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- RSASSA-PSS verification now properly handles salt lengths other than hlen

This commit is contained in:
Paul Bakker
2011-03-25 13:58:48 +00:00
parent fbc4a45f15
commit 53019ae6f7
2 changed files with 125 additions and 11 deletions

View File

@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char salt[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE];
const md_info_t *md_info;
md_context_t md_ctx;
int i, hlen, msb, offset = 0;
int i, slen, hlen, msb, offset = 0;
#else
(void) f_rng;
(void) p_rng;
@@ -733,6 +733,8 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
slen = hlen;
memset( sig, 0, olen );
memset( &md_ctx, 0, sizeof( md_context_t ) );
@@ -740,9 +742,9 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
// Generate salt of length hlen
// Generate salt of length slen
//
for( i = 0; i < hlen; ++i )
for( i = 0; i < slen; ++i )
salt[i] = (unsigned char) f_rng( p_rng );
// Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits
@@ -750,15 +752,15 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_sign( rsa_context *ctx,
msb = mpi_msb( &ctx->N ) - 1;
p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2;
*p++ = 0x01;
memcpy( p, salt, hlen );
p += hlen;
memcpy( p, salt, slen );
p += slen;
// Generate H = Hash( M' )
//
md_starts( &md_ctx );
md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 );
md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
md_update( &md_ctx, salt, hlen );
md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen );
md_finish( &md_ctx, p );
// Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask
@@ -805,7 +807,7 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
unsigned char zeros[8];
const md_info_t *md_info;
md_context_t md_ctx;
int hlen, msb;
int slen, hlen, msb;
#endif
siglen = ctx->len;
@@ -935,6 +937,8 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
hlen = md_get_size( md_info );
slen = siglen - hlen - 1;
memset( &md_ctx, 0, sizeof( md_context_t ) );
memset( zeros, 0, 8 );
@@ -967,15 +971,17 @@ int rsa_pkcs1_verify( rsa_context *ctx,
if( *p++ != 0x01 )
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING );
slen -= p - buf;
// Generate H = Hash( M' )
//
md_starts( &md_ctx );
md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 );
md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen );
md_update( &md_ctx, p, hlen );
md_update( &md_ctx, p, slen );
md_finish( &md_ctx, p );
if( memcmp( p, p + hlen, hlen ) == 0 )
if( memcmp( p, p + slen, hlen ) == 0 )
return( 0 );
else
return( POLARSSL_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED );