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Add variable validation

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1. Check allocation success.
2. Check parameter correctness in the use_srtp extension
in server and client.

Signed-off-by: Johan Pascal <johan.pascal@belledonne-communications.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ron Eldor
2018-12-10 14:56:21 +02:00
committed by Johan Pascal
parent 75870ec6a7
commit 313d7b5d74
3 changed files with 27 additions and 9 deletions
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16
library/ssl_cli.c
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@ -837,6 +837,10 @@ static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
if( mki_len != 0 )
{
memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len );
/*
* Increment p to point to the current position.
*/
p += mki_len;
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
}
@ -847,8 +851,9 @@ static void ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* + protection profile length (2 bytes)
* + 2 * number of protection profiles
* + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte)
* + mki value
*/
*olen = 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len;
*olen = p - buf;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
@ -1848,7 +1853,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
/*
* Length is 5 and optional mki_value : one protection profile(2 bytes)
* + length(2 bytes) and srtp_mki
* + length(2 bytes) + mki_len(1 byte)
* and optional srtp_mki
*/
if( ( len != 5 ) && ( len != ( 5 + mki_len ) ) )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
@ -1862,9 +1868,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* one protection profile in server Hello
*/
if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) )
{
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
}
server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3];
server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_value( server_protection_profile_value );
@ -1901,8 +1905,8 @@ static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* that is different than the one the client offered, then the client
* MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert.
*/
if( len > 5 &&
( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) )
if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len ||
( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) )
{
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );