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Implement psa_sign_message and psa_verify_message functions

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Signed-off-by: gabor-mezei-arm <gabor.mezei@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
gabor-mezei-arm
2021-04-14 21:14:28 +02:00
parent 0ac7dbcfdc
commit e8efa3911c
4 changed files with 305 additions and 1 deletions
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136
library/psa_crypto.c
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@ -1556,6 +1556,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_validate_key_policy( const psa_key_policy_t *policy )
PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH |
PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) ) != 0 )
@ -2840,6 +2842,140 @@ cleanup:
/* Asymmetric cryptography */
/****************************************************************/
psa_status_t psa_sign_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_size,
size_t * signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
*signature_length = 0;
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
if ( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
/* Immediately reject a zero-length signature buffer. This guarantees
* that signature must be a valid pointer. (On the other hand, the hash
* buffer can in principle be empty since it doesn't actually have
* to be a hash.) */
if( signature_size == 0 )
return( PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
goto exit;
if( ! PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR( slot->attr.type ) )
{
status = PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto exit;
}
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
input, input_length,
hash, sizeof( hash ),
&hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) );
goto exit;
}
status = psa_driver_wrapper_sign_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_size, signature_length );
memset( hash, 0, hash_length );
exit:
/* Fill the unused part of the output buffer (the whole buffer on error,
* the trailing part on success) with something that isn't a valid signature
* (barring an attack on the signature and deliberately-crafted input),
* in case the caller doesn't check the return status properly. */
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS )
memset( signature + *signature_length, '!',
signature_size - *signature_length );
else
memset( signature, '!', signature_size );
/* If signature_size is 0 then we have nothing to do. We must not call
* memset because signature may be NULL in this case. */
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_verify_message( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key,
psa_algorithm_t alg,
const uint8_t * input,
size_t input_length,
const uint8_t * signature,
size_t signature_length )
{
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_status_t unlock_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
size_t hash_length;
uint8_t hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE( alg ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
if ( ! PSA_ALG_IS_HASH( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ) ) )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( key, &slot,
PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE,
alg );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
return( status );
psa_key_attributes_t attributes = {
.core = slot->attr
};
status = psa_driver_wrapper_hash_compute( PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH( alg ),
input, input_length,
hash, sizeof( hash ),
&hash_length );
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
{
memset( hash, 0, sizeof( hash ) );
goto exit;
}
status = psa_driver_wrapper_verify_hash(
&attributes, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes,
alg, hash, hash_length,
signature, signature_length );
memset( hash, 0, hash_length );
exit:
unlock_status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot );
return( ( status == PSA_SUCCESS ) ? unlock_status : status );
}
psa_status_t psa_sign_hash_internal(
const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
const uint8_t *key_buffer, size_t key_buffer_size,