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Merge tag 'mbedtls-2.14.0' into feature-psa

Browse Source 
Mbed TLS version 2.14.0

Resolved conflicts in include/mbedtls/config.h,
tests/scripts/check-files.py, and yotta/create-module.sh by removing yotta.

Resolved conflicts in tests/.jenkins/Jenkinsfile by continuing to run
mbedtls-psa job.
This commit is contained in:
Jaeden Amero
2018-11-16 11:28:57 +00:00
parent 7588f78d18 556d7d9e3b
commit 818eab2e76
167 changed files with 8508 additions and 4543 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

6
library/CMakeLists.txt
View File

@@ -160,15 +160,15 @@ endif(USE_STATIC_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
if(USE_SHARED_MBEDTLS_LIBRARY)
add_library(mbedcrypto SHARED ${src_crypto})
set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.13.0 SOVERSION 3)
set_target_properties(mbedcrypto PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 3)
target_link_libraries(mbedcrypto ${libs})
add_library(mbedx509 SHARED ${src_x509})
set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.13.0 SOVERSION 0)
set_target_properties(mbedx509 PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 0)
target_link_libraries(mbedx509 ${libs} mbedcrypto)
add_library(mbedtls SHARED ${src_tls})
set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.13.0 SOVERSION 12)
set_target_properties(mbedtls PROPERTIES VERSION 2.14.0 SOVERSION 12)
target_link_libraries(mbedtls ${libs} mbedx509)
install(TARGETS mbedtls mbedx509 mbedcrypto

13
library/aes.c
View File

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C)
#include "mbedtls/padlock.h"
@@ -1142,11 +1143,11 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
unsigned char prev_tweak[16];
unsigned char tmp[16];
/* Sectors must be at least 16 bytes. */
/* Data units must be at least 16 bytes long. */
if( length < 16 )
return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
/* NIST SP 80-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */
/* NIST SP 800-38E disallows data units larger than 2**20 blocks. */
if( length > ( 1 << 20 ) * 16 )
return MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH;
@@ -1757,7 +1758,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;
@@ -1821,7 +1822,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;
@@ -1886,7 +1887,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;
@@ -1949,7 +1950,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && keybits == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && keybits == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
continue;

31
library/asn1write.c
View File

@@ -257,34 +257,37 @@ int mbedtls_asn1_write_int( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int val )
return( (int) len );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
int mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, int tag,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start,
(const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) );
(const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, tag ) );
return( (int) len );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_utf8_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING, text, text_len) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING, text, text_len) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *text, size_t text_len )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_raw_buffer( p, start,
(const unsigned char *) text, text_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING ) );
return( (int) len );
return( mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string(p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING, text, text_len) );
}
int mbedtls_asn1_write_bitstring( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,

88
library/bignum.c
View File

@@ -2056,12 +2056,12 @@ cleanup:
/*
* Miller-Rabin pseudo-primality test (HAC 4.24)
*/
static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t rounds,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret, count;
size_t i, j, k, n, s;
size_t i, j, k, s;
mbedtls_mpi W, R, T, A, RR;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &W ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &A );
@@ -2077,27 +2077,12 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &R, s ) );
i = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( X );
/*
* HAC, table 4.4
*/
n = ( ( i >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( i >= 850 ) ? 3 :
( i >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( i >= 350 ) ? 8 :
( i >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( i >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 );
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
for( i = 0; i < rounds; i++ )
{
/*
* pick a random A, 1 < A < |X| - 1
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) );
if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &A, &W ) >= 0 )
{
j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A ) - mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &A, j + 1 ) );
}
A.p[0] |= 3;
count = 0;
do {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &A, X->n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) );
@@ -2105,7 +2090,7 @@ static int mpi_miller_rabin( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
j = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &A );
k = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &W );
if (j > k) {
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &A, j - k ) );
A.p[A.n - 1] &= ( (mbedtls_mpi_uint) 1 << ( k - ( A.n - 1 ) * biL - 1 ) ) - 1;
}
if (count++ > 30) {
@@ -2160,9 +2145,9 @@ cleanup:
/*
* Pseudo-primality test: small factors, then Miller-Rabin
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( const mbedtls_mpi *X, int rounds,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi XX;
@@ -2186,17 +2171,34 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
return( ret );
}
return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, f_rng, p_rng ) );
return( mpi_miller_rabin( &XX, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/*
* Pseudo-primality test, error probability 2^-80
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( const mbedtls_mpi *X,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
/*
* In the past our key generation aimed for an error rate of at most
* 2^-80. Since this function is deprecated, aim for the same certainty
* here as well.
*/
return mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, 40, f_rng, p_rng );
}
#endif
/*
* Prime number generation
*
* If dh_flag is 0 and nbits is at least 1024, then the procedure
* follows the RSA probably-prime generation method of FIPS 186-4.
* NB. FIPS 186-4 only allows the specific bit lengths of 1024 and 1536.
* To generate an RSA key in a way recommended by FIPS 186-4, both primes must
* be either 1024 bits or 1536 bits long, and flags must contain
* MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR.
*/
int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int flags,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
@@ -2209,6 +2211,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
#endif
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
size_t k, n;
int rounds;
mbedtls_mpi_uint r;
mbedtls_mpi Y;
@@ -2219,6 +2222,27 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
n = BITS_TO_LIMBS( nbits );
if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR ) == 0 )
{
/*
* 2^-80 error probability, number of rounds chosen per HAC, table 4.4
*/
rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1300 ) ? 2 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 3 :
( nbits >= 650 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 350 ) ? 8 :
( nbits >= 250 ) ? 12 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 18 : 27 );
}
else
{
/*
* 2^-100 error probability, number of rounds computed based on HAC,
* fact 4.48
*/
rounds = ( ( nbits >= 1450 ) ? 4 : ( nbits >= 1150 ) ? 5 :
( nbits >= 1000 ) ? 6 : ( nbits >= 850 ) ? 7 :
( nbits >= 750 ) ? 8 : ( nbits >= 500 ) ? 13 :
( nbits >= 250 ) ? 28 : ( nbits >= 150 ) ? 40 : 51 );
}
while( 1 )
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( X, n * ciL, f_rng, p_rng ) );
@@ -2229,9 +2253,9 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
if( k > nbits ) MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( X, k - nbits ) );
X->p[0] |= 1;
if( dh_flag == 0 )
if( ( flags & MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_DH ) == 0 )
{
ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( X, f_rng, p_rng );
ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )
goto cleanup;
@@ -2264,8 +2288,10 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( mbedtls_mpi *X, size_t nbits, int dh_flag,
*/
if( ( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( X ) ) == 0 &&
( ret = mpi_check_small_factors( &Y ) ) == 0 &&
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 &&
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, f_rng, p_rng ) ) == 0 )
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( X, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) )
== 0 &&
( ret = mpi_miller_rabin( &Y, rounds, f_rng, p_rng ) )
== 0 )
goto cleanup;
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE )

