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Rename mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new to mbedtls_ct_uint_if

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Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dave Rodgman
2023-05-17 15:51:59 +01:00
parent 2243137715
commit 2b4486a014
5 changed files with 9 additions and 9 deletions
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6
library/rsa.c
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@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
* buffer. Do it without branches to avoid leaking the padding
* validity through timing. RSA keys are small enough that all the
* size_t values involved fit in unsigned int. */
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
bad, (unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) (ilen - pad_count - 3));
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
* - OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE if the padding is good but the decrypted
* plaintext does not fit in the output buffer.
* - 0 if the padding is correct. */
ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(
ret = -(int) mbedtls_ct_uint_if(
bad,
(unsigned) (-(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING)),
mbedtls_ct_uint_if0(
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ static int mbedtls_ct_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_unpadding(unsigned char *input,
* Copy anyway to avoid revealing the length through timing, because
* revealing the length is as bad as revealing the padding validity
* for a Bleichenbacher attack. */
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if_new(output_too_large,
plaintext_size = mbedtls_ct_uint_if(output_too_large,
(unsigned) plaintext_max_size,
(unsigned) plaintext_size);