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Fix a few more typos

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Signed-off-by: Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard <manuel.pegourie-gonnard@arm.com>
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Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
2022-02-10 12:58:09 +01:00
parent 196a1c4256
commit 58d101b721
1 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions
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6
docs/architecture/psa-migration/psa-limitations.md
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@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Arbitrary parameters for FFDH
(See also the first paragraph in the previous section.) (See also the first paragraph in the previous section.)
Currently, the PSA Crypto API can only perform FFDH with a limited set of Currently, the PSA Crypto API can only perform FFDH with a limited set of
well-know parameters (some of them defined in the spec, but implementations well-known parameters (some of them defined in the spec, but implementations
are free to extend that set). are free to extend that set).
TLS 1.2 (and earlier) on the other hand have the server send explicit TLS 1.2 (and earlier) on the other hand have the server send explicit
parameters (P and G) in is ServerKeyExchange message. This has been found to parameters (P and G) in its ServerKeyExchange message. This has been found to
be suboptimal for security, as it is prohibitively hard for the client to be suboptimal for security, as it is prohibitively hard for the client to
verify the strength of these parameters. This led to the development of RFC verify the strength of these parameters. This led to the development of RFC
7919 which allows use of named groups in TLS 1.2 - however as this is only an 7919 which allows use of named groups in TLS 1.2 - however as this is only an
@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ When it comes to cryptographic operations, only two things are supported:
The verification is done using `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext()`. The verification is done using `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext()`.
Note: since X.509 parsing ensures that message hash = encoding hash, and Note: since X.509 parsing ensures that message hash = encoding hash, and
`mbedtls_pk_verify_ext()` use encoding hash = mgf1 hash, it looks like all `mbedtls_pk_verify_ext()` uses encoding hash = mgf1 hash, it looks like all
three hash algorithms must be equal, which would be good news as it would three hash algorithms must be equal, which would be good news as it would
match a limitation of the PSA API. match a limitation of the PSA API.