43
library/certs.c
View File

@@ -218,12 +218,13 @@ const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_key_rsa );
const char mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa[] = "PolarSSLTest";
const size_t mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_ca_pwd_rsa ) - 1;
/* tests/data_files/server2.crt */
const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"
"MIIDNzCCAh+gAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n"
"MA8GA1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMTEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n"
"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n"
"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WjA0MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
"A1UEChMIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMTCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n"
"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxEjAQBgNVBAMMCWxvY2FsaG9zdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcN\r\n"
"AQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMFNo93nzR3RBNdJcriZrA545Do8Ss86ExbQWuTN\r\n"
"owCIp+4ea5anUrSQ7y1yej4kmvy2NKwk9XfgJmSMnLAofaHa6ozmyRyWvP7BBFKz\r\n"
"NtSj+uGxdtiQwWG0ZlI2oiZTqqt0Xgd9GYLbKtgfoNkNHC1JZvdbJXNG6AuKT2kM\r\n"
@@ -231,16 +232,17 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa[] =
"hYvai0Re4hjGYi/HZo36Xdh98yeJKQHFkA4/J/EwyEoO79bex8cna8cFPXrEAjya\r\n"
"HT4P6DSYW8tzS1KW2BGiLICIaTla0w+w3lkvEcf36hIBMJcCAwEAAaNNMEswCQYD\r\n"
"VR0TBAIwADAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUpQXoZLjc32APUBJNYKhkr02LQ5MwHwYDVR0jBBgw\r\n"
"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAJxnXClY\r\n"
"oHkbp70cqBrsGXLybA74czbO5RdLEgFs7rHVS9r+c293luS/KdliLScZqAzYVylw\r\n"
"UfRWvKMoWhHYKp3dEIS4xTXk6/5zXxhv9Rw8SGc8qn6vITHk1S1mPevtekgasY5Y\r\n"
"iWQuM3h4YVlRH3HHEMAD1TnAexfXHHDFQGe+Bd1iAbz1/sH9H8l4StwX6egvTK3M\r\n"
"wXRwkKkvjKaEDA9ATbZx0mI8LGsxSuCqe9r9dyjmttd47J1p1Rulz3CLzaRcVIuS\r\n"
"RRQfaD8neM9c1S/iJ/amTVqJxA1KOdOS5780WhPfSArA+g4qAmSjelc3p4wWpha8\r\n"
"zhuYwjVuX6JHG0c=\r\n"
"FoAUtFrkpbPe0lL2udWmlQ/rPrzH/f8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADggEBAAFzC0rF\r\n"
"y6De8WMcdgQrEw3AhBHFjzqnxZw1ene4IBSC7lTw8rBSy3jOWQdPUWn+0y/pCeeF\r\n"
"kti6sevFdl1hLemGtd4q+T9TKEKGg3ND4ARfB5AUZZ9uEHq8WBkiwus5clGS17Qd\r\n"
"dS/TOisB59tQruLx1E1bPLtBKyqk4koC5WAULJwfpswGSyWJTpYwIpxcWE3D2tBu\r\n"
"UB6MZfXZFzWmWEOyKbeoXjXe8GBCGgHLywvYDsGQ36HSGtEsAvR2QaTLSxWYcfk1\r\n"
"fbDn4jSWkb4yZy1r01UEigFQtONieGwRFaUqEcFJHJvEEGVgh9keaVlOj2vrwf5r\r\n"
"4mN4lW7gLdenN6g=\r\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_crt_rsa );
/* tests/data_files/server2.key */
const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"
"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAwU2j3efNHdEE10lyuJmsDnjkOjxKzzoTFtBa5M2jAIin7h5r\r\n"
@@ -271,11 +273,12 @@ const char mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa[] =
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_srv_key_rsa );
/* tests/data_files/cli-rsa-sha256.crt */
const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\r\n"
"MIIDhTCCAm2gAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n"
"MIIDPzCCAiegAwIBAgIBBDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA7MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDER\r\n"
"MA8GA1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGTAXBgNVBAMMEFBvbGFyU1NMIFRlc3QgQ0EwHhcN\r\n"
"MTcwNTA1MTMwNzU5WhcNMjcwNTA2MTMwNzU5WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
"MTEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WhcNMjEwMjEyMTQ0NDA2WjA8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJOTDERMA8G\r\n"
"A1UECgwIUG9sYXJTU0wxGjAYBgNVBAMMEVBvbGFyU1NMIENsaWVudCAyMIIBIjAN\r\n"
"BgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6f\r\n"
"M60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaFB9X4J7BKNdBjngpuG7fa8H6r7gwQk4ZJGDTzqCrSV/Uu\r\n"
@@ -283,18 +286,18 @@ const char mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa[] =
"MjDV0/YI0FZPRo7yX/k9Z5GIMC5Cst99++UMd//sMcB4j7/Cf8qtbCHWjdmLao5v\r\n"
"4Jv4EFbMs44TFeY0BGbH7vk2DmqV9gmaBmf0ZXH4yqSxJeD+PIs1BGe64E92hfx/\r\n"
"/DZrtenNLQNiTrM9AM+vdqBpVoNq0qjU51Bx5rU2BXcFbXvI5MT9TNUhXwIDAQAB\r\n"
"o4GSMIGPMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITBjBgNVHSMEXDBa\r\n"
"gBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/6E/pD0wOzELMAkGA1UEBhMCTkwxETAPBgNV\r\n"
"BAoMCFBvbGFyU1NMMRkwFwYDVQQDDBBQb2xhclNTTCBUZXN0IENBggEAMAkGA1Ud\r\n"
"EwQCMAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAC7yO786NvcHpK8UovKIG9cB32oSQQom\r\n"
"LoR0eHDRzdqEkoq7yGZufHFiRAAzbMqJfogRtxlrWAeB4y/jGaMBV25IbFOIcH2W\r\n"
"iCEaMMbG+VQLKNvuC63kmw/Zewc9ThM6Pa1Hcy0axT0faf1B/U01j0FIcw/6mTfK\r\n"
"D8w48OIwc1yr0JtutCVjig5DC0yznGMt32RyseOLcUe+lfq005v2PAiCozr5X8rE\r\n"
"ofGZpiM2NqRPePgYy+Vc75Zk28xkRQq1ncprgQb3S4vTsZdScpM9hLf+eMlrgqlj\r\n"
"c5PLSkXBeLE5+fedkyfTaLxxQlgCpuoOhKBm04/R1pWNzUHyqagjO9Q=\r\n"
"o00wSzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRxoQBzckAvVHZeM/xSj7zx3WtGITAf\r\n"
"BgNVHSMEGDAWgBS0WuSls97SUva51aaVD+s+vMf9/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC\r\n"
"AQEAlHabem2Tu69VUN7EipwnQn1dIHdgvT5i+iQHpSxY1crPnBbAeSdAXwsVEqLQ\r\n"
"gOOIAQD5VIITNuoGgo4i+4OpNh9u7ZkpRHla+/swsfrFWRRbBNP5Bcu74AGLstwU\r\n"
"zM8gIkBiyfM1Q1qDQISV9trlCG6O8vh8dp/rbI3rfzo99BOHXgFCrzXjCuW4vDsF\r\n"
"r+Dao26bX3sJ6UnEWg1H3o2x6PpUcvQ36h71/bz4TEbbUUEpe02V4QWuL+wrhHJL\r\n"
"U7o3SVE3Og7jPF8sat0a50YUWhwEFI256m02KAXLg89ueUyYKEr6rNwhcvXJpvU9\r\n"
"giIVvd0Sbjjnn7NC4VDbcXV8vw==\r\n"
"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\r\n";
const size_t mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa_len = sizeof( mbedtls_test_cli_crt_rsa );
/* tests/data_files/cli-rsa.key */
const char mbedtls_test_cli_key_rsa[] =
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\r\n"
"MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAyHTEzLn5tXnpRdkUYLB9u5Pyax6fM60Nj4o8VmXl3ETZzGaF\r\n"

15
library/cipher.c
View File

@@ -237,9 +237,13 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t iv_len )
{
size_t actual_iv_size;
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info || NULL == iv )
if( NULL == ctx || NULL == ctx->cipher_info )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
else if( NULL == iv && iv_len != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_CIPHER_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( NULL == iv && iv_len == 0 )
ctx->iv_size = 0;
/* avoid buffer overflow in ctx->iv */
if( iv_len > MBEDTLS_MAX_IV_LENGTH )
@@ -268,8 +272,11 @@ int mbedtls_cipher_set_iv( mbedtls_cipher_context_t *ctx,
}
#endif
memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size );
ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size;
if ( actual_iv_size != 0 )
{
memcpy( ctx->iv, iv, actual_iv_size );
ctx->iv_size = actual_iv_size;
}
return( 0 );
}

6
library/cipher_wrap.c
View File

@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_128_ecb_info = {
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
128,
"AES-128-ECB",
16,
0,
0,
16,
&aes_info
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_192_ecb_info = {
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
192,
"AES-192-ECB",
16,
0,
0,
16,
&aes_info
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ static const mbedtls_cipher_info_t aes_256_ecb_info = {
MBEDTLS_MODE_ECB,
256,
"AES-256-ECB",
16,
0,
0,
16,
&aes_info

63
library/ctr_drbg.c
View File

@@ -66,6 +66,18 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_init( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx )
* Non-public function wrapped by mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed(). Necessary to allow
* NIST tests to succeed (which require known length fixed entropy)
*/
/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.3.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(ctx, f_entropy, p_entropy,
* custom, len, entropy_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
* security_strength) -> initial_working_state
* with inputs
* custom[:len] = nonce || personalization_string
* where entropy_input comes from f_entropy for entropy_len bytes
* and with outputs
* ctx = initial_working_state
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed_entropy_len(
mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
@@ -256,6 +268,14 @@ exit:
return( ret );
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Update (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.2)
* ctr_drbg_update_internal(ctx, provided_data)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Update(provided_data, Key, V)
* with inputs and outputs
* ctx->aes_ctx = Key
* ctx->counter = V
*/
static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char data[MBEDTLS_CTR_DRBG_SEEDLEN] )
{
@@ -301,6 +321,18 @@ static int ctr_drbg_update_internal( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
return( 0 );
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.3.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update(ctx, additional, add_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Instantiate(entropy_input, nonce, personalization_string,
* security_strength) -> initial_working_state
* with inputs
* ctx->counter = all-bits-0
* ctx->aes_ctx = context from all-bits-0 key
* additional[:add_len] = entropy_input || nonce || personalization_string
* and with outputs
* ctx = initial_working_state
*/
void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )
{
@@ -318,6 +350,18 @@ void mbedtls_ctr_drbg_update( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
}
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Reseed with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.4.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed(ctx, additional, len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional_input)
* -> new_working_state
* with inputs
* ctx contains working_state
* additional[:len] = additional_input
* and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
* and with output
* ctx contains new_working_state
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t len )
{
@@ -371,6 +415,25 @@ int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_reseed( mbedtls_ctr_drbg_context *ctx,
return( 0 );
}
/* CTR_DRBG_Generate with derivation function (SP 800-90A &sect;10.2.1.5.2)
* mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add(ctx, output, output_len, additional, add_len)
* implements
* CTR_DRBG_Reseed(working_state, entropy_input, additional[:add_len])
* -> working_state_after_reseed
* if required, then
* CTR_DRBG_Generate(working_state_after_reseed,
* requested_number_of_bits, additional_input)
* -> status, returned_bits, new_working_state
* with inputs
* ctx contains working_state
* requested_number_of_bits = 8 * output_len
* additional[:add_len] = additional_input
* and entropy_input comes from calling ctx->f_entropy
* and with outputs
* status = SUCCESS (this function does the reseed internally)
* returned_bits = output[:output_len]
* ctx contains new_working_state
*/
int mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng,
unsigned char *output, size_t output_len,
const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len )

156
library/ecdh.c
View File

@@ -40,36 +40,62 @@
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT)
/*
* Generate public key: simple wrapper around mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair
* Generate public key (restartable version)
*
* Note: this internal function relies on its caller preserving the value of
* the output parameter 'd' across continuation calls. This would not be
* acceptable for a public function but is OK here as we control call sites.
*/
static int ecdh_gen_public_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
/* If multiplication is in progress, we already generated a privkey */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx == NULL || rs_ctx->rsm == NULL )
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, d, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, Q, d, &grp->G,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
/*
* Generate public key
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *d, mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
return mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng );
return( ecdh_gen_public_restartable( grp, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_GEN_PUBLIC_ALT */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT)
/*
* Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z,
static int ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *z,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_ecp_point P;
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &P );
/*
* Make sure Q is a valid pubkey before using it
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul( grp, &P, d, Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &P, d, Q,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &P ) )
{
@@ -84,14 +110,39 @@ cleanup:
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */
/*
* Compute shared secret (SEC1 3.3.1)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *z,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *d,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
return( ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( grp, z, Q, d,
f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDH_COMPUTE_SHARED_ALT */
/*
* Initialize context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdh_init( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx )
{
memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdh_context ) );
mbedtls_ecp_group_init( &ctx->grp );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->d );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Q );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Qp );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->z );
ctx->point_format = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vi );
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &ctx->Vf );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->_d );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ctx->restart_enabled = 0;
mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->rs );
#endif
}
/*
@@ -103,15 +154,29 @@ void mbedtls_ecdh_free( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx )
return;
mbedtls_ecp_group_free( &ctx->grp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Q );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Qp );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vi );
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &ctx->Vf );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->d );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->z );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->_d );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->rs );
#endif
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Enable restartable operations for context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx )
{
ctx->restart_enabled = 1;
}
#endif
/*
* Setup and write the ServerKeyExhange parameters (RFC 4492)
* struct {
@@ -126,13 +191,28 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
{
int ret;
size_t grp_len, pt_len;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) )
!= 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ctx->restart_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_group( &ctx->grp, &grp_len, buf, blen ) )
!= 0 )
@@ -142,7 +222,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
blen -= grp_len;
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, ctx->point_format,
&pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 )
&pt_len, buf, blen ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*olen = grp_len + pt_len;
@@ -206,13 +286,27 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) )
!= 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ctx->restart_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ( ret = ecdh_gen_public_restartable( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
return mbedtls_ecp_tls_write_point( &ctx->grp, &ctx->Q, ctx->point_format,
olen, buf, blen );
@@ -248,15 +342,31 @@ int mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( mbedtls_ecdh_context *ctx, size_t *olen,
void *p_rng )
{
int ret;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx *rs_ctx = NULL;
#endif
if( ctx == NULL )
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->grp.pbits == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, &ctx->d,
f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ctx->restart_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ctx->rs;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ( ret = ecdh_compute_shared_restartable( &ctx->grp,
&ctx->z, &ctx->Qp, &ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
#else
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared( &ctx->grp, &ctx->z, &ctx->Qp,
&ctx->d, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->z ) > blen )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );

500
library/ecdsa.c
View File

@@ -42,6 +42,178 @@
#include "mbedtls/hmac_drbg.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
#define mbedtls_free free
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Sub-context for ecdsa_verify()
*/
struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver
{
mbedtls_mpi u1, u2; /* intermediate values */
enum { /* what to do next? */
ecdsa_ver_init = 0, /* getting started */
ecdsa_ver_muladd, /* muladd step */
} state;
};
/*
* Init verify restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_ver_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u1 );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->u2 );
ctx->state = ecdsa_ver_init;
}
/*
* Free the components of a verify restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_ver_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ver_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u1 );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->u2 );
ecdsa_restart_ver_init( ctx );
}
/*
* Sub-context for ecdsa_sign()
*/
struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig
{
int sign_tries;
int key_tries;
mbedtls_mpi k; /* per-signature random */
mbedtls_mpi r; /* r value */
enum { /* what to do next? */
ecdsa_sig_init = 0, /* getting started */
ecdsa_sig_mul, /* doing ecp_mul() */
ecdsa_sig_modn, /* mod N computations */
} state;
};
/*
* Init verify sign sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_sig_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx )
{
ctx->sign_tries = 0;
ctx->key_tries = 0;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->k );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &ctx->r );
ctx->state = ecdsa_sig_init;
}
/*
* Free the components of a sign restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_sig_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_sig_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->k );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->r );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Sub-context for ecdsa_sign_det()
*/
struct mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx; /* DRBG state */
enum { /* what to do next? */
ecdsa_det_init = 0, /* getting started */
ecdsa_det_sign, /* make signature */
} state;
};
/*
* Init verify sign_det sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_det_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &ctx->rng_ctx );
ctx->state = ecdsa_det_init;
}
/*
* Free the components of a sign_det restart sub-context
*/
static void ecdsa_restart_det_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_det_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &ctx->rng_ctx );
ecdsa_restart_det_init( ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
#define ECDSA_RS_ECP &rs_ctx->ecp
/* Utility macro for checking and updating ops budget */
#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) \
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_budget( grp, &rs_ctx->ecp, ops ) );
/* Call this when entering a function that needs its own sub-context */
#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) do { \
/* reset ops count for this call if top-level */ \
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ecp.depth++ == 0 ) \
rs_ctx->ecp.ops_done = 0; \
\
/* set up our own sub-context if needed */ \
if( mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() && \
rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \
{ \
rs_ctx->SUB = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( *rs_ctx->SUB ) ); \
if( rs_ctx->SUB == NULL ) \
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_ALLOC_FAILED ); \
\
ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_init( rs_ctx->SUB ); \
} \
} while( 0 )
/* Call this when leaving a function that needs its own sub-context */
#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) do { \
/* clear our sub-context when not in progress (done or error) */ \
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->SUB != NULL && \
ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS ) \
{ \
ecdsa_restart_## SUB ##_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \
mbedtls_free( rs_ctx->SUB ); \
rs_ctx->SUB = NULL; \
} \
\
if( rs_ctx != NULL ) \
rs_ctx->ecp.depth--; \
} while( 0 )
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#define ECDSA_RS_ECP NULL
#define ECDSA_BUDGET( ops ) /* no-op; for compatibility */
#define ECDSA_RS_ENTER( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx
#define ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( SUB ) (void) rs_ctx
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Derive a suitable integer for group grp from a buffer of length len
* SEC1 4.1.3 step 5 aka SEC1 4.1.4 step 3
@@ -70,13 +242,17 @@ cleanup:
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message (SEC1 4.1.3)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 4 (hash message)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
static int ecdsa_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries, blind_tries;
int ret, key_tries, sign_tries;
int *p_sign_tries = &sign_tries, *p_key_tries = &key_tries;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi k, e, t;
mbedtls_mpi *pk = &k, *pr = r;
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
@@ -89,26 +265,72 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &t );
sign_tries = 0;
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( sig );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_sign_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->sign_tries;
p_key_tries = &rs_ctx->sig->key_tries;
pk = &rs_ctx->sig->k;
pr = &rs_ctx->sig->r;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_mul )
goto mul;
if( rs_ctx->sig->state == ecdsa_sig_modn )
goto modn;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
*p_sign_tries = 0;
do
{
if( *p_sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Steps 1-3: generate a suitable ephemeral keypair
* and set r = xR mod n
*/
key_tries = 0;
*p_key_tries = 0;
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( grp, &k, &R, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( r, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
if( key_tries++ > 10 )
if( *p_key_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, pk, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_mul;
mul:
#endif
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable( grp, &R, pk, &grp->G,
f_rng, p_rng, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pr, &R.X, &grp->N ) );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( r, 0 ) == 0 );
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( pr, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
rs_ctx->sig->state = ecdsa_sig_modn;
modn:
#endif
/*
* Accounting for everything up to the end of the loop
* (step 6, but checking now avoids saving e and t)
*/
ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 4 );
/*
* Step 5: derive MPI from hashed message
@@ -119,57 +341,60 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
* Generate a random value to blind inv_mod in next step,
* avoiding a potential timing leak.
*/
blind_tries = 0;
do
{
size_t n_size = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &t, n_size, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_shift_r( &t, 8 * n_size - grp->nbits ) );
/* See mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair() */
if( ++blind_tries > 30 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED );
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &t, 1 ) < 0 ||
mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &t, &grp->N ) >= 0 );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_gen_privkey( grp, &t, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/*
* Step 6: compute s = (e + r * d) / k = t (e + rd) / (kt) mod n
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, r, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, pr, d ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &e, &e, s ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &e, &e, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &k, &k, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, &k, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pk, pk, &t ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( s, pk, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( s, s, &e ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( s, s, &grp->N ) );
if( sign_tries++ > 10 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_RANDOM_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
}
while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( s, 0 ) == 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->sig != NULL )
mbedtls_mpi_copy( r, pr );
#endif
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &k ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &t );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( sig );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
/*
* Compute ECDSA signature of a hashed message
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
return( ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
static int ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context rng_ctx;
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_context *p_rng = &rng_ctx;
unsigned char data[2 * MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES];
size_t grp_len = ( grp->nbits + 7 ) / 8;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
@@ -181,21 +406,58 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi
mbedtls_mpi_init( &h );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_init( &rng_ctx );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( det );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
p_rng = &rs_ctx->det->rng_ctx;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->det->state == ecdsa_det_sign )
goto sign;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/* Use private key and message hash (reduced) to initialize HMAC_DRBG */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( d, data, grp_len ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( derive_mpi( grp, &h, buf, blen ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &h, data + grp_len, grp_len ) );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( &rng_ctx, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_seed_buf( p_rng, md_info, data, 2 * grp_len );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->det != NULL )
rs_ctx->det->state = ecdsa_det_sign;
sign:
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng );
#else
ret = ecdsa_sign_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen,
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_random, p_rng, rs_ctx );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
cleanup:
mbedtls_hmac_drbg_free( &rng_ctx );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &h );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( det );
return( ret );
}
/*
* Deterministic signature wrapper
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_mpi *r, mbedtls_mpi *s,
const mbedtls_mpi *d, const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg )
{
return( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( grp, r, s, d, buf, blen, md_alg, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
@@ -203,21 +465,40 @@ cleanup:
* Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message (SEC1 4.1.4)
* Obviously, compared to SEC1 4.1.3, we skip step 2 (hash message)
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
static int ecdsa_verify_restartable( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q,
const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi e, s_inv, u1, u2;
mbedtls_ecp_point R;
mbedtls_mpi *pu1 = &u1, *pu2 = &u2;
mbedtls_ecp_point_init( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &s_inv );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &u2 );
/* Fail cleanly on curves such as Curve25519 that can't be used for ECDSA */
if( grp->N.p == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
ECDSA_RS_ENTER( ver );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL )
{
/* redirect to our context */
pu1 = &rs_ctx->ver->u1;
pu2 = &rs_ctx->ver->u2;
/* jump to current step */
if( rs_ctx->ver->state == ecdsa_ver_muladd )
goto muladd;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Step 1: make sure r and s are in range 1..n-1
*/
@@ -228,11 +509,6 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Additional precaution: make sure Q is valid
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_check_pubkey( grp, Q ) );
/*
* Step 3: derive MPI from hashed message
*/
@@ -241,21 +517,27 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
/*
* Step 4: u1 = e / s mod n, u2 = r / s mod n
*/
ECDSA_BUDGET( MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_CHK + MBEDTLS_ECP_OPS_INV + 2 );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &s_inv, s, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u1, &e, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u1, &u1, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu1, &e, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu1, pu1, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &u2, r, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &u2, &u2, &grp->N ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( pu2, r, &s_inv ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( pu2, pu2, &grp->N ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->ver != NULL )
rs_ctx->ver->state = ecdsa_ver_muladd;
muladd:
#endif
/*
* Step 5: R = u1 G + u2 Q
*
* Since we're not using any secret data, no need to pass a RNG to
* mbedtls_ecp_mul() for countermesures.
*/
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd( grp, &R, &u1, &grp->G, &u2, Q ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecp_muladd_restartable( grp,
&R, pu1, &grp->G, pu2, Q, ECDSA_RS_ECP ) );
if( mbedtls_ecp_is_zero( &R ) )
{
@@ -280,11 +562,24 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
cleanup:
mbedtls_ecp_point_free( &R );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &e ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &s_inv );
mbedtls_mpi_free( &u1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &u2 );
ECDSA_RS_LEAVE( ver );
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
/*
* Verify ECDSA signature of hashed message
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t blen,
const mbedtls_ecp_point *Q, const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s)
{
return( ecdsa_verify_restartable( grp, buf, blen, Q, r, s, NULL ) );
}
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
/*
* Convert a signature (given by context) to ASN.1
@@ -313,11 +608,13 @@ static int ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( const mbedtls_mpi *r, const mbedtls_mpi *s,
/*
* Compute and write signature
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
void *p_rng,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
@@ -329,14 +626,19 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign_det( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_det_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, md_alg, rs_ctx ) );
#else
(void) md_alg;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT)
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_sign( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng ) );
#endif
#else
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_restartable( &ctx->grp, &r, &s, &ctx->d,
hash, hlen, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx ) );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_SIGN_ALT */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_signature_to_asn1( &r, &s, sig, slen ) );
@@ -347,7 +649,20 @@ cleanup:
return( ret );
}
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
/*
* Compute and write signature
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *slen,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
ctx, md_alg, hash, hlen, sig, slen, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
@@ -365,6 +680,18 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_det( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen )
{
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
ctx, hash, hlen, sig, slen, NULL ) );
}
/*
* Restartable read and check signature
*/
int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hlen,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t slen,
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *) sig;
@@ -395,10 +722,15 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx,
ret += MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
goto cleanup;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT)
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
&ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
&ctx->Q, &r, &s ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
#else
if( ( ret = ecdsa_verify_restartable( &ctx->grp, hash, hlen,
&ctx->Q, &r, &s, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
goto cleanup;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT */
/* At this point we know that the buffer starts with a valid signature.
* Return 0 if the buffer just contains the signature, and a specific
@@ -423,7 +755,7 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_genkey( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_ecp_group_id gid,
return( mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ctx->grp, gid ) ||
mbedtls_ecp_gen_keypair( &ctx->grp, &ctx->d, &ctx->Q, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_ECDSA_GENKEY_ALT */
/*
* Set context from an mbedtls_ecp_keypair
@@ -458,4 +790,42 @@ void mbedtls_ecdsa_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_context *ctx )
mbedtls_ecp_keypair_free( ctx );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ecp_restart_init( &ctx->ecp );
ctx->ver = NULL;
ctx->sig = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
ctx->det = NULL;
#endif
}
/*
* Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ecp_restart_free( &ctx->ecp );
ecdsa_restart_ver_free( ctx->ver );
mbedtls_free( ctx->ver );
ctx->ver = NULL;
ecdsa_restart_sig_free( ctx->sig );
mbedtls_free( ctx->sig );
ctx->sig = NULL;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
ecdsa_restart_det_free( ctx->det );
mbedtls_free( ctx->det );
ctx->det = NULL;
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */

1057
library/ecp.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

15
library/error.c
View File

@@ -165,6 +165,10 @@
#include "mbedtls/pkcs5.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
#include "mbedtls/poly1305.h"
#endif
@@ -289,6 +293,8 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The buffer contains a valid signature followed by more data" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - The ECP hardware accelerator failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "ECP - Operation in progress, call again with the same parameters to continue" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
@@ -517,6 +523,8 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - The asynchronous operation is not completed yet" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "SSL - A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_USE_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CREATE_C)
@@ -823,6 +831,13 @@ void mbedtls_strerror( int ret, char *buf, size_t buflen )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PADLOCK - Input data should be aligned" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PADLOCK_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_HW_ACCEL_FAILED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PLATFORM - Hardware accelerator failed" );
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "PLATFORM - The requested feature is not supported by the platform" );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_POLY1305_C)
if( use_ret == -(MBEDTLS_ERR_POLY1305_BAD_INPUT_DATA) )
mbedtls_snprintf( buf, buflen, "POLY1305 - Invalid input parameter(s)" );

5
library/gcm.c
View File

@@ -48,9 +48,8 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) && defined(MBEDTLS_AES_C)
#include "mbedtls/aes.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include <stdio.h>
#define mbedtls_printf printf
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C */
@@ -764,7 +763,7 @@ int mbedtls_gcm_self_test( int verbose )
* there is an alternative underlying implementation i.e. when
* MBEDTLS_AES_ALT is defined.
*/
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_AES_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE && key_len == 192 )
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PLATFORM_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED && key_len == 192 )
{
mbedtls_printf( "skipped\n" );
break;

161
library/pk.c
View File

@@ -69,6 +69,34 @@ void mbedtls_pk_free( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx )
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( mbedtls_pk_context ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_pk_restart_init( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
ctx->pk_info = NULL;
ctx->rs_ctx = NULL;
}
/*
* Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_pk_restart_free( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func == NULL )
{
return;
}
ctx->pk_info->rs_free_func( ctx->rs_ctx );
ctx->pk_info = NULL;
ctx->rs_ctx = NULL;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Get pk_info structure from type
*/
@@ -171,6 +199,73 @@ static inline int pk_hashlen_helper( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, size_t *hash_len
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Helper to set up a restart context if needed
*/
static int pk_restart_setup( mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *ctx,
const mbedtls_pk_info_t *info )
{
/* Don't do anything if already set up or invalid */
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info != NULL )
return( 0 );
/* Should never happen when we're called */
if( info->rs_alloc_func == NULL || info->rs_free_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ( ctx->rs_ctx = info->rs_alloc_func() ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_ALLOC_FAILED );
ctx->pk_info = info;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
/*
* Verify a signature (restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */
if( rs_ctx != NULL &&
mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() &&
ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func != NULL )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = ctx->pk_info->verify_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx,
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, rs_ctx->rs_ctx );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx );
return( ret );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
(void) rs_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len ) );
}
/*
* Verify a signature
*/
@@ -178,15 +273,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ctx->pk_info->verify_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->verify_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len ) );
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, NULL ) );
}
/*
@@ -247,6 +335,50 @@ int mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( mbedtls_pk_type_t type, const void *options,
return( mbedtls_pk_verify( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len ) );
}
/*
* Make a signature (restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
mbedtls_pk_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* optimization: use non-restartable version if restart disabled */
if( rs_ctx != NULL &&
mbedtls_ecp_restart_is_enabled() &&
ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func != NULL )
{
int ret;
if( ( ret = pk_restart_setup( rs_ctx, ctx->pk_info ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
ret = ctx->pk_info->sign_rs_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, rs_ctx->rs_ctx );
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
mbedtls_pk_restart_free( rs_ctx );
return( ret );
}
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
(void) rs_ctx;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
/*
* Make a signature
*/
@@ -255,15 +387,8 @@ int mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_pk_context *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng )
{
if( ctx == NULL || ctx->pk_info == NULL ||
pk_hashlen_helper( md_alg, &hash_len ) != 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
if( ctx->pk_info->sign_func == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
return( ctx->pk_info->sign_func( ctx->pk_ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
return( mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( ctx, md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng, NULL ) );
}
/*

202
library/pk_wrap.c
View File

@@ -190,11 +190,19 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_info = {
rsa_can_do,
rsa_verify_wrap,
rsa_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
rsa_decrypt_wrap,
rsa_encrypt_wrap,
rsa_check_pair_wrap,
rsa_alloc_wrap,
rsa_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
rsa_debug,
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
@@ -262,6 +270,110 @@ static int eckey_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* Forward declarations */
static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
void *rs_ctx );
static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
void *rs_ctx );
/*
* Restart context for ECDSA operations with ECKEY context
*
* We need to store an actual ECDSA context, as we need to pass the same to
* the underlying ecdsa function, so we can't create it on the fly every time.
*/
typedef struct
{
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ecdsa_rs;
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_ctx;
} eckey_restart_ctx;
static void *eckey_rs_alloc( void )
{
eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( eckey_restart_ctx ) );
if( ctx != NULL )
{
rs_ctx = ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs );
mbedtls_ecdsa_init( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx );
}
return( ctx );
}
static void eckey_rs_free( void *ctx )
{
eckey_restart_ctx *rs_ctx;
if( ctx == NULL)
return;
rs_ctx = ctx;
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_rs );
mbedtls_ecdsa_free( &rs_ctx->ecdsa_ctx );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
static int eckey_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
void *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
/* Should never happen */
if( rs == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx,
md_alg, hash, hash_len,
sig, sig_len, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
static int eckey_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
void *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
eckey_restart_ctx *rs = rs_ctx;
/* Should never happen */
if( rs == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/* set up our own sub-context if needed (that is, on first run) */
if( rs->ecdsa_ctx.grp.pbits == 0 )
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_ecdsa_from_keypair( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, ctx ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( &rs->ecdsa_ctx, md_alg,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
f_rng, p_rng, &rs->ecdsa_rs ) );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
static int eckey_check_pair( const void *pub, const void *prv )
@@ -301,15 +413,23 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckey_info = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
eckey_verify_wrap,
eckey_sign_wrap,
#else
NULL,
NULL,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
eckey_verify_rs_wrap,
eckey_sign_rs_wrap,
#endif
#else /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
NULL,
NULL,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair,
eckey_alloc_wrap,
eckey_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
eckey_rs_alloc,
eckey_rs_free,
#endif
eckey_debug,
};
@@ -329,11 +449,19 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_eckeydh_info = {
eckeydh_can_do,
NULL,
NULL,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair,
eckey_alloc_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
eckey_free_wrap, /* Same underlying key structure */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
eckey_debug, /* Same underlying key structure */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
@@ -369,6 +497,40 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
static int ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
const unsigned char *sig, size_t sig_len,
void *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
((void) md_alg);
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_read_signature_restartable(
(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len,
(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_SIG_LEN_MISMATCH );
return( ret );
}
static int ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap( void *ctx, mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash, size_t hash_len,
unsigned char *sig, size_t *sig_len,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
void *rs_ctx )
{
return( mbedtls_ecdsa_write_signature_restartable(
(mbedtls_ecdsa_context *) ctx,
md_alg, hash, hash_len, sig, sig_len, f_rng, p_rng,
(mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx *) rs_ctx ) );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
static void *ecdsa_alloc_wrap( void )
{
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_context ) );
@@ -385,6 +547,24 @@ static void ecdsa_free_wrap( void *ctx )
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
static void *ecdsa_rs_alloc( void )
{
void *ctx = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_ctx ) );
if( ctx != NULL )
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_init( ctx );
return( ctx );
}
static void ecdsa_rs_free( void *ctx )
{
mbedtls_ecdsa_restart_free( ctx );
mbedtls_free( ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA,
"ECDSA",
@@ -392,11 +572,19 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_ecdsa_info = {
ecdsa_can_do,
ecdsa_verify_wrap,
ecdsa_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ecdsa_verify_rs_wrap,
ecdsa_sign_rs_wrap,
#endif
NULL,
NULL,
eckey_check_pair, /* Compatible key structures */
ecdsa_alloc_wrap,
ecdsa_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
ecdsa_rs_alloc,
ecdsa_rs_free,
#endif
eckey_debug, /* Compatible key structures */
};
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */
@@ -506,6 +694,10 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
rsa_alt_can_do,
NULL,
rsa_alt_sign_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
rsa_alt_decrypt_wrap,
NULL,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
@@ -515,6 +707,10 @@ const mbedtls_pk_info_t mbedtls_rsa_alt_info = {
#endif
rsa_alt_alloc_wrap,
rsa_alt_free_wrap,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
NULL,
NULL,
#endif
NULL,
};

