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Merge commit '01b34fb316a5' into development

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Merge a development version of Mbed TLS 2.16.0 that doesn't have
parameter validation into development.

The following conflicts were resolved:

- Update ChangeLog to include release notes merged from development so
  far, with a version of "2.14.0+01b34fb316a5" and release date of
  "xxxx-xx-xx" to show this is not a released version, but instead a
  snapshot of the development branch equivalent to version of the 2.14.0
  with additional commits from the mbedtls/development branch up through
  01b34fb316 included. Entries added for unreleased versions of Mbed
  Crypto remain at the top of the file for Mbed TLS 2.xx.x.
- Replace the Mbed Crypto version of
  mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt() with the version from Mbed TLS
  which fixes timing variations and memory access variations that could
  lead to a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle attack. This will
  prevent using psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with zero-length output buffers
  until a follow up commit is made to restore this capability.
- In ssl_srv.c, include changes for both the new ECDH interface and
  opaque PSK as already added to development previously.
This commit is contained in:
Jaeden Amero
2019-02-05 12:05:16 +00:00
parent acdf07c033 01b34fb316
commit 68933640f5
46 changed files with 1605 additions and 394 deletions
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14
library/ssl_ticket.c
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@ -217,9 +217,9 @@ static int ssl_save_session( const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
if( left < 3 + cert_len )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 16 & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len >> 8 & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( cert_len & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 16 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
*p++ = (unsigned char)( ( cert_len ) & 0xFF );
if( session->peer_cert != NULL )
memcpy( p, session->peer_cert->raw.p, cert_len );
@ -244,14 +244,14 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
size_t cert_len;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
if( p + sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > end )
if( sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) > (size_t)( end - p ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
memcpy( session, p, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) );
p += sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session );
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
if( p + 3 > end )
if( 3 > (size_t)( end - p ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
cert_len = ( p[0] << 16 ) | ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2];
@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
{
int ret;
if( p + cert_len > end )
if( cert_len > (size_t)( end - p ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
session->peer_cert = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sizeof( mbedtls_x509_crt ) );
@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static int ssl_load_session( mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
mbedtls_x509_crt_init( session->peer_cert );
if( ( ret = mbedtls_x509_crt_parse_der( session->peer_cert,
p, cert_len ) ) != 0 )
p, cert_len ) ) != 0 )
{
mbedtls_x509_crt_free( session->peer_cert );
mbedtls_free( session->peer_cert );