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mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der and mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw: reject bits==0
Cleanly reject bits == 0 when calling mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der() and mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(). This can plausibly happen when bits is user-provided data that the calling application doesn't check. Before this patch, there was typically-benign undefined behavior, such as adding 0 to a null pointer or calling memcpy on a null pointer with a size of 0. Signed-off-by: Gilles Peskine <Gilles.Peskine@arm.com>
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@ -440,6 +440,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_raw_to_der(size_t bits, const unsigned char *raw, size_t raw_l
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unsigned char *p = der + der_size;
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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if (bits == 0) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
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}
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if (raw_len != (2 * coordinate_len)) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
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}
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@ -559,6 +562,9 @@ int mbedtls_ecdsa_der_to_raw(size_t bits, const unsigned char *der, size_t der_l
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size_t coordinate_size = PSA_BITS_TO_BYTES(bits);
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int ret;
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if (bits == 0) {
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return MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_INVALID_DATA;
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}
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/* The output raw buffer should be at least twice the size of a raw
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* coordinate in order to store r and s. */
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if (raw_size < coordinate_size * 2) {
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