36
library/pkparse.c
View File

@@ -1295,6 +1295,7 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
return( 0 );
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_PASSWORD_MISMATCH )
{
@@ -1306,39 +1307,42 @@ int mbedtls_pk_parse_key( mbedtls_pk_context *pk,
return( 0 );
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_RSA );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ),
key, keylen ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
}
else
if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 &&
pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_pk_rsa( *pk ), key, keylen ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
mbedtls_pk_init( pk );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
pk_info = mbedtls_pk_info_from_type( MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) ) != 0 ||
( ret = pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ),
key, keylen ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
}
else
if( mbedtls_pk_setup( pk, pk_info ) == 0 &&
pk_parse_key_sec1_der( mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk ),
key, keylen ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
mbedtls_pk_free( pk );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
/* If MBEDTLS_RSA_C is defined but MBEDTLS_ECP_C isn't,
* it is ok to leave the PK context initialized but not
* freed: It is the caller's responsibility to call pk_init()
* before calling this function, and to call pk_free()
* when it fails. If MBEDTLS_ECP_C is defined but MBEDTLS_RSA_C
* isn't, this leads to mbedtls_pk_free() being called
* twice, once here and once by the caller, but this is
* also ok and in line with the mbedtls_pk_free() calls
* on failed PEM parsing attempts. */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
}

13
library/platform.c
View File

@@ -30,7 +30,14 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY)
/* The compile time configuration of memory allocation via the macros
* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO takes precedence over the runtime
* configuration via mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free(). So, omit everything
* related to the latter if MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_{FREE/CALLOC}_MACRO are defined. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY) && \
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) )
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_STD_CALLOC)
static void *platform_calloc_uninit( size_t n, size_t size )
{
@@ -71,7 +78,9 @@ int mbedtls_platform_set_calloc_free( void * (*calloc_func)( size_t, size_t ),
mbedtls_free_func = free_func;
return( 0 );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_MEMORY &&
!( defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_CALLOC_MACRO) &&
defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_FREE_MACRO) ) */
#if defined(_WIN32)
#include <stdarg.h>

68
library/platform_util.c
View File

@@ -20,6 +20,14 @@
* This file is part of Mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
/*
* Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before
* config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms.
*/
#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE)
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
@@ -27,6 +35,7 @@
#endif
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -65,3 +74,62 @@ void mbedtls_platform_zeroize( void *buf, size_t len )
memset_func( buf, 0, len );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_ZEROIZE_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT)
#include <time.h>
#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \
defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \
defined(__MACH__)))
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ ||
* (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */
#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) )
/*
* This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long
* preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in
* platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and
* threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so
* we keep it private by only defining it in this file
*/
#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) )
#define PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME
#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */
#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) ) */
struct tm *mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( const mbedtls_time_t *tt,
struct tm *tm_buf )
{
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
return( ( gmtime_s( tm_buf, tt ) == 0 ) ? tm_buf : NULL );
#elif !defined(PLATFORM_UTIL_USE_GMTIME)
return( gmtime_r( tt, tm_buf ) );
#else
struct tm *lt;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 )
return( NULL );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
lt = gmtime( tt );
if( lt != NULL )
{
memcpy( tm_buf, lt, sizeof( struct tm ) );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C)
if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex ) != 0 )
return( NULL );
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */
return( ( lt == NULL ) ? NULL : tm_buf );
#endif /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */

35
library/rsa.c
View File

@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
{
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi H, G, L;
int prime_quality = 0;
if( f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
@@ -509,6 +510,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
if( nbits % 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* If the modulus is 1024 bit long or shorter, then the security strength of
* the RSA algorithm is less than or equal to 80 bits and therefore an error
* rate of 2^-80 is sufficient.
*/
if( nbits > 1024 )
prime_quality = MBEDTLS_MPI_GEN_PRIME_FLAG_LOW_ERR;
mbedtls_mpi_init( &H );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &G );
mbedtls_mpi_init( &L );
@@ -523,11 +532,11 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1, 0,
f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P, nbits >> 1,
prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1, 0,
f_rng, p_rng ) );
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q, nbits >> 1,
prime_quality, f_rng, p_rng ) );
/* make sure the difference between p and q is not too small (FIPS 186-4 §B.3.3 step 5.4) */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &H, &ctx->P, &ctx->Q ) );
@@ -1527,7 +1536,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
size_t olen;
unsigned char *p = sig;
unsigned char salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0;
size_t slen, min_slen, hlen, offset = 0;
int ret;
size_t msb;
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
@@ -1556,10 +1565,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info );
slen = hlen;
if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 )
/* Calculate the largest possible salt length. Normally this is the hash
* length, which is the maximum length the salt can have. If there is not
* enough room, use the maximum salt length that fits. The constraint is
* that the hash length plus the salt length plus 2 bytes must be at most
* the key length. This complies with FIPS 186-4 §5.5 (e) and RFC 8017
* (PKCS#1 v2.2) §9.1.1 step 3. */
min_slen = hlen - 2;
if( olen < hlen + min_slen + 2 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
else if( olen >= hlen + hlen + 2 )
slen = hlen;
else
slen = olen - hlen - 2;
memset( sig, 0, olen );
@@ -1569,7 +1588,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx,
/* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */
msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1;
p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
p += olen - hlen - slen - 2;
*p++ = 0x01;
memcpy( p, salt, slen );
p += slen;

9
library/rsa_internal.c
View File

@@ -351,15 +351,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( const mbedtls_mpi *N, const mbedtls_mpi *P,
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME)
/*
* When generating keys, the strongest security we support aims for an error
* rate of at most 2^-100 and we are aiming for the same certainty here as
* well.
*/
if( f_rng != NULL && P != NULL &&
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( P, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( P, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
goto cleanup;
}
if( f_rng != NULL && Q != NULL &&
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime( Q, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
( ret = mbedtls_mpi_is_prime_ext( Q, 50, f_rng, p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED;
goto cleanup;

113
library/ssl_cli.c
View File

@@ -1763,6 +1763,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
}
#endif
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
&& comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE
@@ -2068,6 +2076,10 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
(const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
@@ -2097,7 +2109,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
*
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
*/
if( (*p) > end - 2 )
if( end - (*p) < 2 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
@@ -2106,7 +2118,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
*p += 2;
if( (*p) > end - len )
if( end - (*p) < (int) len )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message "
"(psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
@@ -2349,6 +2361,14 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing )
{
goto start_processing;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
@@ -2386,6 +2406,12 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing;
start_processing:
#endif
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
@@ -2478,6 +2504,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
size_t params_len = p - params;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
/*
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
@@ -2600,12 +2627,25 @@ static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len ) ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable(
&ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk,
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
}
@@ -2903,6 +2943,16 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
*/
i = 4;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
{
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret )
goto ecdh_calc_secret;
mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx );
}
#endif
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&n,
&ssl->out_msg[i], 1000,
@@ -2910,11 +2960,26 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
{
ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = n;
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
}
ecdh_calc_secret:
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
n = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
ssl->handshake->premaster,
@@ -2922,6 +2987,10 @@ static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}
@@ -3140,9 +3209,18 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
unsigned int hashlen;
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign )
{
goto sign;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
@@ -3174,8 +3252,15 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
/*
* Make an RSA signature of the handshake digests
* Make a signature of the handshake digests
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
sign:
#endif
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
@@ -3252,11 +3337,21 @@ static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
}
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n,
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
#endif
return( ret );
}

2
library/ssl_ticket.c
View File

@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static int ssl_ticket_update_keys( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx )
uint32_t current_time = (uint32_t) mbedtls_time( NULL );
uint32_t key_time = ctx->keys[ctx->active].generation_time;
if( current_time > key_time &&
if( current_time >= key_time &&
current_time - key_time < ctx->ticket_lifetime )
{
return( 0 );

199
library/ssl_tls.c
View File

@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static int ssl_get_remaining_payload_in_datagram( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl
{
int ret;
size_t remaining, expansion;
size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN;
size_t max_len = MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
const size_t mfl = mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( ssl );
@@ -212,7 +212,10 @@ static int ssl_double_retransmit_timeout( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
* delivered) of any compliant IPv4 (and IPv6) network, and should work
* on most non-IP stacks too. */
if( ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout != ssl->conf->hs_timeout_min )
{
ssl->handshake->mtu = 508;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "mtu autoreduction to %d bytes", ssl->handshake->mtu ) );
}
new_timeout = 2 * ssl->handshake->retransmit_timeout;
@@ -2304,13 +2307,13 @@ static int ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
correct = 0;
}
auth_done++;
/*
* Finally check the correct flag
*/
if( correct == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
}
/*
* Finally check the correct flag
*/
if( correct == 0 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC );
#endif /* SSL_SOME_MODES_USE_MAC */
/* Make extra sure authentication was performed, exactly once */
@@ -5429,60 +5432,16 @@ write_msg:
return( ret );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* Once the certificate message is read, parse it into a cert chain and
* perform basic checks, but leave actual verification to the caller
*/
static int ssl_parse_certificate_chain( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
int ret;
size_t i, n;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
uint8_t alert;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET )
authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode;
#endif
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
/* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We
let it decide whether to alert. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
ssl->state++;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3)
/*
@@ -5502,10 +5461,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
one. The client should know what's going on, so we
don't send an alert. */
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
return( 0 );
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 */
@@ -5526,10 +5482,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
one. The client should know what's going on, so we
don't send an alert. */
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_MISSING;
if( authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
return( 0 );
else
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE );
}
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
@@ -5679,6 +5632,94 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
return( 0 );
}
int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
int ret;
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * const ciphersuite_info =
ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
const int authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET
? ssl->handshake->sni_authmode
: ssl->conf->authmode;
#else
const int authmode = ssl->conf->authmode;
#endif
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate" ) );
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER &&
authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result = MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_SKIP_VERIFY;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate" ) );
ssl->state++;
return( 0 );
}
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_verify )
{
goto crt_verify;
}
#endif
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
{
/* mbedtls_ssl_read_record may have sent an alert already. We
let it decide whether to alert. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
return( ret );
}
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_certificate_chain( ssl ) ) != 0 )
{
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE &&
authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL )
{
ret = 0;
}
#endif
ssl->state++;
return( ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled)
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_verify;
crt_verify:
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled)
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx;
#endif
if( authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain;
@@ -5700,19 +5741,24 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
/*
* Main check: verify certificate
*/
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile(
ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable(
ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert,
ca_chain, ca_crl,
ssl->conf->cert_profile,
ssl->hostname,
&ssl->session_negotiate->verify_result,
ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy );
ssl->conf->f_vrfy, ssl->conf->p_vrfy, rs_ctx );
if( ret != 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "x509_verify_cert", ret );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
#endif
/*
* Secondary checks: always done, but change 'ret' only if it was 0
*/
@@ -5765,6 +5811,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
if( ret != 0 )
{
uint8_t alert;
/* The certificate may have been rejected for several reasons.
Pick one and send the corresponding alert. Which alert to send
may be a subject of debate in some cases. */
@@ -5807,6 +5855,8 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
}
ssl->state++;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate" ) );
return( ret );
@@ -6584,6 +6634,10 @@ static void ssl_handshake_params_init( mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake )
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( &handshake->ecrs_ctx );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
handshake->sni_authmode = MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET;
#endif
@@ -7905,6 +7959,12 @@ size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_max_frag_len( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
static size_t ssl_get_current_mtu( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
{
/* Return unlimited mtu for client hello messages to avoid fragmentation. */
if( ssl->conf->endpoint == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT &&
( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO ||
ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO ) )
return ( 0 );
if( ssl->handshake == NULL || ssl->handshake->mtu == 0 )
return( ssl->mtu );
@@ -8741,6 +8801,7 @@ static void ssl_buffering_free_slot( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( hs_buf->is_valid == 1 )
{
hs->buffering.total_bytes_buffered -= hs_buf->data_len;
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hs_buf->data, hs_buf->data_len );
mbedtls_free( hs_buf->data );
memset( hs_buf, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_hs_buffer ) );
}
@@ -8825,6 +8886,10 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_free( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL__ECP_RESTARTABLE)
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( &handshake->ecrs_ctx );
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
mbedtls_free( handshake->verify_cookie );
ssl_flight_free( handshake->flight );

