diff --git a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h index 4f65398e24..33e2e77b99 100644 --- a/include/psa/crypto_extra.h +++ b/include/psa/crypto_extra.h @@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_abort( psa_pake_operation_t * operation ); */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT {PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, 0, \ - MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT, \ + NULL, 0 , \ PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE, {0}, 0, 0, \ {.dummy = 0}} #else @@ -1920,7 +1920,8 @@ struct psa_pake_operation_s #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_BUILTIN_PAKE) unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(input_step); unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(output_step); - mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password); + uint8_t* MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password); + size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len); psa_pake_role_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(role); uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer[MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE]); size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(buffer_length); diff --git a/library/psa_crypto.c b/library/psa_crypto.c index 2ce5e4320d..8c9deffadf 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto.c @@ -877,20 +877,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_restrict_key_policy( return( PSA_SUCCESS ); } -/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints - * and lock it. - * - * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is - * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is - * zero, the algorithm is not checked. - * - * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key - * into a key slot if not already done. - * - * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of - * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. - */ -static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, psa_key_usage_t usage, diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_core.h b/library/psa_crypto_core.h index 98638481c8..5cefa273aa 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_core.h +++ b/library/psa_crypto_core.h @@ -183,6 +183,24 @@ static inline psa_key_slot_number_t psa_key_slot_get_slot_number( } #endif +/** Get the description of a key given its identifier and policy constraints + * and lock it. + * + * The key must have allow all the usage flags set in \p usage. If \p alg is + * nonzero, the key must allow operations with this algorithm. If \p alg is + * zero, the algorithm is not checked. + * + * In case of a persistent key, the function loads the description of the key + * into a key slot if not already done. + * + * On success, the returned key slot is locked. It is the responsibility of + * the caller to unlock the key slot when it does not access it anymore. + */ +psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + psa_key_slot_t **p_slot, + psa_key_usage_t usage, + psa_algorithm_t alg ); + /** Completely wipe a slot in memory, including its policy. * * Persistent storage is not affected. diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c index 870b5b5654..659b712a5b 100644 --- a/library/psa_crypto_pake.c +++ b/library/psa_crypto_pake.c @@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( psa_pake_operation_t *operation, psa_key_attributes_t attributes = psa_key_attributes_init(); psa_key_type_t type; psa_key_usage_t usage; + psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; if( operation->alg == PSA_ALG_NONE || operation->state != PSA_PAKE_STATE_SETUP ) @@ -273,7 +274,27 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key( psa_pake_operation_t *operation, if( ( usage & PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE ) == 0 ) return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED ); - operation->password = password; + if( operation->password != NULL ) + return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); + + status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy( password, &slot, + PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, + PSA_ALG_JPAKE ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); + + operation->password = mbedtls_calloc( 1, slot->key.bytes ); + if( operation->password == NULL ) + { + psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY ); + } + memcpy( operation->password, slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes ); + operation->password_len = slot->key.bytes; + + status = psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); + if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) + return( status ); return( PSA_SUCCESS ); } @@ -348,9 +369,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role( psa_pake_operation_t *operation, static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation ) { int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; - psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; mbedtls_ecjpake_role role; - psa_key_slot_t *slot = NULL; if( operation->role == PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT ) role = MBEDTLS_ECJPAKE_CLIENT; @@ -359,22 +378,20 @@ static psa_status_t psa_pake_ecjpake_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation ) else return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); - if( psa_is_valid_key_id( operation->password, 1 ) == 0 ) + if( operation->password_len == 0 ) return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); - status = psa_get_and_lock_key_slot( operation->password, &slot ); - if( status != PSA_SUCCESS ) - return( status ); - - ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_setup( &operation->ctx.ecjpake, role, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1, - slot->key.data, slot->key.bytes ); + operation->password, + operation->password_len ); - psa_unlock_key_slot( slot ); - slot = NULL; + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len ); + mbedtls_free( operation->password ); + operation->password = NULL; + operation->password_len = 0; if( ret != 0 ) return( mbedtls_ecjpake_to_psa_error( ret ) ); @@ -840,7 +857,11 @@ psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t * operation) { operation->input_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID; operation->output_step = PSA_PAKE_STEP_INVALID; - operation->password = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT; + if( operation->password_len > 0 ) + mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->password, operation->password_len ); + mbedtls_free( operation->password ); + operation->password = NULL; + operation->password_len = 0; operation->role = PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE; mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->buffer, MBEDTLS_PSA_PAKE_BUFFER_SIZE ); operation->buffer_length = 0; diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data index cce3fd0fe8..659205d529 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.data @@ -6549,11 +6549,16 @@ ecjpake_setup:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD:PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE:PSA_PAKE_ PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS -ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0 +ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:0 PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds, client input first depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS -ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1 +ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":1:0 + +# This test case relies on implementation (it may need to be adjusted in the future) +PSA PAKE: ecjpake rounds - key is destroyed after being passed to set_password_key +depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS +ecjpake_rounds:PSA_ALG_JPAKE:PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC, PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256):PSA_ALG_SHA_256:PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256):"abcdef":0:1 PSA PAKE: ecjpake no input errors depends_on:PSA_WANT_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR:PSA_WANT_ECC_SECP_R1_256:PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256 diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function index 779f594dca..ca1614befa 100644 --- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function +++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto.function @@ -31,6 +31,27 @@ #define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_ACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id != 0 ) #define ASSERT_OPERATION_IS_INACTIVE( operation ) TEST_ASSERT( operation.id == 0 ) +#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE) +int ecjpake_operation_setup( psa_pake_operation_t *operation, + psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite, + psa_pake_role_t role, + mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key, + size_t key_available ) +{ + PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_abort( operation ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_setup( operation, cipher_suite ) ); + + PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_role( operation, role) ); + + if( key_available ) + PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( operation, key ) ); + return 0; +exit: + return 1; +} +#endif + /** An invalid export length that will never be set by psa_export_key(). */ static const size_t INVALID_EXPORT_LENGTH = ~0U; @@ -8740,7 +8761,6 @@ void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg, { psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); psa_pake_operation_t operation = psa_pake_operation_init(); - psa_pake_operation_t op_copy = psa_pake_operation_init(); psa_algorithm_t alg = alg_arg; psa_pake_primitive_t primitive = primitive_arg; psa_key_type_t key_type_pw = key_type_pw_arg; @@ -8839,22 +8859,25 @@ void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg, if( input_first ) { /* Invalid parameters (input) */ - op_copy = operation; - TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, + TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, NULL, 0 ), PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); /* Invalid parameters (step) */ - op_copy = operation; - TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10, + TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role, + key, pw_data->len ) , 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10, output_buffer, size_zk_proof ), PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); /* Invalid first step */ - op_copy = operation; - TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, + TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role, + key, pw_data->len ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, output_buffer, size_zk_proof ), PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); /* Possibly valid */ + TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role, + key, pw_data->len ), 0 ); TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_input( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, output_buffer, size_key_share ), expected_status_input_output); @@ -8875,22 +8898,25 @@ void ecjpake_setup( int alg_arg, int key_type_pw_arg, int key_usage_pw_arg, else { /* Invalid parameters (output) */ - op_copy = operation; - TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, + TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, NULL, 0, NULL ), PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); - op_copy = operation; /* Invalid parameters (step) */ - TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10, + TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role, + key, pw_data->len ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF + 10, output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ), PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT ); /* Invalid first step */ - op_copy = operation; - TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &op_copy, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, + TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role, + key, pw_data->len ), 0 ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ), PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); /* Possibly valid */ + TEST_EQUAL( ecjpake_operation_setup( &operation, &cipher_suite, role, + key, pw_data->len ), 0 ); TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_output( &operation, PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, output_buffer, buf_size, &output_len ), expected_status_input_output ); @@ -8974,7 +9000,7 @@ exit: /* BEGIN_CASE depends_on:PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE */ void ecjpake_rounds( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg, int derive_alg_arg, data_t *pw_data, - int client_input_first ) + int client_input_first, int destroy_key ) { psa_pake_cipher_suite_t cipher_suite = psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(); psa_pake_operation_t server = psa_pake_operation_init(); @@ -9025,6 +9051,9 @@ void ecjpake_rounds( int alg_arg, int primitive_arg, int hash_arg, PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &server, key ) ); PSA_ASSERT( psa_pake_set_password_key( &client, key ) ); + if( destroy_key == 1 ) + psa_destroy_key( key ); + TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &server, &server_derive ), PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE ); TEST_EQUAL( psa_pake_get_implicit_key( &client, &client_derive ),