1
0
mirror of https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git synced 2025-08-02 21:06:37 +03:00

Merge pull request #6303 from gilles-peskine-arm/bignum-core-random

Bignum: Implement mbedtls_mpi_core_random
This commit is contained in:
Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
2022-12-16 09:58:07 +01:00
committed by GitHub
9 changed files with 823 additions and 440 deletions

View File

@ -134,6 +134,27 @@ void mbedtls_mpi_core_bigendian_to_host( mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
}
}
/* Whether min <= A, in constant time.
* A_limbs must be at least 1. */
unsigned mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi( mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
size_t A_limbs )
{
/* min <= least significant limb? */
unsigned min_le_lsl = 1 ^ mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_lt( A[0], min );
/* limbs other than the least significant one are all zero? */
mbedtls_mpi_uint msll_mask = 0;
for( size_t i = 1; i < A_limbs; i++ )
msll_mask |= A[i];
/* The most significant limbs of A are not all zero iff msll_mask != 0. */
unsigned msll_nonzero = mbedtls_ct_mpi_uint_mask( msll_mask ) & 1;
/* min <= A iff the lowest limb of A is >= min or the other limbs
* are not all zero. */
return( min_le_lsl | msll_nonzero );
}
void mbedtls_mpi_core_cond_assign( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *A,
size_t limbs,
@ -561,6 +582,67 @@ cleanup:
return( ret );
}
int mbedtls_mpi_core_random( mbedtls_mpi_uint *X,
mbedtls_mpi_uint min,
const mbedtls_mpi_uint *N,
size_t limbs,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng )
{
unsigned ge_lower = 1, lt_upper = 0;
size_t n_bits = mbedtls_mpi_core_bitlen( N, limbs );
size_t n_bytes = ( n_bits + 7 ) / 8;
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
/*
* When min == 0, each try has at worst a probability 1/2 of failing
* (the msb has a probability 1/2 of being 0, and then the result will
* be < N), so after 30 tries failure probability is a most 2**(-30).
*
* When N is just below a power of 2, as is the case when generating
* a random scalar on most elliptic curves, 1 try is enough with
* overwhelming probability. When N is just above a power of 2,
* as when generating a random scalar on secp224k1, each try has
* a probability of failing that is almost 1/2.
*
* The probabilities are almost the same if min is nonzero but negligible
* compared to N. This is always the case when N is crypto-sized, but
* it's convenient to support small N for testing purposes. When N
* is small, use a higher repeat count, otherwise the probability of
* failure is macroscopic.
*/
int count = ( n_bytes > 4 ? 30 : 250 );
/*
* Match the procedure given in RFC 6979 §3.3 (deterministic ECDSA)
* when f_rng is a suitably parametrized instance of HMAC_DRBG:
* - use the same byte ordering;
* - keep the leftmost n_bits bits of the generated octet string;
* - try until result is in the desired range.
* This also avoids any bias, which is especially important for ECDSA.
*/
do
{
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_core_fill_random( X, limbs,
n_bytes,
f_rng, p_rng ) );
mbedtls_mpi_core_shift_r( X, limbs, 8 * n_bytes - n_bits );
if( --count == 0 )
{
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
goto cleanup;
}
ge_lower = mbedtls_mpi_core_uint_le_mpi( min, X, limbs );
lt_upper = mbedtls_mpi_core_lt_ct( X, N, limbs );
}
while( ge_lower == 0 || lt_upper == 0 );
cleanup:
return( ret );
}
/* BEGIN MERGE SLOT 1 */
static size_t exp_mod_get_window_size( size_t Ebits )