47
library/threading.c
View File

@@ -19,6 +19,14 @@
* This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org)
*/
/*
* Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be defined before
* config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms.
*/
#if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE)
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
@@ -29,6 +37,36 @@
#include "mbedtls/threading.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT)
#if !defined(_WIN32) && (defined(unix) || \
defined(__unix) || defined(__unix__) || (defined(__APPLE__) && \
defined(__MACH__)))
#include <unistd.h>
#endif /* !_WIN32 && (unix || __unix || __unix__ ||
* (__APPLE__ && __MACH__)) */
#if !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) )
/*
* This is a convenience shorthand macro to avoid checking the long
* preprocessor conditions above. Ideally, we could expose this macro in
* platform_util.h and simply use it in platform_util.c, threading.c and
* threading.h. However, this macro is not part of the Mbed TLS public API, so
* we keep it private by only defining it in this file
*/
#if ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) )
#define THREADING_USE_GMTIME
#endif /* ! ( defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32) ) */
#endif /* !( ( defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION >= 200809L ) || \
( defined(_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS ) && \
_POSIX_THREAD_SAFE_FUNCTIONS >= 20112L ) ) */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE && !MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_GMTIME_R_ALT */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_PTHREAD)
static void threading_mutex_init_pthread( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *mutex )
{
@@ -114,6 +152,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_set_alt( void (*mutex_init)( mbedtls_threading_mutex_t *
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex );
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME)
mbedtls_mutex_init( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex );
#endif
}
/*
@@ -124,6 +165,9 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex );
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME)
mbedtls_mutex_free( &mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex );
#endif
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_ALT */
@@ -136,5 +180,8 @@ void mbedtls_threading_free_alt( void )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_FS_IO)
mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_readdir_mutex MUTEX_INIT;
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_USE_GMTIME)
mbedtls_threading_mutex_t mbedtls_threading_gmtime_mutex MUTEX_INIT;
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_THREADING_C */

12
library/timing.c
View File

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include <windows.h>
#include <winbase.h>
#include <process.h>
struct _hr_time
{
@@ -267,18 +268,17 @@ unsigned long mbedtls_timing_get_timer( struct mbedtls_timing_hr_time *val, int
/* It's OK to use a global because alarm() is supposed to be global anyway */
static DWORD alarmMs;
static DWORD WINAPI TimerProc( LPVOID TimerContext )
static void TimerProc( void *TimerContext )
{
((void) TimerContext);
(void) TimerContext;
Sleep( alarmMs );
mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 1;
return( TRUE );
/* _endthread will be called implicitly on return
* That ensures execution of thread funcition's epilogue */
}
void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
{
DWORD ThreadId;
if( seconds == 0 )
{
/* No need to create a thread for this simple case.
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ void mbedtls_set_alarm( int seconds )
mbedtls_timing_alarmed = 0;
alarmMs = seconds * 1000;
CloseHandle( CreateThread( NULL, 0, TimerProc, NULL, 0, &ThreadId ) );
(void) _beginthread( TimerProc, 0, NULL );
}
#else /* _WIN32 && !EFIX64 && !EFI32 */

3
library/version_features.c
View File

@@ -339,6 +339,9 @@ static const char *features[] = {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_NIST_OPTIM */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
"MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC)
"MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC",
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC */

11
library/x509.c
View File

@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@
* http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/languages/X.690-0207.pdf
*/
/* Ensure gmtime_r is available even with -std=c99; must be included before
* config.h, which pulls in glibc's features.h. Harmless on other platforms. */
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE)
#include "mbedtls/config.h"
#else
@@ -67,6 +63,7 @@
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME_DATE)
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <time.h>
#endif
@@ -901,11 +898,7 @@ static int x509_get_current_time( mbedtls_x509_time *now )
int ret = 0;
tt = mbedtls_time( NULL );
#if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(EFIX64) && !defined(EFI32)
lt = gmtime_s( &tm_buf, &tt ) == 0 ? &tm_buf : NULL;
#else
lt = gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf );
#endif
lt = mbedtls_platform_gmtime_r( &tt, &tm_buf );
if( lt == NULL )
ret = -1;

169
library/x509_create.c
View File

@@ -33,48 +33,84 @@
#include <string.h>
/* Structure linking OIDs for X.509 DN AttributeTypes to their
* string representations and default string encodings used by Mbed TLS. */
typedef struct {
const char *name;
size_t name_len;
const char*oid;
const char *name; /* String representation of AttributeType, e.g.
* "CN" or "emailAddress". */
size_t name_len; /* Length of 'name', without trailing 0 byte. */
const char *oid; /* String representation of OID of AttributeType,
* as per RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */
int default_tag; /* The default character encoding used for the
* given attribute type, e.g.
* MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING for UTF-8. */
} x509_attr_descriptor_t;
#define ADD_STRLEN( s ) s, sizeof( s ) - 1
/* X.509 DN attributes from RFC 5280, Appendix A.1. */
static const x509_attr_descriptor_t x509_attrs[] =
{
{ ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "C" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "O" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "L" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "R" ), MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ), MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "title" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ), MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ), MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ), MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT },
{ NULL, 0, NULL }
{ ADD_STRLEN( "CN" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "commonName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_CN, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "C" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "countryName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_COUNTRY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "O" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORGANIZATION, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "L" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "locality" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_LOCALITY, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "R" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "OU" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "organizationalUnitName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_ORG_UNIT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "ST" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "stateOrProvinceName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_STATE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "emailAddress" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "serialNumber" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SERIAL_NUMBER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalAddress" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_ADDRESS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "postalCode" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_POSTAL_CODE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "dnQualifier" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_DN_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "title" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_TITLE, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "surName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "SN" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_SUR_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "givenName" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "GN" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GIVEN_NAME, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "initials" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_INITIALS, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "pseudonym" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_PSEUDONYM, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "generationQualifier" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_AT_GENERATION_QUALIFIER, MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "domainComponent" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ ADD_STRLEN( "DC" ),
MBEDTLS_OID_DOMAIN_COMPONENT, MBEDTLS_ASN1_IA5_STRING },
{ NULL, 0, NULL, MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL }
};
static const char *x509_at_oid_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len )
static const x509_attr_descriptor_t *x509_attr_descr_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len )
{
const x509_attr_descriptor_t *cur;
@@ -83,7 +119,10 @@ static const char *x509_at_oid_from_name( const char *name, size_t name_len )
strncmp( cur->name, name, name_len ) == 0 )
break;
return( cur->oid );
if ( cur->name == NULL )
return( NULL );
return( cur );
}
int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *name )
@@ -92,6 +131,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na
const char *s = name, *c = s;
const char *end = s + strlen( s );
const char *oid = NULL;
const x509_attr_descriptor_t* attr_descr = NULL;
int in_tag = 1;
char data[MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_DN_NAME_SIZE];
char *d = data;
@@ -103,12 +143,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na
{
if( in_tag && *c == '=' )
{
if( ( oid = x509_at_oid_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL )
if( ( attr_descr = x509_attr_descr_from_name( s, c - s ) ) == NULL )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_UNKNOWN_OID;
goto exit;
}
oid = attr_descr->oid;
s = c + 1;
in_tag = 0;
d = data;
@@ -127,13 +168,19 @@ int mbedtls_x509_string_to_names( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *na
}
else if( !in_tag && ( *c == ',' || c == end ) )
{
if( mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ),
(unsigned char *) data,
d - data ) == NULL )
mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur =
mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data( head, oid, strlen( oid ),
(unsigned char *) data,
d - data );
if(cur == NULL )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED );
}
// set tagType
cur->val.tag = attr_descr->default_tag;
while( c < end && *(c + 1) == ' ' )
c++;
@@ -192,46 +239,40 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension( mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid,
*
* AttributeValue ::= ANY DEFINED BY AttributeType
*/
static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
const char *oid, size_t oid_len,
const unsigned char *name, size_t name_len )
static int x509_write_name( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start, mbedtls_asn1_named_data* cur_name)
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
const char *oid = (const char*)cur_name->oid.p;
size_t oid_len = cur_name->oid.len;
const unsigned char *name = cur_name->val.p;
size_t name_len = cur_name->val.len;
// Write PrintableString for all except MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL
//
if( MBEDTLS_OID_SIZE( MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL ) == oid_len &&
memcmp( oid, MBEDTLS_OID_PKCS9_EMAIL, oid_len ) == 0 )
{
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_ia5_string( p, start,
(const char *) name,
name_len ) );
}
else
{
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_printable_string( p, start,
(const char *) name,
name_len ) );
}
// Write correct string tag and value
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tagged_string( p, start,
cur_name->val.tag,
(const char *) name,
name_len ) );
// Write OID
//
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid, oid_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_oid( p, start, oid,
oid_len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_len( p, start, len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, mbedtls_asn1_write_tag( p, start,
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED |
MBEDTLS_ASN1_SET ) );
return( (int) len );
}
int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first )
mbedtls_asn1_named_data *first )
{
int ret;
size_t len = 0;
@@ -239,9 +280,7 @@ int mbedtls_x509_write_names( unsigned char **p, unsigned char *start,
while( cur != NULL )
{
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, (char *) cur->oid.p,
cur->oid.len,
cur->val.p, cur->val.len ) );
MBEDTLS_ASN1_CHK_ADD( len, x509_write_name( p, start, cur ) );
cur = cur->next;
}

