw buffer. + * \param coordinate_size Size (in bytes) of a single coordinate in raw + * format. + * + * \return On success, the amount of DER data parsed from the + * provided der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG if the integer tag + * is missing in the der buffer. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH if the integer + * is null (i.e. all zeros) or if the output raw buffer + * is too small to contain the converted raw value. + * + * \warning Der and raw buffers must not be overlapping. */ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, @@ -466,7 +499,7 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, } if (raw_len < coordinate_size) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + return ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; } if (unpadded_len < coordinate_size) { From 5713c8a5ac38990dc3747dc10b50a3b54a35a0c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 15:48:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 310/551] psa_util: minor code improvements Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index e16971bc53..c257d7593f 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -414,9 +414,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, /* Since raw and der buffers might overlap, dump r and s before starting * the conversion. */ - memset(r, 0, sizeof(r)); memcpy(r, raw, coordinate_len); - memset(s, 0, sizeof(s)); memcpy(s, raw + coordinate_len, coordinate_len); /* der buffer will initially be written starting from its end so we pick s @@ -481,6 +479,10 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t unpadded_len, padding_len = 0; + if (raw_len < coordinate_size) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; + } + /* Get the length of ASN.1 element (i.e. the integer we need to parse). */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + der_len, &unpadded_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); @@ -498,10 +500,6 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, } } - if (raw_len < coordinate_size) { - return ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - if (unpadded_len < coordinate_size) { padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; memset(raw, 0x00, padding_len); @@ -557,7 +555,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, data_len -= ret; /* Check that we consumed all the input der data. */ - if ((p - der) != (int) der_len) { + if ((size_t) (p - der) != der_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } From bda440f82da4fe20b7e3bfc0f0d9ae66fe8a9442 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 08:16:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 311/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: increase the size of tested integers - Replace 192 case with 256 - Replace 256 case with 512 - Add 521 case Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 142 ++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index ce942c841a..8598a4ef1d 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -1,71 +1,81 @@ -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 - -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Raw data too short -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA - -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, DER buffer too small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30340218010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL - -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Null r -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA - -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, Null s -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA - -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, r with MSb set -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"810101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30350219008101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 - -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 192bit, s with MSb set -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:192:"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101820202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30350218010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101021900820202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Raw buffer too small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong sequence tag -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"403402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Invalid sequence length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"30FF02180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong integer tag -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303401180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong r integer length (too small) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402170101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402190101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010218020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010217020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH - -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 192bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:192:"303402180101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010219020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA - ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"30440220010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010102200202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Raw data too short +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null r +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null s +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, r with MSb set +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, s with MSb set +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010102200202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":"01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Raw buffer too small +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong sequence tag +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"40440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid sequence length +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30ff0220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong integer tag +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440120111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too small) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440219111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102192222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:512:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 512bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:512:"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8 +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:528:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8 +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 521bit, Success +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:528:"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 From 99c0369d314ca613d4b721f96c8987560a60c220 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 08:21:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 312/551] psa_util: add include asn1write.h in public header This is mandatory to have support for the error codes defined in the asn1write.h header file. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 5 +++++ tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 2 -- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index ea0d5bb0dd..87787f1e03 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -16,6 +16,11 @@ #include "psa/crypto.h" +/* ASN1 defines used in the ECDSA conversion functions. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +#include +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) /* Expose whatever RNG the PSA subsystem uses to applications using the diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index 2a990733f4..bf1f88d8b8 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -1,8 +1,6 @@ /* BEGIN_HEADER */ -#include #include #include -#include enum { ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER = 0, From c22e3ce8efd8a6f6c804ac1b28c17b0ea3bb4080 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 08:46:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 313/551] psa_util: remove CRYPTO_C guard from ECDSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 8 +++---- library/psa_util.c | 22 ++++++++++--------- .../test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 7 +----- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 87787f1e03..93fb38d736 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ #include "psa/crypto.h" -/* ASN1 defines used in the ECDSA conversion functions. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) +/* ASN1 defines used in the ECDSA conversion functions. + * Note: intentionally not adding MBEDTLS_ASN1_[PARSE|WRITE]_C guards here + * otherwise error codes would be unknown in test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data.*/ #include -#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) @@ -180,6 +180,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa { return (mbedtls_md_type_t) (psa_alg & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK); } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format (used by PSA APIs) to DER ASN.1 @@ -221,5 +222,4 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, /**@}*/ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index c257d7593f..ad5c9fb127 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -8,14 +8,20 @@ #include "common.h" +/* This is needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */ +#include + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) +#include +#include +#endif + +#include "psa_util_internal.h" + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #include -#include "psa_util_internal.h" - -/* The following includes are needed for MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX macros */ -#include #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_LIGHT) #include #endif @@ -40,10 +46,6 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_SOME_PSA) #include #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) -#include -#include -#endif /* PSA_SUCCESS is kept at the top of each error table since * it's the most common status when everything functions properly. */ @@ -334,6 +336,8 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, } #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der @@ -565,5 +569,3 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index bf1f88d8b8..57cda0945e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -8,12 +8,7 @@ enum { }; /* END_HEADER */ -/* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES - * depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C - * END_DEPENDENCIES - */ - -/* BEGIN_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int direction, int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; From 3f0809a99d3464ca105c75d75093a8e6cd9fffd8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 09:00:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 314/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: split ECDSA test function in two Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 40 ++++++++--------- .../test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 43 ++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 8598a4ef1d..a8d34581c0 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -1,81 +1,81 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Raw data too short depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer too small depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null r depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null s depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, r with MSb set depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, s with MSb set depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Raw buffer too small depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong sequence tag depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"40440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"40440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid sequence length depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30ff0220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30ff0220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong integer tag depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440120111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440120111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too small) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440219111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440219111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102192222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102192222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:512:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:512:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:512:"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:512:"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 # Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER:528:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 # Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW:528:"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:528:"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index 57cda0945e..3c4976607a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -1,15 +1,10 @@ /* BEGIN_HEADER */ #include #include - -enum { - ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER = 0, - ECDSA_DER_TO_RAW, -}; /* END_HEADER */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ -void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int direction, int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ +void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; size_t tmp_buf_len = exp_result->len; @@ -17,15 +12,31 @@ void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int direction, int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_re TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); - if (direction == ECDSA_RAW_TO_DER) { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, - key_bits), exp_ret); - } else { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, - key_bits), exp_ret); - } + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, + key_bits), exp_ret); + + if (exp_ret == 0) { + ASSERT_COMPARE(exp_result->x, exp_result->len, tmp_buf, ret_len); + } + +exit: + mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); +} +/* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +void ecdsa_der_to_raw(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) +{ + unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; + size_t tmp_buf_len = exp_result->len; + size_t ret_len; + + TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, + key_bits), exp_ret); if (exp_ret == 0) { ASSERT_COMPARE(exp_result->x, exp_result->len, tmp_buf, ret_len); From 3ccb2b54236a096c6757521ecce458b5e84f4abe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 10:51:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 315/551] all.sh: add exception for ASN1_PARSE_C in check_test_dependencies There is no PSA equivalent to ASN1 legacy symbols. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 44930d28b5..41faaee479 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -1059,11 +1059,16 @@ component_check_test_dependencies () { echo "!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH" >> $expected # No PSA equivalent - used to skip decryption tests in PSA-ECB, CBC/XTS/NIST_KW/DES echo "!MBEDTLS_BLOCK_CIPHER_NO_DECRYPT" >> $expected - # This is used by import_rsa_made_up() in test_suite_psa_crypto in order - # to build a fake RSA key of the wanted size based on + # MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C is used by import_rsa_made_up() in test_suite_psa_crypto + # in order to build a fake RSA key of the wanted size based on # PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS. The legacy module is only used by # the test code and that's probably the most convenient way of achieving # the test's goal. + # + # Both MBEDTLS_ASN1_[PARSE|WRITE]_C are used in ECDSA conversion functions + # (in psa_util module) and, therefore, also in test_suite_psa_crypto_util. + # There is no PSA equivalent for these ASN1 symbols in PSA. + echo "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C" >> $expected echo "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C" >> $expected # No PSA equivalent - we should probably have one in the future. echo "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE" >> $expected From 86bae52c5500509d9837fff6f0d40e2cff980e2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 11:12:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 316/551] psa_util: skip leading zeros in der format with "if" instead of "while" This is possible because we know that DER format can have at most 1 leading zero. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index ad5c9fb127..e69ff6bb6c 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -494,8 +494,8 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, return ret; } - /* Skip leading zeros */ - while (*p == 0x00) { + /* Skip possible leading zero */ + if (*p == 0x00) { p++; unpadded_len--; /* It should never happen that the input number is all zeros. */ From a7b83a04ee9142f876c4703fbbdb5ee56c6566a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:07:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 317/551] psa_util: add variable casting in convert_raw_to_der_single_int() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index e69ff6bb6c..ef9aff1724 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t ra unsigned char *der_buf_end) { unsigned char *p = der_buf_end; - int len = raw_len; + int len = (int) raw_len; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; /* Copy the raw coordinate to the end of der_buf. */ From 31657ed70c80303d980c0d88ba5d0f1cca15fd4e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 07:01:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 318/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: change curve type for 256bits tests Tests with 256 bits curve simply depends on any curve of that size, but they don't really care about which family is enabled. Here I replaced PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 with PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 because otherwise there were test disparities in the "analyze_driver_vs_reference_tfm_config" component of "analyze_outcomes.py". It looked simpler to change the curve type in the test suite's data rather than adding proper exceptions in "analyze_outcomes.py" Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 32 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index a8d34581c0..49848615c4 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -1,65 +1,65 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Raw data too short -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer too small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null r -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null s -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, r with MSb set -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, s with MSb set -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Raw buffer too small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong sequence tag -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"40440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid sequence length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30ff0220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong integer tag -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440120111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too small) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440219111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102192222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success From 17105df3e776a79b2668c2fb960ef1f4dcb8171a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 10:41:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 319/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: add comments to 512/521 bit size test cases Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 49848615c4..45a3cb5656 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -62,20 +62,24 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +# 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 ecdsa_raw_to_der:512:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +# 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA DER -> Raw, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 ecdsa_der_to_raw:512:"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 -# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8 +# 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. +# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 -# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8 +# 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. +# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8. ECDSA DER -> Raw, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 ecdsa_der_to_raw:528:"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 From f4d2dc2d772cef1baa7367996c45e9a0ae7e1be1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 10:57:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 320/551] psa_util: guard ECDSA conversion functions with proper (internal) symbol Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h | 7 +++++++ include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 4 ++++ library/psa_util.c | 4 ++++ tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h index 696266c6fb..833f152688 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h @@ -400,6 +400,13 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_USE_ARMV8_A_CRYPTO_ONLY #endif +/* psa_util file features some ECDSA conversion functions, to convert between + * legacy's ASN.1 DER format and PSA's raw one. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA +#endif + /* Some internal helpers to determine which keys are availble. */ #if (!defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)) || \ (defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_AES)) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 93fb38d736..3bf05d1832 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format (used by PSA APIs) to DER ASN.1 * format (used by legacy crypto APIs). @@ -220,6 +222,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, size_t bits); #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ + /**@}*/ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_H */ diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index ef9aff1724..c78b6035d9 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -338,6 +338,8 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) + #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der @@ -569,3 +571,5 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ + +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index 3c4976607a..bfdafa7b3a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ #include /* END_HEADER */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ void ecdsa_der_to_raw(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; From 688f795cb38b86995051c3033b7aeb73f573ddf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 09:18:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 321/551] asn1: use the new symbol to guard dependencies of ECDSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/asn1.h | 5 +++-- include/mbedtls/asn1write.h | 5 +++-- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 4 ---- library/asn1parse.c | 5 +++-- library/asn1write.c | 5 +++-- library/psa_util.c | 4 ---- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 4 ++-- 7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h index 3c3bfad9d4..ff019f432a 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/asn1.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1.h @@ -197,7 +197,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_asn1_named_data { } mbedtls_asn1_named_data; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) /** * \brief Get the length of an ASN.1 element. * Updates the pointer to immediately behind the length. @@ -244,7 +245,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_len(unsigned char **p, int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, size_t *len, int tag); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** diff --git a/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h b/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h index 7af4aba41f..0c5a85ac27 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/asn1write.h @@ -36,7 +36,8 @@ extern "C" { #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) /** * \brief Write a length field in ASN.1 format. * @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_len(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, */ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsigned char tag); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA*/ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 3bf05d1832..15e92e36f9 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -184,7 +184,6 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format (used by PSA APIs) to DER ASN.1 * format (used by legacy crypto APIs). * @@ -201,9 +200,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, size_t bits); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format (used by legacy crypto * APIs) to raw format (used by PSA APIs). * @@ -220,7 +217,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, size_t bits); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ diff --git a/library/asn1parse.c b/library/asn1parse.c index c02b233eca..e33fdf71da 100644 --- a/library/asn1parse.c +++ b/library/asn1parse.c @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -73,7 +74,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(unsigned char **p, return mbedtls_asn1_get_len(p, end, len); } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) int mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(unsigned char **p, diff --git a/library/asn1write.c b/library/asn1write.c index 114091d635..775a9ef530 100644 --- a/library/asn1write.c +++ b/library/asn1write.c @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ #include "common.h" -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) #include "mbedtls/asn1write.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" @@ -62,7 +63,7 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *start, unsign return 1; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C || MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C || MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) static int mbedtls_asn1_write_len_and_tag(unsigned char **p, diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index c78b6035d9..9e21602f65 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -340,7 +340,6 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C) /** * \brief Convert a single raw coordinate to DER ASN.1 format. The output der * buffer is filled backward (i.e. starting from its end). @@ -451,9 +450,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C) /** * \brief Convert a single integer from ASN.1 DER format to raw. * @@ -570,6 +567,5 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, return 0; } -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index bfdafa7b3a..8f0dd6cfc3 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ #include /* END_HEADER */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA:MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ void ecdsa_der_to_raw(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; From 448377bec7c7d1a063c7bc6a0adeb8053659e97b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 16:24:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 322/551] all.sh: remove MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C exception from check_test_dependencies() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 41faaee479..fddcc01539 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -1065,10 +1065,9 @@ component_check_test_dependencies () { # the test code and that's probably the most convenient way of achieving # the test's goal. # - # Both MBEDTLS_ASN1_[PARSE|WRITE]_C are used in ECDSA conversion functions + # MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C is also used in ECDSA conversion functions # (in psa_util module) and, therefore, also in test_suite_psa_crypto_util. - # There is no PSA equivalent for these ASN1 symbols in PSA. - echo "MBEDTLS_ASN1_PARSE_C" >> $expected + # There is no PSA equivalent for this ASN1 symbols in PSA. echo "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C" >> $expected # No PSA equivalent - we should probably have one in the future. echo "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE" >> $expected From 1533c3f660e009b333c9f1f47b4866769f3edde6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 11:24:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 323/551] test_suite_rsa: improve rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key() adding more checks Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 8 ++++---- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index de5e5699a6..92209c46f6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -617,13 +617,13 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST rsa_selftest: RSA parse/write PKCS#1 private key - 1024 bits -rsa_import_pkcs1_key:0:"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" +rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key:0:"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" RSA parse/write PKCS#1 public key - 1024 bits -rsa_import_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001" +rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001" RSA parse/write PKCS#1 private key - 2048 bits -rsa_import_pkcs1_key:0:"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" +rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key:0:"308204a40201000282010100dcabfd25f3b7d67155e5c2520518570e95754ef883a973f94b2b0fb2d7ad733a3b0976c6314770eaf728304ee61e0dfe91811fc4a8219fbc3687cb3cfca54b58804d1ed4de985dc827374cb31b7b23225e130858d6b812dee6a356a8f8d211ba0930d0ec38193cee0a186f4a760cc3aa40e1d04fe4a14506ed279a9080aedd2676a4026bcb1ee24b2c00853bffcc04b5fb3e542626c2b2c54a62f3d6e01df95544fdf85c22cc0846275cb9cdfe73876e94e532ced0bca9876de74ff1edc9c8ac89aa8586aa34ca6f44c972d1e73aaddae168a5e67ec69cd14f206155e6e1161e7aa6754e947d5d26ee5f8789598a79ea4ff0263e2b8bf90641320771955007d102030100010282010100d25c964f769d3aad0210ac04da5c90a9136b27e41a47108a86d0beff6341330640bf4dddb39e82134b97a12da58ae3165988f94ad4687148cfc6f5c4e6a7804316d3eddf496f807f4c7b17ffe9e3a1e3a2408c857bf32ff2137584284242a7a96c1780229f7bd7aca82d10f2afc48d4620e1e35e35fa52be3e97b16dad6e84dbdfab4e7e21c7c2e5e5cd1c936f6c221e806bd14afa77b3eefc62e984aa2d391da408aaec0dbd2eade3023ebac77e3416cd67491d60053d317c6c8665be5c33961c379309d37d0a653d1859a6abfe195644d474739dbc44f62e623505f9460d9d8defafb12f4149d5baaf798f1345f565430cd7c096c24ca8d02d13fe90c20c5102818100f116cfdbfc0d5b3528cbfada1b21d4292ff188d41a4b22e658a9e29f610adf5fcb3329b0f567ba5029195fd648d06cc2174638f2f18ff0e0251e283e0a0b1f792751925efb617af3405083245c673dae77edc811fd668769d28ac1bee36261658a32f56a5e1b9b9e4f4fa7da55adeeb08c92f1de89f6186bd9c6d1e721638d2d02818100ea51e8798225e4ee77aa08e2f5ee0f8b847edd4c34d9bf7b8cf339b61d5bd22d504c5ab5f17572850f39018736474a449186e783dfda35da95902c8eaaec4bebb8ab6c057c678f37cd53fc1a12e5ace83d2a44d72195d565b3e8c12f89f2523fe37e52adbafde783be361fcd1f021aaaabf860febd8c5726c7089622ccca73b50281807d8248b7d76204a78a13970650b5adc3bb67dcb9beee7abebc4dc4e3001c2ee9a9d97accdb1523137431f78890e3a09af28ee63ae3b2f1cd5ec57261c9ccbc97cff651630d2f5458aa94bf910061e6e49b1eb8d754ba39a8c7a8e0f04564041c5e73e4fb78fe9a673216dfe57451563fa70f20c79fbef43bc166160463877609028180693b0fa44206b2a145ac5f014e60f32a3cfe9c73b4e8754e0f26cc2c35531f38aa6f1fedc5da70ebc0c261255003041f771b96ad6ac29c9ce5be31c4808e4e2a366d05be10f89121065d49428c6a0914e32330774ce5f5480f5be02671551a0b07279c09d9885d8894cbc9cc5cb89d3138b9fb156c1ab2a8ff89a3a34d453e6102818100aff57dd813fd064d8d1a5e8c7ea7e534dff6963a9b5b1c4da12219268c0500288901bbd36edb8071679bcd9d0d8deacfaa52e4b3659f4a69a5c5322f104524f83eb4b94bf6f02b5ad7c2ccd9bc5688f4e18ff2a70ae7638a83f2f87d8ecc9e0eebf2283f809670c8a0b79e1a576a6c9c04d4d71b75647c818a23873cdc0d77bf" RSA parse/write PKCS#1 public key - 2048 bits -rsa_import_pkcs1_key:1:"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" +rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key:1:"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" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 315d4f6bb1..62f593e039 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1373,7 +1373,7 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ -void rsa_import_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) +void rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) { mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; unsigned char *input_start = input->x; @@ -1388,13 +1388,21 @@ void rsa_import_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); + /* Parse the key and write it back to output_buf. */ if (is_public) { TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(&rsa_ctx, &input_start, input_end), 0); + TEST_ASSERT(input_start == input_end); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); } else { TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_write(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); } + /* This check holds because we alloacated an output buffer which is exactly + * large enough to contain the written data. */ + TEST_ASSERT(output_end == output_start); + + /* Check that the written key matches with the one provided in input. */ + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(output_buf, input->len, input->x, input->len); exit: mbedtls_free(output_buf); From 6def24ce73fb90d5706b290cce675f7bd0a0f4ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 12:33:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 324/551] test_suite_[pkparse/rsa]: move RSA private key parsing tests Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/rsa_internal.h | 1 + tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data | 72 ---------------------------- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 13 +++++ 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h index 62972c6345..6046850fcc 100644 --- a/library/rsa_internal.h +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #define MBEDTLS_RSA_INTERNAL_H #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "mbedtls/asn1.h" /** * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data index 6387735878..762fd52a23 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -1120,78 +1120,6 @@ pk_parse_key:"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT Key ASN1 (First tag not Sequence) pk_parse_key:"020100":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, incorrect version tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"300100":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, version tag missing) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3000":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, invalid version) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3003020101":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct version, incorrect tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"300402010000":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format+values, minimal modulus size (128 bit)) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":0 - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, modulus too small (127 bit)) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, modulus even) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857002030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, d == 0) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct format, d == p == q == 0) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900000000000000000002090000000000000000000209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, trailing garbage) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3064020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, n wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100FF1100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, e wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571FF030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, d wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c85710203010001FF11009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, p wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201FF0900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, q wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61FF0900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, dp wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a211FF09009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, dq wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401FF0813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - -Key ASN1 (RSAPrivateKey, correct values, qp wrong tag) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C -pk_parse_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b7221FF08052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT - Key ASN1 (ECPrivateKey, empty parameters) depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_parse_key:"30070201010400a000":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index 92209c46f6..5d816104ad 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -627,3 +627,57 @@ rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key:0:"308204a40201000282010100dcabfd25f3b7d67155e5c252051 RSA parse/write PKCS#1 public key - 2048 bits rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key:1:"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" + +RSA parse private key - incorrect version tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"300100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - version tag missing +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +RSA parse private key - invalid version +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3003020101":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA parse private key - correct version, incorrect tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"300402010000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct format+values, minimal modulus size (128 bit) +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":0 + +RSA parse private key - correct format, modulus too small (127 bit) +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED + +RSA parse private key - correct format, modulus even +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857002030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA parse private key - correct format, d == 0 +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA parse private key - correct format, d == p == q == 0 +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900000000000000000002090000000000000000000209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA parse private key - correct values, trailing garbage +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3064020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +RSA parse private key - correct values, n wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100FF1100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct values, e wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571FF030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct values, d wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c85710203010001FF11009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct values, p wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201FF0900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct values, q wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61FF0900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct values, dp wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a211FF09009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct values, dq wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401FF0813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse private key - correct values, qp wrong tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b7221FF08052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 62f593e039..4fe15dd6bc 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1372,6 +1372,19 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_parse_pkcs1_key(data_t *input, int exp_ret_val) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), exp_ret_val); + +exit: + mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa_ctx); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE */ void rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) { From 6d597f1967cb140686724f6cd1d69a988d801bc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 13:44:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 325/551] test_suite_rsa: extend rsa_parse_pkcs1_key adding tests for public key Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++-------- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 11 ++++- 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index 5d816104ad..bd286814df 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -629,55 +629,85 @@ RSA parse/write PKCS#1 public key - 2048 bits rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key:1:"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" RSA parse private key - incorrect version tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"300100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"300100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - version tag missing -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA RSA parse private key - invalid version -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3003020101":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3003020101":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA parse private key - correct version, incorrect tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"300402010000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"300402010000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct format+values, minimal modulus size (128 bit) -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":0 +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":0 RSA parse private key - correct format, modulus too small (127 bit) -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED RSA parse private key - correct format, modulus even -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857002030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857002030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA parse private key - correct format, d == 0 -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA parse private key - correct format, d == p == q == 0 -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900000000000000000002090000000000000000000209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900000000000000000002090000000000000000000209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA parse private key - correct values, trailing garbage -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3064020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3064020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH RSA parse private key - correct values, n wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100FF1100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100FF1100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct values, e wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571FF030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571FF030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct values, d wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c85710203010001FF11009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c85710203010001FF11009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct values, p wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201FF0900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201FF0900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct values, q wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61FF0900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61FF0900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct values, dp wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a211FF09009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a211FF09009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct values, dq wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401FF0813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401FF0813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct values, qp wrong tag -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b7221FF08052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b7221FF08052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse public key - wrong initial tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"318189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse public key - wrong modulus tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189038181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse public key - wrong public exponent tag +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70303010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse public key - modulus 0 +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"3081890281810000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA parse public key - public exponent 0 +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA parse public key - wrong sequence length +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308188028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +RSA parse public key - wrong modulus length +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028180009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + +RSA parse public key - wrong public exponent length +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70202010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + +RSA parse public key - missing modulus +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30050203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +RSA parse public key - missing public exponent +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308184028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb7":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 4fe15dd6bc..71ca2b9ace 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1373,12 +1373,19 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ -void rsa_parse_pkcs1_key(data_t *input, int exp_ret_val) +void rsa_parse_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input, int exp_ret_val) { mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; + unsigned char *start = input->x; + unsigned char *end = input->x + input->len; + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), exp_ret_val); + if (is_public) { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), exp_ret_val); + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), exp_ret_val); + } exit: mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa_ctx); From ea986472828ad935dddaa9fe481bcc7d9b482df6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 13:55:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 326/551] changelog: document RSA parse/write improvements Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8647.txt | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/8647.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..cfd3a4b9f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +Default behavior changes + * Importing of RSA keys in PEM format in PSA is officially unsupported + (this was previously undocumented). + +Features + * It is possible to enable RSA support in PSA (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + + RSA_C) without enabling PK module (MBEDTLS_[PK|PK_WRITE|PK_PARSE]_C). From 7fd162ec262408e4700f95bfe90638dca5247967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 18:05:53 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 327/551] Refactor common PThreads CMake code Move the flags and find of Threads to root CMakeLists.txt, rather than duplicate these everywhere. Make explicit linking of library with PThreads use the same mechanism. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- CMakeLists.txt | 5 +++++ library/CMakeLists.txt | 2 +- programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/random/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt | 3 --- programs/test/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/util/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- tests/CMakeLists.txt | 4 ---- 15 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt index ad056466ad..68dfcb03d0 100644 --- a/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/CMakeLists.txt @@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ if(MBEDTLS_PYTHON_EXECUTABLE) endif() +# We now potentially need to link all executables against PThreads, if available +set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) +set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) +find_package(Threads) + # If this is the root project add longer list of available CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE values if(CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR STREQUAL CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR) set(CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE ${CMAKE_BUILD_TYPE} diff --git a/library/CMakeLists.txt b/library/CMakeLists.txt index 5c297e0a1f..49803416dd 100644 --- a/library/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/library/CMakeLists.txt @@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ if(HAIKU) endif(HAIKU) if(LINK_WITH_PTHREAD) - set(libs ${libs} pthread) + set(libs ${libs} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT}) endif() if(LINK_WITH_TRUSTED_STORAGE) diff --git a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt index 81741020f5..ccb8db564f 100644 --- a/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/aes/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(executables crypt_and_hash ) diff --git a/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt index b497e8a48d..e925524f68 100644 --- a/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/cipher/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(executables cipher_aead_demo ) diff --git a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt index 97b8fd2ebc..c389029bca 100644 --- a/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/fuzz/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(libs ${mbedtls_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT} diff --git a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt index 504a4052f0..fcacf3ba4f 100644 --- a/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/hash/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(executables generic_sum hello diff --git a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt index 2f55c61224..cd0387a882 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/pkey/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(executables_mbedtls dh_client dh_server diff --git a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt index dd1b1a2a8c..a8e4b0e372 100644 --- a/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/psa/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(executables aead_demo crypto_examples diff --git a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt index c1184d1186..5940395354 100644 --- a/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/random/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(executables gen_entropy gen_random_ctr_drbg diff --git a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt index 8047b9f157..ec2c86fb4a 100644 --- a/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/ssl/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,6 +1,3 @@ -set(THREADS_USE_PTHREADS_WIN32 true) -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) find_package(Threads) set(libs diff --git a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt index 3709276f54..f91f786b9e 100644 --- a/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/test/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(libs ${mbedtls_target} ) diff --git a/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt index 2f8ab2a3af..78bd5e792d 100644 --- a/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/test/cmake_subproject/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,9 +1,5 @@ cmake_minimum_required(VERSION 3.5.1) -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - # Test the target renaming support by adding a prefix to the targets built set(MBEDTLS_TARGET_PREFIX subproject_test_) diff --git a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt index 6a8659e9b4..cb6bc3d2d2 100644 --- a/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/util/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(libs ${mbedcrypto_target} ) diff --git a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt index e41b4069ef..43437f070b 100644 --- a/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/programs/x509/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(libs ${mbedx509_target} ) diff --git a/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/tests/CMakeLists.txt index cb54ea4086..70f5bc9299 100644 --- a/tests/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,7 +1,3 @@ -set(CMAKE_THREAD_PREFER_PTHREAD TRUE) -set(THREADS_PREFER_PTHREAD_FLAG TRUE) -find_package(Threads) - set(libs ${mbedtls_target} ${CMAKE_THREAD_LIBS_INIT} From 0c847bcbe79c11a74b5b1d1fec687d75888dfab5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 19:08:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 328/551] Fix Make issues with Everest enabled Apply Gilles suggestion to fix the problem with make on the CI when everest is enabled, i.e. use $(THIRDPARTY_DIR) instead of a fuzz specific hack involving $(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- 3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc | 8 ++++---- 3rdparty/p256-m/Makefile.inc | 6 +++--- programs/Makefile | 2 +- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc b/3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc index 77a6b49654..8055ce9503 100644 --- a/3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc +++ b/3rdparty/everest/Makefile.inc @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I../3rdparty/everest/include -I../3rdparty/everest/include/everest -I../3rdparty/everest/include/everest/kremlib +THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/include -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/include/everest -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/include/everest/kremlib THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS+= \ - ../3rdparty/everest/library/everest.o \ - ../3rdparty/everest/library/x25519.o \ - ../3rdparty/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.o + $(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/library/everest.o \ + $(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/library/x25519.o \ + $(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/everest/library/Hacl_Curve25519_joined.o diff --git a/3rdparty/p256-m/Makefile.inc b/3rdparty/p256-m/Makefile.inc index fc8f73bf84..53bb55b547 100644 --- a/3rdparty/p256-m/Makefile.inc +++ b/3rdparty/p256-m/Makefile.inc @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/include -I../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m/include/p256-m -I../3rdparty/p256-m/p256-m_driver_interface +THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES+=-I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m/p256-m/include -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m/p256-m/include/p256-m -I$(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m/p256-m_driver_interface THIRDPARTY_CRYPTO_OBJECTS+= \ - ../3rdparty/p256-m//p256-m_driver_entrypoints.o \ - ../3rdparty/p256-m//p256-m/p256-m.o + $(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m//p256-m_driver_entrypoints.o \ + $(THIRDPARTY_DIR)/p256-m//p256-m/p256-m.o diff --git a/programs/Makefile b/programs/Makefile index 82c8569963..6baf4651a5 100644 --- a/programs/Makefile +++ b/programs/Makefile @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ all: fuzz endif fuzz: ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS} - $(MAKE) -C fuzz THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES=$(THIRDPARTY_INCLUDES) + $(MAKE) -C fuzz ${MBEDTLS_TEST_OBJS}: $(MAKE) -C ../tests mbedtls_test From 9cd2e9ad1b0c198708694661fc0567cddf2c754a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 13:40:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 329/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: require MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C Ideally this and other pk functions would work with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT (i.e. whether PSA API functions are implemented locally or via client-server communication). However, at the moment, some helper functions are missing when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is disabled, at least mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(). For the time being, don't provide mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() when MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C is disabled. We can improve later, looking generally at a group of functions to generalize, not mixed with delivering new APIs. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/pk.h | 4 ++-- library/pk.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h index a43b94955c..54ca9adc8f 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, psa_key_usage_t usage); #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) /** * \brief Determine valid PSA attributes that can be used to * import a key into PSA. @@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_usage_t usage, psa_key_attributes_t *attributes); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ /** * \brief Verify signature (including padding if relevant). diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 191132553d..b629ce2e81 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, int want_crypt) @@ -586,7 +586,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return 0; } -#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ /* * Helper for mbedtls_pk_sign and mbedtls_pk_verify From 2bd4ddc8e0c0a908aea046ff8f79547805e840cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 14:15:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 330/551] Implement pick-a-curve when ECP_LIGHT is disabled Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index e522ea747b..2a8a5f78c1 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -160,6 +160,43 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_key_len_func(void *ctx) } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) +static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecc_pick_grp_id(void) +{ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT) + return mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list()[0]; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519; +#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) + return MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448; +#else + return 0; +#endif +} +#endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_type_t *psa_type) @@ -201,7 +238,7 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, case MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH: case MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA: { - mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_ecp_grp_id_list()[0]; + mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = ecc_pick_grp_id(); size_t bits; *psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(mbedtls_ecc_group_to_psa(grp_id, &bits)); TEST_EQUAL(pk_genkey(pk, grp_id), 0); From 77faddf93b3fbe9601dcdb69fdc0e338d5f5133d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 10:50:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 331/551] Depend on legacy RSA key generation for test code In principle the RSA tests shouldn't depend on RSA key generation: they just need to operate on RSA keys. However they do need some method of creating an RSA key, and we're currently doing random generation. So depend on what the test code needs. Depend on the legacy RSA interface, since driver-only RSA isn't currently supported in the PK module. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 96 ++++++++++++++--------------- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 6 +- 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index 8951e72170..e64f9b7616 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -688,136 +688,136 @@ pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ # Bad usage due to not specifying sign/crypt/derive. PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=0 (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH # Bad usage due to not specifying sign/crypt/derive. PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=EXPORT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH # This usage could make sense, but is not currently supported. PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=DECRYPT|EXPORT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH # Bad usage due to not specifying more than one of sign/crypt/derive. PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=DECRYPT|SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH # This usage could make sense, but is not currently supported. PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=SIGN_MESSAGE|SIGN_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH # This usage could make sense, but is not currently supported. PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=SIGN_MESSAGE|VERIFY_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair DECRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair DECRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-512 pair DECRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair->public ENCRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair->public ENCRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-512 pair->public ENCRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public ENCRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 public ENCRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_256) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-512 public ENCRYPT -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_SHA512:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(PSA_ALG_SHA_512) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair SIGN_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair SIGN_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair->public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 pair->public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v21 SHA-256 public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_MD_NONE:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public SIGN_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 pair DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: RSA v15 public DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair DECRYPT (bad) @@ -989,69 +989,69 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_MESSAGE & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN|VERIFY & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN|DECRYPT & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN|... & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT # For a PK_OPAQUE key, mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() ignores the input # key's algorithm policy. Just this time, test with a few different algorithms. PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [0] -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [raw] -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [v15] -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [PSS] -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, DECRYPT & DECRYPT -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, DECRYPT|... & DECRYPT -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, ... & DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, ... & EXPORT (bad) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & ENCRYPT -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:0:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 2a8a5f78c1..cf0581c83f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -215,10 +215,14 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, *psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR; mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk); if (want_pair) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( rsa, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS, 65537), 0); +#else + TEST_FAIL("I don't know how to create an RSA key pair in this configuration."); +#endif } else { unsigned char N[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS)] = { 0xff }; N[sizeof(N) - 1] = 0x03; @@ -1772,7 +1776,7 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ void pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes(int md_type, int from_pair, int usage_arg, int to_pair, int expected_alg) From 80edec5f847a2baaaa3173bd849cc8dac1a0b8d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 09:33:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 332/551] all.sh: remove MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C exception from check_test_dependencies() Since we officially disabled support for importing of PEM formatted keys into PSA we removed dedicated tests from test_suite_psa_crypto. As a consequence MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C is no more an exception for component_check_test_dependencies(). Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index f0a0058c98..318df378a4 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -1069,9 +1069,6 @@ component_check_test_dependencies () { echo "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE" >> $expected # No PSA equivalent - needed by some init tests echo "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED" >> $expected - # Used by two tests that are about an extension to the PSA standard; - # as such, no PSA equivalent. - echo "MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C" >> $expected # Compare reality with expectation. # We want an exact match, to ensure the above list remains up-to-date. From 92c17c456c6cef1058598062b207c032d8b9fad3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chien Wong Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 19:11:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 333/551] Use separate input/output buffer. Explain why error is expected Signed-off-by: Chien Wong --- tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function | 43 ++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function index 07a6e4593b..e23d8d03da 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function @@ -493,15 +493,20 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ +/* NISP SP 800-38D, Section 5.2.1.1 requires that bit length of IV should + * satisfy 1 <= bit_len(IV) <= 2^64 - 1. */ void gcm_invalid_iv_len(void) { mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + // Invalid IV length 0 gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, 0, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + // Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8. #if SIZE_MAX >= UINT64_MAX + // Invalid IV length 2^61 gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, 1ULL << 61, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); #endif @@ -513,30 +518,31 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ -/* - * Test if GCM rejects total ad_len >= 2^61 bytes. - * Also test if GCM handles potential total ad_len overflow properly. - - * Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8. - */ void gcm_add_len_too_long(void) { + // Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8. #if SIZE_MAX >= UINT64_MAX mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + /* NISP SP 800-38D, Section 5.2.1.1 requires that bit length of AD should + * be <= 2^64 - 1, ie < 2^64. This is the minimum invalid length in bytes. */ + uint64_t len_max = 1ULL << 61; gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, 1ULL << 61), + // Feed AD that just exceeds the length limit + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, len_max), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + // Feed AD that just exceeds the length limit in two calls TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, 1), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, (1ULL << 61) - 1), + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, len_max - 1), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); + // Test if potential total AD length overflow is handled properly TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, 1), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update_ad(&ctx, b16, UINT64_MAX), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); @@ -547,35 +553,36 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE */ -/* - * Test if GCM rejects total input length > 2^36 - 32 bytes. - * Also test if GCM handles potential total input length overflow properly. - - * Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8. - */ void gcm_input_len_too_long(void) { + // Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8 #if SIZE_MAX >= UINT64_MAX mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + uint8_t out[1]; size_t out_len; + /* NISP SP 800-38D, Section 5.2.1.1 requires that bit length of input should + * be <= 2^39 - 256. This is the maximum valid length in bytes. */ uint64_t len_max = (1ULL << 36) - 32; gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, len_max + 1, b16, len_max + 1, + // Feed input that just exceeds the length limit + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, len_max + 1, out, len_max + 1, &out_len), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, 1, b16, 1, &out_len), 0); + // Feed input that just exceeds the length limit in two calls + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, 1, out, 1, &out_len), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, len_max, b16, len_max, &out_len), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, 1, b16, 1, &out_len), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, UINT64_MAX, b16, UINT64_MAX, + // Test if potential total input length overflow is handled properly + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, 1, out, 1, &out_len), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, UINT64_MAX, out, UINT64_MAX, &out_len), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); From ef56795fd273b36a712dde7987a10fd54065ec79 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chien Wong Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 19:22:50 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 334/551] Fix 1 forgotten separate input/output buffer Signed-off-by: Chien Wong --- tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function index e23d8d03da..dac2a5df2c 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function @@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ void gcm_input_len_too_long(void) gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, sizeof(b16), 0); // Feed input that just exceeds the length limit in two calls TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, 1, out, 1, &out_len), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, len_max, b16, len_max, &out_len), + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_gcm_update(&ctx, b16, len_max, out, len_max, &out_len), MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); From 43643c471492a6524600ecbbd3b90db94b3db538 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 13:21:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 335/551] Remove now-redundant guard fixup "mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: require MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C" Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index b629ce2e81..3f28787385 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -577,12 +577,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, } psa_set_key_usage_flags(attributes, more_usage); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) - /* Assume that we have all Mbed TLS attributes. When - * MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT is enabled but not MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C, - * we only assume standard PSA functions. */ psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(attributes, PSA_ALG_NONE); -#endif return 0; } From da2a33de0f2d0f7f179220d1a92f788d1459c3e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sergei Trofimovich Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 20:48:56 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 336/551] tests: fix `calloc()` argument list (`gcc-14` fix) `gcc-14` added a new `-Wcalloc-transposed-args` warning recently. It detected minor infelicity in `calloc()` API usage in `mbedtls`: In file included from /build/mbedtls/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h:19, from /build/mbedtls/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c:11: /build/mbedtls/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c: In function 'mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options': /build/mbedtls/tests/include/test/macros.h:128:46: error: 'calloc' sizes specified with 'sizeof' in the earlier argument and not in the later argument [-Werror=calloc-transposed-args] 128 | (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc(sizeof(*(pointer)), \ | ^ Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich --- tests/include/test/macros.h | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/macros.h b/tests/include/test/macros.h index 8de9c4d952..a73e06fca8 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/macros.h +++ b/tests/include/test/macros.h @@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ do { \ TEST_ASSERT((pointer) == NULL); \ if ((item_count) != 0) { \ - (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc(sizeof(*(pointer)), \ - (item_count)); \ + (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc((item_count), \ + sizeof(*(pointer))); \ TEST_ASSERT((pointer) != NULL); \ } \ } while (0) @@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ #define TEST_CALLOC_NONNULL(pointer, item_count) \ do { \ TEST_ASSERT((pointer) == NULL); \ - (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc(sizeof(*(pointer)), \ - (item_count)); \ + (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc((item_count), \ + sizeof(*(pointer))); \ if (((pointer) == NULL) && ((item_count) == 0)) { \ (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc(1, 1); \ } \ @@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ do { \ TEST_ASSERT((pointer) == NULL); \ if ((item_count) != 0) { \ - (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc(sizeof(*(pointer)), \ - (item_count)); \ + (pointer) = mbedtls_calloc((item_count), \ + sizeof(*(pointer))); \ TEST_ASSUME((pointer) != NULL); \ } \ } while (0) From 1a54352f5a2abccf86f52108398fbc3f9126760b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 09:35:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 337/551] psa_crypto_ffdh: move dhm.h inclusion to c file Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c | 6 ++++++ library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c index 6cc086ef60..95b2a1eab2 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c @@ -10,6 +10,12 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +/* This header is only needed because it defines + * MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHExxxx_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in + * mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). A part from that, this module + * only uses bignum functions for arithmetic. */ +#include + #include #include "psa_crypto_core.h" #include "psa_crypto_ffdh.h" diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h index baeb9286cd..79accd15ac 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.h @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ #define PSA_CRYPTO_FFDH_H #include -#include /** Perform a key agreement and return the FFDH shared secret. * From 48e4167cedda343e05645999564780164cf9eebe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 10:34:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 338/551] adjust_legacy_from_psa: improve pattern for enabling internal symbols Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 156 +++++------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h index 9e6163f2da..8888b2c1a7 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -47,128 +47,56 @@ */ /* ECC: curves: is acceleration complete? */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256)) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES #endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448)) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_192) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_224) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_256) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_384) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_R1_521) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_192) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_224) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ECC_SECP_K1_256) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_WEIERSTRASS_CURVES #endif /* ECC: algs: is acceleration complete? */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE) +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDH)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_ECDSA)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_JPAKE)) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS #endif /* ECC: key types: is acceleration complete? */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC #endif -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES -#endif - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES #endif @@ -443,38 +371,42 @@ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ +/* Internal macro to state that there is at least 1 domain parameter which is builtin. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS +#endif + #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 From bcf0fc5119115a2d6502d3acd3121c7813a51b02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 14:53:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 339/551] adjust_legacy_crypto: add parenthesis to improve clarity Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h index 833f152688..eb52d3f230 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h @@ -402,8 +402,8 @@ /* psa_util file features some ECDSA conversion functions, to convert between * legacy's ASN.1 DER format and PSA's raw one. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA)) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_ECDSA) || defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA))) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA #endif From f8ce457fb606309c87ba5c2595eeb9d5a9ce6cf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 14:55:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 340/551] all.sh: fix comment in check_test_dependencies() MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C is no more required for ECDSA conversion functions. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index fddcc01539..c4982b6ccb 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -1064,10 +1064,6 @@ component_check_test_dependencies () { # PSA_VENDOR_RSA_MAX_KEY_BITS. The legacy module is only used by # the test code and that's probably the most convenient way of achieving # the test's goal. - # - # MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C is also used in ECDSA conversion functions - # (in psa_util module) and, therefore, also in test_suite_psa_crypto_util. - # There is no PSA equivalent for this ASN1 symbols in PSA. echo "MBEDTLS_ASN1_WRITE_C" >> $expected # No PSA equivalent - we should probably have one in the future. echo "MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE" >> $expected From 89d8a12e9ce40b2b0eee6e7d3a9fabfbc48910a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 15:04:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 341/551] analyze_outcomes: fix typo Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py index b6e26d4cca..c300f9105e 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py +++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ KNOWN_TASKS = { 'component_driver': 'test_psa_crypto_config_accel_hmac', 'ignored_suites': [ # These suites require legacy hash support, which is disabled - # in the accelerate component. + # in the accelerated component. 'shax', 'mdx', # This suite tests builtins directly, but these are missing # in the accelerated case. From 18be2fb9df3097bbe54c90a420b976dccace4279 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 15:07:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 342/551] driver-only-builds: improve a sentence in the HMAC section Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- docs/driver-only-builds.md | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/driver-only-builds.md b/docs/driver-only-builds.md index e4c30bd338..4095d8ee77 100644 --- a/docs/driver-only-builds.md +++ b/docs/driver-only-builds.md @@ -118,7 +118,9 @@ HMAC by enabling and accelerating: In such a build it is possible to disable legacy HMAC support by disabling `MBEDTLS_MD_C` and still getting crypto operations, X.509 and TLS to work as usual. Exceptions are: -- [Hashes](#hashes) are obviously valid here for the accelerated algorithms. +- As mentioned in [Hashes](#hashes) direct calls to legacy lo-level hash APIs + (`mbedtls_sha256()` etc.) will not be possible for the legacy modules that + are disabled. - Legacy HMAC support (`mbedtls_md_hmac_xxx()`) won't be possible. - `MBEDTLS_PKCS[5|7]_C`, `MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C` and `MBEDTLS_HKDF_C` since they depend on the legacy implementation of HMAC. From e29c868ca498a45976e60b0b6be416f71badb2fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 16:24:44 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 343/551] programs_dh_server: Updated to use `mbedtls_dhm_set_group()` & `mbedtls_dhm_get_len()`. Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/pkey/dh_server.c | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c index 91bac0ef43..1ae5651ba9 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/dh_server.c +++ b/programs/pkey/dh_server.c @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ int main(void) mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; mbedtls_aes_context aes; - mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E; + mbedtls_mpi N, P, Q, D, E, dhm_P, dhm_G; mbedtls_net_init(&listen_fd); mbedtls_net_init(&client_fd); @@ -75,8 +75,8 @@ int main(void) mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg); mbedtls_mpi_init(&N); mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&Q); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); - + mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&dhm_G); /* * 1. Setup the RNG */ @@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ int main(void) goto exit; } - if (mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P), 16, f) != 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(G), 16, f) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&dhm_P, 16, f)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_file(&dhm_G, 16, f)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&dhm, &dhm_P, &dhm_G) != 0)) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! Invalid DH parameter file\n\n"); fclose(f); goto exit; @@ -176,7 +177,7 @@ int main(void) memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); if ((ret = - mbedtls_dhm_make_params(&dhm, (int) mbedtls_mpi_size(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P)), buf, &n, + mbedtls_dhm_make_params(&dhm, (int) mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&dhm), buf, &n, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg)) != 0) { mbedtls_printf(" failed\n ! mbedtls_dhm_make_params returned %d\n\n", ret); goto exit; @@ -286,7 +287,8 @@ int main(void) exit: mbedtls_mpi_free(&N); mbedtls_mpi_free(&P); mbedtls_mpi_free(&Q); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&D); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&D); mbedtls_mpi_free(&E); mbedtls_mpi_free(&dhm_P); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&dhm_G); mbedtls_net_free(&client_fd); mbedtls_net_free(&listen_fd); From 97489dc7e5f9c161395144b0397fb65a5fbfc29b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 16:47:52 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 344/551] programs_benchmark: Updated to use `mbedtls_dhm_set_group()` & `mbedtls_dhm_get_len()` Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/test/benchmark.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/test/benchmark.c b/programs/test/benchmark.c index 6f7f69bda0..895b1488f7 100644 --- a/programs/test/benchmark.c +++ b/programs/test/benchmark.c @@ -1089,18 +1089,21 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) mbedtls_dhm_context dhm; size_t olen; size_t n; + mbedtls_mpi P, G; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&P); mbedtls_mpi_init(&G); for (i = 0; (size_t) i < sizeof(dhm_sizes) / sizeof(dhm_sizes[0]); i++) { mbedtls_dhm_init(&dhm); - if (mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P), dhm_P[i], + if (mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&P, dhm_P[i], dhm_P_size[i]) != 0 || - mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(G), dhm_G[i], - dhm_G_size[i]) != 0) { + mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&G, dhm_G[i], + dhm_G_size[i]) != 0 || + mbedtls_dhm_set_group(&dhm, &P, &G) != 0) { mbedtls_exit(1); } - n = mbedtls_mpi_size(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(P)); + n = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&dhm); mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&dhm, (int) n, buf, n, myrand, NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GY), &dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GX)) != 0) { mbedtls_exit(1); @@ -1119,6 +1122,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret(&dhm, buf, sizeof(buf), &olen, myrand, NULL)); mbedtls_dhm_free(&dhm); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&P), mbedtls_mpi_free(&G); } } #endif From 8ee1b5f46ec60b3bd67706d083116c6d2373918b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Minos Galanakis Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 15:54:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 345/551] programs_benchmark: Updated to use `mbedtls_dhm_read_public()`. Signed-off-by: Minos Galanakis --- programs/test/benchmark.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/programs/test/benchmark.c b/programs/test/benchmark.c index 895b1488f7..8fa5d62987 100644 --- a/programs/test/benchmark.c +++ b/programs/test/benchmark.c @@ -1105,7 +1105,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) n = mbedtls_dhm_get_len(&dhm); mbedtls_dhm_make_public(&dhm, (int) n, buf, n, myrand, NULL); - if (mbedtls_mpi_copy(&dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GY), &dhm.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(GX)) != 0) { + + if (mbedtls_dhm_read_public(&dhm, buf, n) != 0) { mbedtls_exit(1); } From c22bb7a0a461d2671e22df1665914414801087e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 12:15:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 346/551] adjust_legacy_from_psa: optimize legacy enablement also for EC key types Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 48 +++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h index 8888b2c1a7..22dde3a78d 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES_BASIC #endif +/* Special case: we don't support cooked key derivation in drivers yet */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE +#endif + +/* Note: the condition about key derivation is always true as DERIVE can't be + * accelerated yet */ #if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ @@ -96,18 +103,9 @@ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES -#endif - -/* Special case: we don't support cooked key derivation in drivers yet */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) -#undef MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE -#endif - -/* Note: the condition is always true as DERIVE can't be accelerated yet */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE)) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES #endif @@ -314,8 +312,6 @@ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* missing accel */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY */ @@ -324,8 +320,6 @@ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* missing accel */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ @@ -333,8 +327,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* missing accel */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ @@ -342,8 +334,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* missing accel */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ @@ -351,8 +341,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* missing accel */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ @@ -361,11 +349,23 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ECC_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE 1 -#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* missing accel */ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_DERIVE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_LIGHT +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_ECP_C +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif + /* End of ECC section */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) From 0a6acf8db4b5c78272acf03dff08738d938331f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 14:37:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 347/551] adjust_legacy_from_psa: use EC pattern for enabling builtin elements of DH Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- .../mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 139 ++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h index 22dde3a78d..b27f6b9e39 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -368,52 +368,130 @@ /* End of ECC section */ +/* + * DH key types follow the same pattern used above for EC keys. They are defined + * by a triplet (curve, key_type, alg). A triplet is accelerated if all its + * component are accelerated, otherwise each component needs to be builtin. + */ + +/* DH: curves: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES +#endif + +/* DH: algs: is acceleration complete? */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS +#endif + +/* DH: key types: is acceleration complete? */ +#if (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT)) || \ + (defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE)) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES +#endif + #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144 */ #if defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192 */ -/* Internal macro to state that there is at least 1 domain parameter which is builtin. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_2048) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_3072) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_4096) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_6144) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_DH_RFC7919_8192) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS -#endif - #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_PARAMS) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH */ +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ + +#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 +#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C +#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ +#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ + +/* End of DH section */ + #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_HKDF) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_HKDF) /* @@ -601,37 +679,6 @@ #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ #endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ - -#if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 -#define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C -#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ -#endif /* PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY */ - #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY 1 From 2bec5df945585982d29aa44c6a04574468979ac2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 14:39:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 348/551] psa_crypto_ffdh: fix typos Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c index 95b2a1eab2..0099d5f97c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_ffdh.c @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) /* This header is only needed because it defines - * MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHExxxx_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in - * mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). A part from that, this module + * MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC7919_FFDHEXXXX_[P|G]_BIN symbols that are used in + * mbedtls_psa_ffdh_set_prime_generator(). Apart from that, this module * only uses bignum functions for arithmetic. */ #include From cc0fd47531ffeffb3185db77a17ee113ce874ea6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 10:19:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 349/551] platform_util: remove declarations of MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE[_RET]() These macros end up as being always "empty", so they can be removed. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/platform_util.h | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h b/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h index cba02ab3da..1b371ef3f4 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/platform_util.h @@ -23,10 +23,6 @@ extern "C" { #endif -/* Internal macros meant to be called only from within the library. */ -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, ret) do { } while (0) -#define MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) do { } while (0) - /* Internal helper macros for deprecating API constants. */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) #if defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_WARNING) From 41f8f733a13fee5797d305a8196eedd404abd000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 11:44:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 350/551] test_psa_compliance: add exception for tests using wrong RSA pub key format Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py index 0d56ddfd97..ed36befeef 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py +++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py @@ -30,7 +30,12 @@ from mbedtls_dev import build_tree EXPECTED_FAILURES = { # psa_hash_suspend() and psa_hash_resume() are not supported. # - Tracked in issue #3274 - 262, 263 + 262, 263, + # PSA standard format for RSA public keys is a sequence of just n (modulus) + # and e (public exponent). However following tests rely on a format which + # also includes some metadata to identify the key as an RSA key, but this + # is not compliant with PSA standard. + 239, 240, 241, 242, 250, 251, } # We currently use a fork of ARM-software/psa-arch-tests, with a couple of downstream patches From a45a399a6b7418118fd441b4240b583ae3b60a32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 10:28:09 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 351/551] lib: remove NULL pointer checks performed with MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE[_RET] Symbols defined starting from MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE[_RET] are removed as well. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/cipher.h | 10 ----- library/aria.c | 29 ------------- library/bignum.c | 93 ---------------------------------------- library/ecp_curves.c | 7 --- library/ecp_curves_new.c | 7 --- library/platform_util.c | 2 - 6 files changed, 148 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h index 815b5bb19f..1dc31c9c24 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/cipher.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/cipher.h @@ -678,7 +678,6 @@ int MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_cipher_setup_psa(mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx, static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } @@ -698,7 +697,6 @@ static inline unsigned int mbedtls_cipher_get_block_size( static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE); if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_MODE_NONE; } @@ -719,7 +717,6 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_mode_t mbedtls_cipher_get_cipher_mode( static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } @@ -743,8 +740,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_iv_size( static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE); if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_CIPHER_NONE; } @@ -764,7 +759,6 @@ static inline mbedtls_cipher_type_t mbedtls_cipher_get_type( static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL, 0); if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return 0; } @@ -784,8 +778,6 @@ static inline const char *mbedtls_cipher_get_name( static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE); if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_KEY_LENGTH_NONE; } @@ -805,8 +797,6 @@ static inline int mbedtls_cipher_get_key_bitlen( static inline mbedtls_operation_t mbedtls_cipher_get_operation( const mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET( - ctx != NULL, MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE); if (ctx->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_info) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_OPERATION_NONE; } diff --git a/library/aria.c b/library/aria.c index ba1257875c..2c365982c1 100644 --- a/library/aria.c +++ b/library/aria.c @@ -25,12 +25,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" -/* Parameter validation macros */ -#define ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ARIA_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * modify byte order: ( A B C D ) -> ( B A D C ), i.e. swap pairs of bytes * @@ -363,8 +357,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t w[4][4], *w2; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); if (keybits != 128 && keybits != 192 && keybits != 256) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -418,8 +410,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_setkey_dec(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keybits) { int i, j, k, ret; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(key != NULL); ret = mbedtls_aria_setkey_enc(ctx, key, keybits); if (ret != 0) { @@ -455,9 +445,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int i; uint32_t a, b, c, d; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(output != NULL); a = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 0); b = MBEDTLS_GET_UINT32_LE(input, 4); @@ -505,7 +492,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ecb(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, /* Initialize context */ void mbedtls_aria_init(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx) { - ARIA_VALIDATE(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(mbedtls_aria_context)); } @@ -531,13 +517,8 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, unsigned char *output) { unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; - - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); if (length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; @@ -587,14 +568,8 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, { unsigned char c; size_t n; - - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(iv_off != NULL); n = *iv_off; @@ -650,12 +625,8 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int c, i; size_t n; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(ctx != NULL); ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nonce_counter != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(stream_block != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(nc_off != NULL); n = *nc_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c index 1869137c4d..6a80720ced 100644 --- a/library/bignum.c +++ b/library/bignum.c @@ -37,11 +37,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -#define MPI_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define MPI_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - /* * Compare signed values in constant time */ @@ -51,10 +46,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_lt_mpi_ct(const mbedtls_mpi *X, { mbedtls_ct_condition_t different_sign, X_is_negative, Y_is_negative, result; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(ret != NULL); - if (X->n != Y->n) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -115,8 +106,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_assign(mbedtls_mpi *X, unsigned char assign) { int ret = 0; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, Y->n)); @@ -149,8 +138,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, { int ret = 0; int s; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); if (X == Y) { return 0; @@ -179,8 +166,6 @@ cleanup: */ void mbedtls_mpi_init(mbedtls_mpi *X) { - MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL); - X->s = 1; X->n = 0; X->p = NULL; @@ -210,7 +195,6 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_free(mbedtls_mpi *X) int mbedtls_mpi_grow(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; @@ -243,7 +227,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shrink(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nblimbs) { mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (nblimbs > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_LIMBS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; @@ -312,8 +295,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_copy(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { int ret = 0; size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); if (X == Y) { return 0; @@ -355,8 +336,6 @@ cleanup: void mbedtls_mpi_swap(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi *Y) { mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE(Y != NULL); memcpy(&T, X, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); memcpy(X, Y, sizeof(mbedtls_mpi)); @@ -385,7 +364,6 @@ static inline mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_sint_abs(mbedtls_mpi_sint z) int mbedtls_mpi_lset(mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(X, 1)); memset(X->p, 0, X->n * ciL); @@ -403,8 +381,6 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_get_bit(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos) { - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - if (X->n * biL <= pos) { return 0; } @@ -420,7 +396,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_set_bit(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t pos, unsigned char val) int ret = 0; size_t off = pos / biL; size_t idx = pos % biL; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (val != 0 && val != 1) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -448,7 +423,6 @@ cleanup: size_t mbedtls_mpi_lsb(const mbedtls_mpi *X) { size_t i; - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL, 0); #if defined(__has_builtin) #if (MBEDTLS_MPI_UINT_MAX == UINT_MAX) && __has_builtin(__builtin_ctz) @@ -530,8 +504,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_string(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, const char *s) int sign = 1; mbedtls_mpi_uint d; mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(s != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -634,8 +606,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, size_t n; char *p; mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(olen != NULL); MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { @@ -726,9 +696,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_file(mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE *fin) */ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(fin != NULL); - if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -772,7 +739,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_file(const char *p, const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, FILE * newline characters and '\0' */ char s[MBEDTLS_MPI_RW_BUFFER_SIZE]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -843,8 +809,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); - - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ @@ -887,7 +851,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_l(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t i; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(X) + count; @@ -908,7 +871,6 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) { - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); if (X->n != 0) { mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r(X->p, X->n, count); } @@ -921,8 +883,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_shift_r(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t count) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { @@ -964,8 +924,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_abs(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(const mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *Y) { size_t i, j; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(Y != NULL); for (i = X->n; i > 0; i--) { if (X->p[i - 1] != 0) { @@ -1016,7 +974,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(const mbedtls_mpi *X, mbedtls_mpi_sint z) { mbedtls_mpi Y; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); *p = mpi_sint_abs(z); Y.s = TO_SIGN(z); @@ -1035,9 +992,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi size_t j; mbedtls_mpi_uint *p; mbedtls_mpi_uint c; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); if (X == B) { const mbedtls_mpi *T = A; A = X; B = T; @@ -1098,9 +1052,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t n; mbedtls_mpi_uint carry; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); for (n = B->n; n > 0; n--) { if (B->p[n - 1] != 0) { @@ -1152,9 +1103,6 @@ static int add_sub_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, int flip_B) { int ret, s; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); s = A->s; if (A->s * B->s * flip_B < 0) { @@ -1203,8 +1151,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_add_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); B.s = TO_SIGN(b); @@ -1221,8 +1167,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_sub_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_sint b { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); B.s = TO_SIGN(b); @@ -1241,9 +1185,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi size_t i, j; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; int result_is_zero = 0; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); @@ -1300,9 +1241,6 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_mpi_mul_int(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_uint b) { - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - size_t n = A->n; while (n > 0 && A->p[n - 1] == 0) { --n; @@ -1448,8 +1386,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, size_t i, n, t, k; mbedtls_mpi X, Y, Z, T1, T2; mbedtls_mpi_uint TP2[3]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; @@ -1572,7 +1508,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, { mbedtls_mpi B; mbedtls_mpi_uint p[1]; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); p[0] = mpi_sint_abs(b); B.s = TO_SIGN(b); @@ -1588,9 +1523,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_div_int(mbedtls_mpi *Q, mbedtls_mpi *R, int mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(mbedtls_mpi *R, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(R != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(B, 0) < 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NEGATIVE_VALUE; @@ -1618,8 +1550,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_mod_int(mbedtls_mpi_uint *r, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi_s { size_t i; mbedtls_mpi_uint x, y, z; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(r != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); if (b == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_DIVISION_BY_ZERO; @@ -1763,11 +1693,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, mbedtls_mpi RR, T, W[(size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_MPI_WINDOW_SIZE], WW, Apos; int neg; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(E != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 0) <= 0 || (N->p[0] & 1) == 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -2054,10 +1979,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd(mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B) size_t lz, lzt; mbedtls_mpi TA, TB; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(G != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(B != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&TA); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TB); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&TA, A)); @@ -2168,9 +2089,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_fill_random(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t size, int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(size); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); if (size == 0) { @@ -2214,9 +2132,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod(mbedtls_mpi *X, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi G, TA, TU, U1, U2, TB, TV, V1, V2; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(A != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(N != NULL); if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(N, 1) <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -2372,9 +2287,6 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin(const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds, size_t i, j, k, s; mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&W); mbedtls_mpi_init(&R); mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); mbedtls_mpi_init(&A); mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); @@ -2462,8 +2374,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds, { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_mpi XX; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); XX.s = 1; XX.n = X->n; @@ -2513,9 +2423,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime(mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags, mbedtls_mpi_uint r; mbedtls_mpi Y; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(X != NULL); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(f_rng != NULL); - if (nbits < 3 || nbits > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_BITS) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c index 577e23b7aa..d295709d42 100644 --- a/library/ecp_curves.c +++ b/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -23,12 +23,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ @@ -4722,7 +4716,6 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); diff --git a/library/ecp_curves_new.c b/library/ecp_curves_new.c index 4ee0f5800c..035b23a1b4 100644 --- a/library/ecp_curves_new.c +++ b/library/ecp_curves_new.c @@ -28,12 +28,6 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_ALT) -/* Parameter validation macros based on platform_util.h */ -#define ECP_VALIDATE_RET(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE_RET(cond, MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA) -#define ECP_VALIDATE(cond) \ - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(cond) - #define ECP_MPI_INIT(_p, _n) { .p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) (_p), .s = 1, .n = (_n) } #define ECP_MPI_INIT_ARRAY(x) \ @@ -4764,7 +4758,6 @@ cleanup: */ int mbedtls_ecp_group_load(mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_group_id id) { - ECP_VALIDATE_RET(grp != NULL); mbedtls_ecp_group_free(grp); mbedtls_ecp_group_init(grp); diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c index 9f5dcb8748..f840004344 100644 --- a/library/platform_util.c +++ b/library/platform_util.c @@ -93,8 +93,6 @@ static void *(*const volatile memset_func)(void *, int, size_t) = memset; void mbedtls_platform_zeroize(void *buf, size_t len) { - MBEDTLS_INTERNAL_VALIDATE(len == 0 || buf != NULL); - if (len > 0) { #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_HAS_EXPLICIT_BZERO) explicit_bzero(buf, len); From ea3a6114e6fd8feada89ba550d563546aa521cc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 10:37:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 352/551] aria: replace ARIA_VALIDATE_RET() with a simple "if" block Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/aria.c | 15 ++++++++------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/aria.c b/library/aria.c index 2c365982c1..a4d6c5062f 100644 --- a/library/aria.c +++ b/library/aria.c @@ -517,8 +517,10 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cbc(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, unsigned char *output) { unsigned char temp[MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE]; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); + + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if (length % MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH; @@ -568,8 +570,10 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, { unsigned char c; size_t n; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT || - mode == MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT); + + if ((mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_ENCRYPT) && (mode != MBEDTLS_ARIA_DECRYPT)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } n = *iv_off; @@ -625,9 +629,6 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, int c, i; size_t n; - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || input != NULL); - ARIA_VALIDATE_RET(length == 0 || output != NULL); - n = *nc_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this From 4e048f1749757d4ea83f8bab414fc47015119f8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 10:46:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 353/551] bignum: removing usage of MPI_VALIDATE_RET() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/bignum.c | 2 -- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/bignum.c b/library/bignum.c index 6a80720ced..d3d72ab747 100644 --- a/library/bignum.c +++ b/library/bignum.c @@ -606,7 +606,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_write_string(const mbedtls_mpi *X, int radix, size_t n; char *p; mbedtls_mpi T; - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); if (radix < 2 || radix > 16) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -809,7 +808,6 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(mbedtls_mpi *X, const unsigned char *buf, size_t buf { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; const size_t limbs = CHARS_TO_LIMBS(buflen); - MPI_VALIDATE_RET(buflen == 0 || buf != NULL); /* Ensure that target MPI has exactly the necessary number of limbs */ MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_resize_clear(X, limbs)); From f23336e0406e719fe5d736e2b464e22468ca0f3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 11:39:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 354/551] Make psa_close_key thread safe There are two mutex locks here, the one performed in get_and_lock.. and the one performed outside. Linearizes at the final unlock. (This function is deprecated) Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 47ace359d7..3bb2691c62 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -536,11 +536,22 @@ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) return status; } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif if (slot->registered_readers == 1) { - return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } else { - return psa_unregister_read(slot); + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; } psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) From b0821959ae4a742de79d834bd71bc3cd1952fb86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 11:42:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 355/551] Make psa_purge_key thread safe Relies on get_and_lock_X being thread safe. There are two mutex locks here, one in psa_get_and_lock... Linearization point is the final unlock (or first lock on failure). Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 3bb2691c62..e8813b901c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -564,12 +564,22 @@ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) return status; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { - return psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); + status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } else { - return psa_unregister_read(slot); + status = psa_unregister_read(slot); } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + return status; } void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats) From 16abd59a62522852423a35c2b96a087676e6a7ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 17:37:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 356/551] Update psa_wipe_all_key_slots and document non-thread safety This function, and mbedtls_psa_crypto_free, are not thread safe as they wipe slots regardless of state. They are not part of the PSA Crypto API, untrusted applications cannot call these functions in a crypto service. In a service intergration, mbedtls_psa_crypto_free on the client cuts the communication with the crypto service. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- include/psa/crypto_extra.h | 2 ++ library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 6 ++++++ library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h index fc9bf4f0f5..18dccae0a0 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key( * * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer, * including the whole key store. + * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of + * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use. * * This is an Mbed TLS extension. */ diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index e8813b901c..599cc363be 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -144,6 +144,9 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) { size_t slot_idx; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; slot->registered_readers = 1; @@ -151,6 +154,9 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); +#endif } psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h index 002429b933..18a914496d 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.h @@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_status_t psa_initialize_key_slots(void); /** Delete all data from key slots in memory. + * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of + * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use. * * This does not affect persistent storage. */ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void); From 9b9b5a52d95c476a66e441706a38e98631c6990e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 16:53:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 357/551] psa_util: some code improvement to convert_der_to_raw_single_int() This commit also fixes test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data due to the change in one of the return values. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 10 +++++++--- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 2 +- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 9e21602f65..0349873121 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, } /* Skip possible leading zero */ - if (*p == 0x00) { + if ((*p == 0x00) && (unpadded_len > 0)) { p++; unpadded_len--; /* It should never happen that the input number is all zeros. */ @@ -503,9 +503,13 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, } } - if (unpadded_len < coordinate_size) { + if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { + /* Parsed number is longer than the maximum expected value. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } else { padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; - memset(raw, 0x00, padding_len); + /* raw buffer was already zeroed in mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() so + * zero-padding operation is skipped here. */ } memcpy(raw + padding_len, p, unpadded_len); p += unpadded_len; diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 45a3cb5656..40f6391607 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3044021911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 From ee5238fcf4c25f046cd54a00680118e3da65f2b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 17:34:07 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 358/551] suite_psa_crypto_util: add more testing for mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() A new test function is added, ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental, that tests incremental output DER buffer sizes checking that only the correct one (tested at last) works correctly. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 12 ++++++++++ .../test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 40f6391607..4bb2044a59 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -83,3 +83,15 @@ ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 ecdsa_der_to_raw:528:"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:256:"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:512:"9111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818502410091111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index 8f0dd6cfc3..d1647d4b38 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -25,6 +25,30 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ +void ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result) +{ + unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; + size_t tmp_buf_len = exp_result->len; + size_t ret_len; + size_t i; + + TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); + + for (i = 0; i < tmp_buf_len; i++) { + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, i, &ret_len, + key_bits) != 0); + } + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, i, &ret_len, + key_bits), 0); + +exit: + mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ void ecdsa_der_to_raw(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { From 122c94fd269a0c0f3c047a1a9f7ca03489ab292b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 18:02:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 359/551] psa_util: remove raw_len param from convert_der_to_raw_single_int() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 12 ++---------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 0349873121..0c603b704d 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -460,7 +460,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, * \param raw Output buffer that will be filled with the * converted data. This should be at least * coordinate_size bytes. - * \param raw_len Size (in bytes) of the output raw buffer. * \param coordinate_size Size (in bytes) of a single coordinate in raw * format. * @@ -475,17 +474,12 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, * \warning Der and raw buffers must not be overlapping. */ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, - unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, - size_t coordinate_size) + unsigned char *raw, size_t coordinate_size) { unsigned char *p = der; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t unpadded_len, padding_len = 0; - if (raw_len < coordinate_size) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; - } - /* Get the length of ASN.1 element (i.e. the integer we need to parse). */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, p + der_len, &unpadded_len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); @@ -543,8 +537,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, memset(raw_tmp, 0, sizeof(raw_tmp)); /* Extract r */ - ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, sizeof(raw_tmp), - coordinate_size); + ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, coordinate_size); if (ret < 0) { return ret; } @@ -553,7 +546,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, /* Extract s */ ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp + coordinate_size, - sizeof(raw_tmp) - coordinate_size, coordinate_size); if (ret < 0) { return ret; From c053d968f2b90926a6c69b079fc35d25713005fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 25 Jan 2024 17:56:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 360/551] Make psa_destroy_key threadsafe We do not require linearizability in the case of destroying a key in use. Using a key and destroying it simultaneously will not cause any issues as the user will only use the copy of the key in the slot. Two simulatenous deletion calls to one key cannot interfere, the first caller sets the slot's state to PENDING_DELETION, the second caller will back off. Remove outdated comment about one key being in multiple slots, psa_open_key does not put the key into a new slot. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index e6d3851ba8..c81666818c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1071,6 +1071,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) return status; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif /* Set the key slot containing the key description's state to * PENDING_DELETION. This stops new operations from registering * to read the slot. Current readers can safely continue to access @@ -1079,7 +1083,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) * If the key is persistent, we can now delete the copy of the key * from memory. If the key is opaque, we require the driver to * deal with the deletion. */ - slot->state = PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION; + status = psa_key_slot_state_transition(slot, PSA_SLOT_FULL, + PSA_SLOT_PENDING_DELETION); + + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + goto exit; + } if (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(slot->attr.lifetime)) { /* Refuse the destruction of a read-only key (which may or may not work @@ -1134,11 +1143,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) if (overall_status == PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; } - - /* TODO: other slots may have a copy of the same key. We should - * invalidate them. - * https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/214 - */ } #endif /* defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_STORAGE_C) */ @@ -1159,8 +1163,14 @@ exit: /* Unregister from reading the slot. If we are the last active reader * then this will wipe the slot. */ status = psa_unregister_read(slot); - /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering over - * a storage error. */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering or + * SERVICE_FAILURE from unlocking over a storage error. */ if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { overall_status = status; } From 7a795fd9515a27dd1d7e5cc4fe319526c46842b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 18:08:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 361/551] suite_psa_crypto_util: add more test cases for DER->RAW - r with MSb set - Invalid r (only 1 zero byte) Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 4bb2044a59..49b4919540 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -62,6 +62,14 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, r with MSb set +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (only 1 zero byte) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502010002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 From 763971f32ec317c5c8c6248f39d2f30cee3a93b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2024 17:13:36 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 362/551] Comment on locking strategy in psa_destroy_key Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index c81666818c..9d7b72f87c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1072,6 +1072,10 @@ psa_status_t psa_destroy_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We cannot unlock between setting the state to PENDING_DELETION + * and destroying the key in storage, as otherwise another thread + * could load the key into a new slot and the key will not be + * fully destroyed. */ PSA_THREADING_CHK_GOTO_EXIT(mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); #endif From 307ce2cff5fa44decd481cd334c9206ad8e3725a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 08:05:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 363/551] test_psa_compliance: use the last upstream release of psa-arch-tests Release: v23.06_API1.5_ADAC_EAC This fixes all the issues that were previously added as exceptions. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py | 23 +++-------------------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py index ed36befeef..8d70cbca38 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py +++ b/tests/scripts/test_psa_compliance.py @@ -27,27 +27,10 @@ from mbedtls_dev import build_tree # The test numbers correspond to the numbers used by the console output of the test suite. # Test number 2xx corresponds to the files in the folder # psa-arch-tests/api-tests/dev_apis/crypto/test_c0xx -EXPECTED_FAILURES = { - # psa_hash_suspend() and psa_hash_resume() are not supported. - # - Tracked in issue #3274 - 262, 263, - # PSA standard format for RSA public keys is a sequence of just n (modulus) - # and e (public exponent). However following tests rely on a format which - # also includes some metadata to identify the key as an RSA key, but this - # is not compliant with PSA standard. - 239, 240, 241, 242, 250, 251, -} +EXPECTED_FAILURES = {} # type: dict -# We currently use a fork of ARM-software/psa-arch-tests, with a couple of downstream patches -# that allow it to build with Mbed TLS 3, and fixes a couple of issues in the compliance test suite. -# These fixes allow the tests numbered 216, 248 and 249 to complete successfully. -# -# Once all the fixes are upstreamed, this fork should be replaced with an upstream commit/tag. -# - Tracked in issue #5145 -# -# Web URL: https://github.com/bensze01/psa-arch-tests/tree/fixes-for-mbedtls-3 -PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REPO = 'https://github.com/bensze01/psa-arch-tests.git' -PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REF = 'fix-pr-5736' +PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REPO = 'https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests.git' +PSA_ARCH_TESTS_REF = 'v23.06_API1.5_ADAC_EAC' #pylint: disable=too-many-branches,too-many-statements,too-many-locals def main(library_build_dir: str): From e0c13cffb30453877d7e1f280465d50da1671021 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 10:17:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 364/551] Update some msg descriptions Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 13338d4cda..aeeddd6b9f 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -2453,16 +2453,16 @@ component_test_no_psa_crypto_full_cmake_asan() { # Note: ssl-opt.sh has some test cases that depend on # MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE && !MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO # This is the only component where those tests are not skipped. - msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + msg "test: ssl-opt.sh (full minus PSA crypto)" tests/ssl-opt.sh - msg "test: compat.sh default (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + msg "test: compat.sh default (full minus PSA crypto)" tests/compat.sh - msg "test: compat.sh NULL (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + msg "test: compat.sh NULL (full minus PSA crypto)" tests/compat.sh -f 'NULL' - msg "test: compat.sh ARIA + ChachaPoly (full minus MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)" + msg "test: compat.sh ARIA + ChachaPoly (full minus PSA crypto)" env OPENSSL="$OPENSSL_NEXT" tests/compat.sh -e '^$' -f 'ARIA\|CHACHA' } From f8c2cd14896d0047926a3e242896ece3b580c0b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 10:18:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 365/551] Update preprocessor guard comment Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index cf0581c83f..23a7b2523a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ static int pk_genkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int curve_or_keybits) &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk)->d, &mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk)->Q, mbedtls_test_rnd_std_rand, NULL); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C && !MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA */ } #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS */ From 3da3c0a0009dca7abd26c387d1754f8c56a431e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 10:22:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 366/551] Always call psa_crypto_init when testing mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() actually works without having initialized the PSA subsystem, because it doesn't call any non-client PSA API functions. But the function is only useful in conjunction with the PSA API: it's meant to be followed by importing a key with the resulting attributes. We don't advertize it to work without an up-and-running PSA subsystem, and there's no need to test it without an up-and-running PSA subsystem as we were (accidentally) doing. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 23a7b2523a..225ead4844 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -1711,7 +1711,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes(int pk_type, int from_pair, psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; - MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + PSA_INIT(); psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = 0; if (!pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { @@ -1772,7 +1772,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes(int pk_type, int from_pair, exit: mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); + PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ @@ -1786,7 +1786,7 @@ void pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes(int md_type, int from_pair, psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + PSA_INIT(); psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = 0; if (!pk_setup_for_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { @@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ void pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes(int md_type, int from_pair, exit: mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); + PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ @@ -1847,7 +1847,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes_fail(int pk_type, int from_pair, psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; - MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + PSA_INIT(); psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type; if (!pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { @@ -1860,7 +1860,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes_fail(int pk_type, int from_pair, exit: mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); + PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ From 03aa9bc2268d2e5c00fccb3cfd18c498e23f79a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 11:08:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 367/551] Switch pk_setup_for_type() to return MBEDTLS_ERR_xxx Use mbedtls return codes rather than a boolean "has test not failed?". Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 24 ++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 225ead4844..3fa7c7a1ca 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/asn1.h" #include "mbedtls/base64.h" #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" +#include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "pk_internal.h" @@ -201,10 +202,8 @@ static mbedtls_ecp_group_id ecc_pick_grp_id(void) static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, mbedtls_pk_context *pk, psa_key_type_t *psa_type) { - int ok = 0; - if (pk_type == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE) { - return 1; + return 0; } TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(pk_type)), 0); @@ -278,10 +277,10 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, if (!want_pair) { *psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(*psa_type); } - ok = 1; + return 0; exit: - return ok; + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR; } #endif @@ -1714,9 +1713,8 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes(int pk_type, int from_pair, PSA_INIT(); psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = 0; - if (!pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { - goto exit; - } + TEST_EQUAL(pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, + &pk, &expected_psa_type), 0); if (!to_pair) { expected_psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(expected_psa_type); } @@ -1789,9 +1787,8 @@ void pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes(int md_type, int from_pair, PSA_INIT(); psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = 0; - if (!pk_setup_for_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { - goto exit; - } + TEST_EQUAL(pk_setup_for_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA, from_pair, + &pk, &expected_psa_type), 0); mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_set_padding(rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21, md_type), 0); if (!to_pair) { @@ -1850,9 +1847,8 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes_fail(int pk_type, int from_pair, PSA_INIT(); psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type; - if (!pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, &pk, &expected_psa_type)) { - goto exit; - } + TEST_EQUAL(pk_setup_for_type(pk_type, from_pair, + &pk, &expected_psa_type), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), expected_ret); From 2a6cb5c88104d92496365d77bbb0a91f803d2241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?=C3=98rjan=20Malde?= Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 12:51:35 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 368/551] fix build for midipix MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: Ørjan Malde --- library/entropy_poll.c | 2 +- library/platform_util.c | 11 ++++++----- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/entropy_poll.c b/library/entropy_poll.c index bd21e2d226..794ee03a83 100644 --- a/library/entropy_poll.c +++ b/library/entropy_poll.c @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later */ -#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) +#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__midipix__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE) /* Ensure that syscall() is available even when compiling with -std=c99 */ #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif diff --git a/library/platform_util.c b/library/platform_util.c index 9f5dcb8748..eafb0aa916 100644 --- a/library/platform_util.c +++ b/library/platform_util.c @@ -151,10 +151,10 @@ void mbedtls_zeroize_and_free(void *buf, size_t len) #include #if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \ defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \ - defined(__MACH__))) + defined(__MACH__)) || defined__midipix__) #include #endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || - * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */ + * (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __midipix__) */ #if !((defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L) || \ (defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS) && \ @@ -222,9 +222,10 @@ void (*mbedtls_test_hook_test_fail)(const char *, int, const char *); #include #if !defined(_WIN32) && \ (defined(unix) || defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || \ - (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__)) + (defined(__APPLE__) && defined(__MACH__)) || defined(__HAIKU__) || defined(__midipix__)) #include -#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__) */ +#endif \ + /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ || (__APPLE__ && __MACH__) || __HAIKU__ || __midipix__) */ #if (defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 199309L) || defined(__HAIKU__) mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) { @@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ mbedtls_ms_time_t mbedtls_ms_time(void) struct timespec tv; mbedtls_ms_time_t current_ms; -#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) +#if defined(__linux__) && defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || defined(__midipix__) ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &tv); #else ret = clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &tv); From 9e4eeff6e0b3e1ab4d60517998d6137e153c4a27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Cosgrove Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:51:18 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 369/551] Fix comment about verison of clang required for 'build_aes_armce' Signed-off-by: Tom Cosgrove --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 44930d28b5..9e45e0fee3 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -4750,7 +4750,7 @@ component_build_aes_aesce_armcc () { } support_build_aes_armce() { - # clang >= 4 is required to build with AES extensions + # clang >= 11 is required to build with AES extensions ver="$(clang --version|grep version|sed -E 's#.*version ([0-9]+).*#\1#')" [ "${ver}" -ge 11 ] } From d4c373a597ea27edcbcd2104e907315493605f68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tom Cosgrove Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:56:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 370/551] Refactor all.sh clang version detection code Prevents a script failure when attempting to run build_aes_armce on a system without clang Signed-off-by: Tom Cosgrove --- tests/scripts/all.sh | 32 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/all.sh b/tests/scripts/all.sh index 9e45e0fee3..315a66b14d 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/all.sh +++ b/tests/scripts/all.sh @@ -821,6 +821,14 @@ pre_generate_files() { fi } +clang_version() { + if command -v clang > /dev/null ; then + clang --version|grep version|sed -E 's#.*version ([0-9]+).*#\1#' + else + echo 0 # report version 0 for "no clang" + fi +} + ################################################################ #### Helpers for components using libtestdriver1 ################################################################ @@ -4692,14 +4700,8 @@ component_test_aesni_m32 () { # ~ 60s } support_test_aesni_m32_clang() { - support_test_aesni_m32 && if command -v clang > /dev/null ; then - # clang >= 4 is required to build with target attributes - clang_ver="$(clang --version|grep version|sed -E 's#.*version ([0-9]+).*#\1#')" - [[ "${clang_ver}" -ge 4 ]] - else - # clang not available - false - fi + # clang >= 4 is required to build with target attributes + support_test_aesni_m32 && [[ $(clang_version) -ge 4 ]] } component_test_aesni_m32_clang() { @@ -4751,8 +4753,7 @@ component_build_aes_aesce_armcc () { support_build_aes_armce() { # clang >= 11 is required to build with AES extensions - ver="$(clang --version|grep version|sed -E 's#.*version ([0-9]+).*#\1#')" - [ "${ver}" -ge 11 ] + [[ $(clang_version) -ge 11 ]] } component_build_aes_armce () { @@ -4807,15 +4808,8 @@ component_build_aes_armce () { } support_build_sha_armce() { - if command -v clang > /dev/null ; then - # clang >= 4 is required to build with SHA extensions - clang_ver="$(clang --version|grep version|sed -E 's#.*version ([0-9]+).*#\1#')" - - [[ "${clang_ver}" -ge 4 ]] - else - # clang not available - false - fi + # clang >= 4 is required to build with SHA extensions + [[ $(clang_version) -ge 4 ]] } component_build_sha_armce () { From 78da7468ca64838cfd3405a819f59b970b2da3b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 15:08:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 371/551] psa_util: minor improvements to convert_der_to_raw_single_int() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 0c603b704d..dfea36b904 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -459,7 +459,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, * \param der_len Length of the der buffer in bytes. * \param raw Output buffer that will be filled with the * converted data. This should be at least - * coordinate_size bytes. + * coordinate_size bytes and it must be zeroed before + * calling this function. * \param coordinate_size Size (in bytes) of a single coordinate in raw * format. * @@ -500,11 +501,10 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { /* Parsed number is longer than the maximum expected value. */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; - } else { - padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; - /* raw buffer was already zeroed in mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() so - * zero-padding operation is skipped here. */ } + padding_len = coordinate_size - unpadded_len; + /* raw buffer was already zeroed by the calling function so zero-padding + * operation is skipped here. */ memcpy(raw + padding_len, p, unpadded_len); p += unpadded_len; From 98e1931a0a7486a147ae64877ea1542690d99582 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 15:46:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 372/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: alloc/free buffer inside loop in ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index d1647d4b38..9dc95b659d 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -33,17 +33,19 @@ void ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_resul size_t ret_len; size_t i; - TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); - - for (i = 0; i < tmp_buf_len; i++) { + for (i = 1; i < tmp_buf_len; i++) { + TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, tmp_buf, i, &ret_len, key_bits) != 0); + mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); + tmp_buf = NULL; } + + TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, tmp_buf, i, &ret_len, key_bits), 0); - exit: mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); } From 252311d41e1e13de76c1a71875b3553f54210fbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 15:50:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 373/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: add test with 0-length for r Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 49b4919540..78f048ade4 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -70,6 +70,10 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (only 1 zero byte) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502010002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (0-length) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3025020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 From 36dee75368a0db0aa262f0dda0c53400b2ccd0f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:15:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 374/551] Update ECDSA signature conversion based on experimentation Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index fb00705971..e09d23c49f 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, * It is an error if `usage` has more than one flag set, or has a usage that is incompatible with the key type. * `mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes` sets the algorithm usage policy based on information in the key object and on `usage`. * For an RSA key with the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15` padding mode, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` for a sign/verify usage, and `PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT` for an encrypt/decrypt usage. - * For an RSA key with the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15` padding mode, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` for a sign/verify usage, and `PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash)` for an encrypt/decrypt usage where `hash` is from the RSA key's parameters. (Note that `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` is only allowed in signature algorithms.) + * For an RSA key with the `MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21` padding mode, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)` for a sign/verify usage, and `PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash)` for an encrypt/decrypt usage where `hash` is from the RSA key's parameters. (Note that `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH` is only allowed in signature algorithms.) * For an `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` or `MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA` with a sign/verify usage, the algorithm policy is `PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA` if `MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC` is enabled and `PSA_ALG_ECDSA` otherwise. In either case, the hash policy is `PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH`. * For an `MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY` or `MBEDTLS_PK_ECDKEY_DH` with the usage `PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE`, the algorithm is `PSA_ALG_ECDH`. * For a `MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE`, this function reads the attributes of the existing PK key and copies them (without overriding the lifetime and key identifier in `attributes`), then applies a public-key restriction if needed. @@ -331,7 +331,8 @@ Based on the [gap analysis](#signature-formats): ``` int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, - unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len); + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, + size_t bits); int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, size_t bits); @@ -339,5 +340,5 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, * These functions convert between the signature format used by `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}{,_ext}` and the signature format used by `psa_{sign,verify}_{hash,message}`. * The input and output buffers can overlap. - -[OPEN] Should these functions rely on the ASN.1 module? To be decided when implementing. +* The `bits` parameter is necessary in the DER-to-raw direction because the DER format lacks leading zeros, so something else needs to convey the size of (r,s). The `bits` parameter is not needed in the raw-to-DER direction, but [it can help catch errors](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8681#discussion_r1445980971) and the information is readily available in practice. +* Should these functions rely on the ASN.1 module? We experimented [calling ASN.1 functions](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8681), [reimplementing simpler ASN.1 functions](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8696), and [providing the functions from the ASN.1 module](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8703). Providing the functions from the ASN.1 module [won on a compromise of code size and simplicity](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7765#issuecomment-1893670015). From cbb9caead4c4ba5d80d6cb01386518ef6d05eaaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 16 Feb 2023 23:40:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 375/551] Changelog for building SHA-256 and 512 with old libc Linux/Aarch64: support SHA acceleration detection with older libc On Linux on aarch64 (64-bit ARMv8) processors, we use getauxval() to detect whether the runtime environment supports SHA-256 or SHA-512 acceleration. Some libc do not define the necessary HWCAP_xxx constants to analyze the result of getauxval(), either because they don't bother or because they're too old to recognize the values we need (for example, HWCAP_SHA2 appeared in Glibc 2.24 and HWCAP_SHA512 appeared in Glibc 2.27). In such cases, assume that the values are the same as in the kernel ABI and define the constants manually. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- ChangeLog.d/linux-aarch64-hwcap.txt | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/linux-aarch64-hwcap.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/linux-aarch64-hwcap.txt b/ChangeLog.d/linux-aarch64-hwcap.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..23af87824d --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/linux-aarch64-hwcap.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +Bugfix + * On Linux on ARMv8, fix a build error with SHA-256 and SHA-512 + acceleration detection when the libc headers do not define the + corresponding constant. Reported by valord577. From 76e4c6352daf57645e19493c4566a949c0502198 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 11:33:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 376/551] test_suite_aria: remove NOT_DEFINED dependency from aria_invalid_param() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function index f1748d114a..a454ebaf70 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_aria.function @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ * END_DEPENDENCIES */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:NOT_DEFINED */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ void aria_invalid_param() { mbedtls_aria_context ctx; @@ -52,8 +52,10 @@ void aria_invalid_param() output)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC) || defined(MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CFB) exit: return; +#endif } /* END_CASE */ From 779a1a5b204141b9bf7174fb981d49a8d35096b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 11:40:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 377/551] aria: remove leftover in comments Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/aria.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/aria.c b/library/aria.c index a4d6c5062f..d9f84cc59d 100644 --- a/library/aria.c +++ b/library/aria.c @@ -578,8 +578,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_cfb128(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, n = *iv_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited - * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this - * outside of parameter validation. */ + * buffer overflow. */ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -631,8 +630,7 @@ int mbedtls_aria_crypt_ctr(mbedtls_aria_context *ctx, n = *nc_off; /* An overly large value of n can lead to an unlimited - * buffer overflow. Therefore, guard against this - * outside of parameter validation. */ + * buffer overflow. */ if (n >= MBEDTLS_ARIA_BLOCKSIZE) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ARIA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } From f988f95b9a5b430cb81e9bb233161afd9a961ad6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:40:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 378/551] test_suite_bignum: add test function: mpi_zero_length_buffer_is_null() The goal is to test all the bignum's functions that accept a buffer and its length and verify that they do not crash if a NULL pointer is passed in as buffer and 0 length is specified. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function index c90f1bbbb0..2305f488cd 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.function @@ -143,6 +143,26 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void mpi_zero_length_buffer_is_null() +{ + mbedtls_mpi X; + size_t olen; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&X); + + /* Simply test that the following functions do not crash when a NULL buffer + * pointer and 0 length is passed. We don't care much about the return value. */ + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&X, NULL, 0), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le(&X, NULL, 0), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_write_string(&X, 16, NULL, 0, &olen), MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&X, NULL, 0), 0); + +exit: + mbedtls_mpi_free(&X); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE */ void mpi_read_binary(data_t *buf, char *input_A) { diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data index 9d068f1467..c53e42a8f3 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_bignum.misc.data @@ -82,6 +82,9 @@ mpi_read_write_string:16:"":2:"0":4:0:0 Test mpi_write_string #10 (Negative hex with odd number of digits) mpi_read_write_string:16:"-1":16:"":3:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL +Provide NULL buffer with 0 length +mpi_zero_length_buffer_is_null + Base test mbedtls_mpi_read_binary #1 mpi_read_binary:"0941379d00fed1491fe15df284dfde4a142f68aa8d412023195cee66883e6290ffe703f4ea5963bf212713cee46b107c09182b5edcd955adac418bf4918e2889af48e1099d513830cec85c26ac1e158b52620e33ba8692f893efbb2f958b4424":"0941379D00FED1491FE15DF284DFDE4A142F68AA8D412023195CEE66883E6290FFE703F4EA5963BF212713CEE46B107C09182B5EDCD955ADAC418BF4918E2889AF48E1099D513830CEC85C26AC1E158B52620E33BA8692F893EFBB2F958B4424" From dae21d3808be93c30fda318b19657b4db6ad2b5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 15:31:42 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 379/551] Support SHA-512 hwcap detection on old libc Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/sha512.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/sha512.c b/library/sha512.c index 601125445c..6dcea8da5d 100644 --- a/library/sha512.c +++ b/library/sha512.c @@ -102,6 +102,14 @@ # if defined(__linux__) /* Our preferred method of detection is getauxval() */ # include +# if !defined(HWCAP_SHA512) +/* The same header that declares getauxval() should provide the HWCAP_xxx + * constants to analyze its return value. However, the libc may be too + * old to have the constant that we need. So if it's missing, assume that + * the value is the same one used by the Linux kernel ABI. + */ +# define HWCAP_SHA512 (1 << 21) +# endif # endif /* Use SIGILL on Unix, and fall back to it on Linux */ # include From 91372f5549ac16438993913d5a2a52373b33f3e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 17:01:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 380/551] test_suite_rsa: add more test cases for RSA key parsing Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index bd286814df..545e7ff4e7 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -643,6 +643,9 @@ rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"300402010000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG RSA parse private key - correct format+values, minimal modulus size (128 bit) rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":0 +RSA parse private key - missing SEQUENCE +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + RSA parse private key - correct format, modulus too small (127 bit) rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED @@ -682,6 +685,9 @@ rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000 RSA parse private key - correct values, qp wrong tag rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b7221FF08052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +RSA parse public key - missing SEQUENCE +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG + RSA parse public key - wrong initial tag rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"318189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG @@ -711,3 +717,6 @@ rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30050203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA RSA parse public key - missing public exponent rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308184028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb7":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + +RSA parse public key - correct values, trailing garbage +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30818a028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb7020301000100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH From 3af9bc18f3be7a3e3cc52aa5f08dd4c7b92ddcb6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 17:21:57 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 381/551] Wrap get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory calls in mutex It is useful to do this for the call in get_and_lock_key_slot. Documenting that get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory requires the mutex is not part of this PR Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 599cc363be..f4c6ee005c 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -527,26 +527,29 @@ psa_status_t psa_open_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_handle_t *handle) psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) { - psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; if (psa_key_handle_is_null(handle)) { return PSA_SUCCESS; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(handle, &slot); if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { if (status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) { status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE; } - +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif return status; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( - &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); -#endif if (slot->registered_readers == 1) { status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } else { @@ -562,18 +565,22 @@ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) { - psa_status_t status; + psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; psa_key_slot_t *slot; - status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, &slot); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return status; - } - #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); #endif + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_in_memory(key, &slot); + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( + &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); +#endif + return status; + } + if ((!PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(slot->attr.lifetime)) && (slot->registered_readers == 1)) { status = psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); From fad978b2321551d91c51ce4a3ff76fea1a9ef34e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 18:00:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 382/551] Fix race condition with test comparison functions Make sure we hold the mutex whilst making several changes at the same time, to prevent race condition on writing connected bits of data. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/helpers.c | 185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 107 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index d0c75b08d1..85345d8cfd 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -53,18 +53,13 @@ mbedtls_test_result_t mbedtls_test_get_result(void) void mbedtls_test_set_result(mbedtls_test_result_t result, const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) { -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior + * to calling this function. */ mbedtls_test_info.result = result; mbedtls_test_info.test = test; mbedtls_test_info.line_no = line_no; mbedtls_test_info.filename = filename; - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } const char *mbedtls_test_get_test(void) @@ -151,15 +146,10 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void) void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) { -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior + * to calling this function. */ mbedtls_test_info.step = step; - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_get_line1(char *line) @@ -177,19 +167,14 @@ void mbedtls_test_get_line1(char *line) void mbedtls_test_set_line1(const char *line) { -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior + * to calling this function. */ if (line == NULL) { memset(mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } else { memcpy(mbedtls_test_info.line1, line, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_get_line2(char *line) @@ -207,19 +192,14 @@ void mbedtls_test_get_line2(char *line) void mbedtls_test_set_line2(const char *line) { -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior + * to calling this function. */ if (line == NULL) { memset(mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } else { memcpy(mbedtls_test_info.line2, line, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); } - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } @@ -264,15 +244,10 @@ unsigned mbedtls_test_get_case_uses_negative_0(void) void mbedtls_test_set_case_uses_negative_0(unsigned uses) { -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior + * to calling this function. */ mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0 = uses; - -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_increment_case_uses_negative_0(void) @@ -355,21 +330,41 @@ int mbedtls_test_ascii2uc(const char c, unsigned char *uc) void mbedtls_test_fail(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) { - if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { - /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + /* Don't use accessor, we already hold mutex. */ + if (mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + /* If we have already recorded the test as having failed then don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ - return; + mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED, test, line_no, filename); } - mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED, test, line_no, filename); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_skip(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SKIPPED, test, line_no, filename); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void) { +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS, 0, 0, 0); mbedtls_test_set_step((unsigned long) (-1)); mbedtls_test_set_line1(NULL); @@ -378,6 +373,10 @@ void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void) #if defined(MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C) mbedtls_test_set_case_uses_negative_0(0); #endif + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } int mbedtls_test_equal(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, @@ -390,21 +389,31 @@ int mbedtls_test_equal(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, return 1; } - if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { - /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + /* Don't use accessor, as we already hold mutex. */ + if (mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + /* If we've already recorded the test as having failed then don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ - return 0; + + char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; + mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + value1, (long long) value1); + mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + value2, (long long) value2); + mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); } - char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; - mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), - "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", - value1, (long long) value1); - mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), - "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", - value2, (long long) value2); - mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + return 0; } @@ -418,21 +427,31 @@ int mbedtls_test_le_u(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, return 1; } - if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { - /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + /* Don't use accessor, we already hold mutex. */ + if (mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + /* If we've already recorded the test as having failed then don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ - return 0; + + char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; + mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "lhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", + value1, value1); + mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "rhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", + value2, value2); + mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); } - char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; - mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), - "lhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", - value1, value1); - mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), - "rhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", - value2, value2); - mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + return 0; } @@ -446,21 +465,31 @@ int mbedtls_test_le_s(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, return 1; } - if (mbedtls_test_get_result() == MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { - /* We've already recorded the test as having failed. Don't +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + /* Don't use accessor, we already hold mutex. */ + if (mbedtls_test_get_result() != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + /* If we've already recorded the test as having failed then don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ - return 0; + + char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; + mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + (unsigned long long) value1, value1); + mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); + (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), + "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", + (unsigned long long) value2, value2); + mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); } - char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; - mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), - "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", - (unsigned long long) value1, value1); - mbedtls_test_set_line1(buf); - (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), - "rhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", - (unsigned long long) value2, value2); - mbedtls_test_set_line2(buf); + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + return 0; } From a888645bb8f5ec8e43179d355243483205e501f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 17:35:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 383/551] test_suite_rsa: add test for key write with incremental output size Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 6 ++++ tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index 545e7ff4e7..8a224d5eff 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -720,3 +720,9 @@ rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308184028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6 RSA parse public key - correct values, trailing garbage rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30818a028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb7020301000100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +RSA priv key write - incremental output buffer size +rsa_key_write_incremental:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c" + +RSA priv public key write - incremental output buffer size +rsa_key_write_incremental:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 71ca2b9ace..44caacd6e8 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1430,6 +1430,56 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* BEGIN_CASE */ +void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) +{ + mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; + unsigned char *buf = NULL, *start, *end; + size_t i; + + mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); + + /* This is supposed to succeed as the real target of this test are the + * write attempt below. */ + if (is_public) { + start = input->x; + end = input->x + input->len; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), 0); + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); + } + + for (i = 1; i < input->len; i++) { + TEST_CALLOC(buf, i); + end = buf + i; + /* We don't care much about the return value as long as it fails. */ + if (is_public) { + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + } else { + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_key_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + } + mbedtls_free(buf); + buf = NULL; + } + + /* Ensure with the correct output buffer size everything works as expected. */ + TEST_CALLOC(buf, i); + end = buf + i; + + if (is_public) { + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + } else { + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_key_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) > 0); + } + +exit: + if (buf != NULL) { + mbedtls_free(buf); + } + mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa_ctx); +} +/* END_CASE */ + /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ void rsa_selftest() { From efcc55500265c7a1a39a507cfbb0220aebefd689 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 11:15:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 384/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: add test with 0-length s Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 78f048ade4..46af1f16fe 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -74,6 +74,10 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (0-length) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3025020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid s (0-length) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3044022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA + # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 From 3122f4da50b401cc56374ad8891bfd782a506483 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 11:16:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 385/551] psa_util: invert check order for leading zeros in convert_der_to_raw_single_int() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index dfea36b904..be257e72eb 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, } /* Skip possible leading zero */ - if ((*p == 0x00) && (unpadded_len > 0)) { + if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { p++; unpadded_len--; /* It should never happen that the input number is all zeros. */ From faf026c67cf8054b8be8a42091f700a1b1417744 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 14:32:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 386/551] Explain purpose of test specific write/parse ticket functions Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index 51957463c5..980c192188 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -2427,7 +2427,13 @@ int mbedtls_test_tweak_tls13_certificate_msg_vector_len( } #endif /* MBEDTLS_TEST_HOOKS */ -/* Functions for session ticket tests */ +/* + * Functions for tests based on tickets. Implementations of the + * write/parse ticket interfaces as defined by mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write/parse_t. + * Basically same implementations as in ticket.c without the encryption. That + * way we can tweak easily tickets characteristics to simulate misbehaving + * peers. + */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) int mbedtls_test_ticket_write( void *p_ticket, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session, From 095a3a5a299d5e7a2adab71bc2aa25d5f44606a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 14:34:22 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 387/551] Fix PSA init and done macros in TLS unit tests Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 234181d765..65fed181b3 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3582,7 +3582,7 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options); mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&saved_session); - MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + PSA_INIT(); client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, @@ -3652,7 +3652,7 @@ exit: mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options); mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session); - MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); + PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ @@ -3678,7 +3678,7 @@ void tls13_early_data() mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options); mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&saved_session); - MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); + PSA_INIT(); client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, @@ -3767,6 +3767,6 @@ exit: mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session); mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(0); - MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); + PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ From 5de9c6f295fcc4328c6c94af0aa217a1a43ae2d7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 14:45:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 388/551] Fix and add comments in ticket and early data test function Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 65fed181b3..9b282dc538 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3606,8 +3606,9 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() /* * Run initial handshake: ephemeral key exchange mode, certificate with - * RSA key, signed with PKCS15, verified with PKCS21. Then, get the ticket - * sent by the server at the end of its handshake sequence. + * SECP256R1 key, CA certificate with SECP384R1 key, ECDSA signature + * algorithm. Then, get the ticket sent by the server at the end of its + * handshake sequence. */ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), @@ -3637,6 +3638,11 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + /* + * Run the handshake up to MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP and not + * MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER to preserve handshake data for the checks + * below. + */ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP) == 0); @@ -3656,6 +3662,11 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ +/* + * The !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 dependency of tls13_early_data() below is + * a temporary workaround to not run the test in Windows-2013 where there is + * an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf(). + */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ void tls13_early_data() { @@ -3707,8 +3718,9 @@ void tls13_early_data() /* * Run initial handshake: ephemeral key exchange mode, certificate with - * RSA key, signed with PKCS15, verified with PKCS21. Then, get the ticket - * sent by the server at the end of its handshake sequence. + * SECP256R1 key, CA certificate with SECP384R1 key, ECDSA signature + * algorithm. Then, get the ticket sent by the server at the end of its + * handshake sequence. */ TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), From eb84534ee3e77dede536f13744d19a4b392831db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 14:48:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 389/551] Use TEST_EQUAL instead of TEST_ASSERT where possible Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 30 ++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 9b282dc538..d26407e2de 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3610,9 +3610,9 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() * algorithm. Then, get the ticket sent by the server at the end of its * handshake sequence. */ - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); do { ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)); @@ -3643,9 +3643,9 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() * MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER to preserve handshake data for the checks * below. */ - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP), 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->resume, 1); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->new_session_tickets_count, 1); @@ -3722,9 +3722,9 @@ void tls13_early_data() * algorithm. Then, get the ticket sent by the server at the end of its * handshake sequence. */ - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); do { ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)); @@ -3752,9 +3752,9 @@ void tls13_early_data() mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO), 0); TEST_ASSERT(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); @@ -3764,9 +3764,9 @@ void tls13_early_data() early_data_len); TEST_EQUAL(ret, early_data_len); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED), 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED); From 9efc60298ffbc09c43c837cbf7565023a312666e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:33:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 390/551] Fix code style issues Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/helpers.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 85345d8cfd..49a7df2989 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void) void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) { /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior - * to calling this function. */ + * to calling this function. */ mbedtls_test_info.step = step; } @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_get_line1(char *line) void mbedtls_test_set_line1(const char *line) { /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior - * to calling this function. */ + * to calling this function. */ if (line == NULL) { memset(mbedtls_test_info.line1, 0, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); @@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_get_line2(char *line) void mbedtls_test_set_line2(const char *line) { /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior - * to calling this function. */ + * to calling this function. */ if (line == NULL) { memset(mbedtls_test_info.line2, 0, MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH); @@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ unsigned mbedtls_test_get_case_uses_negative_0(void) void mbedtls_test_set_case_uses_negative_0(unsigned uses) { /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior - * to calling this function. */ + * to calling this function. */ mbedtls_test_info.case_uses_negative_0 = uses; } From 6823247376c67aaf52badb20c5bcad69bf3a53b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 15:59:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 391/551] Fix compile warning in tests Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function index dac2a5df2c..0af4209f4e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function @@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ static void gcm_reset_ctx(mbedtls_gcm_context *ctx, const uint8_t *key, TEST_EQUAL(starts_ret, mbedtls_gcm_starts(ctx, mode, iv, iv_len)); exit: /* empty */ + return; } /* END_HEADER */ @@ -514,6 +515,7 @@ void gcm_invalid_iv_len(void) goto exit; /* To suppress error that exit is defined but not used */ exit: /* empty */ + return; } /* END_CASE */ From 24e9a32c83ac07c08260060e62eba432ae1fb4c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 12:26:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 392/551] Refactor to help future other implementations Improve the definition of mbedtls_test_thread_t to assist adding future threading implementations, when they happen. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h index ba965c8775..0054358eaa 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h @@ -27,11 +27,6 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) #include - -typedef struct mbedtls_test_thread_t { - pthread_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(thread); -} mbedtls_test_thread_t; - #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) @@ -58,17 +53,30 @@ void mbedtls_test_thread_set_alt(int (*thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thr void *thread_data), int (*thread_join)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread)); +#else /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT*/ + +typedef struct mbedtls_test_thread_t { + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD) + pthread_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(thread); +#else /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD */ + /* Make sure this struct is always non-empty */ + unsigned dummy; +#endif + +} mbedtls_test_thread_t; + #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT*/ /** - * \brief The function pointers for thread create and thread + * \brief The function pointers for thread create and thread * join. * - * \note These functions are part of the testing API only and + * \note These functions are part of the testing API only and * thus not considered part of the public API of * MbedTLS and thus may change without notice. * - * \note All these functions are expected to work or + * \note All these functions are expected to work or * the result will be undefined. */ extern int (*mbedtls_test_thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, From ae942ece478f7909f679699f08109556ac40c44c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 12:44:01 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 393/551] Fix style issues Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h index 0054358eaa..79bc6c0ded 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/threading_helpers.h @@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_test_thread_t { #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT*/ /** - * \brief The function pointers for thread create and thread + * \brief The function pointers for thread create and thread * join. * - * \note These functions are part of the testing API only and - * thus not considered part of the public API of + * \note These functions are part of the testing API only + * and thus not considered part of the public API of * MbedTLS and thus may change without notice. * - * \note All these functions are expected to work or + * \note All these functions are expected to work or * the result will be undefined. */ extern int (*mbedtls_test_thread_create)(mbedtls_test_thread_t *thread, From 0b2835d1fde5739bd728e8b805ca76c22f90e9e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 13:27:04 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 394/551] Fix accidental copy paste mistake Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/helpers.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 49a7df2989..936da066fb 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void) #endif #ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } From ba8e9addd9c968ae25fa251dc0c40459f9c555f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 13:54:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 395/551] Fix test dependencies Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data index 57f05caf5f..108630ee8e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.misc.data @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ GCM - Invalid parameters gcm_invalid_param: GCM - Invalid IV length -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES gcm_invalid_iv_len: GCM - Additional data length too long -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES gcm_add_len_too_long: GCM - Input length too long -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_GCM_C +depends_on:MBEDTLS_GCM_C:MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES gcm_input_len_too_long: From 2d73baf171560d27afef869cc960172b717ea7db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 15:25:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 396/551] psa_util: convert_der_to_raw_single_int: ensure the input DER integers have valid length Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index be257e72eb..b13d83d470 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -492,10 +492,10 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { p++; unpadded_len--; - /* It should never happen that the input number is all zeros. */ - if (unpadded_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } + } + /* It should never happen that the input number has 0 length. */ + if (unpadded_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; } if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { From 3ecb395fb93626e6250ee693b6eb0ce3eba0fe44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 15:26:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 397/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: fix tests for 0-length and one 0x00 byte for r and s Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 46af1f16fe..9368d79398 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -68,15 +68,19 @@ ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (only 1 zero byte) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502010002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502010002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid s (only 1 zero byte) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111020100":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (0-length) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3025020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid s (0-length) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit,Invalid s (0-length) depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3044022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success @@ -110,4 +114,4 @@ ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:512:"9111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 -ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" +ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" \ No newline at end of file From 9e520f7ea952b7c815c66f93e8743b45772abd12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 15:50:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 398/551] changelog: improve descriptions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8647.txt | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt index cfd3a4b9f0..44007e2c28 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt @@ -1,7 +1,10 @@ Default behavior changes - * Importing of RSA keys in PEM format in PSA is officially unsupported - (this was previously undocumented). + * psa_import_key() now only accepts RSA keys in the PSA standard formats. + The undocumented ability to import other formats (PKCS#8, SubjectPublicKey, + PEM) accepted by the pkparse module has been removed. Applications that + need these format can call mbedtls_pk_parse_{public,}key() followed by + mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(). -Features - * It is possible to enable RSA support in PSA (MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C + - RSA_C) without enabling PK module (MBEDTLS_[PK|PK_WRITE|PK_PARSE]_C). +Changes + * RSA support in PSA no longer auto-enables the pkparse and pkwrite modules, + saving code size when those are not otherwise enabled. From 52ed54b9490745b3daae5bc9acb99b5455654c34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 16:29:01 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 399/551] psa_crypto_rsa: remove unnecessary casting Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c index 7da6012c9f..cfa2da6191 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -73,8 +73,8 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); } else { - unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) data; - unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) (data + data_length); + unsigned char *p = data; + unsigned char *end = (data + data_length); status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(*p_rsa, &p, end)); } if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { From 149b0e7ca2e19bbc2d0aff72615e7727fdbd844c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 14:25:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 400/551] ssl.h: Fix comment Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 36295269a0..3e6b1e6057 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -1843,7 +1843,7 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ +#endif /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys); From 5d0ae9021f28e317cfe7a2a10852dacb163c5872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2024 14:20:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 401/551] tls13: srv: Refine early data status The main purpose is to know from the status if early data can be received of not and why. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- library/ssl_misc.h | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- library/ssl_tls.c | 10 ++++++++++ library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 3 +++ 4 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 3e6b1e6057..f478a18eb7 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -1644,6 +1644,26 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { */ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /** + * On client side, status of the negotiation of the use of early data. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() for more + * information. + * + * On server side, internal only, status of early data in the course of an + * handshake. One of MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED and + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED. + * + * Reset to #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, at the beginning of a new + * handshake. + */ + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status); +#endif + unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) @@ -1841,10 +1861,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { * and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status); -#endif - /** Callback to export key block and master secret */ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys); void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */ diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 96afe7628d..9439408268 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2132,8 +2132,26 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, size_t *out_len); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED \ +/* Additional internal early data status, server side only. */ +/* + * The server has not received the ClientHello yet, the status of early data + * is thus unknown. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN \ MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT + +/* + * The server has received the ClientHello, it contained no early data + * extension. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED 3 + +/* + * The server has received the early data extension, it has accepted early + * data and received the end of early data message from the client marking the + * end of early data reception. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED 4 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 0bc18f1261..72db821a6a 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1098,6 +1098,16 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN == 0, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN not equal to 0"); +#endif + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT == 0, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT not equal to 0"); + ssl->early_data_status = 0; +#endif + /* Initialize structures */ mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate); ssl_handshake_params_init(ssl->handshake); diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 904bb5b6f4..ff501c8a92 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -3024,6 +3024,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); + ssl->early_data_status = + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED; + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" "( K_recv = handshake )")); From 739a1d42469e9f65aa39ca1b5615a33eb58c961e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2022 21:10:25 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 402/551] tls: Add internal function ssl_read_application_data() The function will be used by mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() as well. Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_msg.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 6579c9686d..e769767516 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -5647,13 +5647,54 @@ static int ssl_handle_hs_message_post_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; } +/* + * brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes from the input + * buffer. + * + * param ssl SSL context: + * - First byte of application data not read yet in the input + * buffer located at address `in_offt`. + * - The number of bytes of data not read yet is `in_msglen`. + * param buf buffer that will hold the data + * param len maximum number of bytes to read + * + * note The function updates the fields `in_offt` and `in_msglen` + * according to the number of bytes read. + * + * return The number of bytes read. + */ +static int ssl_read_application_data( + mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + size_t n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) ? len : ssl->in_msglen; + + if (len != 0) { + memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n); + ssl->in_msglen -= n; + } + + /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data + from the memory. */ + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n); + + if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) { + /* all bytes consumed */ + ssl->in_offt = NULL; + ssl->keep_current_message = 0; + } else { + /* more data available */ + ssl->in_offt += n; + } + + return (int) n; +} + /* * Receive application data decrypted from the SSL layer */ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t n; if (ssl == NULL || ssl->conf == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -5817,30 +5858,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ } - n = (len < ssl->in_msglen) - ? len : ssl->in_msglen; - - if (len != 0) { - memcpy(buf, ssl->in_offt, n); - ssl->in_msglen -= n; - } - - /* Zeroising the plaintext buffer to erase unused application data - from the memory. */ - mbedtls_platform_zeroize(ssl->in_offt, n); - - if (ssl->in_msglen == 0) { - /* all bytes consumed */ - ssl->in_offt = NULL; - ssl->keep_current_message = 0; - } else { - /* more data available */ - ssl->in_offt += n; - } + ret = ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= read")); - return (int) n; + return ret; } /* From 6a5904db458b4eb0a673b33e6050524e172c1d9a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 17:11:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 403/551] tls13: srv: Move early data size check placeholder Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 15 +++++++-------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index ff501c8a92..3b560e7991 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -2911,6 +2911,13 @@ static int ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) if (ssl->in_msgtype == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("Received early data")); + /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 + * + * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data + * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. + * + * TODO: Add received data size check here. + */ return SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA; } @@ -2956,14 +2963,6 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_early_application_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen] = 0; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("\n%s", ssl->in_msg)); - /* RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 - * - * A server receiving more than max_early_data_size bytes of 0-RTT data - * SHOULD terminate the connection with an "unexpected_message" alert. - * - * TODO: Add received data size check here. - */ - return 0; } From 032985c351020a1e82e485d8146d1bdb01404d58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 17:59:33 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 404/551] Add MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA error code Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index f478a18eb7..22ceb3904f 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -90,8 +90,17 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x7B00 /** Not possible to read early data */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80 +/** + * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. + * This error code can be returned only on server side. This error code can be + * returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), + * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() if early data has been received + * as part of the handshake sequence they triggered. To read the early + * data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(). + */ +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00 /** Not possible to write early data */ -#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00 +#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C80 /* Error space gap */ /* Error space gap */ /* Error space gap */ @@ -4749,6 +4758,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use * and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in * this case you must stop using the context (see below). + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific. + * You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the + * early data before to resume the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4757,7 +4771,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -4826,8 +4841,9 @@ static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * * \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using * the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it * or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before * re-using it for a new connection; the current connection @@ -4895,6 +4911,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server * side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a * new connection using the same source port. See below. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of an handshake triggered by the function. + * This is server specific. You must call + * mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the early data before + * to resume the reading of post handshake application data. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4903,8 +4925,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current @@ -4969,6 +4992,12 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) - * in this case you must call this function again to complete * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as + * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been + * received as part of an handshake triggered by the function. + * This is server specific. You must call + * mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the early data before + * to resume the writing of application data. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4976,8 +5005,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * a non-negative value, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE, - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, * you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing, * and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() * on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current From 3a04562ace1ba39667c80173fb4cfb74008bb922 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2024 18:44:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 405/551] Update mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() definition Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 21 ++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 22ceb3904f..7f1bd8f167 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -5075,8 +5075,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** - * \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes while performing - * the handshake (early data). + * \brief Read at most 'len' bytes of early data + * + * \note This API is server specific. + * + * \note Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. * * \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_read(). The * specification of mbedtls_ssl_read() relevant to TLS 1.3 @@ -5084,10 +5087,19 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * function and the present documentation is restricted to the * differences with mbedtls_ssl_read(). * + * \note This function can be used in conjunction with + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), + * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early + * data when these functions return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. + * * \param ssl SSL context * \param buf buffer that will hold the data * \param len maximum number of bytes to read * + * \note Unlike mbedtls_ssl_read(), this function does not return + * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. + * * \return One additional specific return value: * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA. * @@ -5112,11 +5124,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * \p ssl but this does not preclude for using it with * mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). - * - * \note When a server wants to retrieve early data, it is expected - * that this function starts the handshake for the SSL context - * \p ssl. But this is not mandatory. - * */ int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); From d9ca354dbd760f68c716b773dd2e844b8a22010f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Wed, 6 Dec 2023 17:23:52 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 406/551] tls13: srv: Add mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() API Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_msg.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 26 ++------------------ 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index e769767516..825ca8fe99 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -5865,6 +5865,55 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) return ret; } + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const struct mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; + unsigned char *p = buf; + + if (ssl == NULL || ((conf = ssl->conf) == NULL)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if ((!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(conf)) || + (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || + (conf->early_data_enabled != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; + } + + if ((ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN) && + (ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; + } + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl); + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA) { + if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) { + /* Set the reading pointer */ + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + } + ret = ssl_read_application_data(ssl, p, len); + } else if (ret == 0) { + /* + * If the handshake is completed, return immediately that early data + * cannot be read anymore. This potentially saves another call to this + * API and when the function returns 0, it only means that zero byte + * of early data has been received. + */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; + } + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + /* * Send application data to be encrypted by the SSL layer, taking care of max * fragment length and buffer size. diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 3b560e7991..97ce5c276f 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -2943,29 +2943,6 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return 0; } -MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_tls13_process_early_application_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record(ssl, 0)) != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret); - return ret; - } - - /* - * Output early data - * - * For the time being, we print received data via debug message. - * - * TODO: Remove it when `mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data` is ready. - */ - ssl->in_msg[ssl->in_msglen] = 0; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(3, ("\n%s", ssl->in_msg)); - - return 0; -} - /* * RFC 8446 section A.2 * @@ -3039,7 +3016,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) ssl_tls13_prepare_for_handshake_second_flight(ssl); } else if (ret == SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_process_early_application_data(ssl)); + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA; + goto cleanup; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("should never happen")); ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR; From 192e0f9b1d8f81044bb70b2c9b60f117b9e0cde2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:55:06 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 407/551] ssl_server2: Add read early data support Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ tests/data_files/tls13_early_data.txt | 1 + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) diff --git a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c index 598d38caca..48b2282c90 100644 --- a/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c +++ b/programs/ssl/ssl_server2.c @@ -1612,6 +1612,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) int tls13_early_data_enabled = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; #endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C) mbedtls_memory_buffer_alloc_init(alloc_buf, sizeof(alloc_buf)); #if defined(MBEDTLS_MEMORY_DEBUG) @@ -3450,6 +3451,19 @@ handshake: fflush(stdout); while ((ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(&ssl)) != 0) { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA) { + memset(buf, 0, opt.buffer_size); + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&ssl, buf, opt.buffer_size); + if (ret > 0) { + buf[ret] = '\0'; + mbedtls_printf(" %d early data bytes read\n\n%s\n", + ret, (char *) buf); + } + continue; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE) if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS && ssl_async_keys.inject_error == SSL_ASYNC_INJECT_ERROR_CANCEL) { diff --git a/tests/data_files/tls13_early_data.txt b/tests/data_files/tls13_early_data.txt index 0c84b07205..95811fd391 100644 --- a/tests/data_files/tls13_early_data.txt +++ b/tests/data_files/tls13_early_data.txt @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ EarlyData context: line 0 lf EarlyData context: line 1 lf +EarlyData context: line 2 lf EarlyData context: If it appears, that means early_data received. From 579bd4d46b3b253deea9fcfc8bd5826aad088b00 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2023 15:37:10 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 408/551] Update early data test Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh index c1682e3cfb..b6894de817 100755 --- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh +++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh @@ -506,4 +506,7 @@ run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m: EarlyData: feature is enabled, good." \ -s "Sent max_early_data_size=$EARLY_DATA_INPUT_LEN" \ -s "ClientHello: early_data(42) extension exists." \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists." \ - -s "$( tail -1 $EARLY_DATA_INPUT )" + -s "$( head -1 $EARLY_DATA_INPUT )" \ + -s "$( tail -1 $EARLY_DATA_INPUT )" \ + -s "200 early data bytes read" \ + -s "106 early data bytes read" From 7b6ee9482e71a47488278a7e1d68d8681f03e174 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2024 10:29:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 409/551] tls13: srv: Reject early data in case of HRR Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 97ce5c276f..6933d1a058 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -1780,7 +1780,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; @@ -1801,6 +1802,11 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return; } + if (hrr_required) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EarlyData: rejected, HRR required.")); + return; + } + if (!handshake->resume) { /* We currently support early data only in the case of PSKs established via a NewSessionTicket message thus in the case of a session @@ -1858,7 +1864,8 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Update the handshake state machine */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) +static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -1882,8 +1889,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - /* There is enough information, update early data state. */ - ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(ssl); + /* There is enough information, update early data status. */ + ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(ssl, hrr_required); if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); @@ -1893,6 +1900,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return ret; } } +#else + ((void) hrr_required); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ return 0; @@ -1947,7 +1956,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return 0; } - MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(ssl)); + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK( + ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(ssl, parse_client_hello_ret == + SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_HRR_REQUIRED)); if (SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_OK == parse_client_hello_ret) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO); From 7d21cded3f0bf8fe7096f253585cf19547a5deb4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:37:55 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 410/551] ssl.h: Simplify guard MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA implies MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 thus MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA is equivalent to MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 7f1bd8f167..610ed2711f 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport); */ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) /** * \brief Set the early data mode * Default: disabled on server and client @@ -2073,7 +2073,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) /** From 0883b8b625a5531f2fc8a61b6b0417f00f76f91e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:13:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 411/551] tls13: Introduce early_data_state SSL context field Introduce early_data_state SSL context field to distinguish better this internal state from the status values defined for the mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() API. Distinguish also between the client and server states. Note that the client state are going to be documented and reworked as part of the implementation of mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(). Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- library/ssl_debug_helpers.h | 5 +++ library/ssl_misc.h | 24 --------------- library/ssl_msg.c | 6 ++-- library/ssl_tls.c | 8 +---- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 14 ++++----- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 22 ++++++------- 7 files changed, 74 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 610ed2711f..bf30852912 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -1621,6 +1621,49 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config { #endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +enum mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state { + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_SENT, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED +}; + +/* + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_WAITING_CH: + * The server is waiting for the ClientHello. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING: + * The server has received a ClientHello indicating early data and has + * accepted them. It is now expecting early data and the end of early + * data message. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED: + * The server has received a ClientHello indicating early data and has + * rejected them. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_RECEIVED: + * The server has received a ClientHello, no indication of early data. + * + * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_EOED_RECEIVED + * The server has received the early data extension, it has accepted early + * data and received the end of early data message from the client marking + * the end of early data reception. + */ + +enum mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state { + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_WAITING_CH, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_RECEIVED, + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_EOED_RECEIVED +}; + +union mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state { + enum mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state cli; + enum mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state srv; +}; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ + struct mbedtls_ssl_context { const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */ @@ -1655,22 +1698,10 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) /** - * On client side, status of the negotiation of the use of early data. - * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() for more - * information. - * - * On server side, internal only, status of early data in the course of an - * handshake. One of MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED, - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED. - * - * Reset to #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, at the beginning of a new - * handshake. + * State of the sending (client side) or reception (server side) of early + * data. Reset to the initial state at the beginning of a new handshake. */ - int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status); + union mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state); #endif unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ diff --git a/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h index 2b0e73772b..3410c90228 100644 --- a/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h +++ b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int flags); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +const char *mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state_str(enum mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state in); +const char *mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state_str(enum mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state in); +#endif + #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extensions_mask) \ mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ hs_msg_type, extensions_mask, NULL) diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 9439408268..2a488bbdbf 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2130,30 +2130,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* Additional internal early data status, server side only. */ -/* - * The server has not received the ClientHello yet, the status of early data - * is thus unknown. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT - -/* - * The server has received the ClientHello, it contained no early data - * extension. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED 3 - -/* - * The server has received the early data extension, it has accepted early - * data and received the end of early data message from the client marking the - * end of early data reception. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED 4 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 825ca8fe99..c6ba1158db 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -5888,8 +5888,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; } - if ((ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN) && - (ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED)) { + if ((ssl->early_data_state.srv != + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_WAITING_CH) && + (ssl->early_data_state.srv != + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; } diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 72db821a6a..50a8cd2092 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1099,13 +1099,7 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN == 0, - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN not equal to 0"); -#endif - MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT == 0, - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT not equal to 0"); - ssl->early_data_status = 0; + ssl->early_data_state.cli = 0; #endif /* Initialize structures */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index 76f0f18962..94bbfe85a3 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -1195,10 +1195,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * `accepted` if the EncryptedExtension message contain an early data * indication extension. */ - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; + ssl->early_data_state.cli = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write early_data extension")); - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT; + ssl->early_data_state.cli = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_SENT; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) size_t psk_len; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk")); @@ -1916,7 +1916,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * cases we compute it here. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT || + if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_SENT || handshake->key_exchange_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) #endif @@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; + ssl->early_data_state.cli = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED; } #endif @@ -2565,9 +2565,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); - } else if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) { + } else if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 6933d1a058..9fcea5821b 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -1780,8 +1780,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int hrr_required) +static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; @@ -1789,11 +1789,11 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: no early data extension received.")); - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED; + ssl->early_data_state.srv = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_RECEIVED; return; } - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; + ssl->early_data_state.srv = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( @@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return; } - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; + ssl->early_data_state.srv = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1890,9 +1890,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) /* There is enough information, update early data status. */ - ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(ssl, hrr_required); + ssl_tls13_update_early_data_state(ssl, hrr_required); - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_state.srv == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( @@ -2541,7 +2541,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_state.srv == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( ssl, 0, p, end, &output_len); if (ret != 0) { @@ -2868,7 +2868,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_state.srv == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING) { /* See RFC 8446 section A.2 for more information */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to early keys for inbound traffic. " @@ -3011,8 +3011,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); - ssl->early_data_status = - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED; + ssl->early_data_state.srv = + MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_EOED_RECEIVED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" From 2c4308958d613f47b33003beba0c087419c24895 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 18:11:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 412/551] ssl.h: Fix comments Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index bf30852912..485ff57af6 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -4793,7 +4793,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific. * You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the - * early data before to resume the handshake. + * early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4947,7 +4947,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * received as part of an handshake triggered by the function. * This is server specific. You must call * mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the early data before - * to resume the reading of post handshake application data. + * resuming the reading of post handshake application data. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -5028,7 +5028,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * received as part of an handshake triggered by the function. * This is server specific. You must call * mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the early data before - * to resume the writing of application data. + * resuming the writing of application data. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * From 44d70a5f2341b3664b8be81a37b94ee97773c4bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 18:16:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 413/551] tls13: early data: Improve documentation Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 485ff57af6..ccabbc2393 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -92,11 +92,12 @@ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80 /** * Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake. - * This error code can be returned only on server side. This error code can be - * returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), - * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() if early data has been received - * as part of the handshake sequence they triggered. To read the early - * data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(). + * This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early + * data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API. + * This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if + * early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they + * triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(). */ #define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00 /** Not possible to write early data */ @@ -2057,14 +2058,23 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode); * \param conf The SSL configuration to use. * \param early_data_enabled can be: * - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED: early data functionality is disabled - * This is the default on client and server. + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED: + * Early data functionality is disabled. This is the default on client and + * server. * - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED: early data functionality is enabled and - * may be negotiated in the handshake. Application using - * early data functionality needs to be aware of the - * lack of replay protection of the early data application - * payloads. + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED: + * Early data functionality is enabled and may be negotiated in the handshake. + * Application using early data functionality needs to be aware that the + * security properties for early data (also refered to as 0-RTT data) are + * weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. See the documentation of + * mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() and mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() for more + * information. + * When early data functionality is enabled on server and only in that case, + * the call to one of the APIs that trigger or resume an handshake sequence, + * namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), + * mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code + * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have + * been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(). * * \warning This interface is experimental and may change without notice. * @@ -4791,9 +4801,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * this case you must stop using the context (see below). * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been - * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific. - * You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the - * early data before resuming the handshake. + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -4944,10 +4956,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * new connection using the same source port. See below. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been - * received as part of an handshake triggered by the function. - * This is server specific. You must call - * mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the early data before - * resuming the reading of post handshake application data. + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -5025,10 +5038,11 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); * the handshake when you're done attending other tasks. * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as * defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been - * received as part of an handshake triggered by the function. - * This is server specific. You must call - * mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() to read the early data before - * resuming the writing of application data. + * received as part of the handshake. This is server specific + * and may occur only if the early data feature has been + * enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() + * documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * to read the early data before resuming the handshake. * \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using * the context (see below). * @@ -5111,6 +5125,21 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * \note This API is server specific. * * \note Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. + * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification: + * + * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than + * those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically: + * - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted + * solely under keys derived using the offered PSK. + * - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections. + * Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data + * is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data + * does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has + * weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the + * data is authenticated either with TLS client + * authentication or inside the application protocol. The + * same warnings apply to any use of the + * early_exporter_master_secret. * * \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_read(). The * specification of mbedtls_ssl_read() relevant to TLS 1.3 From ed7d4bfda589684c59aaadc14e4bfdba07f7cd3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 07:55:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 414/551] tls13: srv: Simplify mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() API Do not progress the handshake in the API, just read early data if some has been detected by a previous call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write(). Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 44 +++++++++----------------------------- library/ssl_msg.c | 42 ++++-------------------------------- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index ccabbc2393..5644f08c84 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -5141,49 +5141,25 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * same warnings apply to any use of the * early_exporter_master_secret. * - * \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_read(). The - * specification of mbedtls_ssl_read() relevant to TLS 1.3 - * (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS 1.2) applies to this - * function and the present documentation is restricted to the - * differences with mbedtls_ssl_read(). - * - * \note This function can be used in conjunction with + * \note This function is used in conjunction with * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), * mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early * data when these functions return * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. * - * \param ssl SSL context + * \param ssl SSL context, it must have been initialized and set up. * \param buf buffer that will hold the data * \param len maximum number of bytes to read * - * \note Unlike mbedtls_ssl_read(), this function does not return + * \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid. + * \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA if it is not + * possible to read early data for the SSL context \p ssl. Note + * that this function is intended to be called for an SSL + * context \p ssl only after a call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), + * mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or + * mbedtls_ssl_write() for \p ssl that has returned * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA. - * - * \return One additional specific return value: - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA. - * - * #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA is returned when it - * is not possible to read early data for the SSL context - * \p ssl. - * - * It may have been possible and it is not possible - * anymore because the server received the End of Early Data - * message or the maximum number of allowed early data for the - * PSK in use has been reached. - * - * It may never have been possible and will never be possible - * for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data - * is disabled for that context or more generally the context - * is not suitably configured to enable early data or the - * client does not use early data or the first call to the - * function was done while the handshake was already too - * advanced to gather and accept early data. - * - * It is not possible to read early data for the SSL context - * \p ssl but this does not preclude for using it with - * mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or - * mbedtls_ssl_handshake(). */ int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index c6ba1158db..3547f67989 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -5865,54 +5865,20 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) return ret; } - #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - const struct mbedtls_ssl_config *conf; - unsigned char *p = buf; - - if (ssl == NULL || ((conf = ssl->conf) == NULL)) { + if (ssl == NULL || (ssl->conf == NULL)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if ((!mbedtls_ssl_conf_is_tls13_enabled(conf)) || - (conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) || - (conf->early_data_enabled != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED)) { + if ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) || + (ssl->in_offt == NULL)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; } - if (ssl->tls_version != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; - } - - if ((ssl->early_data_state.srv != - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_WAITING_CH) && - (ssl->early_data_state.srv != - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; - } - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake(ssl); - if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA) { - if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) { - /* Set the reading pointer */ - ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; - } - ret = ssl_read_application_data(ssl, p, len); - } else if (ret == 0) { - /* - * If the handshake is completed, return immediately that early data - * cannot be read anymore. This potentially saves another call to this - * API and when the function returns 0, it only means that zero byte - * of early data has been received. - */ - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; - } - - return ret; + return ssl_read_application_data(ssl, buf, len); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 9fcea5821b..5b90dd5c7d 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -2929,6 +2929,10 @@ static int ssl_tls13_end_of_early_data_coordinate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * * TODO: Add received data size check here. */ + if (ssl->in_offt == NULL) { + /* Set the reading pointer */ + ssl->in_offt = ssl->in_msg; + } return SSL_GOT_EARLY_DATA; } From 44ff9506ddb315d06f2c33ccf5fe3f0a2ee60014 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 16:51:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 415/551] rsa: set parse/write functions out of !RSA_ALT guard Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/rsa.c | 665 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 332 insertions(+), 333 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index e0c38c3bcf..b81039ceb9 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -46,6 +46,338 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + int ret, version; + size_t len; + unsigned char *p, *end; + + mbedtls_mpi T; + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + p = (unsigned char *) key; + end = p + keylen; + + /* + * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) + * + * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * version Version, + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e + * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d + * prime1 INTEGER, -- p + * prime2 INTEGER, -- q + * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) + * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) + * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p + * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL + * } + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + end = p + len; + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (version != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + NULL, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import D */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, + &T, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import P */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import Q */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, + NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) + /* + * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in + * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by + * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid + * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading + * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which + * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q + * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a + * description of one such attack. + */ + + /* Import DP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import DQ */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Import QP */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + +#else + /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ + if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } +#endif + + /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default + * implementation but is still called: + * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to + * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) + * - as is also sanity-checks the key + * + * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with + * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. + */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { + goto cleanup; + } + + if (p != end) { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + + if (ret != 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); + } + + return ret; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len; + + /* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ + + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (*p + len != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + /* Import N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p += len; + + /* Import E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + *p += len; + + if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || + mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + if (*p != end) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + return 0; +} + +int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + size_t len = 0; + int ret; + + mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ + + /* + * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. + */ + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export QP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DQ */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export DP */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export Q */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export P */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export D */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} + +/* + * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { + * modulus INTEGER, -- n + * publicExponent INTEGER -- e + * } + */ +int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, + unsigned char **p) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + size_t len = 0; + mbedtls_mpi T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); + + /* Export E */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + + /* Export N */ + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { + goto end_of_export; + } + len += ret; + +end_of_export: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); + if (ret < 0) { + return ret; + } + + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | + MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); + + return (int) len; +} #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) @@ -688,339 +1020,6 @@ static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, return 0; } -int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) -{ - int ret, version; - size_t len; - unsigned char *p, *end; - - mbedtls_mpi T; - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - p = (unsigned char *) key; - end = p + keylen; - - /* - * This function parses the RSAPrivateKey (PKCS#1) - * - * RSAPrivateKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * version Version, - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER, -- e - * privateExponent INTEGER, -- d - * prime1 INTEGER, -- p - * prime2 INTEGER, -- q - * exponent1 INTEGER, -- d mod (p-1) - * exponent2 INTEGER, -- d mod (q-1) - * coefficient INTEGER, -- (inverse of q) mod p - * otherPrimeInfos OtherPrimeInfos OPTIONAL - * } - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - end = p + len; - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (version != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import D */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, - &T, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import P */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import Q */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, - NULL, NULL)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) - /* - * The RSA CRT parameters DP, DQ and QP are nominally redundant, in - * that they can be easily recomputed from D, P and Q. However by - * parsing them from the PKCS1 structure it is possible to avoid - * recalculating them which both reduces the overhead of loading - * RSA private keys into memory and also avoids side channels which - * can arise when computing those values, since all of D, P, and Q - * are secret. See https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/055 for a - * description of one such attack. - */ - - /* Import DP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import DQ */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->DQ, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - /* Import QP */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy(&rsa->QP, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - -#else - /* Verify existence of the CRT params */ - if ((ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(&p, end, &T)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } -#endif - - /* rsa_complete() doesn't complete anything with the default - * implementation but is still called: - * - for the benefit of alternative implementation that may want to - * pre-compute stuff beyond what's provided (eg Montgomery factors) - * - as is also sanity-checks the key - * - * Furthermore, we also check the public part for consistency with - * mbedtls_pk_parse_pubkey(), as it includes size minima for example. - */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa)) != 0) { - goto cleanup; - } - - if (p != end) { - ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - -cleanup: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - - if (ret != 0) { - mbedtls_rsa_free(rsa); - } - - return ret; -} - -int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len; - - /* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } - */ - - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (*p + len != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - - /* Import N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - *p += len; - - /* Import E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - *p += len; - - if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || - mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - if (*p != end) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - - return 0; -} - -int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, - unsigned char **p) -{ - size_t len = 0; - int ret; - - mbedtls_mpi T; /* Temporary holding the exported parameters */ - - /* - * Export the parameters one after another to avoid simultaneous copies. - */ - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - /* Export QP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DQ */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export DP */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export Q */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export P */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export D */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - -end_of_export: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_int(p, start, 0)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - return (int) len; -} - -/* - * RSAPublicKey ::= SEQUENCE { - * modulus INTEGER, -- n - * publicExponent INTEGER -- e - * } - */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, - unsigned char **p) -{ - int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - size_t len = 0; - mbedtls_mpi T; - - mbedtls_mpi_init(&T); - - /* Export E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &T)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - - /* Export N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_export(rsa, &T, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_asn1_write_mpi(p, start, &T)) < 0) { - goto end_of_export; - } - len += ret; - -end_of_export: - - mbedtls_mpi_free(&T); - if (ret < 0) { - return ret; - } - - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len(p, start, len)); - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | - MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); - - return (int) len; -} - #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) /* From 135ebde273d57f23932650efc60a17af00a1b328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 17:00:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 416/551] rsa: rename parse/write functions in order to follow the standard format Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pk_wrap.c | 8 ++++---- library/pkparse.c | 12 ++++++------ library/pkwrite.c | 4 ++-- library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 8 ++++---- library/rsa.c | 8 ++++---- library/rsa_internal.h | 8 ++++---- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 7 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c index ff8eeb14cc..f8ce099952 100644 --- a/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static int rsa_verify_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; } - key_len = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(rsa, buf, &p); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_psa_rsa_sign_ext(psa_algorithm_t alg, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; } - key_len = mbedtls_rsa_key_write(rsa_ctx, buf, &p); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa_ctx, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { mbedtls_free(buf); return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static int rsa_decrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - key_len = mbedtls_rsa_key_write(rsa, buf, &p); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } @@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ static int rsa_encrypt_wrap(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; } - key_len = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(rsa, buf, &p); + key_len = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, buf, &p); if (key_len <= 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index 17df101f01..b2127b2e5b 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, end); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, end); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) @@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs8_unencrypted_der( #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, len)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); return ret; } @@ -1288,7 +1288,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, if (ret == 0) { pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if ((ret = mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info)) != 0 || - (ret = mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), + (ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), pem.buf, pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(pk); } @@ -1429,7 +1429,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA); if (mbedtls_pk_setup(pk, pk_info) == 0 && - mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { + mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), key, keylen) == 0) { return 0; } @@ -1504,7 +1504,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + pem.buflen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); } @@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, } p = (unsigned char *) key; - ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + keylen); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + keylen); if (ret == 0) { return ret; } diff --git a/library/pkwrite.c b/library/pkwrite.c index 91529eb752..b9ddcf1d8d 100644 --- a/library/pkwrite.c +++ b/library/pkwrite.c @@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int pk_write_rsa_der(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *buf, return (int) len; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - return mbedtls_rsa_key_write(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), buf, p); + return mbedtls_rsa_write_key(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), buf, p); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ @@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey(unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (mbedtls_pk_get_type(key) == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key), start, p)); + MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD(len, mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*key), start, p)); } else #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c index cfa2da6191..0047a26bfb 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -71,11 +71,11 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( /* Parse the data. */ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); } else { unsigned char *p = data; unsigned char *end = (data + data_length); - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(*p_rsa, &p, end)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(*p_rsa, &p, end)); } if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; @@ -163,9 +163,9 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_export_key(psa_key_type_t type, * representation of the non-encrypted PKCS#1 RSAPrivateKey for a * private key and of the RFC3279 RSAPublicKey for a public key. */ if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { - ret = mbedtls_rsa_key_write(rsa, data, &end); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_key(rsa, data, &end); } else { - ret = mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(rsa, data, &end); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(rsa, data, &end); } if (ret < 0) { diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index b81039ceb9..62b56cd25c 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" -int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { int ret, version; size_t len; @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ cleanup: return ret; } -int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, return 0; } -int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, unsigned char **p) { size_t len = 0; @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ end_of_export: * publicExponent INTEGER -- e * } */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, unsigned char **p) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h index 6046850fcc..7bbdc8c2b5 100644 --- a/library/rsa_internal.h +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case of invalid version. */ -int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); /** * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, si * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case of importing or * priv/pub validation errors. */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end); /** @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its * end and moving toward its start. */ -int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, unsigned char **p); /** @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_key_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, * \note The output buffer is filled backward, i.e. starting from its * end and moving toward its start. */ -int mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, +int mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, unsigned char **p); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 44caacd6e8..2cc9fc17e5 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1382,9 +1382,9 @@ void rsa_parse_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input, int exp_ret_val) mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); if (is_public) { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), exp_ret_val); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), exp_ret_val); } else { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), exp_ret_val); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), exp_ret_val); } exit: @@ -1410,12 +1410,12 @@ void rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) /* Parse the key and write it back to output_buf. */ if (is_public) { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(&rsa_ctx, &input_start, input_end), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, &input_start, input_end), 0); TEST_ASSERT(input_start == input_end); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); } else { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_write(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); } /* This check holds because we alloacated an output buffer which is exactly * large enough to contain the written data. */ @@ -1444,9 +1444,9 @@ void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) if (is_public) { start = input->x; end = input->x + input->len; - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_parse(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), 0); } else { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_key_parse(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); } for (i = 1; i < input->len; i++) { @@ -1454,9 +1454,9 @@ void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) end = buf + i; /* We don't care much about the return value as long as it fails. */ if (is_public) { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); } else { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_key_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); } mbedtls_free(buf); buf = NULL; @@ -1467,9 +1467,9 @@ void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) end = buf + i; if (is_public) { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_pubkey_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); } else { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_key_write(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) > 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) > 0); } exit: From 201e643509f7ddb4a30805f48446c4712bb49dbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 17:19:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 417/551] rsa: simplify mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey() input parameters In this way mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey() and mbedtls_rsa_parse_key() input parameter list is the same. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pkparse.c | 6 +-- library/psa_crypto_rsa.c | 4 +- library/rsa.c | 79 ++++++++++++++-------------- library/rsa_internal.h | 9 ++-- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 15 ++---- 5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index b2127b2e5b..a47815b846 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -850,7 +850,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { - ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), p, end); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) @@ -1504,7 +1504,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + pem.buflen)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, pem.buflen)) != 0) { mbedtls_pk_free(ctx); } @@ -1551,7 +1551,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_public_key(mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, } p = (unsigned char *) key; - ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), &p, p + keylen); + ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*ctx), p, keylen); if (ret == 0) { return ret; } diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c index 0047a26bfb..4a574d1c70 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_rsa.c @@ -73,9 +73,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_rsa_load_representation( if (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)) { status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); } else { - unsigned char *p = data; - unsigned char *end = (data + data_length); - status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(*p_rsa, &p, end)); + status = mbedtls_to_psa_error(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(*p_rsa, data, data_length)); } if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { goto exit; diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 62b56cd25c..f4add9173f 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -46,6 +46,34 @@ #include "mbedtls/platform.h" +/* + * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. + * + * The value zero is: + * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter + * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). + * + * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to + * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. + */ +static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, + const unsigned char *end, + mbedtls_mpi *X) +{ + int ret; + + ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } + + return 0; +} + int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { int ret, version; @@ -192,9 +220,10 @@ cleanup: return ret; } -int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end) +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { + unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) key; + unsigned char *end = (unsigned char *) (key + keylen); int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; size_t len; @@ -205,45 +234,45 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, * } */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) != 0) { return ret; } - if (*p + len != end) { + if (p + len != end) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } /* Import N */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { return ret; } - if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, *p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, p, len, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - *p += len; + p += len; /* Import E */ - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { return ret; } if ((ret = mbedtls_rsa_import_raw(rsa, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, - NULL, 0, *p, len)) != 0) { + NULL, 0, p, len)) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - *p += len; + p += len; if (mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) != 0 || mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa) != 0) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (*p != end) { + if (p != end) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } @@ -992,34 +1021,6 @@ size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) return ctx->len; } -/* - * Wrapper around mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi() that rejects zero. - * - * The value zero is: - * - never a valid value for an RSA parameter - * - interpreted as "omitted, please reconstruct" by mbedtls_rsa_complete(). - * - * Since values can't be omitted in PKCS#1, passing a zero value to - * rsa_complete() would be incorrect, so reject zero values early. - */ -static int asn1_get_nonzero_mpi(unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end, - mbedtls_mpi *X) -{ - int ret; - - ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_mpi(p, end, X); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; - } - - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int(X, 0) == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - return 0; -} - #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) /* diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h index 7bbdc8c2b5..acf14a2ff6 100644 --- a/library/rsa_internal.h +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -34,18 +34,15 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, si * \brief Parse a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded public RSA key. * * \param rsa The RSA context where parsed data will be stored. - * \param p Beginning of the buffer containing the key to be parsed. - * On successful return, the referenced pointer will be - * updated in order to point to the end of the parsed data. - * \param end End of the buffer containing the key to be parsed. + * \param key The buffer that contains the key. + * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 on success. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case of importing or * priv/pub validation errors. */ -int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char **p, - const unsigned char *end); +int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); /** * \brief Write a PKCS#1 (ASN.1) encoded private RSA key. diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 2cc9fc17e5..357c6edc29 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1376,13 +1376,11 @@ exit: void rsa_parse_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input, int exp_ret_val) { mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; - unsigned char *start = input->x; - unsigned char *end = input->x + input->len; mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); if (is_public) { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), exp_ret_val); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), exp_ret_val); } else { TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), exp_ret_val); } @@ -1396,8 +1394,6 @@ exit: void rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) { mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; - unsigned char *input_start = input->x; - unsigned char *input_end = input->x + input->len; unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; unsigned char *output_start; unsigned char *output_end; @@ -1410,8 +1406,7 @@ void rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) /* Parse the key and write it back to output_buf. */ if (is_public) { - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, &input_start, input_end), 0); - TEST_ASSERT(input_start == input_end); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); } else { TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); @@ -1434,7 +1429,7 @@ exit: void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) { mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; - unsigned char *buf = NULL, *start, *end; + unsigned char *buf = NULL, *end; size_t i; mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); @@ -1442,9 +1437,7 @@ void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) /* This is supposed to succeed as the real target of this test are the * write attempt below. */ if (is_public) { - start = input->x; - end = input->x + input->len; - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, &start, end), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); } else { TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); } From 5fe9f6699bef38d3af95ecb4cd222de318993078 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 17:35:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 418/551] rsa_internal: update documentation for parse/write functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/rsa_internal.h | 22 +++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h index acf14a2ff6..4cb564efae 100644 --- a/library/rsa_internal.h +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -24,9 +24,11 @@ * \param key The buffer that contains the key. * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. * - * \return 0 in success - * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. - * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case of invalid version. + * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. */ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); @@ -39,8 +41,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, si * * \return 0 on success. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. - * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA in case of importing or - * priv/pub validation errors. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while + * parsing data. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the + * provided key fail. */ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); @@ -56,8 +60,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, * * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer * (i.e. a value > 0). - * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA is the RSA context does not - * cointain valid. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid key pair. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the * output buffer. * @@ -79,8 +83,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_write_key(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, unsigned char *start, * * \return On success, the number of bytes written to the output buffer * (i.e. a value > 0). - * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA is the RSA context does not - * cointain valid. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA if the RSA context does not + * contain a valid public key. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of failure while writing to the * output buffer. * From 56cfe2fab6e5c529be54256fa15c657952502323 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 17:53:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 419/551] test_suite_rsa: improve rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key() and rsa_key_write_incremental() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 26 +++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 357c6edc29..6d1a0f03c1 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1395,29 +1395,27 @@ void rsa_parse_write_pkcs1_key(int is_public, data_t *input) { mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; unsigned char *output_buf = NULL; - unsigned char *output_start; - unsigned char *output_end; - - TEST_CALLOC(output_buf, input->len); - output_start = output_buf; - output_end = output_buf + input->len; + unsigned char *output_end, *output_p; + size_t output_len; mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); + TEST_CALLOC(output_buf, input->len); + output_end = output_buf + input->len; + output_p = output_end; + /* Parse the key and write it back to output_buf. */ if (is_public) { TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, output_buf, &output_p), input->len); } else { TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, output_start, &output_end), input->len); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, output_buf, &output_p), input->len); } - /* This check holds because we alloacated an output buffer which is exactly - * large enough to contain the written data. */ - TEST_ASSERT(output_end == output_start); + output_len = output_end - output_p; /* Check that the written key matches with the one provided in input. */ - TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(output_buf, input->len, input->x, input->len); + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(output_p, output_len, input->x, input->len); exit: mbedtls_free(output_buf); @@ -1466,9 +1464,7 @@ void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) } exit: - if (buf != NULL) { - mbedtls_free(buf); - } + mbedtls_free(buf); mbedtls_rsa_free(&rsa_ctx); } /* END_CASE */ From 164537c4a65b66dcd57a0a2e074304c5ffb9cf03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 18:05:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 420/551] tls13: early data: Improve, add comments Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 5 +++-- library/ssl_msg.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 5644f08c84..2aae32ea20 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -2074,7 +2074,8 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode); * namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), * mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code * MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have - * been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(). + * been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() + * before calling the original function again. * * \warning This interface is experimental and may change without notice. * @@ -5124,7 +5125,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); * * \note This API is server specific. * - * \note Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. + * \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446. * IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification: * * The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 3547f67989..20501c940a 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -5873,6 +5873,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } + /* + * The server may receive early data only while waiting for the End of + * Early Data handshake message. + */ if ((ssl->state != MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA) || (ssl->in_offt == NULL)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA; From 3b9034544e7fd2f5dc634795c8c3996506de7a10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 18:11:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 421/551] Revert "tls13: Introduce early_data_state SSL context field" This reverts commit 0883b8b625a5531f2fc8a61b6b0417f00f76f91e. Due to the scope reduction of mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() it is not necessary anymore to refine the usage of early_data_status/state rather the opposite. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 61 +++++++++---------------------------- library/ssl_debug_helpers.h | 5 --- library/ssl_misc.h | 24 +++++++++++++++ library/ssl_tls.c | 8 ++++- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 14 ++++----- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 22 ++++++------- 6 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 2aae32ea20..635804d3a6 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -1622,49 +1622,6 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_config { #endif }; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -enum mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state { - MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_SENT, - MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED, - MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED -}; - -/* - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_WAITING_CH: - * The server is waiting for the ClientHello. - * - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING: - * The server has received a ClientHello indicating early data and has - * accepted them. It is now expecting early data and the end of early - * data message. - * - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED: - * The server has received a ClientHello indicating early data and has - * rejected them. - * - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_RECEIVED: - * The server has received a ClientHello, no indication of early data. - * - * MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_EOED_RECEIVED - * The server has received the early data extension, it has accepted early - * data and received the end of early data message from the client marking - * the end of early data reception. - */ - -enum mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state { - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_WAITING_CH, - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING, - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED, - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_RECEIVED, - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_EOED_RECEIVED -}; - -union mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state { - enum mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state cli; - enum mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state srv; -}; -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ - struct mbedtls_ssl_context { const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */ @@ -1699,10 +1656,22 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) /** - * State of the sending (client side) or reception (server side) of early - * data. Reset to the initial state at the beginning of a new handshake. + * On client side, status of the negotiation of the use of early data. + * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() for more + * information. + * + * On server side, internal only, status of early data in the course of an + * handshake. One of MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED, + * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED, + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED and + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED. + * + * Reset to #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT or + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, at the beginning of a new + * handshake. */ - union mbedtls_ssl_early_data_state MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state); + int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status); #endif unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */ diff --git a/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h index 3410c90228..2b0e73772b 100644 --- a/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h +++ b/library/ssl_debug_helpers.h @@ -49,11 +49,6 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_print_ticket_flags(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int flags); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -const char *mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state_str(enum mbedtls_ssl_cli_early_data_state in); -const char *mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state_str(enum mbedtls_ssl_srv_early_data_state in); -#endif - #define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRINT_EXTS(level, hs_msg_type, extensions_mask) \ mbedtls_ssl_print_extensions(ssl, level, __FILE__, __LINE__, \ hs_msg_type, extensions_mask, NULL) diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 2a488bbdbf..9439408268 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2130,6 +2130,30 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) +/* Additional internal early data status, server side only. */ +/* + * The server has not received the ClientHello yet, the status of early data + * is thus unknown. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN \ + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT + +/* + * The server has received the ClientHello, it contained no early data + * extension. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED 3 + +/* + * The server has received the early data extension, it has accepted early + * data and received the end of early data message from the client marking the + * end of early data reception. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED 4 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 50a8cd2092..72db821a6a 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1099,7 +1099,13 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - ssl->early_data_state.cli = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN == 0, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN not equal to 0"); +#endif + MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT == 0, + "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT not equal to 0"); + ssl->early_data_status = 0; #endif /* Initialize structures */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index 94bbfe85a3..76f0f18962 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -1195,10 +1195,10 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, * `accepted` if the EncryptedExtension message contain an early data * indication extension. */ - ssl->early_data_state.cli = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; } else { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write early_data extension")); - ssl->early_data_state.cli = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_SENT; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) size_t psk_len; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk")); @@ -1916,7 +1916,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_server_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) * cases we compute it here. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_SENT || + if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT || handshake->key_exchange_mode == MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) #endif @@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; } - ssl->early_data_state.cli = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; } #endif @@ -2565,9 +2565,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); - } else if (ssl->early_data_state.cli == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED) { + } else if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 5b90dd5c7d..4bdb7e7b82 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -1780,8 +1780,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int hrr_required) +static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; @@ -1789,11 +1789,11 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: no early data extension received.")); - ssl->early_data_state.srv = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_NOT_RECEIVED; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED; return; } - ssl->early_data_state.srv = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_REJECTED; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( @@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_state(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return; } - ssl->early_data_state.srv = MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1890,9 +1890,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) /* There is enough information, update early data status. */ - ssl_tls13_update_early_data_state(ssl, hrr_required); + ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(ssl, hrr_required); - if (ssl->early_data_state.srv == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING) { + if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( @@ -2541,7 +2541,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_state.srv == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING) { + if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( ssl, 0, p, end, &output_len); if (ret != 0) { @@ -2868,7 +2868,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_state.srv == MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_ACCEPTING) { + if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { /* See RFC 8446 section A.2 for more information */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to early keys for inbound traffic. " @@ -3015,8 +3015,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); - ssl->early_data_state.srv = - MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_EARLY_DATA_STATE_EOED_RECEIVED; + ssl->early_data_status = + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED; MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" From 78a38f607cdc4fc5292eefa6d6489a49bc9b1e58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 18:30:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 422/551] tls13: srv: Do not use early_data_status Due to the scope reduction for mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(), on server as early data state variable we now only need a flag in the handshake context indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 16 +++--------- library/ssl_misc.h | 28 +++------------------ library/ssl_tls.c | 10 ++------ library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 37 +++++++++++----------------- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 3 +-- 5 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index 635804d3a6..b0633609d6 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -1654,22 +1654,14 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { */ mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) /** - * On client side, status of the negotiation of the use of early data. + * Status of the negotiation of the use of early data. * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() for more * information. * - * On server side, internal only, status of early data in the course of an - * handshake. One of MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED, - * #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED, - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED and - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED. - * - * Reset to #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT or - * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN, at the beginning of a new - * handshake. + * Reset to #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT when the context is + * reset. */ int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_status); #endif diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 9439408268..c9632f97b4 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -650,6 +650,10 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { /* Flag indicating if a CertificateRequest message has been sent * to the client or not. */ uint8_t certificate_request_sent; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + /* Flag indicating if the server has accepted early data or not. */ + uint8_t early_data_accepted; +#endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) @@ -2130,30 +2134,6 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) -/* Additional internal early data status, server side only. */ -/* - * The server has not received the ClientHello yet, the status of early data - * is thus unknown. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN \ - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT - -/* - * The server has received the ClientHello, it contained no early data - * extension. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED 3 - -/* - * The server has received the early data extension, it has accepted early - * data and received the end of early data message from the client marking the - * end of early data reception. - */ -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED 4 -#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ - #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 72db821a6a..c952add9b3 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1098,14 +1098,8 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN == 0, - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN not equal to 0"); -#endif - MBEDTLS_STATIC_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT == 0, - "MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT not equal to 0"); - ssl->early_data_status = 0; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT; #endif /* Initialize structures */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 4bdb7e7b82..8bd70ef02c 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -1780,8 +1780,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int hrr_required) +static int ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, + int hrr_required) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; @@ -1789,22 +1789,19 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) == 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: no early data extension received.")); - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_RECEIVED; - return; + return 0; } - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; - if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, feature disabled in server configuration.")); - return; + return 0; } if (hrr_required) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EarlyData: rejected, HRR required.")); - return; + return 0; } if (!handshake->resume) { @@ -1813,7 +1810,7 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, resumption. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, not a session resumption.")); - return; + return 0; } /* RFC 8446 4.2.10 @@ -1836,7 +1833,7 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected key in " "`pre_shared_key` is not the first one.")); - return; + return 0; } if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != @@ -1844,7 +1841,7 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ciphersuite is not the one " "of the selected pre-shared key.")); - return; + return 0; } @@ -1853,11 +1850,10 @@ static void ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, early_data not allowed in ticket " "permission bits.")); - return; + return 0; } - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; - + return 1; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1889,10 +1885,10 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - /* There is enough information, update early data status. */ - ssl_tls13_update_early_data_status(ssl, hrr_required); + ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = + ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(ssl, hrr_required); - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); if (ret != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( @@ -2541,7 +2537,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_encrypted_extensions_body(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( ssl, 0, p, end, &output_len); if (ret != 0) { @@ -2868,7 +2864,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_write_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { /* See RFC 8446 section A.2 for more information */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to early keys for inbound traffic. " @@ -3015,9 +3011,6 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_end_of_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(ssl_tls13_parse_end_of_early_data( ssl, buf, buf + buf_len)); - ssl->early_data_status = - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA_RECEIVED; - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Switch to handshake keys for inbound traffic" "( K_recv = handshake )")); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index d26407e2de..12b048f38e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3768,8 +3768,7 @@ void tls13_early_data() &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED); + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1); TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1); exit: From 38dbab9f8d3adaba6ffb12769d420565d365e060 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 19:31:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 423/551] tests: ssl: Adjust early data test Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 28 ++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 12b048f38e..2d1a757e44 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ #define SSL_MESSAGE_QUEUE_INIT { NULL, 0, 0, 0 } -#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ @@ -3662,12 +3661,7 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* - * The !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 dependency of tls13_early_data() below is - * a temporary workaround to not run the test in Windows-2013 where there is - * an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf(). - */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ void tls13_early_data() { int ret = -1; @@ -3678,7 +3672,6 @@ void tls13_early_data() mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options; mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; - mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern server_pattern = { NULL, 0 }; /* * Test set-up @@ -3699,9 +3692,6 @@ void tls13_early_data() mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; - server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer; - server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern; - server_pattern.pattern = early_data; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); @@ -3750,15 +3740,12 @@ void tls13_early_data() ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl), MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO), 0); TEST_ASSERT(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); - TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 0); ret = write_early_data(&(client_ep.ssl), (unsigned char *) early_data, early_data_len); @@ -3766,10 +3753,16 @@ void tls13_early_data() TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED), 0); + MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED), MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1); - TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)), + early_data_len); + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf, early_data_len, early_data, early_data_len); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); exit: mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL); @@ -3777,7 +3770,6 @@ exit: mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options); mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session); - mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(0); PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ From e208b25b7942c3c5ee2c092363d2d38ee4d913cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:42:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 424/551] Minor documentation improvements Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/pk.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h index 54ca9adc8f..7b41321f09 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -554,17 +554,17 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, * \p usage, exporting and copying the key, and * possibly other permissions as documented for the * \p usage parameter. - * The permitted algorithm is determined as follows + * The permitted algorithm policy is determined as follows * based on the #mbedtls_pk_type_t type of \p pk, * the chosen \p usage and other factors: - * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA with whose underlying + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(#PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) * if \p usage is SIGN/VERIFY, and * #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT * if \p usage is ENCRYPT/DECRYPT. - * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA with whose underlying + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_RSA whose underlying * #mbedtls_rsa_context has the padding mode * #MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 and the digest type * corresponding to the PSA algorithm \c hash: @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, * - #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH or #MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY * if \p usage is DERIVE: * #PSA_ALG_ECDH. - * - #MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: same as the algorithm policy + * - #MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE: same as the primary algorithm * set for the underlying PSA key, except that * sign/decrypt flags are removed if the type is * set to a public key type. From 19411635a5bf6f3c45744b82855f1aa3380f8a50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:42:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 425/551] Test enrollment algorithm for the non-OPAQUE case Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 3fa7c7a1ca..0711a93a93 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -1723,6 +1723,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes(int pk_type, int from_pair, mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; //TODO: diversity psa_set_key_id(&attributes, key_id); psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, lifetime); + psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes, 42); psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = usage; /* Usage implied universally */ From 7e353ba37a70961f5eb934c2d5be190ad654cf51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:46:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 426/551] Create auxiliary function for repeated code Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 68 ++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 0711a93a93..14d049dfc6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -135,6 +135,32 @@ static int pk_genkey(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int curve_or_keybits) return -1; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +static psa_key_usage_t pk_get_psa_attributes_implied_usage( + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage) +{ + /* Usage implied universally */ + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } + /* Usage implied by mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() */ + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; + } + if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; + } + expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + return expected_usage; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) int mbedtls_rsa_decrypt_func(void *ctx, size_t *olen, const unsigned char *input, unsigned char *output, @@ -1724,26 +1750,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes(int pk_type, int from_pair, psa_set_key_id(&attributes, key_id); psa_set_key_lifetime(&attributes, lifetime); psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes, 42); - - psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = usage; - /* Usage implied universally */ - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; - } - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; - } - /* Usage implied by mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() */ - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; - } - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; - } - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; - } - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = pk_get_psa_attributes_implied_usage(usage); #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC) /* When the resulting algorithm is ECDSA, the compile-time configuration @@ -1795,26 +1802,7 @@ void pk_rsa_v21_get_psa_attributes(int md_type, int from_pair, if (!to_pair) { expected_psa_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(expected_psa_type); } - - psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = usage; - /* Usage implied universally */ - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE; - } - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; - } - /* Usage implied by mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() */ - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH; - } - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE; - } - if (expected_usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT) { - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT; - } - expected_usage |= PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY; + psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = pk_get_psa_attributes_implied_usage(usage); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), 0); From ae2668be973fac1a437955c0e61fda636ee9a647 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:48:04 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 427/551] Don't use mbedtls_pk_ec in our own code Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 3f28787385..696e7e5072 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, size_t bits = psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes); psa_ecc_family_t family = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(old_type); #else - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); + const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0); size_t bits = 0; psa_ecc_family_t family = diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 14d049dfc6..706bb7086e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, &pk->priv_id)); #else - mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec(*pk); + mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ec->d); #endif } From 0aad5f8f34bb6a6ecf2e30c6d01dde4c77944e30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:49:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 428/551] Copypasta Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 696e7e5072..c32294d437 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -553,7 +553,6 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } break; - break; default: return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; } From 2e54854d16ff84d8d2277134b1a14bd507f4a742 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:50:00 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 429/551] Copypasta Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index e64f9b7616..204f58cc8e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -701,7 +701,7 @@ PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=DECRYPT|EXPORT (bad) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -# Bad usage due to not specifying more than one of sign/crypt/derive. +# Bad usage due to specifying more than one of sign/crypt/derive. PSA attributes for pk: RSA usage=DECRYPT|SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH From e2a77f21ea79063a1e9dd025447cf927283ff222 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:50:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 430/551] Use PSA_INIT with test that requires PSA USE_PSA_INIT is for test code that doesn't use PSA functions when USE_PSA_CRYPTO is disabled. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 706bb7086e..7969d22b0e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque(int o_type_arg, int o_bits_arg, psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg; - USE_PSA_INIT(); + PSA_INIT(); psa_set_key_type(&attributes, o_type); psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits); @@ -1899,6 +1899,6 @@ exit: mbedtls_pk_free(&pk); psa_destroy_key(key_id); psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); - USE_PSA_DONE(); + PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ From e45d51f7b58deb9ad4e246d111b26af3bdfc8698 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 20:53:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 431/551] Clearer variable names Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 7969d22b0e..3d7a1798d3 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -1850,8 +1850,8 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -void pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque(int o_type_arg, int o_bits_arg, - int o_usage_arg, int o_alg_arg, +void pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque(int from_type_arg, int from_bits_arg, + int from_usage_arg, int from_alg_arg, int usage_arg, int expected_ret, int to_pair, int expected_usage_arg) @@ -1860,18 +1860,18 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque(int o_type_arg, int o_bits_arg, mbedtls_pk_init(&pk); psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; - psa_key_type_t o_type = o_type_arg; - size_t bits = o_bits_arg; - psa_key_usage_t o_usage = o_usage_arg; - psa_algorithm_t alg = o_alg_arg; + psa_key_type_t from_type = from_type_arg; + size_t bits = from_bits_arg; + psa_key_usage_t from_usage = from_usage_arg; + psa_algorithm_t alg = from_alg_arg; psa_key_usage_t usage = usage_arg; psa_key_usage_t expected_usage = expected_usage_arg; PSA_INIT(); - psa_set_key_type(&attributes, o_type); + psa_set_key_type(&attributes, from_type); psa_set_key_bits(&attributes, bits); - psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, o_usage); + psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, from_usage); psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, alg); psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(&attributes, 42); //TODO: test with persistent key @@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ void pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque(int o_type_arg, int o_bits_arg, TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_setup_opaque(&pk, key_id), 0); psa_key_type_t expected_psa_type = - to_pair ? o_type : PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(o_type); + to_pair ? from_type : PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(from_type); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&pk, usage, &attributes), expected_ret); From e8209752440abd4f2014e71e7a0aa018ad247db4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 21:00:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 432/551] Fix comment Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/pk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index c32294d437..80e30bea08 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) case MBEDTLS_PK_RSA: { - int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: encrypt/decrypt; 1: sign/verify */ + int want_crypt = 0; /* 0: sign/verify; 1: encrypt/decrypt */ switch (usage) { case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE: case PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH: From 793920c1ffc64660835d1257afbc9daf3d16eb58 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 21:26:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 433/551] mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes: opaque: require specified usage In the MBEDTLS_PK_OPAQUE, have mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() require the specified usage to be enabled for the specified key. Otherwise the following call to mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() is unlikely to result in a key with a useful policy, so the call to mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() was probably an error. Adjust the existing test cases accordingly and add a few negative test cases. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/pk.h | 1 + library/pk.c | 3 ++ tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 60 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h index 7b41321f09..f218558b43 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -585,6 +585,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_can_do_ext(const mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, psa_algorithm_t alg, * set for the underlying PSA key, except that * sign/decrypt flags are removed if the type is * set to a public key type. + * The underlying key must allow \p usage. * Note that the enrollment algorithm set with * psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm() is not copied. * diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 80e30bea08..3b9c5376d0 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -564,6 +564,9 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, new_type = PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(new_type); } more_usage = psa_get_key_usage_flags(&old_attributes); + if ((usage & more_usage) == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } psa_set_key_type(attributes, new_type); psa_set_key_bits(attributes, psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes)); psa_set_key_algorithm(attributes, psa_get_key_algorithm(&old_attributes)); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index 204f58cc8e..0858163c98 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -988,9 +988,9 @@ PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public VERIFY_HASH (bad) depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE (bad policy) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_MESSAGE & SIGN_MESSAGE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME @@ -1008,23 +1008,31 @@ PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN|... & SIGN_MESSAGE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_MESSAGE & SIGN_HASH (bad policy) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 + # For a PK_OPAQUE key, mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes() ignores the input # key's algorithm policy. Just this time, test with a few different algorithms. -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [0] +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_HASH & SIGN_HASH [0] depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_NONE:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [raw] +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_HASH & SIGN_HASH [raw] depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [v15] +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_HASH & SIGN_HASH [v15] depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH [PSS] +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, SIGN_HASH & SIGN_HASH [PSS] depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE + +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & DECRYPT (bad policy) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, DECRYPT & DECRYPT depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME @@ -1042,21 +1050,21 @@ PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, ... & EXPORT (bad) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_MESSAGE +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, VERIFY_MESSAGE & VERIFY_MESSAGE depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_HASH +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, VERIFY_HASH & VERIFY_HASH depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE -PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, 0 & ENCRYPT +PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair->public, ENCRYPT & ENCRYPT depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:0:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:0:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT -PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE (bad policy) depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN_MESSAGE & SIGN_MESSAGE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 @@ -1074,9 +1082,9 @@ PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN|... & SIGN_MESSAGE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT -PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, 0 & SIGN_HASH +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN_HASH & SIGN_HASH depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & DERIVE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 @@ -1090,14 +1098,14 @@ PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & EXPORT (bad) depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 -PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_MESSAGE +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, VERIFY_MESSAGE & VERIFY_MESSAGE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE -PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, 0 & VERIFY_HASH +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, VERIFY_HASH & VERIFY_HASH depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH -PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, 0 & ENCRYPT (bad) +PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, ENCRYPT & ENCRYPT (bad) depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:0:0 +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:0:0 From a1a7b0805758f28d3ddf3505ddba092028855782 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 21:32:29 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 434/551] Fix typo in dependency Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index 0858163c98..3902d3dc38 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -1063,49 +1063,49 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE (bad policy) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN_MESSAGE & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN|VERIFY & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN|DECRYPT & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN|... & SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN_HASH & SIGN_HASH -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & DERIVE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & EXPORT (bad) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE | PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY | PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT | PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDH:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:1:0 PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, VERIFY_MESSAGE & VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, VERIFY_HASH & VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, ENCRYPT & ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1_256 +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH:0:0 From 591e83d13969019b887a2499b92f722923cb3fe5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 21:33:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 435/551] Add missing implied usage Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index 3902d3dc38..55146feaab 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):2 PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, SIGN_HASH & SIGN_HASH depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:0:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair, ... & DERIVE depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 @@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):2 PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, VERIFY_HASH & VERIFY_HASH depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 -pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH +pk_get_psa_attributes_opaque:PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1):256:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH | PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE PSA attributes for pk: opaque ECC pair->public, ENCRYPT & ENCRYPT (bad) depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_GENERATE:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256 From 5922cb9309ac0a22a066111b6183c5616b8fedd9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 09:21:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 436/551] pkparse: keep legacy PK error codes when RSA key parsing fails This helps in reverting the changes to test_suite_x509parse.data when the RSA key parsing fails. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pkparse.c | 9 +++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data | 10 +++++----- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index a47815b846..91d6eb59ea 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -851,6 +851,15 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) if (pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_RSA) { ret = mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_pk_rsa(*pk), *p, (size_t) (end - *p)); + if (ret == 0) { + /* On success all the input has been consumed by the parsing function. */ + *p += end - *p; + } else if (ret & 0x7f) { + /* In case of ASN1 error codes add MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); + } else { + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY; + } } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data index 6e201259cf..261c220ee6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data @@ -1774,15 +1774,15 @@ x509parse_crt:"307d3068a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c3 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring length) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring tag) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400310000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400310000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv RSA modulus) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0302ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG +x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0302ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, total length mismatch) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 @@ -1790,11 +1790,11 @@ x509parse_crt:"3081893074a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, check failed) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +x509parse_crt:"3081873072a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374301c300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030b0030080202ffff0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, check failed, expanded length notation) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +x509parse_crt:"308196308180a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a30080600130454657374302a300d06092A864886F70D010101050003190030160210fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffe0202ffff300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY # We expect an extension parsing error here because the IssuerID is optional. # Hence, if we find an ASN.1 tag doesn't match the IssuerID, we assume the From c701cb28350353d8ee293791368c411d372e0eff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 11:09:37 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 437/551] test_suite_rsa: improve rsa_key_write_incremental() Output buffer is tested from being 1 single byte up to twice what it is strictly required to contain the output data. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 33 ++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 6d1a0f03c1..2f700289a8 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -1427,8 +1427,8 @@ exit: void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) { mbedtls_rsa_context rsa_ctx; - unsigned char *buf = NULL, *end; - size_t i; + unsigned char *buf = NULL, *end, *p; + size_t i, written_data; mbedtls_rsa_init(&rsa_ctx); @@ -1440,27 +1440,36 @@ void rsa_key_write_incremental(int is_public, data_t *input) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(&rsa_ctx, input->x, input->len), 0); } + /* Test with an output buffer smaller than required. */ for (i = 1; i < input->len; i++) { TEST_CALLOC(buf, i); end = buf + i; + p = end; /* We don't care much about the return value as long as it fails. */ if (is_public) { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, buf, &p) != 0); } else { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, buf, &p) != 0); } mbedtls_free(buf); buf = NULL; } - /* Ensure with the correct output buffer size everything works as expected. */ - TEST_CALLOC(buf, i); - end = buf + i; - - if (is_public) { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) != 0); - } else { - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, buf, &end) > 0); + /* Test with an output buffer equal or larger than what it is strictly required. */ + for (i = input->len; i < (2 * input->len); i++) { + TEST_CALLOC(buf, i); + end = buf + i; + p = end; + /* This time all write functions must succeed. */ + if (is_public) { + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_pubkey(&rsa_ctx, buf, &p) > 0); + } else { + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_write_key(&rsa_ctx, buf, &p) > 0); + } + written_data = (end - p); + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(p, written_data, input->x, input->len); + mbedtls_free(buf); + buf = NULL; } exit: From 684d78fcfa471109a3b9eeafbb18d8cdef8f8da2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 12:30:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 438/551] test_suite_rsa: improve key parsing tests for extra data 2 scenarios are taken into account: - syntactically valid extra data inside the SEQUENCE - extra data outside the SEQUENCE A single integer is used as extra data in both cases. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index 8a224d5eff..f4bd60a676 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -658,8 +658,11 @@ rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"30630201000211007c8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000 RSA parse private key - correct format, d == p == q == 0 rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c8571020301000102110000000000000000000000000000000000020900000000000000000002090000000000000000000209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA -RSA parse private key - correct values, trailing garbage -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3064020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c00":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +RSA parse private key - correct values, extra integer inside the SEQUENCE +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3066020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c020100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +RSA parse private key - correct values, extra integer outside the SEQUENCE +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c020100":0 RSA parse private key - correct values, n wrong tag rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:0:"3063020100FF1100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG @@ -718,8 +721,11 @@ rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30050203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA RSA parse public key - missing public exponent rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308184028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb7":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA -RSA parse public key - correct values, trailing garbage -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30818a028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb7020301000100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +RSA parse public key - correct values, extra integer inside the SEQUENCE +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30818c028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001020100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH + +RSA parse public key - correct values, extra integer outside the SEQUENCE +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":0 RSA priv key write - incremental output buffer size rsa_key_write_incremental:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c" From c9dd8611f8f4d10ddbfe823dfc7615acd957536d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 12:34:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 439/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: add missing new line at the end of file Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 9368d79398..c92b5fcc17 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -114,4 +114,4 @@ ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:512:"9111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 -ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" \ No newline at end of file +ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" From cb3b4cae0a78460be0cadec7bc553d629e838e4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 13:12:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 440/551] Fix handling of ECC public keys under MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA The test code to construct test keys and the implementation had matching errors: both assumed that there was a PSA public key object. Fix this. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- include/mbedtls/pk.h | 2 ++ library/pk.c | 14 +++++--------- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 4 +--- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/pk.h b/include/mbedtls/pk.h index f218558b43..13b960a874 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/pk.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/pk.h @@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_pk_context { * inside the ecp_keypair structure * - the following fields are used for all public key operations: signature * verify, key pair check and key write. + * - For a key pair, priv_id contains the private key. For a public key, + * priv_id is null. * Of course, when MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA is not enabled, the legacy * ecp_keypair structure is used for storing the public key and performing * all the operations. diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 3b9c5376d0..d0869b822c 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -464,16 +464,12 @@ int mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(const mbedtls_pk_context *pk, int sign_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH); int derive_ok = (pk_type != MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA); #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) - psa_key_attributes_t old_attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - status = psa_get_key_attributes(pk->priv_id, &old_attributes); - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + psa_ecc_family_t family = pk->ec_family; + size_t bits = pk->ec_bits; + int has_private = 0; + if (pk->priv_id != MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT) { + has_private = 1; } - psa_key_type_t old_type = psa_get_key_type(&old_attributes); - int has_private = PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(old_type); - size_t bits = psa_get_key_bits(&old_attributes); - psa_ecc_family_t family = PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(old_type); #else const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(*pk); int has_private = (ec->d.n != 0); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 3d7a1798d3..efbe6b0c35 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -283,9 +283,7 @@ static int pk_setup_for_type(mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type, int want_pair, PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH); psa_set_key_algorithm(&pub_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY); PSA_ASSERT(psa_destroy_key(pk->priv_id)); - PSA_ASSERT(psa_import_key(&pub_attributes, - pk->pub_raw, pk->pub_raw_len, - &pk->priv_id)); + pk->priv_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; #else mbedtls_ecp_keypair *ec = mbedtls_pk_ec_rw(*pk); mbedtls_mpi_free(&ec->d); From d078386287b53486ec95fc400a7bcd1007b18f39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 13:13:34 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 441/551] Smoke tests for mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes after parsing We'll test more fully by adding a call to mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa() once that function is implemented. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 79 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function index d416b87247..14afef6e94 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function @@ -41,6 +41,33 @@ void pk_parse_keyfile_rsa(char *key_file, char *password, int result) TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_can_do(&ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)); rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa), 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + &attributes), 0); +#endif } exit: @@ -68,6 +95,21 @@ void pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa(char *key_file, int result) TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_can_do(&ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)); rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa), 0); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + &attributes), 0); +#endif } exit: @@ -100,6 +142,17 @@ void pk_parse_public_keyfile_ec(char *key_file, int result) eckey = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(ctx); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey(&eckey->grp, &eckey->Q), 0); #endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + &attributes), 0); +#endif } exit: @@ -124,11 +177,34 @@ void pk_parse_keyfile_ec(char *key_file, char *password, int result) if (res == 0) { TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_can_do(&ctx, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY)); -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) + /* PSA keys are already checked on import so nothing to do here. */ +#else const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *eckey = mbedtls_pk_ec_ro(ctx); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecp_check_privkey(&eckey->grp, &eckey->d), 0); -#else - /* PSA keys are already checked on import so nothing to do here. */ +#endif + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH, + &attributes), 0); + psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE, + &attributes), 0); #endif } From fc590dd3612466ab343db79490cc32355d5ec86a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 13:46:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 442/551] changelog: fix typo Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8647.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt index 44007e2c28..98326dc017 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8647.txt @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Default behavior changes * psa_import_key() now only accepts RSA keys in the PSA standard formats. The undocumented ability to import other formats (PKCS#8, SubjectPublicKey, PEM) accepted by the pkparse module has been removed. Applications that - need these format can call mbedtls_pk_parse_{public,}key() followed by + need these formats can call mbedtls_pk_parse_{public,}key() followed by mbedtls_pk_import_into_psa(). Changes From 6fb1be6cb1f8640446e68574fba8f8d5bc5f2459 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio de Angelis Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 14:05:32 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 443/551] Add comments in psa/crypto_struct.h for id layout Make sure the layout of psa_key_attributes_s is commented enough so that it does not accidentally get reorganized by mistake in the future. Signed-off-by: Antonio de Angelis --- include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h index 606d282df2..8216f28ba6 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -241,6 +241,17 @@ typedef struct { psa_key_lifetime_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(lifetime); psa_key_policy_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy); psa_key_attributes_flag_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); + /* This type has a different layout in the client view wrt the + * service view of the key id, i.e. in service view usually is + * expected to have MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined + * thus adding an owner field to the standard psa_key_id_t. For + * implementations with client/service separation, this means the + * object will be marshalled through a transport channel and + * interpreted differently at each side of the transport. Placing + * it at the end of structures allows to interpret the structure + * at the client without reorganizing the memory layout of the + * struct + */ mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id); } psa_core_key_attributes_t; @@ -267,6 +278,12 @@ struct psa_key_attributes_s { */ void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters); size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(domain_parameters_size); + /* With client/service separation, struct psa_key_attributes_s is + * marshalled through a transport channel between the client and + * service side implementation of the PSA Crypto APIs, thus having + * the mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id as the last field of this structure + * allows for a more efficient marshalling/unmarshalling of parameters + */ psa_core_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(core); }; From 4380a33bd3f1ed8a10cccb2fcceddc1d526854d5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio de Angelis Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 14:21:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 444/551] Add a client view layout for interruptible hash and pake Add a client view layout (and update related initializers) for PSA sign/verify hash interruptible operation struct and PAKE operation struct Signed-off-by: Antonio de Angelis --- include/psa/crypto_extra.h | 8 ++++++++ include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h index fc9bf4f0f5..c67345bd2e 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -1828,8 +1828,12 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation); /** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type * psa_pake_operation_t. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP, \ { 0 }, { { 0 } } } +#endif struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s { psa_algorithm_t algorithm; @@ -1957,6 +1961,9 @@ struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s { ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1)) struct psa_pake_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. @@ -1982,6 +1989,7 @@ struct psa_pake_operation_s { psa_driver_pake_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx); psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs); } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data); +#endif }; static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h index cc7731abc4..26c93da7c5 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -455,6 +455,9 @@ static inline size_t psa_get_key_bits( * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash signing. */ struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. @@ -468,9 +471,14 @@ struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s { unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1; uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); +#endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_SIGN_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 } +#endif static inline struct psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void) @@ -485,6 +493,9 @@ psa_sign_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void) * \brief The context for PSA interruptible hash verification. */ struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s { +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) + mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle; +#else /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported. @@ -498,9 +509,14 @@ struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s { unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(error_occurred) : 1; uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(num_ops); +#endif }; +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) +#define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 } +#else #define PSA_VERIFY_HASH_INTERRUPTIBLE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, { 0 }, 0, 0 } +#endif static inline struct psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_s psa_verify_hash_interruptible_operation_init(void) From 5a198925286bf2a9ff849e5d23c930467e9c567f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 13:59:51 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 445/551] pkparse: fix check for ASN1 errors in mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pkparse.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/pkparse.c b/library/pkparse.c index 91d6eb59ea..5a3d3b2590 100644 --- a/library/pkparse.c +++ b/library/pkparse.c @@ -854,7 +854,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_subpubkey(unsigned char **p, const unsigned char *end, if (ret == 0) { /* On success all the input has been consumed by the parsing function. */ *p += end - *p; - } else if (ret & 0x7f) { + } else if ((ret <= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA) && + (ret >= MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL)) { /* In case of ASN1 error codes add MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY. */ ret = MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY, ret); } else { From f15e13ead7dc00a21a58a0830a82f214c3e1a77b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 14:00:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 446/551] test_suite_x509parse: remove useless include of rsa.h Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function index a54c165e14..c2a2f556d2 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.function @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ #include "mbedtls/base64.h" #include "mbedtls/error.h" #include "mbedtls/pk.h" -#include "mbedtls/rsa.h" #include "string.h" #if MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA > 19 From 064dd2b87091704227e64e975beba56e3ee69bb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 14:58:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 447/551] Adjust check order Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu --- tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh index b6894de817..4e6bf876dd 100755 --- a/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh +++ b/tests/opt-testcases/tls13-misc.sh @@ -502,8 +502,8 @@ run_test "TLS 1.3 G->m: EarlyData: feature is enabled, good." \ "$G_NEXT_CLI localhost --priority=NORMAL:-VERS-ALL:+VERS-TLS1.3:+GROUP-ALL:+KX-ALL \ -d 10 -r --earlydata $EARLY_DATA_INPUT " \ 0 \ - -s "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension exists." \ -s "Sent max_early_data_size=$EARLY_DATA_INPUT_LEN" \ + -s "NewSessionTicket: early_data(42) extension exists." \ -s "ClientHello: early_data(42) extension exists." \ -s "EncryptedExtensions: early_data(42) extension exists." \ -s "$( head -1 $EARLY_DATA_INPUT )" \ From 4caf3ca08cb3b1b206477ce07a7a09fa14b7da4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2023 16:13:47 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 448/551] tls13: srv: Add discard_early_data_record SSL field Add discard_early_data_record in SSL context for the record layer to know if it has to discard some potential early data record and how. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++ library/ssl_tls.c | 7 ++++- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index b0633609d6..e0cd79d02a 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -353,6 +353,26 @@ #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000 #define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000 +/* + * Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how. + * + * The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them. + * The server has then to skip past early data by either: + * - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic + * key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured + * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully, + * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the + * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake. + * - skipping all records with an external content type of + * "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the + * configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the + * server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores + * application data message before 2nd ClientHello. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2 + /** * \name SECTION: Module settings * @@ -1782,6 +1802,16 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_context { * within a single datagram. */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * One of: + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD + * MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD + */ + uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record); +#endif + /* * Record layer (outgoing data) */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index c952add9b3..c2f874b45e 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1098,9 +1098,14 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED; } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT; #endif +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ /* Initialize structures */ mbedtls_ssl_session_init(ssl->session_negotiate); diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 8bd70ef02c..6e87d7b9d2 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -1780,28 +1780,15 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -static int ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, - int hrr_required) +static int ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake; - if ((handshake->received_extensions & - MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) == 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( - 1, ("EarlyData: no early data extension received.")); - return 0; - } - if (ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, feature disabled in server configuration.")); - return 0; - } - - if (hrr_required) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(1, ("EarlyData: rejected, HRR required.")); - return 0; + return -1; } if (!handshake->resume) { @@ -1810,7 +1797,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, resumption. */ MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, not a session resumption.")); - return 0; + return -1; } /* RFC 8446 4.2.10 @@ -1833,7 +1820,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected key in " "`pre_shared_key` is not the first one.")); - return 0; + return -1; } if (handshake->ciphersuite_info->id != @@ -1841,7 +1828,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, the selected ciphersuite is not the one " "of the selected pre-shared key.")); - return 0; + return -1; } @@ -1850,10 +1837,10 @@ static int ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, 1, ("EarlyData: rejected, early_data not allowed in ticket " "permission bits.")); - return 0; + return -1; } - return 1; + return 0; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1885,15 +1872,24 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = - ssl_tls13_is_early_data_accepted(ssl, hrr_required); - - if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); - if (ret != 0) { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( - 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); - return ret; + if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { + ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = 0; + if (!hrr_required) { + ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = + (ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(ssl) == 0); + } + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( + 1, "mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform", ret); + return ret; + } + } else { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = + hrr_required ? + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD : + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD; } } #else From 2995d35ac344376acc5e18d3f39e1b6afc6917cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 16:59:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 449/551] tls13: srv: Deprotect and discard early data records Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_msg.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 7 +++- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 20501c940a..bf9a8ca7c0 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -3985,6 +3985,31 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, rec)) != 0) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET(1, "ssl_decrypt_buf", ret); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data, it might receive early + * data as long as it has not received the client Finished message. + * It is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as stated + * in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446: + * + * "Ignore the extension and return a regular 1-RTT response. The + * server then skips past early data by attempting to deprotect + * received records using the handshake traffic key, discarding + * records which fail deprotection (up to the configured + * max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully, + * it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the + * server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake." + */ + if ((old_msg_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD)) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records.")); + /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here. */ + ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) if (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID && ssl->conf->ignore_unexpected_cid @@ -3997,6 +4022,20 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, return ret; } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * If the server were discarding protected records that it fails to + * deprotect because it has rejected early data, as we have just + * deprotected successfully a record, the server has to resume normal + * operation and fail the connection if the deprotection of a record + * fails. + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + if (old_msg_type != rec->type) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(4, ("record type after decrypt (before %d): %d", old_msg_type, rec->type)); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index c06c0a746a..404818dfc4 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3274,5 +3274,8 @@ elliptic_curve_get_properties TLS 1.3 resume session with ticket tls13_resume_session_with_ticket -TLS 1.3 early data -tls13_early_data +TLS 1.3 early data, reference +tls13_early_data:"reference" + +TLS 1.3 early data, deprotect and discard +tls13_early_data:"deprotect and discard" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 2d1a757e44..31a973b6f0 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3662,9 +3662,10 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -void tls13_early_data() +void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) { int ret = -1; + int scenario = 0; unsigned char buf[64]; const char *early_data = "This is early data."; size_t early_data_len = strlen(early_data); @@ -3672,6 +3673,18 @@ void tls13_early_data() mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options; mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; + mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern server_pattern = { NULL, 0 }; + + /* + * Determine scenario. + */ + if (strcmp(scenario_string, "reference") == 0) { + scenario = 0; + } else if (strcmp(scenario_string, "deprotect and discard") == 0) { + scenario = 1; + } else { + TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); + } /* * Test set-up @@ -3692,15 +3705,17 @@ void tls13_early_data() mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer; + server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, mbedtls_test_ticket_write, mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, NULL); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket), &(server_ep.socket), 1024); @@ -3740,6 +3755,16 @@ void tls13_early_data() ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + switch (scenario) { + case 1: /* deprotect and discard */ + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); + server_pattern.pattern = + "EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records."; + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED); + break; + } + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl), MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO), 0); @@ -3751,18 +3776,29 @@ void tls13_early_data() early_data_len); TEST_EQUAL(ret, early_data_len); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED), MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA); + ret = mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); - TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)), - early_data_len); - TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf, early_data_len, early_data, early_data_len); + switch (scenario) { + case 0: + TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA); + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl), + buf, sizeof(buf)), early_data_len); + TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf, early_data_len, early_data, early_data_len); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP), 0); + break; + + case 1: + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 0); + TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1); + break; + } exit: mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL); @@ -3770,6 +3806,7 @@ exit: mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options); mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session); + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(0); PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ From 1483dc3bdedfc3279f84e4aa26427cf7e0c82851 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2024 10:00:47 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 450/551] tls13: cli: Indicate early data only in first ClientHello Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index 76f0f18962..2598bae75e 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -1182,7 +1182,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl) && ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) && - ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED) { + ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED && + ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count == 0) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( ssl, 0, p, end, &ext_len); From 263dbf71679c359be8549e111fcd0160a1ed1ed4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Wed, 26 Oct 2022 10:51:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 451/551] tls13: srv: Do not allow early data indication in 2nd ClientHello Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 6e87d7b9d2..93748a6a24 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -1533,6 +1533,12 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned int extension_type; size_t extension_data_len; const unsigned char *extension_data_end; + uint32_t allowed_exts = MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH; + + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count > 0) { + /* Do not accept early data extension in 2nd ClientHello */ + allowed_exts &= ~MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA); + } /* RFC 8446, section 4.2.11 * @@ -1560,7 +1566,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_parse_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_check_received_extension( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO, extension_type, - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_ALLOWED_EXTS_OF_CH); + allowed_exts); if (ret != 0) { return ret; } From f57d14bed4dbefb7419cbd439afeddcd096058d2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jerry Yu Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2023 16:40:09 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 452/551] Ignore early data app msg before 2nd client hello Signed-off-by: Jerry Yu Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_msg.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 3 +++ tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index bf9a8ca7c0..2fe084c4dc 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -4109,6 +4109,32 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) + /* + * Although the server rejected early data because it needed to send an + * HelloRetryRequest message, it might receive early data as long as it has + * not received the client Finished message. + * The early data is encrypted with early keys and should be ignored as + * stated in section 4.2.10 of RFC 8446 (second case): + * + * "The server then ignores early data by skipping all records with an + * external content type of "application_data" (indicating that they are + * encrypted), up to the configured max_early_data_size. Ignore application + * data message before 2nd ClientHello when early_data was received in 1st + * ClientHello." + */ + if (ssl->discard_early_data_record == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD) { + if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { + MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( + 3, ("EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello")); + /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here. */ + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + } else if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { + ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; + } + } +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) if (ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM) { mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update(ssl); diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index 404818dfc4..e5e4c1e007 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3279,3 +3279,6 @@ tls13_early_data:"reference" TLS 1.3 early data, deprotect and discard tls13_early_data:"deprotect and discard" + +TLS 1.3 early data, discard after HRR +tls13_early_data:"discard after HRR" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 31a973b6f0..949356a1c5 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3674,6 +3674,11 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern server_pattern = { NULL, 0 }; + uint16_t group_list[3] = { + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE + }; /* * Determine scenario. @@ -3682,6 +3687,8 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) scenario = 0; } else if (strcmp(scenario_string, "deprotect and discard") == 0) { scenario = 1; + } else if (strcmp(scenario_string, "discard after HRR") == 0) { + scenario = 2; } else { TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); } @@ -3700,7 +3707,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + group_list); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); @@ -3709,7 +3716,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + group_list); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, @@ -3763,6 +3770,19 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED); break; + + case 2: /* discard after HRR */ + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); + server_pattern.pattern = + "EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello"; + mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(&server_ep.conf, group_list + 1); + /* + * Need to reset again to reconstruct the group list in the + * handshake structure from the configured one. + */ + ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl)); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + break; } TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( @@ -3793,7 +3813,8 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP), 0); break; - case 1: + case 1: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case 2: TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1); From ae2d81c314c15350484c6188995a1bac9791f3ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 09:13:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 453/551] tests: tls13: Run early data test only in TLS 1.3 only config Temporary workaround to not run the early data test in Windows-2013 where there is an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf(). Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 949356a1c5..807b5ab71e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ #define SSL_MESSAGE_QUEUE_INIT { NULL, 0, 0, 0 } -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ +#if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED) && \ @@ -3661,7 +3662,12 @@ exit: } /* END_CASE */ -/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +/* + * The !MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 dependency of tls13_early_data() below is + * a temporary workaround to not run the test in Windows-2013 where there is + * an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf(). + */ +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) { int ret = -1; From 12285c5c7c658a92cecc05a095e36d8d256d828a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 17:52:41 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 454/551] Add calls to BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_INIT / BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_DONE Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function index 0af4209f4e..8bb7b8b8ea 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_gcm.function @@ -499,8 +499,11 @@ exit: void gcm_invalid_iv_len(void) { mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_INIT(); + // Invalid IV length 0 gcm_reset_ctx(&ctx, b16, sizeof(b16) * 8, b16, 0, MBEDTLS_ERR_GCM_BAD_INPUT); mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); @@ -514,8 +517,8 @@ void gcm_invalid_iv_len(void) goto exit; /* To suppress error that exit is defined but not used */ exit: - /* empty */ - return; + mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ @@ -525,7 +528,10 @@ void gcm_add_len_too_long(void) // Only testable on platforms where sizeof(size_t) >= 8. #if SIZE_MAX >= UINT64_MAX mbedtls_gcm_context ctx; + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; + BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_INIT(); + /* NISP SP 800-38D, Section 5.2.1.1 requires that bit length of AD should * be <= 2^64 - 1, ie < 2^64. This is the minimum invalid length in bytes. */ uint64_t len_max = 1ULL << 61; @@ -550,6 +556,7 @@ void gcm_add_len_too_long(void) exit: mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_DONE(); #endif } /* END_CASE */ @@ -563,6 +570,9 @@ void gcm_input_len_too_long(void) uint8_t b16[16] = { 0 }; uint8_t out[1]; size_t out_len; + mbedtls_gcm_init(&ctx); + BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_INIT(); + /* NISP SP 800-38D, Section 5.2.1.1 requires that bit length of input should * be <= 2^39 - 256. This is the maximum valid length in bytes. */ uint64_t len_max = (1ULL << 36) - 32; @@ -590,6 +600,7 @@ void gcm_input_len_too_long(void) exit: mbedtls_gcm_free(&ctx); + BLOCK_CIPHER_PSA_DONE(); #endif } /* END_CASE */ From ac61cee2fdcb4b24cc634ab90fa77f85e1dd8087 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 17:53:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 455/551] Restore mutex lock for mbedtls_test_set_step() This function is called externally from several tests, so still requires a mutex lock. Add an internal function to reset the step, for use in functions where the mutex is already held. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/helpers.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index 936da066fb..ee87a61ee5 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -144,12 +144,25 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_test_get_step(void) return step; } -void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) +void mbedtls_test_reset_step(void) { /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior * to calling this function. */ + mbedtls_test_info.step = (unsigned long) (-1); +} + +void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + mbedtls_test_info.step = step; + +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ } void mbedtls_test_get_line1(char *line) @@ -366,7 +379,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void) #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_SUCCESS, 0, 0, 0); - mbedtls_test_set_step((unsigned long) (-1)); + mbedtls_test_reset_step(); mbedtls_test_set_line1(NULL); mbedtls_test_set_line2(NULL); From 098e2d82cd4917cb03f5c385a449a6c83a1660e5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 17:59:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 456/551] Revert accidental formatting change Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h index cf175a3ac4..a5e49cbe57 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/bignum_helpers.h @@ -86,8 +86,8 @@ void mbedtls_test_mpi_mod_modulus_free_with_limbs(mbedtls_mpi_mod_modulus *N); * the "0 (null)" and "0 (1 limb)" and "leading zeros" test cases do what they * claim. * - * \param[out] X The MPI object to populate. It must be initialized. - * \param[in] s The null-terminated hexadecimal string to read from. + * \param[out] X The MPI object to populate. It must be initialized. + * \param[in] s The null-terminated hexadecimal string to read from. * * \return \c 0 on success, an \c MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_xxx error code otherwise. */ From 13ab693c491b59d07436c6a26ce8ecf133646000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 08:48:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 457/551] rsa_internal: fix documentation for mbedtls_rsa_parse_key() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/rsa_internal.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/library/rsa_internal.h b/library/rsa_internal.h index 4cb564efae..f79c3b7122 100644 --- a/library/rsa_internal.h +++ b/library/rsa_internal.h @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ * \param keylen The length of the key buffer in bytes. * * \return 0 on success. + * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_xxx in case of ASN.1 parsing errors. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_xxx in case of RSA internal failures while * parsing data. * \return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED if validity checks on the From 45c33ed41ec2d89535aed1ac81d4345939e5c42a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 09:04:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 458/551] test_suite_rsa: fix data for "extra integer outside the SEQUENCE" Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index f4bd60a676..b404f00d26 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -725,7 +725,7 @@ RSA parse public key - correct values, extra integer inside the SEQUENCE rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"30818c028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001020100":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH RSA parse public key - correct values, extra integer outside the SEQUENCE -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":0 +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001020100":0 RSA priv key write - incremental output buffer size rsa_key_write_incremental:0:"3063020100021100cc8ab070369ede72920e5a51523c857102030100010211009a6318982a7231de1894c54aa4909201020900f3058fd8dc484d61020900d7770dbd8b78a2110209009471f14c26428401020813425f060c4b72210208052b93d01747a87c" From 864519793777dd9bfd416c3a60a272f6d0622934 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 09:50:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 459/551] psa_util: fix documentation of ECDSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 22 ++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 15e92e36f9..b7b710f65a 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -184,35 +184,33 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA) -/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format (used by PSA APIs) to DER ASN.1 - * format (used by legacy crypto APIs). +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 format. * * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. - * \param raw_len Length of raw buffer in bytes + * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. - * \param der_size Size of the output der buffer in bytes. + * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data - * (in bytes) written to der buffer. It's undefined + * (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined * in case of failure. - * \param bits Size of each raw coordinate in bits. + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, size_t bits); -/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format (used by legacy crypto - * APIs) to raw format (used by PSA APIs). +/** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw format. * * \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format. - * \param der_len Size of the der buffer in bytes. + * \param der_len Size of \p der in bytes. * \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw * signature. It can overlap with der buffer. - * \param raw_size Size of the raw buffer in bytes. + * \param raw_size Size of \p raw in bytes. * \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid - * data (in bytes) written to raw buffer. It's undefined + * data (in bytes) written to \p raw. It's undefined * in case of failure. - * \param bits Size of each raw coordinate in bits. + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. */ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, From 315e4afc0a6bc4e55340fe8de7891e076e277da5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 10:09:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 460/551] psa_util: change parameters order in ECDSA conversion functions Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 14 ++++++------- library/pk_wrap.c | 7 +++---- library/psa_util.c | 10 ++++------ .../test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 20 ++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index b7b710f65a..06732d8c5c 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa /** Convert an ECDSA signature from raw format to DER ASN.1 format. * + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER @@ -194,14 +195,13 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data * (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined * in case of failure. - * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, - unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, - size_t bits); +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len); /** Convert an ECDSA signature from DER ASN.1 format to raw format. * + * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. * \param der Buffer that contains the signature in DER format. * \param der_len Size of \p der in bytes. * \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw @@ -210,11 +210,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, * \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid * data (in bytes) written to \p raw. It's undefined * in case of failure. - * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. */ -int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, - unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, - size_t bits); +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c index 9a29d929e8..c45fbd4369 100644 --- a/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -573,9 +573,8 @@ static int ecdsa_verify_psa(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len, } p = (unsigned char *) sig; - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(p, sig_len, extracted_sig, - sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len, - curve_bits); + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(curve_bits, p, sig_len, extracted_sig, + sizeof(extracted_sig), &converted_sig_len); if (ret != 0) { goto cleanup; } @@ -730,7 +729,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, } done: - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(sig, sig_size, sig, sig_size, sig_len, key_bits); + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, sig_size, sig, sig_size, sig_len); return ret; } diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index b13d83d470..2491f2e45a 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -402,9 +402,8 @@ static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t ra return len; } -int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, - unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, - size_t bits) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len) { unsigned char r[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; unsigned char s[PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS)]; @@ -511,9 +510,8 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, return (int) (p - der); } -int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, - unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, - size_t bits) +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len) { unsigned char raw_tmp[PSA_VENDOR_ECDSA_SIGNATURE_MAX_SIZE]; unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) der; diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index 9dc95b659d..c102b07615 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ void ecdsa_raw_to_der(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_r TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, - key_bits), exp_ret); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len), exp_ret); if (exp_ret == 0) { ASSERT_COMPARE(exp_result->x, exp_result->len, tmp_buf, ret_len); @@ -35,17 +34,15 @@ void ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_resul for (i = 1; i < tmp_buf_len; i++) { TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, i, &ret_len, - key_bits) != 0); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, i, &ret_len) != 0); mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); tmp_buf = NULL; } TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, i, &ret_len, - key_bits), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, i, &ret_len), 0); exit: mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); } @@ -60,9 +57,8 @@ void ecdsa_der_to_raw(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_r TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len, - key_bits), exp_ret); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(key_bits, input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len), exp_ret); if (exp_ret == 0) { ASSERT_COMPARE(exp_result->x, exp_result->len, tmp_buf, ret_len); From 6932e290572f2870f66003228b63d11044c49313 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Antonio de Angelis Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 09:49:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 461/551] Correct the ENCODES_OWNER macro name in comment Signed-off-by: Antonio de Angelis --- include/psa/crypto_struct.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h index 8216f28ba6..ca264e3ab2 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_struct.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_struct.h @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ typedef struct { psa_key_attributes_flag_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(flags); /* This type has a different layout in the client view wrt the * service view of the key id, i.e. in service view usually is - * expected to have MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined + * expected to have MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER defined * thus adding an owner field to the standard psa_key_id_t. For * implementations with client/service separation, this means the * object will be marshalled through a transport channel and From 954ef4bbd5727a92113732e51622af374d2f736f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 12:06:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 462/551] psa_util: improve convert_raw_to_der_single_int() Allow the function to support DER buffers than what it is nominally required by the provided coordinates. In other words let's ignore padding zeros in the raw number. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 7 +++++- library/psa_util.c | 25 ++++++++++--------- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 4 +++ .../test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 13 +++++++--- 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 06732d8c5c..132c73f230 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -191,7 +191,12 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. - * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. + * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. Given \p bits parameter: + * * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(\p bits) can be used + * to determine a large enough buffer for any + * \p raw input vector. + * * The minimum size might be smaller in case + * \p raw input vector contains padding zeros. * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data * (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined * in case of failure. diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 2491f2e45a..4e350c097b 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -365,9 +365,21 @@ static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t ra unsigned char *der_buf_end) { unsigned char *p = der_buf_end; - int len = (int) raw_len; + int len; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. + * Provided input MPIs should not be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still + * detect that and return error in case. */ + while (*raw_buf == 0x00) { + ++raw_buf; + --raw_len; + if (raw_len == 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + } + len = (int) raw_len; + /* Copy the raw coordinate to the end of der_buf. */ if ((p - der_buf_start) < len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL; @@ -375,17 +387,6 @@ static int convert_raw_to_der_single_int(const unsigned char *raw_buf, size_t ra p -= len; memcpy(p, raw_buf, len); - /* ASN.1 DER encoding requires minimal length, so skip leading 0s. - * Provided input MPIs should not be 0, but as a failsafe measure, still - * detect that and return error in case. */ - while (*p == 0x00) { - ++p; - --len; - if (len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; - } - } - /* If MSb is 1, ASN.1 requires that we prepend a 0. */ if (*p & 0x80) { if ((p - der_buf_start) < 1) { diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index c92b5fcc17..606e563990 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -115,3 +115,7 @@ ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:512:"9111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer of minimal length (1 byte per integer) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002":"3006020101020102" diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index c102b07615..51f42a7bd7 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ void ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_resul size_t ret_len; size_t i; + /* Test with an output buffer smaller than required (expexted to fail). */ for (i = 1; i < tmp_buf_len; i++) { TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, @@ -39,10 +40,16 @@ void ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_resul mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); tmp_buf = NULL; } + /* Test with an output buffer larger/equal than required (expexted to + * succeed). */ + for (i = tmp_buf_len; i < (2 * tmp_buf_len); i++) { + TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, + tmp_buf, i, &ret_len) == 0); + mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); + tmp_buf = NULL; + } - TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, i, &ret_len), 0); exit: mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); } From e01a2b03c63ef2fd087d850a6a006231417e5f71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 15:16:36 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 463/551] psa_util: update documentation for mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 132c73f230..8868bc13a9 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_l * \param der_len Size of \p der in bytes. * \param[out] raw Buffer that will be filled with the converted raw * signature. It can overlap with der buffer. - * \param raw_size Size of \p raw in bytes. + * \param raw_size Size of \p raw in bytes. Must be at least + * 2 * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. * \param[out] raw_len On success it is updated with the amount of valid * data (in bytes) written to \p raw. It's undefined * in case of failure. From 2bd0ecdf4582ee04877c028c456ecf487d47dc9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 15:25:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 464/551] psa_util: improve documentation for convert_raw_to_der_single_int() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 4e350c097b..1bb02e9077 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ mbedtls_ecp_group_id mbedtls_ecc_group_from_psa(psa_ecc_family_t family, * * \param raw_buf Buffer containing the raw coordinate to be * converted. - * \param raw_len Length of raw_buf in bytes. + * \param raw_len Length of raw_buf in bytes. This must be > 0. * \param der_buf_start Pointer to the beginning of the buffer which * will be filled with the DER converted data. * \param der_buf_end End of the buffer used to store the DER output. From 8334d00772c155c41eb1a735417fd98dfd0382ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 15:35:26 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 465/551] psa_util: improve check of raw_len in mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 3 ++- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 8868bc13a9..a5f09a4f45 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -188,7 +188,8 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa * * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. - * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. + * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be + * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. Given \p bits parameter: diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 1bb02e9077..f3fcd1d8cc 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_l unsigned char *p = der + der_size; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) { + if ((raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) || (raw_len > 2 * coordinate_len)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 606e563990..580622f8c5 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -26,6 +26,14 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, s with MSb set depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte shorter) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte longer) +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 From bec1d842ac2a38d37a30fee182a7246ead5c41c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 15:50:02 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 466/551] psa_util: convert_der_to_raw_single_int() accepts also all zero integers These values are not mathematically valid as signature, but as for what it concerns with ECDSA conversion functions, 0 values in DER format should be translated to 0 values in raw format. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 4 ---- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 24 +++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index f3fcd1d8cc..0a77855b03 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -493,10 +493,6 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, p++; unpadded_len--; } - /* It should never happen that the input number has 0 length. */ - if (unpadded_len == 0) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; - } if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { /* Parsed number is longer than the maximum expected value. */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 580622f8c5..f12a4bb723 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -74,21 +74,29 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, r with MSb set depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (only 1 zero byte) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid r all zeros depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502010002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid s (only 1 zero byte) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid s all zeros depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111020100":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r (0-length) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid r only 1 zero byte depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502010002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit,Invalid s (0-length) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid s only 1 zero byte depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111020100":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid 0-length r +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid 0-length s +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success From 05c256fb3639d3ae3ca414d309851e45fdb36ca4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 16:02:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 467/551] psa_util: minor performance improvement in mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 0a77855b03..7e79b1ce88 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_l return ret; } - memset(raw_tmp, 0, sizeof(raw_tmp)); + memset(raw_tmp, 0, 2 * coordinate_size); /* Extract r */ ret = convert_der_to_raw_single_int(p, data_len, raw_tmp, coordinate_size); From 091bdc416d5056554bb8963054357423165662b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 16:17:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 468/551] psa_util: enhance checks on leading zeros in convert_der_to_raw_single_int() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 10 ++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 12 ++++++++---- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 7e79b1ce88..674f21b9be 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -488,10 +488,20 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, return ret; } + /* It's invalid to have MSb set without a leading 0x00 (leading 0x00 is + * checked below). */ + if ((*p & 0x80) != 0) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } + /* Skip possible leading zero */ if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { p++; unpadded_len--; + /* Only 1 leading zero is allowed, otherwise that's an error. */ + if (*p == 0x00) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; + } } if (unpadded_len > coordinate_size) { diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index f12a4bb723..568f6c571a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -74,13 +74,13 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, r with MSb set depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid r all zeros +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r all zeros depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid s all zeros +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid s all zeros depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid r only 1 zero byte depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 @@ -98,6 +98,10 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid 0-length s depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r: MSb set without leading zero +depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 From 110126110da3316451f9ddf7d4f011973c6d1a17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 16:24:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 469/551] test_suite_psa_util: use more generic symbols for test case dependencies Use PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS instead of a specific curve since what we care about is only bit-size not the curve itself. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 68 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 568f6c571a..69e4e19e97 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -1,141 +1,141 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Raw data too short -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer too small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null r -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Null s -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, r with MSb set -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, s with MSb set -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte shorter) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte longer) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Raw buffer too small -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong sequence tag -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"40440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid sequence length -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30ff0220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong integer tag -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440120111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too small) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440219111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102192222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, r with MSb set -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r all zeros -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid s all zeros -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid r only 1 zero byte -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502010002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid s only 1 zero byte -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111020100":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid 0-length r -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid 0-length s -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r: MSb set without leading zero -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 512 ecdsa_raw_to_der:512:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. ECDSA DER -> Raw, 512bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 512 ecdsa_der_to_raw:512:"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. # Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. # Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8. ECDSA DER -> Raw, 521bit, Success -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 ecdsa_der_to_raw:528:"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:256:"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" ECDSA Raw -> DER, 512bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 512 ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:512:"9111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818502410091111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer of minimal length (1 byte per integer) -depends_on:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256 +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000010000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002":"3006020101020102" From 31e2d83eeef6a4dc564b1791a5ab31ecc5a3c593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 16:45:57 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 470/551] tls13: srv: Improve coding Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 93748a6a24..5f6d1a18a0 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -1879,11 +1879,9 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) if (ssl->handshake->received_extensions & MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_MASK(EARLY_DATA)) { - ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = 0; - if (!hrr_required) { - ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = - (ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(ssl) == 0); - } + ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted = + (!hrr_required) && (ssl_tls13_check_early_data_requirements(ssl) == 0); + if (ssl->handshake->early_data_accepted) { ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_compute_early_transform(ssl); if (ret != 0) { From 71c6e65d83844da1bc15451743bc44a6db75eca4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 16:48:10 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 471/551] tls13: ssl_msg.c: Improve/add comments Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_msg.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_msg.c b/library/ssl_msg.c index 2fe084c4dc..7af9fd2b45 100644 --- a/library/ssl_msg.c +++ b/library/ssl_msg.c @@ -4005,7 +4005,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD)) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ("EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records.")); - /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here. */ + /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here, see issue 6347 */ ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ @@ -4019,6 +4019,10 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */ + /* + * The decryption of the record failed, no reason to ignore it, + * return in error with the decryption error code. + */ return ret; } @@ -4127,7 +4131,7 @@ static int ssl_prepare_record_content(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ("EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello")); - /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here. */ + /* TODO: Add max_early_data_size check here, see issue 6347 */ return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; } else if (rec->type == MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE) { ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; From 1792bb44a0aac407b8d87b08eeba487e19ac854f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 17:34:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 472/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: add more test cases Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 28 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 69e4e19e97..7f3f5b50b0 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -26,6 +26,18 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, s with MSb set depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, both r and s with MSb set +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"A111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3046022100A111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022100A222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, r and s only 1 byte of data +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000022":"3006020111020122":0 + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, r and s only 1 byte of data with MSb set +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000A2":"300802020091020200A2":0 + ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte shorter) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA @@ -54,22 +66,26 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong integer tag depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440120111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too small) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (1 byte smaller than the actual size) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440219111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (too large) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong r integer length (1 byte larger than the actual size) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440221111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too small) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (1 byte smaller than the actual size) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102192222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (too large) +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Wrong s integer length (1 byte larger than the actual size) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102212222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, r size 1 byte larger than allowed for output raw coordinate +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3045022111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, r with MSb set depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3045022100911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"91111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 @@ -118,6 +134,10 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success (integers exactly 521 bits) +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802420111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 + # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. # Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8. ECDSA DER -> Raw, 521bit, Success From 9ae32704b615c473303c35c708efa18673858476 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 16:44:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 473/551] Add missing dependencies for pkparse tests Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data index a8d6536e9a..5e9f0e7a83 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -891,15 +891,15 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT Parse RSA Key #99.3 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.4 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-192-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.5 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.6 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) From 1d5fa22f9dc75841106d96cba39a113fe092dc21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 16:45:38 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 474/551] Fix pkcs5 aes test data Remove the keyLength parameter from the AES-256 tests. Add MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 to the dependencies. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index 790a31ba01..939c82fc09 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -143,16 +143,16 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIP pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ncrypt AES-128-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e" PBES2 Encrypt AES-192-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94" PBES2 Encrypt AES-256-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH -pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301a0408010203040506070802022710300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886 PBES2 Decrypt AES-256-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH -pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" +pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301a0408010203040506070802022710300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" PBES2 Decrypt (bad params tag) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C From 0e60e93c12002b1aae6fb77e647b3cfdba64134e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 17:59:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 475/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: improve ecdsa_der_to_raw() Check that the parsing always fails if the input is truncated. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- .../test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 27 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index 51f42a7bd7..fe811e0629 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -58,20 +58,35 @@ exit: /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_UTIL_HAVE_ECDSA */ void ecdsa_der_to_raw(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result, int exp_ret) { - unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; - size_t tmp_buf_len = exp_result->len; + unsigned char *in_buf = NULL; + size_t in_buf_len; + unsigned char *out_buf = NULL; + size_t out_buf_len = exp_result->len; size_t ret_len; - TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len); + TEST_CALLOC(out_buf, out_buf_len); + + /* Verify that parsing of truncated input always fails. */ + for (in_buf_len = 1; in_buf_len < input->len; in_buf_len++) { + /* We alloc a copy of input buffer with limited length so that sanitizers + * can detect overreads. */ + TEST_CALLOC(in_buf, in_buf_len); + memcpy(in_buf, input->x, in_buf_len); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(key_bits, in_buf, in_buf_len, + out_buf, out_buf_len, &ret_len) != 0); + mbedtls_free(in_buf); + in_buf = NULL; + } TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(key_bits, input->x, input->len, - tmp_buf, tmp_buf_len, &ret_len), exp_ret); + out_buf, out_buf_len, &ret_len), exp_ret); if (exp_ret == 0) { - ASSERT_COMPARE(exp_result->x, exp_result->len, tmp_buf, ret_len); + ASSERT_COMPARE(exp_result->x, exp_result->len, out_buf, ret_len); } exit: - mbedtls_free(tmp_buf); + mbedtls_free(in_buf); + mbedtls_free(out_buf); } /* END_CASE */ From 33327dab8564bff155ec067a281e0e961390e7bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 17:46:41 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 476/551] tests: early data: Switch to mnemonics for test scenarios Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 6 ++--- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 37 +++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index e5e4c1e007..86945cc7b4 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3275,10 +3275,10 @@ TLS 1.3 resume session with ticket tls13_resume_session_with_ticket TLS 1.3 early data, reference -tls13_early_data:"reference" +tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE TLS 1.3 early data, deprotect and discard -tls13_early_data:"deprotect and discard" +tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD TLS 1.3 early data, discard after HRR -tls13_early_data:"discard after HRR" +tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 807b5ab71e..cbb29b6fb2 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ #define SSL_MESSAGE_QUEUE_INIT { NULL, 0, 0, 0 } +/* Mnemonics for the early data test scenarios */ +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE 0 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR 2 + #if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C) && \ @@ -3668,10 +3673,9 @@ exit: * an issue with mbedtls_vsnprintf(). */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:!MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) +void tls13_early_data(int scenario) { int ret = -1; - int scenario = 0; unsigned char buf[64]; const char *early_data = "This is early data."; size_t early_data_len = strlen(early_data); @@ -3686,19 +3690,6 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE }; - /* - * Determine scenario. - */ - if (strcmp(scenario_string, "reference") == 0) { - scenario = 0; - } else if (strcmp(scenario_string, "deprotect and discard") == 0) { - scenario = 1; - } else if (strcmp(scenario_string, "discard after HRR") == 0) { - scenario = 2; - } else { - TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); - } - /* * Test set-up */ @@ -3769,7 +3760,10 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); switch (scenario) { - case 1: /* deprotect and discard */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE: + break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); server_pattern.pattern = "EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records."; @@ -3777,7 +3771,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED); break; - case 2: /* discard after HRR */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR: mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); server_pattern.pattern = "EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello"; @@ -3789,6 +3783,9 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl)); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); break; + + default: + TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); } TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( @@ -3807,7 +3804,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); switch (scenario) { - case 0: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE: TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl), @@ -3819,8 +3816,8 @@ void tls13_early_data(char *scenario_string) MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP), 0); break; - case 1: /* Intentional fallthrough */ - case 2: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1); From fe329cea3fdcda1865c21e24b5fa3e5aef219eaa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 08:00:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 477/551] rsa: handle buffer length similarly in private and public key parsing Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/rsa.c | 8 +++++++- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data | 2 +- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index f4add9173f..b250e1d491 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -109,6 +109,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, si end = p + len; + if (end > (key + keylen)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -239,7 +243,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, return ret; } - if (p + len != end) { + end = p + len; + + if (end > (key + keylen)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index b404f00d26..b89d1583c3 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -707,7 +707,7 @@ RSA parse public key - public exponent 0 rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA parse public key - wrong sequence length -rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308188028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308188028181009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA RSA parse public key - wrong modulus length rsa_parse_pkcs1_key:1:"308189028180009f091e6968b474f76f0e9c237c1d895996ae704b4f6d706acec8d2daac6209bf524aa3f658d0283adba1077f6cbe92e425dcde52290b239cade91be86c88425434986806e85734e159768f3dfea932baaa9409d25bace8ee9dce0cdde0903207299de575ae60feccf0daf82334ab83638539b0da74072f253acea8afc8e66bb70203010001":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data index 261c220ee6..b9ae20c56f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_x509parse.data @@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ x509parse_crt:"307d3068a0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c3 X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring length) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 -x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH +x509parse_crt:"308180306ba0030201008204deadbeef300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500300c310a30080600130454657374301c170c303930313031303030303030170c303931323331323335393539300c310a300806001304546573743015300d06092A864886F70D0101010500030400300000300d06092a864886f70d01010b0500030200ff":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_INVALID_PUBKEY + MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_OUT_OF_DATA X509 CRT ASN1 (TBS, inv SubPubKeyInfo, inv internal bitstring tag) depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256 From d4fc5d9d1c76a6cb978ceb4cc74ec62b111b0007 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 08:42:42 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 478/551] psa_util: allow larger raw buffers in mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() The only real contraint on the raw buffer is that it is large enough to contain 2 coordinates. Larger buffers are therefore allowed and the extra data will simply be ignored. Note = trying to impose a strict sizing on the raw buffer causes several failures in test suites. This suggests that it is quite common to use larger buffer to store raw signatures. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 2 +- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 4 ---- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index a5f09a4f45..9294d29bb2 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa * * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. - * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be + * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be at least * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 674f21b9be..7ce5eea030 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_l unsigned char *p = der + der_size; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if ((raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) || (raw_len > 2 * coordinate_len)) { + if (raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 7f3f5b50b0..f7e6ebace8 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -42,10 +42,6 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte shorter) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte longer) -depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA - ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 From c213a2e1e56b5734a6e1a07b7655df28739baf17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 10:49:14 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 479/551] adjust_legacy_from_psa: use groups instead of curves for DH Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h index b27f6b9e39..56ec276911 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_from_psa.h @@ -370,17 +370,17 @@ /* * DH key types follow the same pattern used above for EC keys. They are defined - * by a triplet (curve, key_type, alg). A triplet is accelerated if all its + * by a triplet (group, key_type, alg). A triplet is accelerated if all its * component are accelerated, otherwise each component needs to be builtin. */ -/* DH: curves: is acceleration complete? */ +/* DH: groups: is acceleration complete? */ #if (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_2048) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_2048)) || \ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_3072) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_3072)) || \ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_4096) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_4096)) || \ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_6144) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_6144)) || \ (defined(PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_8192) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_DH_RFC7919_8192)) -#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES +#define MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS #endif /* DH: algs: is acceleration complete? */ @@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_FFDH) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_ALG_FFDH) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_KEY_TYPES) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_FFDH 1 #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C @@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_IMPORT */ @@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_EXPORT */ @@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC 1 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASIC */ @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ #if defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_CURVES) || \ + defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_GROUPS) || \ defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_DH_ACCEL_INCOMPLETE_ALGS) #define MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define MBEDTLS_BIGNUM_C From 4e9683e8180801a6d0c5326794263c32d62f1e71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chien Wong Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2023 17:07:43 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 480/551] Reduce many unnecessary static memory consumption .data section of ssl_client1 becomes 320 bytes smaller on AMD64. Signed-off-by: Chien Wong --- library/ecp_curves.c | 14 +++++++------- library/sha3.c | 4 ++-- library/ssl_tls.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ecp_curves.c b/library/ecp_curves.c index 577e23b7aa..9a011bbfea 100644 --- a/library/ecp_curves.c +++ b/library/ecp_curves.c @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) /* For these curves, we build the group parameters dynamically. */ #define ECP_LOAD_GROUP -static mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; +static const mbedtls_mpi_uint mpi_one[] = { 1 }; #endif /* @@ -4511,7 +4511,7 @@ static inline void ecp_mpi_set1(mbedtls_mpi *X) { X->s = 1; X->n = 1; - X->p = mpi_one; + X->p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) mpi_one; /* X->p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ } /* @@ -5318,7 +5318,7 @@ cleanup: */ #define P_KOBLITZ_MAX (256 / 8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Max limbs in P #define P_KOBLITZ_R (8 / sizeof(mbedtls_mpi_uint)) // Limbs in R -static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, +static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p_limbs, size_t adjust, size_t shift, mbedtls_mpi_uint mask) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; @@ -5332,7 +5332,7 @@ static inline int ecp_mod_koblitz(mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi_uint *Rp, size_t p /* Init R */ R.s = 1; - R.p = Rp; + R.p = (mbedtls_mpi_uint *) Rp; /* R.p will not be modified so the cast is safe */ R.n = P_KOBLITZ_R; /* Common setup for M */ @@ -5403,7 +5403,7 @@ cleanup: */ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xC9, 0x11, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; @@ -5420,7 +5420,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p192k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) */ static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0x93, 0x1A, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; @@ -5442,7 +5442,7 @@ static int ecp_mod_p224k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) */ static int ecp_mod_p256k1(mbedtls_mpi *N) { - static mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { + static const mbedtls_mpi_uint Rp[] = { MBEDTLS_BYTES_TO_T_UINT_8(0xD1, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00) }; diff --git a/library/sha3.c b/library/sha3.c index d90fefaeac..f420a12497 100644 --- a/library/sha3.c +++ b/library/sha3.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ mbedtls_sha3_family_functions; /* * List of supported SHA-3 families */ -static mbedtls_sha3_family_functions sha3_families[] = { +static const mbedtls_sha3_family_functions sha3_families[] = { { MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, 1152, 224 }, { MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, 1088, 256 }, { MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, 832, 384 }, @@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst, */ int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id) { - mbedtls_sha3_family_functions *p = NULL; + const mbedtls_sha3_family_functions *p = NULL; for (p = sha3_families; p->id != MBEDTLS_SHA3_NONE; p++) { if (p->id == id) { diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index ecfecf2778..10c5f74b2e 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ static const char *extension_name_table[] = { [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT] = "record_size_limit" }; -static unsigned int extension_type_table[] = { +static const unsigned int extension_type_table[] = { [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_UNRECOGNIZED] = 0xff, [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_SERVERNAME] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, [MBEDTLS_SSL_EXT_ID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH] = MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, @@ -3706,7 +3706,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_ETM_BIT) | \ (SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET << SSL_SERIALIZED_SESSION_CONFIG_TICKET_BIT))) -static unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_session_header[] = { MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, @@ -4431,7 +4431,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session) (SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN << SSL_SERIALIZED_CONTEXT_CONFIG_ALPN_BIT) | \ 0u)) -static unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { +static const unsigned char ssl_serialized_context_header[] = { MBEDTLS_VERSION_MAJOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_MINOR, MBEDTLS_VERSION_PATCH, @@ -5049,7 +5049,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf) * See the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves() for what we promise * about this list. */ -static uint16_t ssl_preset_default_groups[] = { +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_groups[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_CURVE25519) MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519, #endif @@ -5100,7 +5100,7 @@ static const int ssl_preset_suiteb_ciphersuites[] = { * - ssl_tls12_preset* is for TLS 1.2 use only. * - ssl_preset_* is for TLS 1.3 only or hybrid TLS 1.3/1.2 handshakes. */ -static uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ @@ -5195,7 +5195,7 @@ static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_default_sig_algs[] = { #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ /* NOTICE: see above */ -static uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDSA_CERT_REQ_ANY_ALLOWED_ENABLED) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ @@ -5236,7 +5236,7 @@ static uint16_t ssl_tls12_preset_suiteb_sig_algs[] = { #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ -static uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_groups[] = { +static const uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_groups[] = { #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1) MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, #endif @@ -5250,7 +5250,7 @@ static uint16_t ssl_preset_suiteb_groups[] = { /* Function for checking `ssl_preset_*_sig_algs` and `ssl_tls12_preset_*_sig_algs` * to make sure there are no duplicated signature algorithm entries. */ MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL -static int ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(uint16_t *sig_algs) +static int ssl_check_no_sig_alg_duplication(const uint16_t *sig_algs) { size_t i, j; int ret = 0; From 735ac3ec05f08392e8890632d9489f43f8778ea6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 11:11:32 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 481/551] Fix builds with secp224k1 as the only curve Normally, if an elliptic curve is enabled in the legacy API then it's also enabled in the PSA API. In particular, if the legacy API has at least one curve then that curve also works with PSA. There is an exception with secp224k1 which PSA does not support. In a build with secp224k1 as the only legacy curve, MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS is enabled (because you can use the curve through PK) but PSA does not support any elliptic curve, so we can't run PK-PSA bridge tests. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 84 ++++++++++++++--------------- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 24 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index 55146feaab..3414958837 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -821,171 +821,171 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME:MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public DECRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public ENCRYPT (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair DERIVE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair DERIVE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public DERIVE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair SIGN_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair SIGN_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair SIGN_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:1:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair->public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY pair->public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA pair->public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public VERIFY_MESSAGE -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public VERIFY_HASH -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:0:PSA_ALG_ECDSA(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH) PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY public SIGN_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECDSA public SIGN_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SOME pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair SIGN_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair VERIFY_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH pair VERIFY_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:1:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public SIGN_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public SIGN_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public VERIFY_MESSAGE (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: ECKEY_DH public VERIFY_HASH (bad) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE pk_get_psa_attributes_fail:MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY_DH:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH:MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH PSA attributes for pk: opaque RSA pair, 0 & SIGN_MESSAGE (bad policy) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 2dd35c8fd8..2574307020 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -36,6 +36,30 @@ #define MBEDTLS_TEST_PK_PSA_SIGN #endif +/* MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE is enabled when PSA supports + * at least one elliptic curve. This is distinct from + * PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY because that symbol can be enabled even + * when there are no curves. This happens in particular in a configuration + * with MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG disabled and where the only legacy curve + * is secp224k1, which is not supported in PSA. */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) || \ + defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) +#define MBEDTLS_TEST_PSA_ECC_AT_LEAST_ONE_CURVE +#endif +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PK_USE_PSA_EC_DATA) static int pk_genkey_ec(mbedtls_pk_context *pk, mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id) { From d0a772740ec78c153b13a3337e2a4e40fbad341e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2024 17:57:05 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 482/551] tests: early data: Complete the handshake Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index cbb29b6fb2..8687a4d6fc 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3810,10 +3810,6 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)), early_data_len); TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf, early_data_len, early_data, early_data_len); - - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP), 0); break; case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: /* Intentional fallthrough */ @@ -3824,6 +3820,10 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) break; } + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); + exit: mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL); mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep, NULL); From b327a1e706f4fbb113ed7f17edcdc23bfa8c5828 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 11:21:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 483/551] Change unaligned access method for old gcc gcc bug https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94662 shows that __attribute__ aligned may be ignored. Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index 248f29bc72..8db550fa53 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -71,10 +71,10 @@ typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 9.3.0 * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. */ - #define UINT_UNALIGNED -typedef uint16_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; -typedef uint32_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; -typedef uint64_t __attribute__((__aligned__(1))) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; + #define UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION +typedef union { uint16_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef union { uint32_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef union { uint64_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; #endif /* @@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; r = *p16; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p16->x; #else memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); #endif @@ -124,6 +127,9 @@ static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; *p16 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) + mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; + p16->x = x; #else memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); #endif @@ -147,6 +153,9 @@ static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; r = *p32; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p32->x; #else memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); #endif @@ -170,6 +179,9 @@ static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; *p32 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) + mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; + p32->x = x; #else memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); #endif @@ -193,6 +205,9 @@ static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; r = *p64; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + r = p64->x; #else memcpy(&r, p, sizeof(r)); #endif @@ -216,6 +231,9 @@ static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; *p64 = x; +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) + mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; + p64->x = x; #else memcpy(p, &x, sizeof(x)); #endif From f20728ee49a89ef8fbb9154dd014c1cbe28a48b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 12:49:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 484/551] Fix missed case for removing accessor Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/helpers.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index ee87a61ee5..da0b54a00a 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_le_s(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, #endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ /* Don't use accessor, we already hold mutex. */ - if (mbedtls_test_get_result() != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { + if (mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { /* If we've already recorded the test as having failed then don't * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ From ec9936d1223283d45d947ab1b6d7f1ea31594fe7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 12:56:45 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 485/551] Improve gcc guards Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index 8db550fa53..65c5321dad 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ typedef uint16_t __packed mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; typedef uint32_t __packed mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; #elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \ - ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 90300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))) + ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 60300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))) /* * Old versions of gcc, depending on how the target is specified, may generate a branch to memcpy * for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than generating some LDR or LDRB instructions From f4e8234f932faa0052b8d97ad9055e7922204aee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 12:57:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 486/551] Improve docs Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index 65c5321dad..14a86cf377 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -55,20 +55,25 @@ typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; #elif defined(MBEDTLS_COMPILER_IS_GCC) && (MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION >= 40504) && \ ((MBEDTLS_GCC_VERSION < 60300) || (!defined(MBEDTLS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))) /* - * Old versions of gcc, depending on how the target is specified, may generate a branch to memcpy - * for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than generating some LDR or LDRB instructions - * (similar for stores). - * Recent versions where unaligned access is not enabled also do this. + * gcc may generate a branch to memcpy for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than + * generating some LDR or LDRB instructions (similar for stores). + * + * For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this always happens. + * For gcc < 6.3.0, this happens at -O0 + * For all versions, this happens iff unaligned access is not supported. + * + * For gcc 4.x, this will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is supported, which + * is correct but not optimal. * * For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate * some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size. * * The manual states: - * "The aligned attribute specifies a minimum alignment for the variable or structure field, - * measured in bytes." - * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Variable-Attributes.html + * "The packed attribute specifies that a variable or structure field should have the smallest + * possible alignment—one byte for a variable" + * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.5.4/gcc/Variable-Attributes.html * - * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 9.3.0 + * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0 * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. */ #define UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION From 22b934e6d2242c5d7c3b14f82ef99ecb62fb7de4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 12:57:16 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 487/551] Use struct not union Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 20 ++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index 14a86cf377..db835955b6 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -76,10 +76,10 @@ typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0 * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. */ - #define UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION -typedef union { uint16_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; -typedef union { uint32_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; -typedef union { uint64_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; + #define UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT +typedef struct { uint16_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { uint32_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { uint64_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; #endif /* @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static inline uint16_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint16(const void *p) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; r = *p16; -#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; r = p16->x; #else @@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint16(void *p, uint16_t x) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; *p16 = x; -#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *p16 = (mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t *) p; p16->x = x; #else @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static inline uint32_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint32(const void *p) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; r = *p32; -#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; r = p32->x; #else @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint32(void *p, uint32_t x) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; *p32 = x; -#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *p32 = (mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t *) p; p32->x = x; #else @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static inline uint64_t mbedtls_get_unaligned_uint64(const void *p) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; r = *p64; -#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; r = p64->x; #else @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static inline void mbedtls_put_unaligned_uint64(void *p, uint64_t x) #if defined(UINT_UNALIGNED) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; *p64 = x; -#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_UNION) +#elif defined(UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *p64 = (mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t *) p; p64->x = x; #else From eae7fce8296404563632062281c3dc7da32f43db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 14:40:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 488/551] add changelog Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/8030.txt | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/8030.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/8030.txt b/ChangeLog.d/8030.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..d99c9e7e4d --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/8030.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +Changes + * Extended PSA Crypto configurations options for FFDH by making it possible + to select only some of the parameters / groups, with the macros + PSA_WANT_DH_RFC7919_XXXX. You now need to defined the corresponding macro + for each size you want to support. Also, if you have an FFDH accelerator, + you'll need to define the appropriate MBEDTLS_PSA_ACCEL macros to signal + support for these domain parameters. From d09f96b829aedcddd5bb40681fca2c31ff20a591 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 13:51:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 489/551] Improve docs Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index db835955b6..fece47dc87 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -58,12 +58,15 @@ typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; * gcc may generate a branch to memcpy for calls like `memcpy(dest, src, 4)` rather than * generating some LDR or LDRB instructions (similar for stores). * - * For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this always happens. - * For gcc < 6.3.0, this happens at -O0 - * For all versions, this happens iff unaligned access is not supported. + * This is architecture dependent: x86-64 seems fine even with old gcc; 32-bit Arm + * is affected. To keep it simple, we enable for all architectures. * - * For gcc 4.x, this will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is supported, which - * is correct but not optimal. + * For versions of gcc < 5.4.0 this issue always happens. + * For gcc < 6.3.0, this issue happens at -O0 + * For all versions, this issue happens iff unaligned access is not supported. + * + * For gcc 4.x, this implementation will generate byte-by-byte loads even if unaligned access is + * supported, which is correct but not optimal. * * For performance (and code size, in some cases), we want to avoid the branch and just generate * some inline load/store instructions since the access is small and constant-size. @@ -73,6 +76,9 @@ typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; * possible alignment—one byte for a variable" * https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-4.5.4/gcc/Variable-Attributes.html * + * Previous implementations used __attribute__((__aligned__(1)), but had issues with a gcc bug: + * https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94662 + * * Tested with several versions of GCC from 4.5.0 up to 13.2.0 * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. */ From 94c5806a64aa68eac1af9ad25d3b4e302fdae2f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 15:49:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 490/551] suite_psa_crypto_util: make ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental() more readable Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function index fe811e0629..2d8915e549 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.function @@ -28,12 +28,11 @@ exit: void ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_result) { unsigned char *tmp_buf = NULL; - size_t tmp_buf_len = exp_result->len; size_t ret_len; size_t i; /* Test with an output buffer smaller than required (expexted to fail). */ - for (i = 1; i < tmp_buf_len; i++) { + for (i = 1; i < exp_result->len; i++) { TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, tmp_buf, i, &ret_len) != 0); @@ -42,7 +41,7 @@ void ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental(int key_bits, data_t *input, data_t *exp_resul } /* Test with an output buffer larger/equal than required (expexted to * succeed). */ - for (i = tmp_buf_len; i < (2 * tmp_buf_len); i++) { + for (i = exp_result->len; i < (2 * exp_result->len); i++) { TEST_CALLOC(tmp_buf, i); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, input->x, input->len, tmp_buf, i, &ret_len) == 0); From e093281a8b51a3d89e61c99b7ac28c7bae47fbfa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 15:00:58 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 491/551] Pacify check-names Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/alignment.h | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/alignment.h b/library/alignment.h index fece47dc87..a17001dd91 100644 --- a/library/alignment.h +++ b/library/alignment.h @@ -83,9 +83,15 @@ typedef uint64_t __packed mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; * We don't enable for older than 4.5.0 as this has not been tested. */ #define UINT_UNALIGNED_STRUCT -typedef struct { uint16_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; -typedef struct { uint32_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; -typedef struct { uint64_t x; } __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint16_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint16_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint32_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint32_unaligned_t; +typedef struct { + uint64_t x; +} __attribute__((packed)) mbedtls_uint64_unaligned_t; #endif /* From 79e2e5d2d00d95fe9d9131baa3d79726d28e1f5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 15:10:03 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 492/551] Add comment to set/increment step functions These functions are thread safe, but using them from within multiple threads at the same time may not have the intended effect, given order cannot be guaranteed. Also, standardise header comment formatting. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index f2fb62d935..a939b1c0e0 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ int mbedtls_test_get_line_no(void); /** * \brief Increment the current test step. + * + * \note Calling this function from within multiple threads at the + * same time is not recommended - whilst it is entirely thread + * safe, the order of calls to this function can obviously not + * be ensured, so unexpected results may occur. */ void mbedtls_test_increment_step(void); @@ -215,30 +220,35 @@ void mbedtls_test_fail(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename); void mbedtls_test_skip(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename); /** - * \brief Set the test step number for failure reports. + * \brief Set the test step number for failure reports. * - * Call this function to display "step NNN" in addition to the - * line number and file name if a test fails. Typically the "step - * number" is the index of a for loop but it can be whatever you - * want. + * Call this function to display "step NNN" in addition to the + * line number and file name if a test fails. Typically the + * "step number" is the index of a for loop but it can be + * whatever you want. + * + * \note Calling this function from a within multiple threads at the + * same time is not recommended - whilst it is entirely thread + * safe, the order of calls to this function can obviously not + * be ensured, so unexpected results may occur. * * \param step The step number to report. */ void mbedtls_test_set_step(unsigned long step); /** - * \brief Reset mbedtls_test_info to a ready/starting state. + * \brief Reset mbedtls_test_info to a ready/starting state. */ void mbedtls_test_info_reset(void); #ifdef MBEDTLS_TEST_MUTEX_USAGE /** - * \brief Get the test info data mutex. + * \brief Get the test info data mutex. * - * \note This is designed only to be used by threading_helpers to avoid a - * deadlock, not for general access to this mutex. + * \note This is designed only to be used by threading_helpers to + * avoid a deadlock, not for general access to this mutex. * - * \return The test info data mutex. + * \return The test info data mutex. */ mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mbedtls_test_get_info_mutex(void); From 2b6a7b37f40c01f63497782525421026ee697f22 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 16:21:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 493/551] suite_psa_crypto_util: use 521 bits data and bit-size instead of 528 Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 12 +++--------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index f7e6ebace8..eb205b905f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -125,20 +125,14 @@ depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 512 ecdsa_der_to_raw:512:"308184024011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111024022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. -# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8. ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 - -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Success (integers exactly 521 bits) -depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:528:"011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802420111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:521:"011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802420111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 # 512/521 bit sizes are useful to test sequence's length encoded with 2 bytes. -# Bit length is rounded up to 528 to be multiple of 8. ECDSA DER -> Raw, 521bit, Success depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:528:"30818802421111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:521:"30818802420111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 @@ -150,7 +144,7 @@ ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:512:"9111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 ECDSA Raw -> DER, 521bit, Incremental DER buffer sizes depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 521 -ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:528:"911111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"3081890243009111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" +ecdsa_raw_to_der_incremental:521:"011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30818802420111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110242012222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222" ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer of minimal length (1 byte per integer) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 From fb53647b0b4c51a57ec195e915cffcca6fcf43f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 14:55:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 494/551] tests: ssl: Move group list to options Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h | 4 +- tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 16 ++++---- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 59 ++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h index 1f41966d66..44c2fcfea4 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_test_ssl_log_pattern { typedef struct mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options { const char *cipher; + uint16_t *group_list; mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version client_min_version; mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version client_max_version; mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version server_min_version; @@ -440,8 +441,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init( mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options *options, mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *dtls_context, mbedtls_test_ssl_message_queue *input_queue, - mbedtls_test_ssl_message_queue *output_queue, - uint16_t *group_list); + mbedtls_test_ssl_message_queue *output_queue); /* * Deinitializes endpoint represented by \p ep. diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index 980c192188..cc96cfed42 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options( rng_seed += 0xD0; #endif opts->cipher = ""; + opts->group_list = NULL; opts->client_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN; opts->client_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN; opts->server_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN; @@ -733,8 +734,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init( mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options *options, mbedtls_test_message_socket_context *dtls_context, mbedtls_test_ssl_message_queue *input_queue, - mbedtls_test_ssl_message_queue *output_queue, - uint16_t *group_list) + mbedtls_test_ssl_message_queue *output_queue) { int ret = -1; uintptr_t user_data_n; @@ -818,8 +818,8 @@ int mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init( } } - if (group_list != NULL) { - mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(&(ep->conf), group_list); + if (options->group_list != NULL) { + mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(&(ep->conf), options->group_list); } mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&(ep->conf), MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED); @@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_handshake( MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, options, &client_context, &client_queue, - &server_queue, NULL) == 0); + &server_queue) == 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(&client.ssl, &timer_client, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, @@ -2016,7 +2016,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_handshake( TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, options, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL) == 0); + NULL) == 0); } if (strlen(options->cipher) > 0) { @@ -2029,7 +2029,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_handshake( MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, options, &server_context, &server_queue, - &client_queue, NULL) == 0); + &client_queue) == 0); #if defined(MBEDTLS_TIMING_C) mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(&server.ssl, &timer_server, mbedtls_timing_set_delay, @@ -2038,7 +2038,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_ssl_perform_handshake( } else { TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, - options, NULL, NULL, NULL, + options, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0); } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 8687a4d6fc..02b950038f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -2457,7 +2457,7 @@ void mbedtls_endpoint_sanity(int endpoint_type) MD_OR_USE_PSA_INIT(); ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(NULL, endpoint_type, &options, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret); ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_certificate_init(NULL, options.pk_alg, @@ -2465,7 +2465,7 @@ void mbedtls_endpoint_sanity(int endpoint_type) TEST_ASSERT(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA == ret); ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&ep, endpoint_type, &options, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); exit: @@ -2509,14 +2509,14 @@ void move_handshake_to_state(int endpoint_type, int tls_version, int state, int mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&second_ep, sizeof(second_ep)); ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&base_ep, endpoint_type, &options, - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init( &second_ep, (endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) ? MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT : MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, - &options, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); + &options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_ASSERT(ret == 0); @@ -3069,11 +3069,10 @@ void force_bad_session_id_len() TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, &options, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL) == 0); + NULL) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, - &options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL) == 0); + &options, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0); mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(1); mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(&server.conf, options.srv_log_fun, @@ -3248,8 +3247,9 @@ void raw_key_agreement_fail(int bad_server_ecdhe_key) mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client, server; mbedtls_psa_stats_t stats; size_t free_slots_before = -1; - mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options options; - mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&options); + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options, server_options; + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options); uint16_t iana_tls_group_list[] = { MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE }; @@ -3257,21 +3257,22 @@ void raw_key_agreement_fail(int bad_server_ecdhe_key) mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client, sizeof(client)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server, sizeof(server)); - options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; - options.server_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; - options.server_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; - /* Client side, force SECP256R1 to make one key bitflip fail * the raw key agreement. Flipping the first byte makes the * required 0x04 identifier invalid. */ + client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + client_options.group_list = iana_tls_group_list; TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, - &options, NULL, NULL, - NULL, iana_tls_group_list), 0); + &client_options, NULL, NULL, + NULL), 0); /* Server side */ + server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + server_options.server_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; + server_options.server_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2; TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, - &options, NULL, NULL, - NULL, NULL), 0); + &server_options, NULL, NULL, + NULL), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client.socket), &(server.socket), @@ -3307,7 +3308,8 @@ void raw_key_agreement_fail(int bad_server_ecdhe_key) exit: mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client, NULL); mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server, NULL); - mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&options); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); MD_OR_USE_PSA_DONE(); } @@ -3336,15 +3338,13 @@ void tls13_server_certificate_msg_invalid_vector_len() client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, - &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options); server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, - &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket), @@ -3591,14 +3591,12 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, - &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, - &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - NULL); + &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, mbedtls_test_ticket_write, mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, @@ -3702,19 +3700,20 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) PSA_INIT(); client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + client_options.group_list = group_list; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, - &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - group_list); + &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + server_options.group_list = group_list; server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer; server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, - &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL, - group_list); + &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, mbedtls_test_ticket_write, From b4ad3e750b9e592cb8e55d95dc1958194de0c5e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 14:57:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 495/551] tests: ssl: First reset to all zeroes options in init Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 18 +++--------------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index cc96cfed42..2090f92cdc 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -49,37 +49,25 @@ void mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options( srand(rng_seed); rng_seed += 0xD0; #endif + + memset(opts, 0, sizeof(*opts)); + opts->cipher = ""; - opts->group_list = NULL; opts->client_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN; opts->client_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN; opts->server_min_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN; opts->server_max_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN; opts->expected_negotiated_version = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3; - opts->expected_handshake_result = 0; - opts->expected_ciphersuite = 0; opts->pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_RSA; - opts->opaque_alg = 0; - opts->opaque_alg2 = 0; - opts->opaque_usage = 0; - opts->psk_str = NULL; - opts->dtls = 0; opts->srv_auth_mode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE; - opts->serialize = 0; opts->mfl = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE; opts->cli_msg_len = 100; opts->srv_msg_len = 100; opts->expected_cli_fragments = 1; opts->expected_srv_fragments = 1; - opts->renegotiate = 0; opts->legacy_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION; - opts->srv_log_obj = NULL; - opts->cli_log_obj = NULL; - opts->srv_log_fun = NULL; - opts->cli_log_fun = NULL; opts->resize_buffers = 1; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) - opts->cache = NULL; TEST_CALLOC(opts->cache, 1); mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(opts->cache); #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) From ced99be007836d65563c8c1af5db6110cadca550 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 15:49:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 496/551] tests: ssl: Add early data handshake option Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h | 1 + tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 5 +++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h index 44c2fcfea4..0aa53c8681 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options { void (*srv_log_fun)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); void (*cli_log_fun)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *); int resize_buffers; + int early_data; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) mbedtls_ssl_cache_context *cache; #endif diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index 2090f92cdc..a9a215949f 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ void mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options( opts->expected_srv_fragments = 1; opts->legacy_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION; opts->resize_buffers = 1; + opts->early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) TEST_CALLOC(opts->cache, 1); mbedtls_ssl_cache_init(opts->cache); @@ -812,6 +813,10 @@ int mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init( mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(&(ep->conf), MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED); +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&(ep->conf), options->early_data); +#endif + #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CACHE_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) if (endpoint_type == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER && options->cache != NULL) { mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(&(ep->conf), options->cache, diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 02b950038f..861aa72ec5 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3701,20 +3701,20 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; client_options.group_list = group_list; + client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&client_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; server_options.group_list = group_list; + server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer; server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED); mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, mbedtls_test_ticket_write, mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, From 1f6e4e4a4999bd4716db933ecb7762479728e018 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 16:31:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 497/551] tests: ssl: Add helper function to get a TLS 1.3 ticket Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h | 11 ++++++ tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 52 ++++++++------------------ 3 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h index 0aa53c8681..3506609ac4 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/ssl_helpers.h @@ -600,6 +600,17 @@ int mbedtls_test_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_session *session, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket( + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options *client_options, + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options *server_options, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + #define ECJPAKE_TEST_PWD "bla" #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) diff --git a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c index a9a215949f..ad4c070bc2 100644 --- a/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/test_helpers/ssl_helpers.c @@ -2455,4 +2455,60 @@ int mbedtls_test_ticket_parse(void *p_ticket, mbedtls_ssl_session *session, return mbedtls_ssl_session_load(session, buf, len); } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \ + defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) +int mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket( + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options *client_options, + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options *server_options, + mbedtls_ssl_session *session) +{ + int ret = -1; + unsigned char buf[64]; + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep)); + + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, + mbedtls_test_ticket_write, + mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, + NULL); + + ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket), + &(server_ep.socket), 1024); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( + &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); + + TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->new_session_tickets_count, 0); + + do { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)); + } while (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session(&(client_ep.ssl), session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + +exit: + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL); + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep, NULL); + + return ret; +} +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C && + MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && + MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 861aa72ec5..ca12051f80 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3572,15 +3572,11 @@ exit: void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() { int ret = -1; - unsigned char buf[64]; mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep; mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options; mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; - /* - * Test set-up - */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep)); mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options); @@ -3589,14 +3585,27 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() PSA_INIT(); + /* + * Run first handshake to get a ticket from the server. + */ client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + + ret = mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket(&client_options, &server_options, + &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Prepare for handshake with the ticket. + */ ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, mbedtls_test_ticket_write, mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, @@ -3607,41 +3616,12 @@ void tls13_resume_session_with_ticket() &(server_ep.socket), 1024); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - /* - * Run initial handshake: ephemeral key exchange mode, certificate with - * SECP256R1 key, CA certificate with SECP384R1 key, ECDSA signature - * algorithm. Then, get the ticket sent by the server at the end of its - * handshake sequence. - */ - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); - - do { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)); - } while (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - - /* - * Save client session and reset the SSL context of the two endpoints. - */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); - TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(client_ep.ssl)); - TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl)); - TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - - /* - * Set saved session on client side and handshake using the ticket - * included in that session. - */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); /* + * Handshake with ticket. + * * Run the handshake up to MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP and not * MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER to preserve handshake data for the checks * below. From bfcdc069efb1d52a98e3578aa0ec62a4bec7e9e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 16:57:25 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 498/551] tests: ssl: Use get TLS 1.3 ticket helper for early data test Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 106 ++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index ca12051f80..d6e4c6aeaf 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3668,9 +3668,6 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE }; - /* - * Test set-up - */ mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep)); mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options); @@ -3679,16 +3676,50 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) PSA_INIT(); + /* + * Run first handshake to get a ticket from the server. + */ + client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; client_options.group_list = group_list; client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; + server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + server_options.group_list = group_list; + server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; + + ret = mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket(&client_options, &server_options, + &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Prepare for handshake with the ticket. + */ + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE: + break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); + server_pattern.pattern = + "EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records."; + server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; + break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR: + mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); + server_pattern.pattern = + "EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello"; + server_options.group_list = group_list + 1; + break; + + default: + TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); + } + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; - server_options.group_list = group_list; - server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; server_options.srv_log_fun = mbedtls_test_ssl_log_analyzer; server_options.srv_log_obj = &server_pattern; ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, @@ -3704,69 +3735,12 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) &(server_ep.socket), 1024); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - /* - * Run initial handshake: ephemeral key exchange mode, certificate with - * SECP256R1 key, CA certificate with SECP384R1 key, ECDSA signature - * algorithm. Then, get the ticket sent by the server at the end of its - * handshake sequence. - */ - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( - &(server_ep.ssl), &(client_ep.ssl), - MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER), 0); - - do { - ret = mbedtls_ssl_read(&(client_ep.ssl), buf, sizeof(buf)); - } while (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET); - - /* - * Save client session and reset the SSL context of the two endpoints. - */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); - TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(client_ep.ssl)); - TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl)); - TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - - /* - * Set saved session on client side and start handshake using the ticket - * included in that session. - */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE: - break; - - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: - mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); - server_pattern.pattern = - "EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records."; - mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(&server_ep.conf, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED); - break; - - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR: - mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); - server_pattern.pattern = - "EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello"; - mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(&server_ep.conf, group_list + 1); - /* - * Need to reset again to reconstruct the group list in the - * handshake structure from the configured one. - */ - ret = mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(&(server_ep.ssl)); - TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); - break; - - default: - TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); - } - + /* + * Handshake with ticket and send early data. + */ TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_move_handshake_to_state( &(client_ep.ssl), &(server_ep.ssl), MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO), 0); From fe59ff794d2e198665ca9456c097eae0b30fab66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 14:31:50 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 499/551] tls13: Send dummy CCS only once Fix cases where the client was sending two CCS, no harm but better to send only one. Prevent to send even more CCS when early data are involved without having to add conditional state transitions. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- library/ssl_misc.h | 15 ++++++++++++--- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- library/ssl_tls13_generic.c | 2 ++ library/ssl_tls13_server.c | 10 +++++++--- 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index 16cd62e283..dff19c88e7 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -731,14 +731,23 @@ struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params { uint8_t key_exchange_mode; /*!< Selected key exchange mode */ /** Number of HelloRetryRequest messages received/sent from/to the server. */ - int hello_retry_request_count; + uint8_t hello_retry_request_count; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + /** + * Number of dummy change_cipher_spec (CCS) record sent. Used to send only + * one CCS per handshake without having to complicate the handshake state + * transitions. + */ + uint8_t ccs_count; +#endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) - /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ - uint16_t hrr_selected_group; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED) uint8_t tls13_kex_modes; /*!< Key exchange modes supported by the client */ #endif + /** selected_group of key_share extension in HelloRetryRequest message. */ + uint16_t hrr_selected_group; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) uint16_t new_session_tickets_count; /*!< number of session tickets */ #endif diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index f4987b316b..e6680c7a69 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -2568,8 +2568,6 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); - } else if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ { @@ -3059,18 +3057,25 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); - if (ret == 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); + ret = 0; + if (ssl->handshake->ccs_count == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); - if (ret == 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state( - ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); + ret = 0; + if (ssl->handshake->ccs_count == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE); break; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c index 2666067b72..386a754024 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_generic.c @@ -1390,6 +1390,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) /* Dispatch message */ MBEDTLS_SSL_PROC_CHK(mbedtls_ssl_write_record(ssl, 0)); + ssl->handshake->ccs_count++; + cleanup: MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= write change cipher spec")); diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c index 62b117cfa7..05693f3bfc 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_server.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_server.c @@ -3482,10 +3482,14 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_server_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO: - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); - if (ret == 0) { - mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); + ret = 0; + if (ssl->handshake->ccs_count == 0) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl); + if (ret != 0) { + break; + } } + mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS); break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ From 90e223364ca559042710316d4ba4e6eb86178284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 15:24:21 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 500/551] tls13: cli: Refine early data status The main purpose of the change is to know from the status, at any point in the handshake, if early data can be sent or not and why. Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- include/mbedtls/ssl.h | 6 ++--- library/ssl_misc.h | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ library/ssl_tls.c | 2 +- library/ssl_tls13_client.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h index e0cd79d02a..9583a15be4 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/ssl.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/ssl.h @@ -5106,9 +5106,9 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl); #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT 0 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED 1 -#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT 1 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED 2 +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED 3 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) /** diff --git a/library/ssl_misc.h b/library/ssl_misc.h index dff19c88e7..942d4ad22f 100644 --- a/library/ssl_misc.h +++ b/library/ssl_misc.h @@ -2145,6 +2145,38 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *end, size_t *out_len); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) +/* + * The client has not sent the first ClientHello yet, it is unknown if the + * client will send an early data indication extension or not. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN 0 + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * is not set and early data cannot be sent yet. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT 4 + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, it has not received the response (ServerHello or + * HelloRetryRequest) from the server yet. The transform to protect early data + * has been set and early data can be written now. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE 5 + +/* + * The client has sent an early data indication extension in its first + * ClientHello, the server has accepted them and the client has received the + * server Finished message. It cannot send early data to the server anymore. + */ +#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED 6 +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */ + #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */ diff --git a/library/ssl_tls.c b/library/ssl_tls.c index 8afedde887..3bbd4ca268 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls.c @@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ static int ssl_handshake_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN; #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) ssl->discard_early_data_record = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD; diff --git a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c index e6680c7a69..5d7a495901 100644 --- a/library/ssl_tls13_client.c +++ b/library/ssl_tls13_client.c @@ -1180,26 +1180,21 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_client_hello_exts(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) - if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl) && - ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) && - ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED && - ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count == 0) { + if (ssl->handshake->hello_retry_request_count == 0) { + if (mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_is_some_psk_enabled(ssl) && + ssl_tls13_early_data_has_valid_ticket(ssl) && + ssl->conf->early_data_enabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( + ssl, 0, p, end, &ext_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return ret; + } + p += ext_len; - ret = mbedtls_ssl_tls13_write_early_data_ext( - ssl, 0, p, end, &ext_len); - if (ret != 0) { - return ret; + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT; + } else { + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT; } - p += ext_len; - - /* Initializes the status to `rejected`. It will be updated to - * `accepted` if the EncryptedExtension message contain an early data - * indication extension. - */ - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; - } else { - MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG(2, ("<= skip write early_data extension")); - ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT; } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1236,7 +1231,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) size_t psk_len; const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; - if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED) { + if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT) { MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ("Set hs psk for early data when writing the first psk")); @@ -1299,6 +1294,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_finalize_client_hello(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE; #endif } #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -1971,6 +1967,13 @@ static int ssl_tls13_postprocess_hrr(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->id; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) + if (ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; + } +#endif + return 0; } @@ -2230,6 +2233,8 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_encrypted_extensions(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) } ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED; + } else if (ssl->early_data_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT) { + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED; } #endif @@ -2567,6 +2572,7 @@ static int ssl_tls13_process_server_finished(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) if (ssl->early_data_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED) { + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED; mbedtls_ssl_handshake_set_state(ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA); } else #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ @@ -3088,6 +3094,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_tls13_handshake_client_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl) 1, ("Switch to early data keys for outbound traffic")); mbedtls_ssl_set_outbound_transform( ssl, ssl->handshake->transform_earlydata); + ssl->early_data_status = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE; } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */ From a7f94e49a821d37f4f33addd5db8d183cb1720f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 09:40:46 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 501/551] tests: ssl: Add early data status unit test Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 3 + tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 143 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 146 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index 86945cc7b4..82ec57ab39 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3282,3 +3282,6 @@ tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD TLS 1.3 early data, discard after HRR tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR + +TLS 1.3 cli, early data status +tls13_cli_early_data_status diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index d6e4c6aeaf..d44848fbd0 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -3787,3 +3787,146 @@ exit: PSA_DONE(); } /* END_CASE */ + +/* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ +void tls13_cli_early_data_status() +{ + int ret = -1; + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep; + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options; + mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; + mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; + + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep)); + mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep)); + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_init_handshake_options(&server_options); + mbedtls_ssl_session_init(&saved_session); + + PSA_INIT(); + + /* + * Run first handshake to get a ticket from the server. + */ + client_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; + server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; + server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; + + ret = mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket(&client_options, &server_options, + &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Prepare for handshake with the ticket. + */ + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, + &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&server_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, + &server_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(&server_ep.conf, + mbedtls_test_ticket_write, + mbedtls_test_ticket_parse, + NULL); + + ret = mbedtls_test_mock_socket_connect(&(client_ep.socket), + &(server_ep.socket), 1024); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + ret = mbedtls_ssl_set_session(&(client_ep.ssl), &saved_session); + TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); + + /* + * Go through the handshake sequence, state by state, checking the early + * data status each time. + */ + do { + int state = client_ep.ssl.state; + + /* Progress the handshake from at least one state */ + while (client_ep.ssl.state == state) { + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(&(client_ep.ssl)); + TEST_ASSERT((ret == 0) || + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) || + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE)); + if (client_ep.ssl.state != state) { + break; + } + ret = mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(&(server_ep.ssl)); + TEST_ASSERT((ret == 0) || + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ) || + (ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE)); + } + + switch (client_ep.ssl.state) { + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT); + break; +#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + + default: + TEST_FAIL("Unexpected state."); + } + } while (client_ep.ssl.state != MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER); + +#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.handshake->ccs_count, 1); +#endif + +exit: + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&client_ep, NULL); + mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_free(&server_ep, NULL); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&client_options); + mbedtls_test_free_handshake_options(&server_options); + mbedtls_ssl_session_free(&saved_session); + PSA_DONE(); +} +/* END_CASE */ From 5c208d7dafb5457e6883c7935d0c3b4de9c7072b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 10:13:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 502/551] tests: ssl: Add scenario param to early data status testing function Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 8 +-- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index 82ec57ab39..916849d9f1 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3274,8 +3274,8 @@ elliptic_curve_get_properties TLS 1.3 resume session with ticket tls13_resume_session_with_ticket -TLS 1.3 early data, reference -tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE +TLS 1.3 early data, early data accepted +tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED TLS 1.3 early data, deprotect and discard tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD @@ -3283,5 +3283,5 @@ tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD TLS 1.3 early data, discard after HRR tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR -TLS 1.3 cli, early data status -tls13_cli_early_data_status +TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, early data accepted +tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index d44848fbd0..920aa2ff40 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #define SSL_MESSAGE_QUEUE_INIT { NULL, 0, 0, 0 } /* Mnemonics for the early data test scenarios */ -#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE 0 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 0 #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1 #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR 2 @@ -3695,7 +3695,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) * Prepare for handshake with the ticket. */ switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: break; case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: @@ -3757,7 +3757,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP); switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_REFERENCE: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: TEST_EQUAL(ret, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 1); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(&(server_ep.ssl), @@ -3789,7 +3789,7 @@ exit: /* END_CASE */ /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA:MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C:MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C:MBEDTLS_TEST_AT_LEAST_ONE_TLS1_3_CIPHERSUITE:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL_ENABLED:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP256R1:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP384R1:MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_VERIFY:MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ -void tls13_cli_early_data_status() +void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) { int ret = -1; mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint client_ep, server_ep; @@ -3820,6 +3820,14 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status() /* * Prepare for handshake with the ticket. */ + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + break; + + default: + TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); + } + ret = mbedtls_test_ssl_endpoint_init(&client_ep, MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT, &client_options, NULL, NULL, NULL); TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); @@ -3864,52 +3872,88 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status() switch (client_ep.ssl.state) { case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN); + break; + } break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); + break; + } break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); + break; + } break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED); + break; + } break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + } break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + } break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + } break; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT); + break; + } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: /* Intentional fallthrough */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); + break; + } break; default: From 265273e8b38dc2eff285d18cc470521a74f80db7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 11:13:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 503/551] tests: early data status: Add "not sent" scenario Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 3 ++ tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index 916849d9f1..ca4a2dcf08 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3285,3 +3285,6 @@ tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, early data accepted tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED + +TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, no early data indication +tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 920aa2ff40..5bb96803bd 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ /* Mnemonics for the early data test scenarios */ #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 0 -#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1 -#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR 2 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT 1 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 2 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR 3 #if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ @@ -3824,6 +3825,10 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: break; + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; + break; + default: TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); } @@ -3873,7 +3878,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) switch (client_ep.ssl.state) { case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN); break; @@ -3886,6 +3892,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; } break; @@ -3895,6 +3906,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; } break; @@ -3904,16 +3920,18 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; } break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA: - switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); - break; - } + TEST_EQUAL(scenario, TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED); + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: @@ -3922,6 +3940,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; } break; @@ -3931,11 +3954,17 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; } break; #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE) case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: + TEST_ASSERT(scenario != TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT); switch (scenario) { case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, @@ -3943,6 +3972,12 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) break; } break; + + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: + TEST_ASSERT(scenario == TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT); + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ @@ -3953,6 +3988,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SERVER_FINISHED_RECEIVED); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; } break; From d6dba675b8b65e9bde5dc16fcbd3ce82f054a00f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 12:22:24 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 504/551] tests: early data status: Add "server rejects" scenario Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 7 +++- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index ca4a2dcf08..0b4f911382 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3277,8 +3277,8 @@ tls13_resume_session_with_ticket TLS 1.3 early data, early data accepted tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED -TLS 1.3 early data, deprotect and discard -tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD +TLS 1.3 early data, server rejects early data +tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS TLS 1.3 early data, discard after HRR tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR @@ -3288,3 +3288,6 @@ tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, no early data indication tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT + +TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, server rejects early data +tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 5bb96803bd..29ec9b33bf 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ /* Mnemonics for the early data test scenarios */ #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 0 #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT 1 -#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 2 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS 2 #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR 3 #if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ @@ -3699,7 +3699,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); server_pattern.pattern = "EarlyData: deprotect and discard app data records."; @@ -3766,7 +3766,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(buf, early_data_len, early_data, early_data_len); break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 0); @@ -3829,6 +3829,10 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; break; + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; + break; + default: TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); } @@ -3879,7 +3883,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: switch (scenario) { case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: /* Intentional fallthrough */ - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN); break; @@ -3888,7 +3893,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); break; @@ -3902,7 +3908,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) case MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS: switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); break; @@ -3925,6 +3932,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + break; } break; @@ -3945,6 +3957,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + break; } break; @@ -3959,6 +3976,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + break; } break; @@ -3966,7 +3988,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO: TEST_ASSERT(scenario != TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT); switch (scenario) { - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT); break; @@ -3974,9 +3997,18 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) break; case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: - TEST_ASSERT(scenario == TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT); - TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + TEST_ASSERT(scenario != TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED); + switch (scenario) { + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); + break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + break; + } break; #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_COMPATIBILITY_MODE */ @@ -3993,6 +4025,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + break; } break; From 2261ab298f15385d3b75f9adc0e99a7cd58b3699 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ronald Cron Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 13:38:31 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 505/551] tests: early data status: Add HRR scenario Signed-off-by: Ronald Cron --- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data | 5 +- tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data index 0b4f911382..69ccf26ee7 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.data @@ -3281,7 +3281,7 @@ TLS 1.3 early data, server rejects early data tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS TLS 1.3 early data, discard after HRR -tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR +tls13_early_data:TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, early data accepted tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED @@ -3291,3 +3291,6 @@ tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, server rejects early data tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS + +TLS 1.3 cli, early data status, hello retry request +tls13_cli_early_data_status:TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function index 29ec9b33bf..2751e58c16 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED 0 #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT 1 #define TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS 2 -#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR 3 +#define TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR 3 #if (!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)) && \ defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C) && \ @@ -3706,7 +3706,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: mbedtls_debug_set_threshold(3); server_pattern.pattern = "EarlyData: Ignore application message before 2nd ClientHello"; @@ -3767,7 +3767,7 @@ void tls13_early_data(int scenario) break; case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD_AFTER_HRR: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(ret, 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_ep.ssl.handshake->early_data_accepted, 0); TEST_EQUAL(server_pattern.counter, 1); @@ -3797,6 +3797,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options client_options; mbedtls_test_handshake_test_options server_options; mbedtls_ssl_session saved_session; + uint16_t group_list[3] = { + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1, + MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE + }; mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&client_ep, sizeof(client_ep)); mbedtls_platform_zeroize(&server_ep, sizeof(server_ep)); @@ -3813,6 +3818,10 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) client_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; server_options.pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA; server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED; + if (scenario == TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR) { + client_options.group_list = group_list; + server_options.group_list = group_list; + } ret = mbedtls_test_get_tls13_ticket(&client_options, &server_options, &saved_session); @@ -3833,6 +3842,10 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) server_options.early_data = MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED; break; + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: + server_options.group_list = group_list + 1; + break; + default: TEST_FAIL("Unknown scenario."); } @@ -3888,6 +3901,16 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: + if (client_ep.ssl.handshake->hello_retry_request_count == 0) { + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_UNKNOWN); + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + } + break; } break; @@ -3903,6 +3926,16 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: + if (client_ep.ssl.handshake->hello_retry_request_count == 0) { + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_CAN_WRITE); + } else { + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + } + break; } break; @@ -3918,6 +3951,11 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; + + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + break; } break; @@ -3933,7 +3971,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); break; @@ -3958,7 +3997,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); break; @@ -3977,7 +4017,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); break; @@ -3989,13 +4030,20 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) TEST_ASSERT(scenario != TEST_EARLY_DATA_NO_INDICATION_SENT); switch (scenario) { case TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: /* Intentional fallthrough */ - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_SENT); break; } break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO: + TEST_ASSERT(scenario == TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR); + TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, + MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); + break; + case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED: TEST_ASSERT(scenario != TEST_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED); switch (scenario) { @@ -4004,7 +4052,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); break; @@ -4026,7 +4075,8 @@ void tls13_cli_early_data_status(int scenario) MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_SENT); break; - case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_SERVER_REJECTS: /* Intentional fallthrough */ + case TEST_EARLY_DATA_HRR: TEST_EQUAL(client_ep.ssl.early_data_status, MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED); break; From 6269f3baf497e3a9b8d5e9d8d40d8a9c4af144f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 16:55:18 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 506/551] Revert "psa_util: allow larger raw buffers in mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der()" This reverts commit d4fc5d9d1c76a6cb978ceb4cc74ec62b111b0007. Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 2 +- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index 9294d29bb2..a5f09a4f45 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa * * \param bits Size of each coordinate in bits. * \param raw Buffer that contains the signature in raw format. - * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be at least + * \param raw_len Length of \p raw in bytes. This must be * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 7ce5eea030..674f21b9be 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_l unsigned char *p = der + der_size; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if (raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) { + if ((raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) || (raw_len > 2 * coordinate_len)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index eb205b905f..1d170297b4 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte shorter) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte longer) +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 From cf81f6997759decd200a8953cd9d3f46f3de447a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 16:57:12 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 507/551] psa_util: smarter raw length check in mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 674f21b9be..970274e3f9 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_l unsigned char *p = der + der_size; int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - if ((raw_len < 2 * coordinate_len) || (raw_len > 2 * coordinate_len)) { + if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; } From bb76f80218fa679eff384a1dace645d5faa5774f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 16:57:23 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 508/551] pk_wrap: use proper raw buffer length in ecdsa_sign_psa() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/pk_wrap.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c index c45fbd4369..d61a7cbadf 100644 --- a/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_psa(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, } done: - ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, sig_size, sig, sig_size, sig_len); + ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(key_bits, sig, *sig_len, sig, sig_size, sig_len); return ret; } From 1810fd9ac8f78be06558b3cdfacc70a9b3ece362 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 17:02:49 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 509/551] add changelog Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- ChangeLog.d/7765.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/7765.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/7765.txt b/ChangeLog.d/7765.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..3dd6b5d305 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/7765.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Features + * Add functions mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() and mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw() to + convert ECDSA signatures between raw and DER (ASN.1) formats. From a76a0011aba1b192df04b710ae876f4395381439 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 16:45:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 510/551] Remove mutex calls in psa_wipe_all_key_slots Code size and code style improvement, these calls aren't needed. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 6 ------ 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index f4c6ee005c..9890de6225 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -144,9 +144,6 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) { size_t slot_idx; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); -#endif for (slot_idx = 0; slot_idx < MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT; slot_idx++) { psa_key_slot_t *slot = &global_data.key_slots[slot_idx]; slot->registered_readers = 1; @@ -154,9 +151,6 @@ void psa_wipe_all_key_slots(void) (void) psa_wipe_key_slot(slot); } global_data.key_slots_initialized = 0; -#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) - mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex); -#endif } psa_status_t psa_reserve_free_key_slot(psa_key_id_t *volatile_key_id, From e053cb2f12ad05b58406a28724b362eeffd09cdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 14:57:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 511/551] Stop platform test failures with GCC and TSAN Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index 7c962a283b..47d4dcd452 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ #if defined(__SANITIZE_ADDRESS__) /* gcc -fsanitize=address */ # define MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ASAN #endif +#if defined(__SANITIZE_THREAD__) /* gcc -fsanitize-thread */ +# define MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_TSAN +#endif + #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) /* clang -fsanitize=address */ # define MBEDTLS_TEST_HAVE_ASAN From 30a303f1a8b856cfd6d44ad89754a018e49fb479 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 19:45:11 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 512/551] ECDSA signature conversion: put bits first Metadata, then inputs, then outputs. https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8703#discussion_r1474697136 Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- .../architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index e09d23c49f..ec3fcd0b1a 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -330,12 +330,12 @@ Based on the [gap analysis](#signature-formats): [ACTION] [#7765](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7765) Implement `mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der` and `mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw` as described below. ``` -int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, - unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len, - size_t bits); -int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, - unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len, - size_t bits); +int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, + const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_len, + unsigned char *der, size_t der_size, size_t *der_len); +int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, + const unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, + unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_size, size_t *raw_len); ``` * These functions convert between the signature format used by `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}{,_ext}` and the signature format used by `psa_{sign,verify}_{hash,message}`. From 447bbce8b4e7fd95388dc365b71c09202cb3d238 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 08:02:03 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 513/551] rsa: remove unnecessary check in priv/pub key parsing Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/rsa.c | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index b250e1d491..c8ea980e07 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -107,12 +107,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_key(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, si return ret; } + /* mbedtls_asn1_get_tag() already ensures that len is valid (i.e. p+len <= end)*/ end = p + len; - if (end > (key + keylen)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_int(&p, end, &version)) != 0) { return ret; } @@ -243,12 +240,9 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_parse_pubkey(mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, const unsigned char *key, return ret; } + /* mbedtls_asn1_get_tag() already ensures that len is valid (i.e. p+len <= end)*/ end = p + len; - if (end > (key + keylen)) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH; - } - /* Import N */ if ((ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER)) != 0) { return ret; From 3f557ad59c3279c00258be0660723290e9ee20af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:22:16 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 514/551] Wording improvement Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md index ec3fcd0b1a..912344e31f 100644 --- a/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md +++ b/docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-legacy-bridges.md @@ -340,5 +340,5 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, * These functions convert between the signature format used by `mbedtls_pk_{sign,verify}{,_ext}` and the signature format used by `psa_{sign,verify}_{hash,message}`. * The input and output buffers can overlap. -* The `bits` parameter is necessary in the DER-to-raw direction because the DER format lacks leading zeros, so something else needs to convey the size of (r,s). The `bits` parameter is not needed in the raw-to-DER direction, but [it can help catch errors](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8681#discussion_r1445980971) and the information is readily available in practice. +* The `bits` parameter is necessary in the DER-to-raw direction because the DER format lacks leading zeros, so something else needs to convey the size of (r,s). The `bits` parameter is redundant in the raw-to-DER direction, but we have it anyway because [it helps catch errors](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8681#discussion_r1445980971), and it isn't a burden on the caller because the information is readily available in practice. * Should these functions rely on the ASN.1 module? We experimented [calling ASN.1 functions](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8681), [reimplementing simpler ASN.1 functions](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8696), and [providing the functions from the ASN.1 module](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/pull/8703). Providing the functions from the ASN.1 module [won on a compromise of code size and simplicity](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/issues/7765#issuecomment-1893670015). From 2840523ae4829984a9b163876351ab5b5a3e3dfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 10:42:22 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 515/551] Remind contributors not to force-push Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- .github/pull_request_template.md | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/.github/pull_request_template.md b/.github/pull_request_template.md index a07e8abd13..586536c0c9 100644 --- a/.github/pull_request_template.md +++ b/.github/pull_request_template.md @@ -18,3 +18,10 @@ Please tick as appropriate and edit the reasons (e.g.: "backport: not needed bec Please refer to the [contributing guidelines](https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/CONTRIBUTING.md), especially the checklist for PR contributors. + +Help make review efficient: +* Multiple simple commits + - please structure your PR into a series of small commits, each of which does one thing +* No force-push + - please do not force-push to update your PR - just add new commit(s) + - use `git merge` (or the GitHub web interface) to resolve conflicts - not `git rebase` From c1a4d1f09a93d25f3037a3d56afaff3990811d94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:04:14 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 516/551] Remove comments about rebasing vs merging; link to longer RTD document Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- .github/pull_request_template.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/pull_request_template.md b/.github/pull_request_template.md index 586536c0c9..55b5964b51 100644 --- a/.github/pull_request_template.md +++ b/.github/pull_request_template.md @@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ Help make review efficient: - please structure your PR into a series of small commits, each of which does one thing * No force-push - please do not force-push to update your PR - just add new commit(s) - - use `git merge` (or the GitHub web interface) to resolve conflicts - not `git rebase` +* See our [Guidelines for Contributors](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/reviews/review-for-contributors/) for more details about the review process. From 2a6593bbb628d72a1c5be18c254ecff6e4f3961c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 11:05:47 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 517/551] Slightly soften force-push suggestion Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- .github/pull_request_template.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/.github/pull_request_template.md b/.github/pull_request_template.md index 55b5964b51..9d30412fd8 100644 --- a/.github/pull_request_template.md +++ b/.github/pull_request_template.md @@ -22,6 +22,6 @@ checklist for PR contributors. Help make review efficient: * Multiple simple commits - please structure your PR into a series of small commits, each of which does one thing -* No force-push +* Avoid force-push - please do not force-push to update your PR - just add new commit(s) * See our [Guidelines for Contributors](https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/reviews/review-for-contributors/) for more details about the review process. From a8082c43d5f8a389ec843b17886673efa14c8667 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 13:31:19 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 518/551] Add MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C dependencies to new pkparse tests Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data index 5e9f0e7a83..6af0702550 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -891,27 +891,27 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_4096_des_sha512.der":"":MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT Parse RSA Key #99.3 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.4 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-192-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.5 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA384, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.pem":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.6 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-128-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes128cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.7 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-192-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes192cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #99.8 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, 2048-bit) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH +depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse Public RSA Key #1 (PKCS#8 wrapped) From affba30833d7b38d22670ba389fe9b71aaf158a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:03:33 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 519/551] psa_util: update documentation for mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- include/mbedtls/psa_util.h | 13 +++++++------ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h index a5f09a4f45..984f031549 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/psa_util.h @@ -192,12 +192,13 @@ static inline mbedtls_md_type_t mbedtls_md_type_from_psa_alg(psa_algorithm_t psa * PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits) bytes. * \param[out] der Buffer that will be filled with the converted DER * output. It can overlap with raw buffer. - * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. Given \p bits parameter: - * * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(\p bits) can be used - * to determine a large enough buffer for any - * \p raw input vector. - * * The minimum size might be smaller in case - * \p raw input vector contains padding zeros. + * \param der_size Size of \p der in bytes. It is enough if \p der_size + * is at least the size of the actual output. (The size + * of the output can vary depending on the presence of + * leading zeros in the data.) You can use + * #MBEDTLS_ECDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN(\p bits) to determine a + * size that is large enough for all signatures for a + * given value of \p bits. * \param[out] der_len On success it contains the amount of valid data * (in bytes) written to \p der. It's undefined * in case of failure. From ef07fa0fc3a6d0a7ebff1777978a7799678f0bd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 15:16:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 520/551] test_suite_psa_crypto_util: add more test for raw->der Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 1d170297b4..86f63ab85e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -2,10 +2,6 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Raw data too short -depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 -ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA - ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, DER buffer too small depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"304402201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111022022222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_BUF_TOO_SMALL @@ -38,14 +34,22 @@ ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, r and s only 1 byte of data with MSb set depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000A2":"300802020091020200A2":0 -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte shorter) +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (r 1 byte shorter) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (1 byte longer) +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (r and s 1 byte shorter) +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111122222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (r 1 byte longer) depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA +ECDSA Raw -> DER, 256bit, Invalid raw signature (r and s 1 byte longer) +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_raw_to_der:256:"111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Success depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"30440220111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111112222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 From bda577bb0bd003206c7234ced60950faaa8a7ef7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2024 17:49:20 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 521/551] Fix confusing comment in ctr drbg thread test Make it clearer where the magic number chosen for entropy_len actually comes from, and why we chose this value. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function index 425c43ef11..63524f25a0 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_ctr_drbg.function @@ -354,7 +354,12 @@ void ctr_drbg_threads(data_t *expected_result, int reseed, int arg_thread_count) const size_t n_random_calls = thread_count * thread_random_reps + 1; - /* Based on the size of MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN for SHA512. */ + /* This is a known-answer test, and although tests use a mock entropy + * function the input entropy length will still affect the output. + * We therefore need to pick a fixed entropy length, rather than using the + * default entropy length (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN). We've chosen to + * use the default value of MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN for SHA-512, + * as this was the value used when the expected answers were calculated. */ const size_t entropy_len = 48; AES_PSA_INIT(); @@ -367,8 +372,8 @@ void ctr_drbg_threads(data_t *expected_result, int reseed, int arg_thread_count) test_offset_idx = 0; - /* Need to do this, otherwise if we are forced into using SHA256 for - * whaever reason, output will differ. */ + /* Need to set a non-default fixed entropy len, to ensure same output across + * all configs - see above for details. */ mbedtls_ctr_drbg_set_entropy_len(&ctx, entropy_len); if (reseed == 0) { From 1910390b4a819d5eaa582ad4a57483b4278e473f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Valerio Setti Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 16:16:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 522/551] psa_util: improve leading zeros check in convert_der_to_raw_single_int() Signed-off-by: Valerio Setti --- library/psa_util.c | 15 +++++++++------ tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data | 16 ++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_util.c b/library/psa_util.c index 970274e3f9..fd119bf3da 100644 --- a/library/psa_util.c +++ b/library/psa_util.c @@ -488,18 +488,21 @@ static int convert_der_to_raw_single_int(unsigned char *der, size_t der_len, return ret; } - /* It's invalid to have MSb set without a leading 0x00 (leading 0x00 is - * checked below). */ - if ((*p & 0x80) != 0) { + /* It's invalid to have: + * - unpadded_len == 0. + * - MSb set without a leading 0x00 (leading 0x00 is checked below). */ + if (((unpadded_len == 0) || (*p & 0x80) != 0)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; } /* Skip possible leading zero */ - if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { + if (*p == 0x00) { p++; unpadded_len--; - /* Only 1 leading zero is allowed, otherwise that's an error. */ - if (*p == 0x00) { + /* It is not allowed to have more than 1 leading zero. + * Ignore the case in which unpadded_len = 0 because that's a 0 encoded + * in ASN.1 format (i.e. 020100). */ + if ((unpadded_len > 0) && (*p == 0x00)) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA; } } diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data index 86f63ab85e..807007b5e6 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_util.data @@ -110,13 +110,21 @@ ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid s only 1 zero byte depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"302502201111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111020100":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid 0-length r +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid 0-length r depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024020002202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA -ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Valid 0-length s +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid 0-length s depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 -ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":0 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3024022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110200":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r 2 leading zeros +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3027020300000102202222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA + +ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid s 2 leading zeros +depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 +ecdsa_der_to_raw:256:"3027022011111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110203000001":"11111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111110000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000":MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA ECDSA DER -> Raw, 256bit, Invalid r: MSb set without leading zero depends_on:PSA_VENDOR_ECC_MAX_CURVE_BITS >= 256 From a3172d1e9644aa6b19f264b5e411c69be21dd7c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 10:47:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 523/551] Inline the SHA3 parameters table into a switch This saves a few bytes of code size. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/sha3.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/sha3.c b/library/sha3.c index f420a12497..5df08f91c8 100644 --- a/library/sha3.c +++ b/library/sha3.c @@ -26,25 +26,6 @@ #define XOR_BYTE 0x6 -typedef struct mbedtls_sha3_family_functions { - mbedtls_sha3_id id; - - uint16_t r; - uint16_t olen; -} -mbedtls_sha3_family_functions; - -/* - * List of supported SHA-3 families - */ -static const mbedtls_sha3_family_functions sha3_families[] = { - { MBEDTLS_SHA3_224, 1152, 224 }, - { MBEDTLS_SHA3_256, 1088, 256 }, - { MBEDTLS_SHA3_384, 832, 384 }, - { MBEDTLS_SHA3_512, 576, 512 }, - { MBEDTLS_SHA3_NONE, 0, 0 } -}; - static const uint64_t rc[24] = { 0x0000000000000001, 0x0000000000008082, 0x800000000000808a, 0x8000000080008000, 0x000000000000808b, 0x0000000080000001, 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008009, @@ -180,21 +161,27 @@ void mbedtls_sha3_clone(mbedtls_sha3_context *dst, */ int mbedtls_sha3_starts(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx, mbedtls_sha3_id id) { - const mbedtls_sha3_family_functions *p = NULL; - - for (p = sha3_families; p->id != MBEDTLS_SHA3_NONE; p++) { - if (p->id == id) { + switch (id) { + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_224: + ctx->olen = 224 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1152 / 8; break; - } + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_256: + ctx->olen = 256 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 1088 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_384: + ctx->olen = 384 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 832 / 8; + break; + case MBEDTLS_SHA3_512: + ctx->olen = 512 / 8; + ctx->max_block_size = 576 / 8; + break; + default: + return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; } - if (p->id == MBEDTLS_SHA3_NONE) { - return MBEDTLS_ERR_SHA3_BAD_INPUT_DATA; - } - - ctx->olen = p->olen / 8; - ctx->max_block_size = p->r / 8; - memset(ctx->state, 0, sizeof(ctx->state)); ctx->index = 0; From 68608b23177faf654dc3d774122b478d7a5d0a06 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 11:51:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 524/551] Remove redundant helper macros in check_config.h MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 28 +++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index b21135686a..40936cd49e 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -281,23 +281,8 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PK_PARSE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -/* Helpers for hash dependencies, will be undefined at the end of the file */ -/* Do SHA-256, 384, 512 to cover Entropy and TLS. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)) -#define MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA256 -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)) -#define MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA384 -#endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)) -#define MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA512 -#endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA256)) + !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ @@ -305,12 +290,12 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA512)) \ + (defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512)) \ && defined(MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) && (MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN > 32) #error "MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN value too high" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_C) && \ - defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA256) + defined(MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256) && !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #error "MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_FORCE_SHA256 defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -471,7 +456,7 @@ /* Use of EC J-PAKE in TLS requires SHA-256. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA256) + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif @@ -975,7 +960,7 @@ #endif #else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || \ - !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA384)) + !(defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) || defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)) #error "MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ @@ -1220,9 +1205,6 @@ /* Undefine helper symbols */ #undef MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_JPAKE -#undef MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA256 -#undef MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA384 -#undef MBEDTLS_MD_HAVE_SHA512 #undef MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_CURVE_SECP256R1 /* From 7eb3f9a5237e9b18ca1ec6df948b0a710b140151 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 11:56:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 525/551] Simplify and fix dependency of MD_C on a hash MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Simplify: let's take advantage of the MD_CAN macros instead of doing it again ourselves. Fix: SHA-3 was forgotten. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 30 +++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 40936cd49e..7852859193 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -468,23 +468,19 @@ #error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && !( \ - defined(MBEDTLS_MD5_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_RIPEMD160_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA224_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA384_C) || \ - defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) || \ - (defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ - (defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_MD5) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_RIPEMD160) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_1) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_224) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384) || \ - defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_512)))) -#error "MBEDTLS_MD_C defined, but not all prerequisites" +#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_MD5) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_RIPEMD160) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA224) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_224) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_384) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA3_512) +#error "MBEDTLS_MD_C defined, but no hash algorithm" #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_LMS_C) && \ From 49f64b4cac9a34405f16bcf9e4e20c7fa0ee3792 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 12:00:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 526/551] Fix dependency on low-level hash modules MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit None of the TLS code is calling low-level hash functions directly. So the correct dependencies here are MD_CAN. (I checked and this was the only occurrence.) Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 7852859193..8c8130bb91 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -461,11 +461,11 @@ #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA256_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) ) -#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires MBEDTLS_SHA512_C, MBEDTLS_SHA256_C or MBEDTLS_SHA1_C" + !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA512) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1) +#error "!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE requires SHA-512, SHA-256 or SHA-1". #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) && \ From 61758e606ea226c275d8c667e539c964ecc0dcfe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 12:03:28 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 527/551] Fix wrong dependency of ECJPAKE_C MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit It always uses MD now. (The "fall back" to PSA Crypto was only in the 1st iteration of driver-only hash support, before we changed the architecture to make everything go through MD.) Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 8c8130bb91..3be200d836 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -234,9 +234,8 @@ #endif #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || \ - !( defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) ) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ + (!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)) #error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif From e1f3faf5bf920c7788f113b22f50096028360214 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 12:17:20 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 528/551] Remove temporary macros that are not needed MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Those were only used for KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE, but had a much larger scope than needed. We actually don't need those macros if we distinguish between cases when expressing dependencies for this key exchange. The remaining helper macros are all short lived. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 53 +++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 3be200d836..1dcd903d25 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -300,13 +300,13 @@ #if defined(__has_feature) #if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) -#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN +#define MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // #undef at the end of this paragraph #endif #endif #if defined(MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN) && !defined(MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN) #error "MBEDTLS_TEST_CONSTANT_FLOW_MEMSAN requires building with MemorySanitizer" #endif -#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN +#undef MBEDTLS_HAS_MEMSAN // temporary macro defined above #if defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_C) && \ !(defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_AES) || defined(MBEDTLS_CCM_GCM_CAN_ARIA) || \ @@ -372,28 +372,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_HMAC_DRBG_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -/* Helper for JPAKE dependencies, will be undefined at the end of the file */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) && defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) -#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_JPAKE -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) -#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_JPAKE -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - -/* Helper for curve SECP256R1 */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) -#if defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) -#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_CURVE_SECP256R1 -#endif -#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) -#define MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_CURVE_SECP256R1 -#endif -#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ - #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) && \ ( !defined(MBEDTLS_CAN_ECDH) || \ !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_CAN_ECDSA_SIGN) || \ @@ -447,11 +425,20 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ - ( !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_JPAKE) || \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_CURVE_SECP256R1) ) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) || \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASIC) || \ + !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) ) #error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif +#else /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ +#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ + ( !defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) || \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) ) +#error "MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED defined, but not all prerequisites" +#endif +#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ /* Use of EC J-PAKE in TLS requires SHA-256. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) && \ @@ -1054,20 +1041,18 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph #endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT) #if !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#define MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // undef at the end of this paragraph #endif - #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL) #error "MBEDTLS_THREADING_C defined, single threading implementation required" #endif -#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL +#undef MBEDTLS_THREADING_IMPL // temporary macro defined above #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) #error "MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO defined, but not all prerequisites" @@ -1198,10 +1183,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_PKCS7_C is defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif -/* Undefine helper symbols */ -#undef MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_JPAKE -#undef MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_CURVE_SECP256R1 - /* * Avoid warning from -pedantic. This is a convenient place for this * workaround since this is included by every single file before the From 1463e49a3c2f2bdd7cac52964c0c0c599ef63d94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 12:28:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 529/551] Move config adjustment to config_adjust MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit After this change, check_config.h does not have any #defined except: - the standard header double-inclusion guard - short-lived helpers that are #undef-ed in the same paragraph Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 14 ++------------ include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 1dcd903d25..1741d8b9c0 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -27,18 +27,8 @@ #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) #error "MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C is required on Windows" #endif - -/* Fix the config here. Not convenient to put an #ifdef _WIN32 in mbedtls_config.h as - * it would confuse config.py. */ -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) -#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT -#endif - -#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ - !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) -#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT -#endif +/* See auto-enabling SNPRINTF_ALT and VSNPRINTF_ALT + * in * config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h */ #endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */ #if defined(TARGET_LIKE_MBED) && defined(MBEDTLS_NET_C) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h index 696266c6fb..6126a1e86f 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h @@ -22,6 +22,22 @@ #ifndef MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H #define MBEDTLS_CONFIG_ADJUST_LEGACY_CRYPTO_H +/* Ideally, we'd set those as defaults in mbedtls_config.h, but + * putting an #ifdef _WIN32 in mbedtls_config.h would confuse config.py. + * + * So, adjust it here. + * Not related to crypto, but this is the bottom of the stack. */ +#if defined(__MINGW32__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER <= 1900) +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_SNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT) && \ + !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_MACRO) +#define MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_VSNPRINTF_ALT +#endif +#endif /* _MINGW32__ || (_MSC_VER && (_MSC_VER <= 1900)) */ + /* Auto-enable CIPHER_C when any of the unauthenticated ciphers is builtin * in PSA. */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) && \ From a6184b2cc88eeb018d6fb1b8c715f98345b00c16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 12:30:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 530/551] Remove redundant check MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit We're already making sure of that in include/mbedtls/config_adjust_psa_superset_legacy.h - no need to double-check here. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 59 ---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 59 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 1741d8b9c0..429bf3e80f 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -44,65 +44,6 @@ #error "MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE without MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME does not make sense" #endif -/* Check that each MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_xxx symbol has its PSA_WANT_ECC_xxx counterpart - * when PSA crypto is enabled. */ -#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG) || defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_256) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP256R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_384) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP384R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_BRAINPOOL_P_R1_512) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_BP512R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_255) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE25519_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_MONTGOMERY_448) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_CURVE448_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_192) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_224) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_384) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP384R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_521) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_192) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP192K1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -/* SECP224K1 is buggy in PSA API so we skip this check */ -#if 0 && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_224) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP224K1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED) && !defined(PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_K1_256) -#error "MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256K1_ENABLED defined, but not its PSA counterpart" -#endif - -#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG || MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C */ - /* Limitations on ECC key types acceleration: if we have any of `PUBLIC_KEY`, * `KEY_PAIR_BASIC`, `KEY_PAIR_IMPORT`, `KEY_PAIR_EXPORT` then we must have * all 4 of them. From afb2eee263a9fa2aae940e3ff19114194ed00167 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 14:31:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 531/551] Add PKCS5/12 exceptions to analyze_block_cipher_dispatch Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py index 6503f9a27b..a54ece636f 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py +++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py @@ -562,6 +562,18 @@ KNOWN_TASKS = { # but these are not available in the accelerated component. re.compile('Set( non-existent)? padding with (AES|CAMELLIA).*'), ], + 'test_suite_pkcs12': [ + # The en/decryption part of PKCS#12 is not yet supported. + # The rest of PKCS#12 (key derivation) works, though. + re.compile(r'PBE Encrypt, .*'), + re.compile(r'PBE Decrypt, .*'), + ], + 'test_suite_pkcs5': [ + # The en/decryption part of PKCS#5 is not yet supported. + # The rest of PKCS#5 (PBKDF2) works, though. + re.compile(r'PBES2 Encrypt, .*'), + re.compile(r'PBES2 Decrypt .*'), + ], 'test_suite_pkparse': [ # PEM (called by pkparse) requires AES_C in order to decrypt # the key, but this is not available in the accelerated From 75e65fe24b4ba67f92bcb44dec768e6b0f5aadfc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 15:43:02 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 532/551] Reformat AES encryption test data in pkcs5 tests The added comma is needed so that these tests match the regex exceptions in analyze_outcomes.py. Moved the Encryption tests so that they are separate to decryption. Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data index 939c82fc09..52e682321f 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkcs5.data @@ -126,6 +126,18 @@ PBES2 Encrypt, pad=8 (PKCS7 padding disabled) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D5510101010101010101010101010101010":138:MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE:"" +PBES2 Encrypt, AES-128-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e" + +PBES2 Encrypt, AES-192-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94" + +PBES2 Encrypt, AES-256-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 +pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301a0408010203040506070802022710300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" + PBES2 Decrypt (OK) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f7264":"1B60098D4834CA752D37B430E70B7A085CFF86E21F4849F969DD1DF623342662443F8BD1252BF83CEF6917551B08EF55A69C8F2BFFC93BCB2DFE2E354DA28F896D1BD1BFB972A1251219A6EC7183B0A4CF2C4998449ED786CAE2138437289EB2203974000C38619DA57A4E685D29649284602BD1806131772DA11A682674DC22B2CF109128DDB7FD980E1C5741FC0DB7":144:0:"308187020100301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107046D306B0201010420F12A1320760270A83CBFFD53F6031EF76A5D86C8A204F2C30CA9EBF51F0F0EA7A1440342000437CC56D976091E5A723EC7592DFF206EEE7CF9069174D0AD14B5F768225962924EE500D82311FFEA2FD2345D5D16BD8A88C26B770D55CD8A2A0EFA01C8B4EDFF" @@ -142,18 +154,6 @@ PBES2 Decrypt (Invalid padding & PKCS7 padding enabled) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_DES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E04082ED7F24A1D516DD702020800301406082A864886F70D030704088A4FCC9DCC394910":"70617373776f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ncrypt AES-128-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e" - -PBES2 Encrypt AES-192-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302a06092A864886F70D01050C301d0408010203040506070802022710020118300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304011604102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7c648a9df9759ba49283c261269a71bc06d45f6c24ab6431d77b2ecec1fd6d1aa751bd05b1c026fc8ff91baeb1b1838aa0f825b23be79bc09331d0607181e234dfea4ab3cbf7997747516486b6865e85de95dc9b64d45462197c891b31af6c94" - -PBES2 Encrypt AES-256-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) -depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_PADDING_PKCS7 -pbes2_encrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"302706092A864886F70D01050C301a0408010203040506070802022710300a06082A864886F70D0209301D060960864801650304012A04102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629":96:0:"7077e6e8e679962c6feda69c704d58507d143cf77be284f773dfcaa4a5f5e7c1cd5527204916302d435071c01126f4aa76205ce61998d7b8fdf065a77d4a77634376b9968e4722c27f2ac85d79565ff4fca9204d3e4bc8c5bd53c1785bb6e566" - PBES2 Decrypt AES-128-CBC (OK, generated with OpenSSL) depends_on:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC pbes2_decrypt:MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE:"301B06092A864886F70D01050C300E0408010203040506070802022710301D060960864801650304010204102F904F75B47B48A618068D79BD9A826C":"50617373776F726450617373776F726450617373776F7264":"0c953c3a9be1502f4d1df1b82df9d99a61ebd2f60ed570d16b241f70b9e61f329174747d052efe5c39bec9d0f7404f84af242914e2ecb74e6e36e8b4147bd0a092a82df789aa3351e0de9f75b285ccb742806526771c8353ffb66176188b556e":96:0:"5468697320697320612066696c6520746f20626520656e6372797074656420776974682050424553322c20776974682061206b65792067656e657261746564207573696e67206120707266202853484132353629" From ac60afc2d295cc1d0ac2b46f3e04a1c5ea7ead7f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Manuel=20P=C3=A9gouri=C3=A9-Gonnard?= Date: Thu, 8 Feb 2024 18:45:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 533/551] Remove useless overly strong dependency MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit ECJPAKE_C only needs MD_LIGHT and it allready auto-enables it in config_adjust_legacy_crypto.h, so nothing to check here. Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard --- include/mbedtls/check_config.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h index 429bf3e80f..a7a346fe53 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/check_config.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/check_config.h @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ #endif /* MBEDTLS_PK_C && MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C) && \ - (!defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) || !defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)) + !defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) #error "MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_C defined, but not all prerequisites" #endif From 67f35688954e7920b58a5765942154da82a64cca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 13:02:23 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 534/551] Reduce analyze_block_cipher_dispatch exceptions Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py | 11 ++--------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py index a54ece636f..8c7f21f85e 100755 --- a/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py +++ b/tests/scripts/analyze_outcomes.py @@ -562,17 +562,10 @@ KNOWN_TASKS = { # but these are not available in the accelerated component. re.compile('Set( non-existent)? padding with (AES|CAMELLIA).*'), ], - 'test_suite_pkcs12': [ - # The en/decryption part of PKCS#12 is not yet supported. - # The rest of PKCS#12 (key derivation) works, though. - re.compile(r'PBE Encrypt, .*'), - re.compile(r'PBE Decrypt, .*'), - ], 'test_suite_pkcs5': [ - # The en/decryption part of PKCS#5 is not yet supported. + # The AES part of PKCS#5 PBES2 is not yet supported. # The rest of PKCS#5 (PBKDF2) works, though. - re.compile(r'PBES2 Encrypt, .*'), - re.compile(r'PBES2 Decrypt .*'), + re.compile(r'PBES2 .* AES-.*') ], 'test_suite_pkparse': [ # PEM (called by pkparse) requires AES_C in order to decrypt From 7fee4f731895aa13a11dd353ead4ee9e9e260e9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 14:11:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 535/551] Fix mutex unlock error handling in psa_destroy_key Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto.c | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 9d7b72f87c..27ea3b84c8 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -1167,17 +1167,19 @@ exit: /* Unregister from reading the slot. If we are the last active reader * then this will wipe the slot. */ status = psa_unregister_read(slot); + /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering over + * a storage error. */ + if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { + overall_status = status; + } #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* Don't overwrite existing errors if the unlock fails. */ + status = overall_status; PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); #endif - /* Prioritize CORRUPTION_DETECTED from unregistering or - * SERVICE_FAILURE from unlocking over a storage error. */ - if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) { - overall_status = status; - } return overall_status; } From 9dc076b4f49ceedb2bfae13c74ae58c3251d1a95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ryan Everett Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 14:20:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 536/551] Fix issue with lock failures returning CORRUPTION_DETECTED Signed-off-by: Ryan Everett --- library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c index 9890de6225..dc38662e1b 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c @@ -529,6 +529,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_close_key(psa_key_handle_t handle) } #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); #endif @@ -563,6 +566,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_purge_key(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key) psa_key_slot_t *slot; #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) + /* We need to set status as success, otherwise CORRUPTION_DETECTED + * would be returned if the lock fails. */ + status = PSA_SUCCESS; PSA_THREADING_CHK_RET(mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_key_slot_mutex)); #endif From 5d2bcc63cd24f28006e22fa641c9ce7eabf76a1d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2024 14:41:24 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 537/551] Fix typo / improve documentation for test step fns Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/include/test/helpers.h | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/include/test/helpers.h b/tests/include/test/helpers.h index 4e59e20949..d08100f158 100644 --- a/tests/include/test/helpers.h +++ b/tests/include/test/helpers.h @@ -116,10 +116,10 @@ int mbedtls_test_get_line_no(void); /** * \brief Increment the current test step. * - * \note Calling this function from within multiple threads at the - * same time is not recommended - whilst it is entirely thread - * safe, the order of calls to this function can obviously not - * be ensured, so unexpected results may occur. + * \note It is not recommended for multiple threads to call this + * function concurrently - whilst it is entirely thread safe, + * the order of calls to this function can obviously not be + * ensured, so unexpected results may occur. */ void mbedtls_test_increment_step(void); @@ -231,10 +231,10 @@ void mbedtls_test_skip(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename); * "step number" is the index of a for loop but it can be * whatever you want. * - * \note Calling this function from a within multiple threads at the - * same time is not recommended - whilst it is entirely thread - * safe, the order of calls to this function can obviously not - * be ensured, so unexpected results may occur. + * \note It is not recommended for multiple threads to call this + * function concurrently - whilst it is entirely thread safe, + * the order of calls to this function can obviously not be + * ensured, so unexpected results may occur. * * \param step The step number to report. */ From 2b20ff62fc8c5fbb73d0c796f69edd063edccf33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: PiotrBzdrega Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2024 01:56:45 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 538/551] move entropy init prior arguments number recognition Signed-off-by: PiotrBzdrega --- programs/pkey/gen_key.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c index 6914c9390d..26453cc955 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c +++ b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c @@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ); mbedtls_mpi_init(&QP); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - + mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy); mbedtls_pk_init(&key); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); @@ -336,7 +336,6 @@ usage: mbedtls_printf("\n . Seeding the random number generator..."); fflush(stdout); - mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy); #if !defined(_WIN32) && defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO) if (opt.use_dev_random) { if ((ret = mbedtls_entropy_add_source(&entropy, dev_random_entropy_poll, From f6a9cfa5d201cc588171fe879577c57a26b58b2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: PiotrBzdrega Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2024 09:41:56 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 539/551] adjust indentation Signed-off-by: PiotrBzdrega --- programs/pkey/gen_key.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c index 26453cc955..194a5cbba6 100644 --- a/programs/pkey/gen_key.c +++ b/programs/pkey/gen_key.c @@ -248,7 +248,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) mbedtls_mpi_init(&D); mbedtls_mpi_init(&E); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&DQ); mbedtls_mpi_init(&QP); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */ - mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy); + + mbedtls_entropy_init(&entropy); mbedtls_pk_init(&key); mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init(&ctr_drbg); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); From 19f1adfc69a315fc703d202bb6ccad815acebdca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 22:17:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 540/551] New function mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen() Document, implement and test mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(). Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt | 3 + include/mbedtls/rsa.h | 10 ++ library/rsa.c | 8 ++ tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function | 35 ++++--- 5 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt b/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..85a9894422 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Features + * The new function mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen() returns the length of the modulus + in bits, i.e. the key size for an RSA key. diff --git a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h index 9136375c15..c1e76b3927 100644 --- a/include/mbedtls/rsa.h +++ b/include/mbedtls/rsa.h @@ -426,6 +426,16 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP); +/** + * \brief This function retrieves the length of the RSA modulus in bits. + * + * \param ctx The initialized RSA context. + * + * \return The length of the RSA modulus in bits. + * + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx); + /** * \brief This function retrieves the length of RSA modulus in Bytes. * diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index f4c08626c6..835146368e 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -1014,6 +1014,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) return ctx->hash_id; } +/* + * Get length in bits of RSA modulus + */ +size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx) +{ + return mbedtls_mpi_bitlen(&ctx->N); +} + /* * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus */ diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data index b89d1583c3..778ec67231 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.data @@ -468,58 +468,160 @@ RSA Deduce Moduli, corrupted mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes:"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e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":1:MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (N,P,Q,D,E), inconsistent -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (N,P,Q,D,E), successive -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (N,P,Q,D,E), successive, inconsistent -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (-,P,Q,D,E) 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RSA Import (-,P,Q,D,E), successive -mbedtls_rsa_import:"":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mbedtls_rsa_import:"":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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mport (N,-,-,D,E) 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+mbedtls_rsa_import:"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mport (N,-,-,D,E), successive 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+mbedtls_rsa_import:"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mport (N,P,Q,-,E) 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+mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":2048:0:1:0:0 RSA Import (N,P,Q,-,E), successive -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":1:1:0:0 +mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":2048:1:1:0:0 RSA Import (-,P,Q,-,E) -mbedtls_rsa_import:"":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":0:1:0:0 +mbedtls_rsa_import:"":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":2048:0:1:0:0 RSA Import (-,P,Q,-,E), successive -mbedtls_rsa_import:"":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":1:1:0:0 +mbedtls_rsa_import:"":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":2048:1:1:0:0 RSA Import (N,-,Q,-,E) -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":0:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":2048:0:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA Import (N,-,Q,-,E), successive -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":1:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA +mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e89":"":"3":2048:1:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"":"":"3":0:0:0:0 +mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"":"":"3":2048:0:0:0:0 RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key, successive -mbedtls_rsa_import:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":"":"":"":"3":1:0:0:0 +mbedtls_rsa_import:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":"":"":"":"3":2048:1:0:0:0 RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key, corrupted -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"":"":"4":0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED:0 +mbedtls_rsa_import:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":"":"":"":"4":2048:0:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED:0 RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E), complete public key, successive, corrupted -mbedtls_rsa_import:"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":"":"":"":"4":1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED:0 +mbedtls_rsa_import:"b38ac65c8141f7f5c96e14470e851936a67bf94cc6821a39ac12c05f7c0b06d9e6ddba2224703b02e25f31452f9c4a8417b62675fdc6df46b94813bc7b9769a892c482b830bfe0ad42e46668ace68903617faf6681f4babf1cc8e4b0420d3c7f61dc45434c6b54e2c3ee0fc07908509d79c9826e673bf8363255adb0add2401039a7bcd1b4ecf0fbe6ec8369d2da486eec59559dd1d54c9b24190965eafbdab203b35255765261cd0909acf93c3b8b8428cbb448de4715d1b813d0c94829c229543d391ce0adab5351f97a3810c1f73d7b1458b97daed4209c50e16d064d2d5bfda8c23893d755222793146d0a78c3d64f35549141486c3b0961a7b4c1a2034f":"":"":"":"4":2048:1:0:MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 512-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"cbc23c9751d5b0dc4f7ea5f871d6e31d7fb8a414eacfa006cf9c782385ce177b2a41b52cd80ddf75c4f14ffb679c388b4d0fe828413c2b8dd651e5039b2e14b3":"fbf724e9d31cb074dd117e96c4f9ad8ff6b4fe6dc72c7b9bc5af370c0833314d":"cf057bde49ab3cc354d731c03925e4cb34d7ecc41335948bca6d3438a0e35dff":"5705d006f8a68170b66aeacb9f231dc0bd89c85a3ea70a3b9e73bf43bca3f69699bfd123ec6fc533d3163dc8645d1e45342ad38b110659e96656f4763ec318f1":"10001":512:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 512-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"cbc23c9751d5b0dc4f7ea5f871d6e31d7fb8a414eacfa006cf9c782385ce177b2a41b52cd80ddf75c4f14ffb679c388b4d0fe828413c2b8dd651e5039b2e14b3":"":"":"":"10001":512:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 513-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"16798857c4718f9367a715b29038d042ea41686a457279db149d4da54146262305da39b02b764f2b56902e4c45425c2c3f404da82f86d8ed3b067da70899c5149":"18486f2d2df61d10ebe578caff5142047cae635909946b57c33028d35e4abac0b":"ecefea558b614138e773e1cd25380e49a910d6dd4b584457c1bfabf86922f87b":"1c3dbb460e6364b725989f7b321f3213e3a92d3bdce86c970ee05ba13cd4993758140f790489b61188c26354a6b372d32081750cecb84db563ec5724d78388ad":"10001":513:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 513-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"16798857c4718f9367a715b29038d042ea41686a457279db149d4da54146262305da39b02b764f2b56902e4c45425c2c3f404da82f86d8ed3b067da70899c5149":"":"":"":"10001":513:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 514-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"32f54232899f45a415e7a7728fc744703f4b4466e56d7d6900f125950bb9a42082d2f0162ce1ac9949da5be37af8c20178d79d8ac1ab860d5ed55b14f49d064ab":"1d2cc9d59be8079457a5f28c3e74d1d4c7763acc1a7e725dff09198a5b99d35cf":"1bf23921dfe89a0f681bf10fd27fd2bc914f8888b8addb1d102255e586827b665":"1d9f13ebecb3f8f7790440020831fd4682846e2ea20f13678674a7340caccd0b37ccaf79b7d4005adafb7e6f84e0ff7bbe28a27fd7337cdf100fe63afe967419":"10001":514:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 514-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"32f54232899f45a415e7a7728fc744703f4b4466e56d7d6900f125950bb9a42082d2f0162ce1ac9949da5be37af8c20178d79d8ac1ab860d5ed55b14f49d064ab":"":"":"":"10001":514:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 515-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"5f47dbe0d15f66c13ce0ff8af2edc7942ef4ff8b6b6e49ef5518ce3754efb5270204cb727c3f325b4a51dc02688eae0a6bfd7549854a7ede8b31f0e4adb835f85":"30c23bf1faf7515ed3e63abcda5b88b6387d213854da798e6662afb09441f192f":"1f4419ac839887606a8d299bc430f8e48f8984ae81982eaf03775fbe1a347bd8b":"5e8416fece5337c84acedb5007a98e4855c85d52fd2ffb91b9b590a2dcd3a8bc88e6e61573daa526a1b37ebae41401e6811d0d1e5458f1a5074178fb274a275a5":"10001":515:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 515-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"5f47dbe0d15f66c13ce0ff8af2edc7942ef4ff8b6b6e49ef5518ce3754efb5270204cb727c3f325b4a51dc02688eae0a6bfd7549854a7ede8b31f0e4adb835f85":"":"":"":"10001":515:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 516-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"bcc54a5a10ef1a3241c60aeec9c5ec54cd63407ee2b69748ad5ec53d1a3d7fea540811ba0eed19574cad6dca28691e2711fdf0e76d2bc6eec508e7a864ee13b03":"3a83434f8995a87a977f0e15e9b39f55551968a5f3cbaf6f7e0f177215c3a69bb":"339e4b5aef4912382ee5f6dd82c2cb5255e604279477ca22ed0b02cab66a75b59":"60a460bc5b8f0dca4d0226f6b9362b17ff4ea0e6550b45c85f79f560a2de796e35d51da40d1eae356cca05626a3686cee2dbcaa5b71b76ffa0cb313fb4a412f1":"10001":516:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 516-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"bcc54a5a10ef1a3241c60aeec9c5ec54cd63407ee2b69748ad5ec53d1a3d7fea540811ba0eed19574cad6dca28691e2711fdf0e76d2bc6eec508e7a864ee13b03":"":"":"":"10001":516:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 517-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"1a7b2e3d43f1b3e060d2f598939d0542178feac3310be308f4fd05872ec91048ea79543c0b00e5f61ec8b577ffa33c26bb74c2bc079033f006e6af59ec15cef529":"72e502be06a9fcb3ef64801055d10ecf8ec2b4a9429423813760e4258cf575373":"3b00e49f541091dce4940c9a36f203d195a81c7812111d9a89fc5971f363085f3":"19297286444925e1ce1ea5be94845ebaae28d1a926b164c8de008d8025b46704d77326956f97ceaadc3ebb74f94edbe1b7df5236693e7bb97cdd77b4569420fd01":"10001":517:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 517-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"1a7b2e3d43f1b3e060d2f598939d0542178feac3310be308f4fd05872ec91048ea79543c0b00e5f61ec8b577ffa33c26bb74c2bc079033f006e6af59ec15cef529":"":"":"":"10001":517:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 518-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"31defca6f97dac931fea5bd182c801b6512065929b327443dad9421379e15b37e33a6d3b11e51bd6905c9df9ec15980e91f10c34607749085456e85c1aad9cae1d":"725f1a4b37008897949b12bc9ba249d60d2df673b5a5367f9b490e79cc798446d":"6fa09a0615754b14f9aa4b5613e60e6d4988437c25b97fc056cb4841931902271":"1bcd08df3439e0d86b7444173966b1bda6dffe7f89d0c88b83169605316e75615c84cf7ea7c9cb16204e67329584d56f1840d247e4b392b627622d2101a2af2781":"10001":518:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 518-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"31defca6f97dac931fea5bd182c801b6512065929b327443dad9421379e15b37e33a6d3b11e51bd6905c9df9ec15980e91f10c34607749085456e85c1aad9cae1d":"":"":"":"10001":518:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 519-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"6de4c503dd2e6d74d6dbc95bdd85b177f3737c3da6b00860db6585d1026ae043450888773afd259ee52e7c70de86a1d805dec0d201b2cd9d91e5e1f323020b47b5":"f4c3d0904f80c3ee121aa94edda195415ddd21e4503ebbaf294993a649f896251":"72f01bc834d3eae97dea004f8af566b6030362fb3eb1063211d1dd699ece87225":"8361ce69203631864e99d5d28eb517c760b7e101941740ed0b6004ec2d07b9b6982132c9cff11ef49f715b04b6d76edd0e936b05efb4acf2cfdf6ea58f1149b41":"10001":519:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 519-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"6de4c503dd2e6d74d6dbc95bdd85b177f3737c3da6b00860db6585d1026ae043450888773afd259ee52e7c70de86a1d805dec0d201b2cd9d91e5e1f323020b47b5":"":"":"":"10001":519:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 520-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"c27fbd5b63f60f14b6fbbda29444aa6639cef01ec2b89b607ca0e5cf64f4f8ea41131c8c2a0204099b2030c8b155553404464fb351a7b44e77138412164997de31":"feb75ab38c05618105c1d7f1459475520cb64d8b477804f6f48b2bcc44ca6c147":"c37ab0c657015601027454c1e45d4abc85f7177d0757312b2811d4dc46f1b60c7":"4b4d2365a79cd317e5042fd62aeb2ec1a72dec1f2caa4655a3cab34e893aa2c81c06e18bd79a0d247dc109ab540c7eb6bf8ef27f02de66e4d8dc511bff7ce33c15":"10001":520:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 520-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"c27fbd5b63f60f14b6fbbda29444aa6639cef01ec2b89b607ca0e5cf64f4f8ea41131c8c2a0204099b2030c8b155553404464fb351a7b44e77138412164997de31":"":"":"":"10001":520:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 521-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"1993ce720408e69a459c96df92b90040b88b0f7234c46b96413d177ed08e562c9b7ed7c1fb351cafc4028d3d9a9792e35ddb8a3770cc5cf7011f778f78e75ff60af":"1f2d345a210b5f085447d9534abe78d77e820dddbb24b2eb334b7c6ba91634a0f9":"d205f332807775231b96e06f47e7c0cec8981f41c6b6e6a96eafdbc40773b20e7":"15ec8c594efc122ecadc9eb6a59dce89aba607676db3b044eb46e28ce15820a5b984349a7b74a9f86c17a8503f29c0cc5b3f68790653bce30d8b0a5ba7730a16b1":"10001":521:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 521-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"1993ce720408e69a459c96df92b90040b88b0f7234c46b96413d177ed08e562c9b7ed7c1fb351cafc4028d3d9a9792e35ddb8a3770cc5cf7011f778f78e75ff60af":"":"":"":"10001":521:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 522-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"2eeccbdf4fb0385fefd27583bdc9ac8b99e57fd6acf0c71010ae65ee0531dbf45686bb737a2a64124ab2f695a73394f7d5dd2ba7a668d872684cb49e12a7d6a49ad":"1c5785f5108bb49e43ee0b3d7261eb0efe10334ac101893a59d67e79fb3f640951":"1a7da635573970c989ca4aaa051d3a51641eed09516f8200d15effb86c3082a39d":"1e2042a744c6f2fa8cc28655a5140425c010fa68fdb0bb6c51f95551619e68034d128406fa6fc7ccd5d35a493ee8ecf98b9e987fed18353ff7e0d50ae0b65f2b841":"10001":522:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 522-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"2eeccbdf4fb0385fefd27583bdc9ac8b99e57fd6acf0c71010ae65ee0531dbf45686bb737a2a64124ab2f695a73394f7d5dd2ba7a668d872684cb49e12a7d6a49ad":"":"":"":"10001":522:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 523-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"6a8c9774b37c37d6f6c95aaf60ab27ebb426a26cd6b22fa44fe1e09f4fa47abeac2d1f84aaff436ef3f07801c617a1f990ca4ece42388d1493723ee9768730d8799":"36f10cb3d7fa6af6616991827dd988fd0687761243126e563a24977d95b3075855":"1f0771656d359a2d4907ded0e0471e27242a59f89e30a4e21fc3cffb5da3dd4635":"4cafcdde87c452e85c0d06410dc1826509ef789dff5496279bfb05d183dfed1c452fda00deb3b345fc31cd255aa1c7e2f19e50191793a7b16e6340f0723e0d5ad11":"10001":523:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 523-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"6a8c9774b37c37d6f6c95aaf60ab27ebb426a26cd6b22fa44fe1e09f4fa47abeac2d1f84aaff436ef3f07801c617a1f990ca4ece42388d1493723ee9768730d8799":"":"":"":"10001":523:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 524-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"c04c05bc77eca9c05702402622b3855ac150a737132c66d6900dc8f512e752f32ce3c777d51da5cca9105b7f8f57da571cec42a450d49e43ea359538acb3610dacf":"3f78102778bec177c9bb4f313a29afbb9c2d0089539f57aeb2976b59d17b1de699":"3079f8628b827258bb785cd0bb40623207ecf6194e65871571bf004bf0c537f5a7":"9c161921de060fd3bbcc6bdd8895474d5f54e425e43e4a4b272ac94f844498241d41f7ee7a6b90775cf5a73b3ce3015b15620494130e9198550cb3f07bdba184ac1":"10001":524:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 524-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"c04c05bc77eca9c05702402622b3855ac150a737132c66d6900dc8f512e752f32ce3c777d51da5cca9105b7f8f57da571cec42a450d49e43ea359538acb3610dacf":"":"":"":"10001":524:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 525-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"18197b4f054a0347a8e81576cf16fdb5d22ce9bb71b11df029c30e047b418ebb4b2d759f8c72f9b24a79b46ddeeeadb17b197911442f6e7bf3ea2106752e901c64fb":"676ee11f6bb61d7094148bb326d0267eb7a105549d72d360707001af8e03ecc6dd":"3ba5a5ba28f8adee0883947963c037e3a2c9e557b3edc5cca35b155e63ed3ae1b7":"d75e61ecbe87c0e817427d0f57874fb224a7dbe79912114ac6ecb1c8bafa146512b1b728d2d860e96fd283ae981ebb3272647841cdd254a5e1f075eb17df596e2c9":"10001":525:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 525-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"18197b4f054a0347a8e81576cf16fdb5d22ce9bb71b11df029c30e047b418ebb4b2d759f8c72f9b24a79b46ddeeeadb17b197911442f6e7bf3ea2106752e901c64fb":"":"":"":"10001":525:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 526-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"2de74b63625125b31a3d4ae2719d74dae2a0dacb84f220c295e8fea55080b3bacad98593ef3dd710a949b84498ba59ac0353f8e6cd4355e9bfc0ddef8ef25ce41309":"766d695ac399679b33cdc68e7bf9b604d922dee04fa60a4aa2fab3263a8b323109":"633a53fef2f6b08daddd9e496625819753284b72f41290dcc8db82e55746555201":"1ff9c25614a29a344cceed5f17edaafcde69567ff6b80382089328ef57488fea49d3e660180107bb0b1770005d814216dbd493fd7aae4891fb2320226615d67e4001":"10001":526:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 526-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"2de74b63625125b31a3d4ae2719d74dae2a0dacb84f220c295e8fea55080b3bacad98593ef3dd710a949b84498ba59ac0353f8e6cd4355e9bfc0ddef8ef25ce41309":"":"":"":"10001":526:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 527-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"54e6bb611922620e32e0e402446e3a2b8eb1be1f44a750a833ac56635a2aca00fa20cdddf6d185e60623da0ba4dd33011d5df7f7f69d95c98c4ca7fddde08ec209db":"d36b6f6e6828bc2cb35b9b5ecca60ea4d33406b11ff4fafc3b439f3fa9c521733b":"66cdc1ad01f31f5eeafff4774bf4ba95ccb58a5afae6744b560e7181f8b0a119e1":"32e1d958f7044939f33a1ecc5110b2a21a31e21cc13b793665499ab88e78687a2eb19a570263370532aac0c418867027c6275b604899b26f9913a10aaacb7895ddc1":"10001":527:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 527-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"54e6bb611922620e32e0e402446e3a2b8eb1be1f44a750a833ac56635a2aca00fa20cdddf6d185e60623da0ba4dd33011d5df7f7f69d95c98c4ca7fddde08ec209db":"":"":"":"10001":527:0:0:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,P,Q,D,E) 528-bit complete pair +mbedtls_rsa_import:"d158d6f8bf79fd0721ad50c08ada2f023bec6970a43cc709dba277046d6e2cfd65b72239c7856c7aea7d40906c4880ce828dc4906d364600cd2dd62a284c9ebfcb59":"ebdbfc4ea38f0dac4032c21663be46d045ce4bec7e6d2d773980fd92ca6aaf0f73":"e33947ec6dccc2ca956495f34923b00a490fdfef67b5332d6f084dccf58191af03":"b2e7b0373e337b1848207c5d3f8c7c15f5adf0e1f1897b33a27e7225d77b0b79b4928fd89ca267c7b334fa39949397a8870a204c9b9e98037bfd8716f0dec4802d3d":"10001":528:0:1:0:0 + +RSA Import (N,-,-,-,E) 528-bit public +mbedtls_rsa_import:"d158d6f8bf79fd0721ad50c08ada2f023bec6970a43cc709dba277046d6e2cfd65b72239c7856c7aea7d40906c4880ce828dc4906d364600cd2dd62a284c9ebfcb59":"":"":"":"10001":528:0:0:0:0 RSA Import Raw (N,P,Q,D,E), complete private key mbedtls_rsa_import_raw:"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":"e79a373182bfaa722eb035f772ad2a9464bd842de59432c18bbab3a7dfeae318c9b915ee487861ab665a40bd6cda560152578e8579016c929df99fea05b4d64efca1d543850bc8164b40d71ed7f3fa4105df0fb9b9ad2a18ce182c8a4f4f975bea9aa0b9a1438a27a28e97ac8330ef37383414d1bd64607d6979ac050424fd17":"c6749cbb0db8c5a177672d4728a8b22392b2fc4d3b8361d5c0d5055a1b4e46d821f757c24eef2a51c561941b93b3ace7340074c058c9bb48e7e7414f42c41da4cccb5c2ba91deb30c586b7fb18af12a52995592ad139d3be429add6547e044becedaf31fa3b39421e24ee034fbf367d11f6b8f88ee483d163b431e1654ad3e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diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function index 2f700289a8..e82452927e 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_rsa.function @@ -183,7 +183,8 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(data_t *message_str, int padding_mode, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&ctx) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&ctx) == 0); @@ -221,7 +222,8 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(data_t *message_str, int padding_mode, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&N, input_N) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&ctx) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify(&ctx, digest, message_str->len, message_str->x, @@ -262,7 +264,8 @@ void rsa_pkcs1_sign_raw(data_t *hash_result, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&ctx) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&ctx) == 0); @@ -305,7 +308,8 @@ void rsa_pkcs1_verify_raw(data_t *hash_result, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&ctx) == 0); @@ -341,7 +345,8 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt(data_t *message_str, int padding_mode, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&ctx) == 0); @@ -382,7 +387,8 @@ void rsa_pkcs1_encrypt_bad_rng(data_t *message_str, int padding_mode, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&ctx) == 0); @@ -432,7 +438,8 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt(data_t *message_str, int padding_mode, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&E, input_E) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&ctx) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&ctx) == 0); @@ -477,8 +484,9 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_public(data_t *message_str, int mod, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, NULL, NULL, NULL, &E) == 0); /* Check test data consistency */ - TEST_ASSERT(message_str->len == (size_t) (mod / 8)); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(message_str->len, (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(&ctx) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_public(&ctx, message_str->x, output) == result); @@ -537,8 +545,9 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_private(data_t *message_str, int mod, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(&ctx, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E) == 0); /* Check test data consistency */ - TEST_ASSERT(message_str->len == (size_t) (mod / 8)); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(message_str->len, (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (size_t) ((mod + 7) / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), (size_t) mod); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_complete(&ctx) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&ctx) == 0); @@ -851,6 +860,7 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_import(char *input_N, char *input_Q, char *input_D, char *input_E, + int bitlen, int successive, int is_priv, int res_check, @@ -936,6 +946,9 @@ void mbedtls_rsa_import(char *input_N, /* On expected success, perform some public and private * key operations to check if the key is working properly. */ if (res_complete == 0) { + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(&ctx), bitlen); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(&ctx), (bitlen + 7) / 8); + if (is_priv) { TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(&ctx) == res_check); } else { From 92fb6041391bca83b0e50836991c980066d9a66c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 22:33:06 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 541/551] Fix mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen() for RSA with non-byte-aligned sizes Add non-regression tests. Update some test functions to not assume that byte_length == bit_length / 8. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt | 4 ++++ library/pk_wrap.c | 2 +- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data | 16 +++++++++++++++- tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function | 22 +++++++++++++++------- tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data | 12 ++++++++++++ tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function | 4 ++++ 6 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt b/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt index 85a9894422..9f0b3243fc 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +Bugfix + * Fix mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen() for RSA keys whose size is not a + multiple of 8. Fixes #868. + Features * The new function mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen() returns the length of the modulus in bits, i.e. the key size for an RSA key. diff --git a/library/pk_wrap.c b/library/pk_wrap.c index 2e00d4a258..69e1baf2e1 100644 --- a/library/pk_wrap.c +++ b/library/pk_wrap.c @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ static int rsa_can_do(mbedtls_pk_type_t type) static size_t rsa_get_bitlen(mbedtls_pk_context *pk) { const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa = (const mbedtls_rsa_context *) pk->pk_ctx; - return 8 * mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa); + return mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(rsa); } #if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data index 3414958837..35f02cb810 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.data @@ -10,7 +10,21 @@ valid_parameters_pkwrite:"308204a20201000282010100a9021f3d406ad555538bfd36ee8265 PK utils: RSA Minimum key depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME -pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS /8):"RSA" +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS:(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 7) / 8:"RSA" + +# mbedtls_rsa_gen_key() only supports even sizes, so we don't test min+1, +# min+3, etc. +PK utils: RSA Minimum key + 2 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 2:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 2:(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 2 + 7) / 8:"RSA" + +PK utils: RSA Minimum key + 4 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 4:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 4:(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 4 + 7) / 8:"RSA" + +PK utils: RSA Minimum key + 6 bits +depends_on:MBEDTLS_RSA_C:MBEDTLS_GENPRIME +pk_utils:MBEDTLS_PK_RSA:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 6:MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 6:(MBEDTLS_RSA_GEN_KEY_MIN_BITS + 6 + 7) / 8:"RSA" PK utils: ECKEY SECP192R1 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PK_HAVE_ECC_KEYS:MBEDTLS_ECP_HAVE_SECP192R1 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function index 2574307020..681de0ff06 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pk.function @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ void pk_psa_utils(int key_is_rsa) TEST_ASSERT(strcmp(mbedtls_pk_get_name(&pk), name) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk) == bitlen); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_get_len(&pk) == bitlen / 8); + TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_get_len(&pk) == (bitlen + 7) / 8); if (key_is_rsa) { TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_can_do(&pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY) == 0); @@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ void pk_rsa_verify_test_vec(data_t *message_str, int digest, int mod, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_setup(&pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) == 0); rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk); - rsa->len = mod / 8; + rsa->len = (mod + 7) / 8; TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&rsa->N, input_N) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&rsa->E, input_E) == 0); @@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ void pk_rsa_verify_ext_test_vec(data_t *message_str, int digest, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_setup(&pk, mbedtls_pk_info_from_type(MBEDTLS_PK_RSA)) == 0); rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk); - rsa->len = mod / 8; + rsa->len = (mod + 7) / 8; TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&rsa->N, input_N) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&rsa->E, input_E) == 0); @@ -1143,7 +1143,7 @@ void pk_rsa_encrypt_decrypt_test(data_t *message, int mod, rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(pk); /* load public key */ - rsa->len = mod / 8; + rsa->len = (mod + 7) / 8; TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&rsa->N, input_N) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&rsa->E, input_E) == 0); @@ -1169,9 +1169,12 @@ void pk_rsa_encrypt_decrypt_test(data_t *message, int mod, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P, input_P) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&Q, input_Q) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa), (mod + 7) / 8); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_len(&pk), (mod + 7) / 8); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk), mod); + memset(result, 0, sizeof(result)); rlen = 0; TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_pk_decrypt(&pk, output, olen, @@ -1222,9 +1225,12 @@ void pk_rsa_decrypt_test_vec(data_t *cipher, int mod, TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P, input_P) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&Q, input_Q) == 0); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E) == 0); - TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa) == (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa), (mod + 7) / 8); TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa) == 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk), mod); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_len(&pk), (mod + 7) / 8); + /* decryption test */ memset(output, 0, sizeof(output)); olen = 0; @@ -1278,7 +1284,7 @@ void pk_wrap_rsa_decrypt_test_vec(data_t *cipher, int mod, TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&P, input_P), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_test_read_mpi(&Q, input_Q), 0); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_import(rsa, &N, &P, &Q, NULL, &E), 0); - TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa), (size_t) (mod / 8)); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_get_len(rsa), (mod + 7) / 8); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_complete(rsa), 0); /* Turn PK context into an opaque one. */ @@ -1287,6 +1293,8 @@ void pk_wrap_rsa_decrypt_test_vec(data_t *cipher, int mod, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT, PSA_ALG_NONE), 0); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&pk), mod); + /* decryption test */ memset(output, 0, sizeof(output)); olen = 0; diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data index 707da7f386..e526311b52 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -914,6 +914,18 @@ Parse RSA Key #99.8 (PKCS#8 encrypted v2 PBKDF2 AES-256-CBC hmacWithSHA384 DER, depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_MODE_CBC:!MBEDTLS_AES_ONLY_128_BIT_KEY_LENGTH pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 +Parse RSA Key #100.1 (512-bit) +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa512.key":"":0 + +Parse RSA Key #100.1 (521-bit) +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa521.key":"":0 + +Parse RSA Key #100.1 (522-bit) +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa522.key":"":0 + +Parse RSA Key #100.1 (528-bit) +pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa528.key":"":0 + Parse Public RSA Key #1 (PKCS#8 wrapped) depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_2048_public.pem":0 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function index 14afef6e94..f4bbb215a0 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function @@ -42,6 +42,10 @@ void pk_parse_keyfile_rsa(char *key_file, char *password, int result) rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey(rsa), 0); + size_t bitlen = mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(rsa); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&ctx), bitlen); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_len(&ctx), (bitlen + 7) / 8); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, From 34a074af37e21c64ea567fcf240ef187c7356ad0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Fri, 2 Feb 2024 10:51:59 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 542/551] Add missing dependency on PEM Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data index e526311b52..1650f51b3a 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.data @@ -915,15 +915,19 @@ depends_on:MBEDTLS_AES_C:MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384:MBEDTLS_PKCS5_C:MBEDTLS_CIPHER_C: pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa_pkcs8_pbes2_pbkdf2_2048_aes256cbc_sha384.der":"PolarSSLTest":0 Parse RSA Key #100.1 (512-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa512.key":"":0 Parse RSA Key #100.1 (521-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa521.key":"":0 Parse RSA Key #100.1 (522-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa522.key":"":0 Parse RSA Key #100.1 (528-bit) +depends_on:MBEDTLS_PEM_C pk_parse_keyfile_rsa:"data_files/rsa528.key":"":0 Parse Public RSA Key #1 (PKCS#8 wrapped) From 59d09486dcf930e090920a6a64325bfa30fb2beb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 16:58:39 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 543/551] Cosmetic fix Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt b/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt index 9f0b3243fc..bcd185fa30 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/rsa-bitlen.txt @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ Bugfix * Fix mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen() for RSA keys whose size is not a - multiple of 8. Fixes #868. + multiple of 8. Fixes #868. Features * The new function mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen() returns the length of the modulus From 069cec1737bc346615035ec63c2033c1a3de9116 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 16:59:17 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 544/551] Also check the RSA length for public keys Do for public keys what "Fix mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen() for RSA with non-byte-aligned sizes" did for key pairs. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function index f4bbb215a0..829e789c06 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_pkparse.function @@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ void pk_parse_public_keyfile_rsa(char *key_file, int result) rsa = mbedtls_pk_rsa(ctx); TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey(rsa), 0); + size_t bitlen = mbedtls_rsa_get_bitlen(rsa); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_bitlen(&ctx), bitlen); + TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_len(&ctx), (bitlen + 7) / 8); + #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C) psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT; TEST_EQUAL(mbedtls_pk_get_psa_attributes(&ctx, From 7238efd13689316d8fc3ef772333a5b0a438d227 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Piotr=20Bzdr=C4=99ga?= Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 21:06:54 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 545/551] changelog for bugfix MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: Piotr Bzdręga --- ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt b/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..7f8c39b098 --- /dev/null +++ b/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +Bugfix + * Avoid segmentation fault caused by releasing not initialized + entropy resource in gen_key example. Fixes #8809 \ No newline at end of file From aa7416594884af048ec77d12f42efaba9c4ff7a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 13:40:26 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 546/551] Fix IAR cast warning Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/pk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/library/pk.c b/library/pk.c index 1b481e1a20..076d3a833d 100644 --- a/library/pk.c +++ b/library/pk.c @@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static psa_algorithm_t psa_algorithm_for_rsa(const mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa, { if (mbedtls_rsa_get_padding_mode(rsa) == MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21) { if (want_crypt) { - mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa); + mbedtls_md_type_t md_type = (mbedtls_md_type_t) mbedtls_rsa_get_md_alg(rsa); return PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(mbedtls_md_psa_alg_from_type(md_type)); } else { return PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH); From b4cb8bef42c1751a35b839e721aa3c6a2f3dba56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Dave Rodgman Date: Fri, 24 Nov 2023 17:08:54 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 547/551] Fix remaining warnings from -Wshorten-64-to-32 Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman --- library/aesce.c | 2 +- library/lms.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/aesce.c b/library/aesce.c index eaaa5b5c3f..6a9e0a1c6b 100644 --- a/library/aesce.c +++ b/library/aesce.c @@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ static void aesce_setkey_enc(unsigned char *rk, * - Section 5, Nr = Nk + 6 * - Section 5.2, the length of round keys is Nb*(Nr+1) */ - const uint32_t key_len_in_words = key_bit_length / 32; /* Nk */ + const size_t key_len_in_words = key_bit_length / 32; /* Nk */ const size_t round_key_len_in_words = 4; /* Nb */ const size_t rounds_needed = key_len_in_words + 6; /* Nr */ const size_t round_keys_len_in_words = diff --git a/library/lms.c b/library/lms.c index 08fe75300a..8d3cae0524 100644 --- a/library/lms.c +++ b/library/lms.c @@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ static int local_err_translation(psa_status_t status) #define H_TREE_HEIGHT_MAX 10 #define MERKLE_TREE_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << (MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type) + 1u)) #define MERKLE_TREE_LEAF_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type)) -#define MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(type) ((size_t) 1 << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type)) +#define MERKLE_TREE_INTERNAL_NODE_AM(type) ((unsigned int) \ + (1u << MBEDTLS_LMS_H_TREE_HEIGHT(type))) #define D_CONST_LEN (2) static const unsigned char D_LEAF_CONSTANT_BYTES[D_CONST_LEN] = { 0x82, 0x82 }; From 971820330867c5e8181100641e4dac584bfa98be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Paul Elliott Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 13:27:06 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 548/551] Fix deadlock with test failures Calling mbedtls_test_fail() attempts to lock the test data mutex. Unfortunately we were calling this from places where we already held this mutex, and this mutex is not recursive, so this deadlocks. Split out mbedtls_test_fail() into mbedtls_test_fail_internal() in order to address this. Signed-off-by: Paul Elliott --- tests/src/helpers.c | 22 +++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/tests/src/helpers.c b/tests/src/helpers.c index da0b54a00a..b9233be956 100644 --- a/tests/src/helpers.c +++ b/tests/src/helpers.c @@ -341,11 +341,10 @@ int mbedtls_test_ascii2uc(const char c, unsigned char *uc) return 0; } -void mbedtls_test_fail(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) +static void mbedtls_test_fail_internal(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) { -#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C - mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); -#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + /* Internal function only - mbedtls_test_info_mutex should be held prior + * to calling this function. */ /* Don't use accessor, we already hold mutex. */ if (mbedtls_test_info.result != MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED) { @@ -353,6 +352,15 @@ void mbedtls_test_fail(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ mbedtls_test_set_result(MBEDTLS_TEST_RESULT_FAILED, test, line_no, filename); } +} + +void mbedtls_test_fail(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename) +{ +#ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C + mbedtls_mutex_lock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); +#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */ + + mbedtls_test_fail_internal(test, line_no, filename); #ifdef MBEDTLS_THREADING_C mbedtls_mutex_unlock(&mbedtls_test_info_mutex); @@ -412,7 +420,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_equal(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; - mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); + mbedtls_test_fail_internal(test, line_no, filename); (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", value1, (long long) value1); @@ -450,7 +458,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_le_u(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; - mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); + mbedtls_test_fail_internal(test, line_no, filename); (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "lhs = 0x%016llx = %llu", value1, value1); @@ -488,7 +496,7 @@ int mbedtls_test_le_s(const char *test, int line_no, const char *filename, * overwrite any previous information about the failure. */ char buf[MBEDTLS_TEST_LINE_LENGTH]; - mbedtls_test_fail(test, line_no, filename); + mbedtls_test_fail_internal(test, line_no, filename); (void) mbedtls_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "lhs = 0x%016llx = %lld", (unsigned long long) value1, value1); From e0a6f7d32007836ba25af15f279b277a6f5915df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: PiotrBzdrega Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 17:08:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 549/551] fill out missing dot in changelog Signed-off-by: PiotrBzdrega --- ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt b/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt index 7f8c39b098..4fb2d1f858 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ Bugfix * Avoid segmentation fault caused by releasing not initialized - entropy resource in gen_key example. Fixes #8809 \ No newline at end of file + entropy resource in gen_key example. Fixes #8809. \ No newline at end of file From f8b983c855a3b0620839085cd7c7a33416aaa091 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Gilles Peskine Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 18:14:58 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 550/551] Pack the iota round constants This saves ~160 bytes of code size, at the cost of a bit of localized complexity in the code. The impact on performance is measurable but small (<5% observed on x86_64) and can go either way (there's a calculation vs memory bandwidth compromise). Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine --- library/sha3.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/sha3.c b/library/sha3.c index 5df08f91c8..27d495fc42 100644 --- a/library/sha3.c +++ b/library/sha3.c @@ -26,14 +26,35 @@ #define XOR_BYTE 0x6 -static const uint64_t rc[24] = { - 0x0000000000000001, 0x0000000000008082, 0x800000000000808a, 0x8000000080008000, - 0x000000000000808b, 0x0000000080000001, 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008009, - 0x000000000000008a, 0x0000000000000088, 0x0000000080008009, 0x000000008000000a, - 0x000000008000808b, 0x800000000000008b, 0x8000000000008089, 0x8000000000008003, - 0x8000000000008002, 0x8000000000000080, 0x000000000000800a, 0x800000008000000a, - 0x8000000080008081, 0x8000000000008080, 0x0000000080000001, 0x8000000080008008, +/* Precomputed masks for the iota transform. + * + * Each round uses a 64-bit mask value. In each mask values, only + * bits whose position is of the form 2^k-1 can be set, thus only + * 7 of 64 bits of the mask need to be known for each mask value. + * + * We use a compressed encoding of the mask where bits 63, 31 and 15 + * are moved to bits 4-6. This allows us to make each mask value + * 1 byte rather than 8 bytes, saving 7*24 = 168 bytes of data (with + * perhaps a little variation due to alignment). Decompressing this + * requires a little code, but much less than the savings on the table. + * + * The impact on performance depends on the platform and compiler. + * There's a bit more computation, but less memory bandwidth. A quick + * benchmark on x86_64 shows a 7% speed improvement with GCC and a + * 5% speed penalty with Clang, compared to the naive uint64_t[24] table. + * YMMV. + */ +/* Helper macro to set the values of the higher bits in unused low positions */ +#define H(b63, b31, b15) (b63 << 6 | b31 << 5 | b15 << 4) +static const uint8_t iota_r_packed[24] = { + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x01, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x82, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x8a, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x00, + H(0, 0, 1) | 0x8b, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x09, + H(0, 0, 0) | 0x8a, H(0, 0, 0) | 0x88, H(0, 1, 1) | 0x09, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(0, 1, 1) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x8b, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x89, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x03, + H(1, 0, 1) | 0x02, H(1, 0, 0) | 0x80, H(0, 0, 1) | 0x0a, H(1, 1, 0) | 0x0a, + H(1, 1, 1) | 0x81, H(1, 0, 1) | 0x80, H(0, 1, 0) | 0x01, H(1, 1, 1) | 0x08, }; +#undef H static const uint8_t rho[24] = { 1, 62, 28, 27, 36, 44, 6, 55, 20, @@ -132,7 +153,11 @@ static void keccak_f1600(mbedtls_sha3_context *ctx) s[24] ^= (~lane[0]) & lane[1]; /* Iota */ - s[0] ^= rc[round]; + /* Decompress the round masks (see definition of rc) */ + s[0] ^= ((iota_r_packed[round] & 0x40ull) << 57 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x20ull) << 26 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x10ull) << 11 | + (iota_r_packed[round] & 0x8f)); } } From dc6606b5e3ecc8ea14edadbbf47fb2da7b2bd88c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: PiotrBzdrega Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2024 22:17:08 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 551/551] newline at end of changelog file Signed-off-by: PiotrBzdrega --- ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt b/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt index 4fb2d1f858..fefc702726 100644 --- a/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt +++ b/ChangeLog.d/gen-key-segfault.txt @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ Bugfix * Avoid segmentation fault caused by releasing not initialized - entropy resource in gen_key example. Fixes #8809. \ No newline at end of file + entropy resource in gen_key example. Fixes #8809.