mirror of
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git
synced 2025-12-24 17:41:01 +03:00
Base the PSA implementation of TLS 1.2 PRF on the MAC API
This means there is no longer a need to have an internal HMAC API, so it is being removed in this commit as well. Signed-off-by: Steven Cooreman <steven.cooreman@silabs.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -3223,6 +3223,13 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation
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/* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */
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PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
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{
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if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret != NULL )
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{
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret,
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operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret_length );
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mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.secret );
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}
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if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL )
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{
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed,
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@@ -3237,7 +3244,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation
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mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.label );
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}
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status = psa_hmac_abort_internal( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf.hmac );
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status = PSA_SUCCESS;
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/* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the
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* mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */
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@@ -3367,7 +3374,8 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(
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{
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg );
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uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_LENGTH( hash_alg );
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mbedtls_psa_hmac_operation_t backup = MBEDTLS_PSA_HMAC_OPERATION_INIT;
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psa_mac_operation_t hmac = PSA_MAC_OPERATION_INIT;
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size_t hmac_output_length;
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psa_status_t status, cleanup_status;
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/* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise
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@@ -3399,10 +3407,17 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(
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* `block_number`.
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*/
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/* Save the hash context before using it, to preserve the hash state with
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* only the inner padding in it. We need this, because inner padding depends
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* on the key (secret in the RFC's terminology). */
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status = psa_hmac_clone_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac, &backup );
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psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
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psa_set_key_type( &attributes, PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC );
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psa_set_key_bits( &attributes,
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PSA_BYTES_TO_BITS( tls12_prf->secret_length ) );
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psa_set_key_usage_flags( &attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH );
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( &hmac,
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&attributes,
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tls12_prf->secret,
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tls12_prf->secret_length,
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PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ) );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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@@ -3412,59 +3427,61 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(
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/* A(1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(0)), where A(0) = seed. (The RFC overloads
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* the variable seed and in this instance means it in the context of the
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* P_hash function, where seed = label + seed.) */
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status = psa_hmac_update_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->label,
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tls12_prf->label_length );
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status = psa_mac_update( &hmac,
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tls12_prf->label,
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tls12_prf->label_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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status = psa_hmac_update_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->seed,
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tls12_prf->seed_length );
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status = psa_mac_update( &hmac,
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tls12_prf->seed,
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tls12_prf->seed_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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}
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else
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{
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/* A(i) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i-1)) */
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status = psa_hmac_update_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
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status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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}
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status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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status = psa_hmac_clone_internal( &backup, &tls12_prf->hmac );
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status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac,
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tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length,
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&hmac_output_length );
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if( hmac_output_length != hash_length )
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status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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/* Calculate HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + label + seed). */
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status = psa_hmac_update_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
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status = psa_driver_wrapper_mac_sign_setup( &hmac,
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&attributes,
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tls12_prf->secret,
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tls12_prf->secret_length,
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PSA_ALG_HMAC( hash_alg ) );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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status = psa_hmac_update_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length );
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status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->Ai, hash_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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status = psa_hmac_update_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length );
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status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->label, tls12_prf->label_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &tls12_prf->hmac,
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tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length );
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status = psa_mac_update( &hmac, tls12_prf->seed, tls12_prf->seed_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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status = psa_hmac_clone_internal( &backup, &tls12_prf->hmac );
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status = psa_mac_sign_finish( &hmac,
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tls12_prf->output_block, hash_length,
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&hmac_output_length );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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goto cleanup;
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cleanup:
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psa_reset_key_attributes( &attributes );
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cleanup_status = psa_hmac_abort_internal( &backup );
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cleanup_status = psa_mac_abort( &hmac );
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if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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status = cleanup_status;
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@@ -3561,8 +3578,8 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(
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PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
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{
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status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
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kdf_alg, output,
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output_length );
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kdf_alg, output,
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output_length );
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}
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else
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PRF ||
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@@ -3891,17 +3908,21 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
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}
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static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_key( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
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const uint8_t *data,
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size_t data_length )
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{
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psa_status_t status;
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if( prf->state != PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_SEED_SET )
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return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
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status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &prf->hmac, data, data_length, hash_alg );
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if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
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return( status );
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if( data_length != 0 )
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{
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prf->secret = mbedtls_calloc( 1, data_length );
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if( prf->secret == NULL )
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return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
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memcpy( prf->secret, data, data_length );
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prf->secret_length = data_length;
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}
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prf->state = PSA_TLS12_PRF_STATE_KEY_SET;
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@@ -3931,7 +3952,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_label( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf
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}
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static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
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psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
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const uint8_t *data,
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size_t data_length )
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@@ -3941,7 +3961,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
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case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED:
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return( psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( prf, data, data_length ) );
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case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:
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return( psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, hash_alg, data, data_length ) );
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return( psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, data, data_length ) );
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case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:
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return( psa_tls12_prf_set_label( prf, data, data_length ) );
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default:
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@@ -3954,7 +3974,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS)
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static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(
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psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
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const uint8_t *data,
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size_t data_length )
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{
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@@ -3981,7 +4000,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(
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memcpy( cur, data, data_length );
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cur += data_length;
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status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, hash_alg, pms, cur - pms );
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status = psa_tls12_prf_set_key( prf, pms, cur - pms );
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mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pms, sizeof( pms ) );
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return( status );
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@@ -3989,18 +4008,17 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key(
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static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(
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psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
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psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
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psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
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const uint8_t *data,
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size_t data_length )
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{
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if( step == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET )
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{
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return( psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( prf, hash_alg,
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return( psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_set_key( prf,
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data, data_length ) );
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}
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return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, hash_alg, step, data, data_length ) );
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return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, step, data, data_length ) );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS */
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@@ -4065,7 +4083,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal(
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if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) )
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{
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status = psa_tls12_prf_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
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PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
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step, data, data_length );
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}
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else
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@@ -4074,7 +4091,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal(
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if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
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{
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status = psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
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PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
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step, data, data_length );
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}
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else
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