689
library/x509_crt.c
View File

@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@
#include "mbedtls/oid.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C)
@@ -53,6 +52,7 @@
#if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C)
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#else
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#define mbedtls_free free
#define mbedtls_calloc calloc
@@ -227,6 +227,153 @@ static int x509_profile_check_key( const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
*/
static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len )
{
size_t i;
unsigned char diff;
const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
{
diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];
if( diff == 0 )
continue;
if( diff == 32 &&
( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) ||
( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) )
{
continue;
}
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
*/
static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name )
{
size_t i;
size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn );
/* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' )
return( -1 );
for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i )
{
if( cn[i] == '.' )
{
cn_idx = i;
break;
}
}
if( cn_idx == 0 )
return( -1 );
if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
* variations (but not all).
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b )
{
if( a->tag == b->tag &&
a->len == b->len &&
memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
a->len == b->len &&
x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
*
* See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
* we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
* but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
* or space folding.)
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b )
{
/* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
while( a != NULL || b != NULL )
{
if( a == NULL || b == NULL )
return( -1 );
/* type */
if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 )
{
return( -1 );
}
/* value */
if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
/* structure of the list of sets */
if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged )
return( -1 );
a = a->next;
b = b->next;
}
/* a == NULL == b */
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Reset (init or clear) a verify_chain
*/
static void x509_crt_verify_chain_reset(
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain )
{
size_t i;
for( i = 0; i < MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE; i++ )
{
ver_chain->items[i].crt = NULL;
ver_chain->items[i].flags = -1;
}
ver_chain->len = 0;
}
/*
* Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
*/
@@ -1667,9 +1814,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
while( crl_list != NULL )
{
if( crl_list->version == 0 ||
crl_list->issuer_raw.len != ca->subject_raw.len ||
memcmp( crl_list->issuer_raw.p, ca->subject_raw.p,
crl_list->issuer_raw.len ) != 0 )
x509_name_cmp( &crl_list->issuer, &ca->subject ) != 0 )
{
crl_list = crl_list->next;
continue;
@@ -1679,7 +1824,8 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
* Check if the CA is configured to sign CRLs
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CHECK_KEY_USAGE)
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca, MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 )
if( mbedtls_x509_crt_check_key_usage( ca,
MBEDTLS_X509_KU_CRL_SIGN ) != 0 )
{
flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_NOT_TRUSTED;
break;
@@ -1739,141 +1885,12 @@ static int x509_crt_verifycrl( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt, mbedtls_x509_crt *ca,
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRL_PARSE_C */
/*
* Like memcmp, but case-insensitive and always returns -1 if different
*/
static int x509_memcasecmp( const void *s1, const void *s2, size_t len )
{
size_t i;
unsigned char diff;
const unsigned char *n1 = s1, *n2 = s2;
for( i = 0; i < len; i++ )
{
diff = n1[i] ^ n2[i];
if( diff == 0 )
continue;
if( diff == 32 &&
( ( n1[i] >= 'a' && n1[i] <= 'z' ) ||
( n1[i] >= 'A' && n1[i] <= 'Z' ) ) )
{
continue;
}
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Return 0 if name matches wildcard, -1 otherwise
*/
static int x509_check_wildcard( const char *cn, const mbedtls_x509_buf *name )
{
size_t i;
size_t cn_idx = 0, cn_len = strlen( cn );
/* We can't have a match if there is no wildcard to match */
if( name->len < 3 || name->p[0] != '*' || name->p[1] != '.' )
return( -1 );
for( i = 0; i < cn_len; ++i )
{
if( cn[i] == '.' )
{
cn_idx = i;
break;
}
}
if( cn_idx == 0 )
return( -1 );
if( cn_len - cn_idx == name->len - 1 &&
x509_memcasecmp( name->p + 1, cn + cn_idx, name->len - 1 ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 strings, case-insensitive, and allowing for some encoding
* variations (but not all).
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_string_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_buf *a, const mbedtls_x509_buf *b )
{
if( a->tag == b->tag &&
a->len == b->len &&
memcmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
if( ( a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || a->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
( b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_UTF8_STRING || b->tag == MBEDTLS_ASN1_PRINTABLE_STRING ) &&
a->len == b->len &&
x509_memcasecmp( a->p, b->p, b->len ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
return( -1 );
}
/*
* Compare two X.509 Names (aka rdnSequence).
*
* See RFC 5280 section 7.1, though we don't implement the whole algorithm:
* we sometimes return unequal when the full algorithm would return equal,
* but never the other way. (In particular, we don't do Unicode normalisation
* or space folding.)
*
* Return 0 if equal, -1 otherwise.
*/
static int x509_name_cmp( const mbedtls_x509_name *a, const mbedtls_x509_name *b )
{
/* Avoid recursion, it might not be optimised by the compiler */
while( a != NULL || b != NULL )
{
if( a == NULL || b == NULL )
return( -1 );
/* type */
if( a->oid.tag != b->oid.tag ||
a->oid.len != b->oid.len ||
memcmp( a->oid.p, b->oid.p, b->oid.len ) != 0 )
{
return( -1 );
}
/* value */
if( x509_string_cmp( &a->val, &b->val ) != 0 )
return( -1 );
/* structure of the list of sets */
if( a->next_merged != b->next_merged )
return( -1 );
a = a->next;
b = b->next;
}
/* a == NULL == b */
return( 0 );
}
/*
* Check the signature of a certificate by its parent
*/
static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent )
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info;
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
@@ -1885,14 +1902,24 @@ static int x509_crt_check_signature( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
return( -1 );
}
if( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) != 0 )
{
/* Skip expensive computation on obvious mismatch */
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &parent->pk, child->sig_pk ) )
return( -1 );
}
return( 0 );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && child->sig_pk == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA )
{
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len, &rs_ctx->pk ) );
}
#else
(void) rs_ctx;
#endif
return( mbedtls_pk_verify_ext( child->sig_pk, child->sig_opts, &parent->pk,
child->sig_md, hash, mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ),
child->sig.p, child->sig.len ) );
}
/*
@@ -1939,6 +1966,7 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
* 1. subject name matches child's issuer
* 2. if necessary, the CA bit is set and key usage allows signing certs
* 3. for trusted roots, the signature is correct
* (for intermediates, the signature is checked and the result reported)
* 4. pathlen constraints are satisfied
*
* If there's a suitable candidate which is also time-valid, return the first
@@ -1961,23 +1989,54 @@ static int x509_crt_check_parent( const mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
* Arguments:
* - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent
* - [in] candidates: chained list of potential parents
* - [out] r_parent: parent found (or NULL)
* - [out] r_signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
* - [in] top: 1 if candidates consists of trusted roots, ie we're at the top
* of the chain, 0 otherwise
* - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
* - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
* (will never be greater than path_cnt)
* - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
*
* Return value:
* - the first suitable parent found (see above regarding time-validity)
* - NULL if no suitable parent was found
* - 0 on success
* - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
*/
static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
int top,
size_t path_cnt,
size_t self_cnt )
static int x509_crt_find_parent_in(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *candidates,
mbedtls_x509_crt **r_parent,
int *r_signature_is_good,
int top,
unsigned path_cnt,
unsigned self_cnt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *badtime_parent = NULL;
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent, *fallback_parent;
int signature_is_good, fallback_signature_is_good;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* did we have something in progress? */
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent != NULL )
{
/* restore saved state */
parent = rs_ctx->parent;
fallback_parent = rs_ctx->fallback_parent;
fallback_signature_is_good = rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good;
/* clear saved state */
rs_ctx->parent = NULL;
rs_ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
/* resume where we left */
goto check_signature;
}
#endif
fallback_parent = NULL;
fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
for( parent = candidates; parent != NULL; parent = parent->next )
{
@@ -1993,17 +2052,38 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
}
/* Signature */
if( top && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 )
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
check_signature:
#endif
ret = x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent, rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
{
continue;
/* save state */
rs_ctx->parent = parent;
rs_ctx->fallback_parent = fallback_parent;
rs_ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
return( ret );
}
#else
(void) ret;
#endif
signature_is_good = ret == 0;
if( top && ! signature_is_good )
continue;
/* optional time check */
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &parent->valid_to ) ||
mbedtls_x509_time_is_future( &parent->valid_from ) )
{
if( badtime_parent == NULL )
badtime_parent = parent;
if( fallback_parent == NULL )
{
fallback_parent = parent;
fallback_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
}
continue;
}
@@ -2011,10 +2091,18 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
break;
}
if( parent == NULL )
parent = badtime_parent;
if( parent != NULL )
{
*r_parent = parent;
*r_signature_is_good = signature_is_good;
}
else
{
*r_parent = fallback_parent;
*r_signature_is_good = fallback_signature_is_good;
}
return( parent );
return( 0 );
}
/*
@@ -2026,34 +2114,78 @@ static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent_in( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
* Arguments:
* - [in] child: certificate for which we're looking for a parent, followed
* by a chain of possible intermediates
* - [in] trust_ca: locally trusted CAs
* - [out] 1 if parent was found in trust_ca, 0 if found in provided chain
* - [in] path_cnt: number of intermediates seen so far
* - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed intermediates seen so far
* - [in] trust_ca: list of locally trusted certificates
* - [out] parent: parent found (or NULL)
* - [out] parent_is_trusted: 1 if returned `parent` is trusted, or 0
* - [out] signature_is_good: 1 if child signature by parent is valid, or 0
* - [in] path_cnt: number of links in the chain so far (EE -> ... -> child)
* - [in] self_cnt: number of self-signed certs in the chain so far
* (will always be no greater than path_cnt)
* - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
*
* Return value:
* - the first suitable parent found (see find_parent_in() for "suitable")
* - NULL if no suitable parent was found
* - 0 on success
* - MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS otherwise
*/
static mbedtls_x509_crt *x509_crt_find_parent( mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
int *parent_is_trusted,
size_t path_cnt,
size_t self_cnt )
static int x509_crt_find_parent(
mbedtls_x509_crt *child,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crt **parent,
int *parent_is_trusted,
int *signature_is_good,
unsigned path_cnt,
unsigned self_cnt,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
int ret;
mbedtls_x509_crt *search_list;
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs */
*parent_is_trusted = 1;
parent = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, trust_ca, 1, path_cnt, self_cnt );
if( parent != NULL )
return( parent );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* restore then clear saved state if we have some stored */
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted != -1 )
{
*parent_is_trusted = rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted;
rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
}
#endif
/* Look for a parent upwards the chain */
*parent_is_trusted = 0;
return( x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, child->next, 0, path_cnt, self_cnt ) );
while( 1 ) {
search_list = *parent_is_trusted ? trust_ca : child->next;
ret = x509_crt_find_parent_in( child, search_list,
parent, signature_is_good,
*parent_is_trusted,
path_cnt, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
{
/* save state */
rs_ctx->parent_is_trusted = *parent_is_trusted;
return( ret );
}
#else
(void) ret;
#endif
/* stop here if found or already in second iteration */
if( *parent != NULL || *parent_is_trusted == 0 )
break;
/* prepare second iteration */
*parent_is_trusted = 0;
}
/* extra precaution against mistakes in the caller */
if( parent == NULL )
{
*parent_is_trusted = 0;
*signature_is_good = 0;
}
return( 0 );
}
/*
@@ -2102,11 +2234,24 @@ static int x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted(
* - EE, Ci1, ..., Ciq cannot be continued with a trusted root
* -> return that chain with NOT_TRUSTED set on Ciq
*
* Tests for (aspects of) this function should include at least:
* - trusted EE
* - EE -> trusted root
* - EE -> intermedate CA -> trusted root
* - if relevant: EE untrusted
* - if relevant: EE -> intermediate, untrusted
* with the aspect under test checked at each relevant level (EE, int, root).
* For some aspects longer chains are required, but usually length 2 is
* enough (but length 1 is not in general).
*
* Arguments:
* - [in] crt: the cert list EE, C1, ..., Cn
* - [in] trust_ca: the trusted list R1, ..., Rp
* - [in] ca_crl, profile: as in verify_with_profile()
* - [out] ver_chain, chain_len: the built and verified chain
* - [out] ver_chain: the built and verified chain
* Only valid when return value is 0, may contain garbage otherwise!
* Restart note: need not be the same when calling again to resume.
* - [in-out] rs_ctx: context for restarting operations
*
* Return value:
* - non-zero if the chain could not be fully built and examined
@@ -2118,24 +2263,50 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE],
size_t *chain_len )
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
/* Don't initialize any of those variables here, so that the compiler can
* catch potential issues with jumping ahead when restarting */
int ret;
uint32_t *flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
mbedtls_x509_crt *child;
mbedtls_x509_crt *parent;
int parent_is_trusted = 0;
int child_is_trusted = 0;
size_t self_cnt = 0;
int parent_is_trusted;
int child_is_trusted;
int signature_is_good;
unsigned self_cnt;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/* resume if we had an operation in progress */
if( rs_ctx != NULL && rs_ctx->in_progress == x509_crt_rs_find_parent )
{
/* restore saved state */
*ver_chain = rs_ctx->ver_chain; /* struct copy */
self_cnt = rs_ctx->self_cnt;
/* restore derived state */
cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len - 1];
child = cur->crt;
flags = &cur->flags;
goto find_parent;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
child = crt;
*chain_len = 0;
self_cnt = 0;
parent_is_trusted = 0;
child_is_trusted = 0;
while( 1 ) {
/* Add certificate to the verification chain */
ver_chain[*chain_len].crt = child;
flags = &ver_chain[*chain_len].flags;
++*chain_len;
cur = &ver_chain->items[ver_chain->len];
cur->crt = child;
cur->flags = 0;
ver_chain->len++;
flags = &cur->flags;
/* Check time-validity (all certificates) */
if( mbedtls_x509_time_is_past( &child->valid_to ) )
@@ -2156,15 +2327,33 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
/* Special case: EE certs that are locally trusted */
if( *chain_len == 1 &&
if( ver_chain->len == 1 &&
x509_crt_check_ee_locally_trusted( child, trust_ca ) == 0 )
{
return( 0 );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
find_parent:
#endif
/* Look for a parent in trusted CAs or up the chain */
parent = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent_is_trusted,
*chain_len - 1, self_cnt );
ret = x509_crt_find_parent( child, trust_ca, &parent,
&parent_is_trusted, &signature_is_good,
ver_chain->len - 1, self_cnt, rs_ctx );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
{
/* save state */
rs_ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_find_parent;
rs_ctx->self_cnt = self_cnt;
rs_ctx->ver_chain = *ver_chain; /* struct copy */
return( ret );
}
#else
(void) ret;
#endif
/* No parent? We're done here */
if( parent == NULL )
@@ -2176,7 +2365,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
/* Count intermediate self-issued (not necessarily self-signed) certs.
* These can occur with some strategies for key rollover, see [SIRO],
* and should be excluded from max_pathlen checks. */
if( *chain_len != 1 &&
if( ver_chain->len != 1 &&
x509_name_cmp( &child->issuer, &child->subject ) == 0 )
{
self_cnt++;
@@ -2185,14 +2374,14 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
/* path_cnt is 0 for the first intermediate CA,
* and if parent is trusted it's not an intermediate CA */
if( ! parent_is_trusted &&
*chain_len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
ver_chain->len > MBEDTLS_X509_MAX_INTERMEDIATE_CA )
{
/* return immediately to avoid overflow the chain array */
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FATAL_ERROR );
}
/* if parent is trusted, the signature was checked by find_parent() */
if( ! parent_is_trusted && x509_crt_check_signature( child, parent ) != 0 )
/* signature was checked while searching parent */
if( ! signature_is_good )
*flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED;
/* check size of signing key */
@@ -2210,6 +2399,7 @@ static int x509_crt_verify_chain(
child = parent;
parent = NULL;
child_is_trusted = parent_is_trusted;
signature_is_good = 0;
}
}
@@ -2278,21 +2468,22 @@ static void x509_crt_verify_name( const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
*/
static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
uint32_t *flags,
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE],
size_t chain_len,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain *ver_chain,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
int ret;
size_t i;
unsigned i;
uint32_t cur_flags;
const mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain_item *cur;
for( i = chain_len; i != 0; --i )
for( i = ver_chain->len; i != 0; --i )
{
cur_flags = ver_chain[i-1].flags;
cur = &ver_chain->items[i-1];
cur_flags = cur->flags;
if( NULL != f_vrfy )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, ver_chain[i-1].crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 )
if( ( ret = f_vrfy( p_vrfy, cur->crt, (int) i-1, &cur_flags ) ) != 0 )
return( ret );
*flags |= cur_flags;
@@ -2302,7 +2493,7 @@ static int x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb(
}
/*
* Verify the certificate validity
* Verify the certificate validity (default profile, not restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
@@ -2311,19 +2502,13 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
&mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, cn, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy ) );
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
&mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default, cn, flags,
f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );
}
/*
* Verify the certificate validity, with profile
*
* This function:
* - checks the requested CN (if any)
* - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
* as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
* - builds and verifies the chain
* - then calls the callback and merges the flags
* Verify the certificate validity (user-chosen profile, not restartable)
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
@@ -2332,16 +2517,38 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy )
{
return( mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl,
profile, cn, flags, f_vrfy, p_vrfy, NULL ) );
}
/*
* Verify the certificate validity, with profile, restartable version
*
* This function:
* - checks the requested CN (if any)
* - checks the type and size of the EE cert's key,
* as that isn't done as part of chain building/verification currently
* - builds and verifies the chain
* - then calls the callback and merges the flags
*/
int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_restartable( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
mbedtls_x509_crt *trust_ca,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile,
const char *cn, uint32_t *flags,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy,
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *rs_ctx )
{
int ret;
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_type;
x509_crt_verify_chain_item ver_chain[X509_MAX_VERIFY_CHAIN_SIZE];
size_t chain_len;
uint32_t *ee_flags = &ver_chain[0].flags;
mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_chain ver_chain;
uint32_t ee_flags;
*flags = 0;
memset( ver_chain, 0, sizeof( ver_chain ) );
chain_len = 0;
ee_flags = 0;
x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ver_chain );
if( profile == NULL )
{
@@ -2351,28 +2558,36 @@ int mbedtls_x509_crt_verify_with_profile( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt,
/* check name if requested */
if( cn != NULL )
x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, ee_flags );
x509_crt_verify_name( crt, cn, &ee_flags );
/* Check the type and size of the key */
pk_type = mbedtls_pk_get_type( &crt->pk );
if( x509_profile_check_pk_alg( profile, pk_type ) != 0 )
*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_PK;
if( x509_profile_check_key( profile, &crt->pk ) != 0 )
*ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
ee_flags |= MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_BAD_KEY;
/* Check the chain */
ret = x509_crt_verify_chain( crt, trust_ca, ca_crl, profile,
ver_chain, &chain_len );
&ver_chain, rs_ctx );
if( ret != 0 )
goto exit;
/* Merge end-entity flags */
ver_chain.items[0].flags |= ee_flags;
/* Build final flags, calling callback on the way if any */
ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags,
ver_chain, chain_len, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
ret = x509_crt_merge_flags_with_cb( flags, &ver_chain, f_vrfy, p_vrfy );
exit:
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
if( rs_ctx != NULL && ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( rs_ctx );
#endif
/* prevent misuse of the vrfy callback - VERIFY_FAILED would be ignored by
* the SSL module for authmode optional, but non-zero return from the
* callback means a fatal error so it shouldn't be ignored */
@@ -2483,4 +2698,36 @@ void mbedtls_x509_crt_free( mbedtls_x509_crt *crt )
while( cert_cur != NULL );
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE)
/*
* Initialize a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
mbedtls_pk_restart_init( &ctx->pk );
ctx->parent = NULL;
ctx->fallback_parent = NULL;
ctx->fallback_signature_is_good = 0;
ctx->parent_is_trusted = -1;
ctx->in_progress = x509_crt_rs_none;
ctx->self_cnt = 0;
x509_crt_verify_chain_reset( &ctx->ver_chain );
}
/*
* Free the components of a restart context
*/
void mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_free( mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_ctx *ctx )
{
if( ctx == NULL )
return;
mbedtls_pk_restart_free( &ctx->pk );
mbedtls_x509_crt_restart_init( ctx );
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && MBEDTLS_ECP_RESTARTABLE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */