mirror of
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git
synced 2025-08-01 10:06:53 +03:00
Merge pull request #229 from k-stachowiak/IOTCRYPT-791-remove-legacy-psa-key-derivation
Remove legacy psa key derivation
This commit is contained in:
Jaeden Amero
GitHub
@ -2600,14 +2600,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hmac_abort_internal( psa_hmac_internal_data *hmac )
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( hmac->opad, sizeof( hmac->opad ) );
|
||||
return( psa_hash_abort( &hmac->hash_ctx ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
static void psa_hmac_init_internal( psa_hmac_internal_data *hmac )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Instances of psa_hash_operation_s can be initialized by zeroization. */
|
||||
memset( hmac, 0, sizeof( *hmac ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
|
||||
|
||||
psa_status_t psa_mac_abort( psa_mac_operation_t *operation )
|
||||
@ -4394,21 +4386,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation
|
||||
/* TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS KDF uses the same core as TLS-1.2 PRF */
|
||||
PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( kdf_alg ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.key != NULL )
|
||||
{
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.key,
|
||||
operation->ctx.tls12_prf.key_len );
|
||||
mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.key );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.Ai_with_seed != NULL )
|
||||
{
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.Ai_with_seed,
|
||||
operation->ctx.tls12_prf.Ai_with_seed_len );
|
||||
mbedtls_free( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.Ai_with_seed );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
if( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed != NULL )
|
||||
{
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( operation->ctx.tls12_prf.seed,
|
||||
@ -4427,7 +4404,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_abort( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation
|
||||
|
||||
/* We leave the fields Ai and output_block to be erased safely by the
|
||||
* mbedtls_platform_zeroize() in the end of this function. */
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
|
||||
@ -4532,119 +4508,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_read( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkd
|
||||
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(
|
||||
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t alg )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg );
|
||||
uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
|
||||
psa_hmac_internal_data hmac;
|
||||
psa_status_t status, cleanup_status;
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t *Ai;
|
||||
size_t Ai_len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* We can't be wanting more output after block 0xff, otherwise
|
||||
* the capacity check in psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() would have
|
||||
* prevented this call. It could happen only if the operation
|
||||
* object was corrupted or if this function is called directly
|
||||
* inside the library. */
|
||||
if( tls12_prf->block_number == 0xff )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
|
||||
|
||||
/* We need a new block */
|
||||
++tls12_prf->block_number;
|
||||
tls12_prf->offset_in_block = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Recall the definition of the TLS-1.2-PRF from RFC 5246:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* P_hash(secret, seed) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(1) + seed) +
|
||||
* HMAC_hash(secret, A(2) + seed) +
|
||||
* HMAC_hash(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A(0) = seed
|
||||
* A(i) = HMAC_hash( secret, A(i-1) )
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The `psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation` structures saves the block
|
||||
* `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i) + seed)` from which the output
|
||||
* is currently extracted as `output_block`, while
|
||||
* `A(i) + seed` is stored in `Ai_with_seed`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Generating a new block means recalculating `Ai_with_seed`
|
||||
* from the A(i)-part of it, and afterwards recalculating
|
||||
* `output_block`.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A(0) is computed at setup time.
|
||||
*
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
psa_hmac_init_internal( &hmac );
|
||||
|
||||
/* We must distinguish the calculation of A(1) from those
|
||||
* of A(2) and higher, because A(0)=seed has a different
|
||||
* length than the other A(i). */
|
||||
if( tls12_prf->block_number == 1 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ai = tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed + hash_length;
|
||||
Ai_len = tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed_len - hash_length;
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ai = tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed;
|
||||
Ai_len = hash_length;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Compute A(i+1) = HMAC_hash(secret, A(i)) */
|
||||
status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hmac,
|
||||
tls12_prf->key,
|
||||
tls12_prf->key_len,
|
||||
hash_alg );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_hash_update( &hmac.hash_ctx,
|
||||
Ai, Ai_len );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &hmac,
|
||||
tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed,
|
||||
hash_length );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Compute the next block `HMAC_hash(secret, A(i+1) + seed)`. */
|
||||
status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hmac,
|
||||
tls12_prf->key,
|
||||
tls12_prf->key_len,
|
||||
hash_alg );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_hash_update( &hmac.hash_ctx,
|
||||
tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed,
|
||||
tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed_len );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &hmac,
|
||||
tls12_prf->output_block,
|
||||
hash_length );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
goto cleanup;
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup:
|
||||
|
||||
cleanup_status = psa_hmac_abort_internal( &hmac );
|
||||
if( status == PSA_SUCCESS && cleanup_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
status = cleanup_status;
|
||||
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block(
|
||||
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t alg )
|
||||
@ -4752,49 +4615,7 @@ cleanup:
|
||||
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
/* Read some bytes from an TLS-1.2-PRF-based operation.
|
||||
* See Section 5 of RFC 5246. */
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read(
|
||||
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t alg,
|
||||
uint8_t *output,
|
||||
size_t output_length )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH( alg );
|
||||
uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
|
||||
while( output_length != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Copy what remains of the current block */
|
||||
uint8_t n = hash_length - tls12_prf->offset_in_block;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check if we have fully processed the current block. */
|
||||
if( n == 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_generate_next_block( tls12_prf,
|
||||
alg );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( n > output_length )
|
||||
n = (uint8_t) output_length;
|
||||
memcpy( output, tls12_prf->output_block + tls12_prf->offset_in_block,
|
||||
n );
|
||||
output += n;
|
||||
output_length -= n;
|
||||
tls12_prf->offset_in_block += n;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read(
|
||||
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t alg,
|
||||
@ -4833,7 +4654,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_read(
|
||||
|
||||
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
|
||||
|
||||
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(
|
||||
@ -4987,284 +4807,6 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_output_key( const psa_key_attributes_t *attribut
|
||||
/* Key derivation */
|
||||
/****************************************************************/
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
/* Set up an HKDF-based operation. This is exactly the extract phase
|
||||
* of the HKDF algorithm.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort()
|
||||
* to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_hkdf_setup( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf,
|
||||
const uint8_t *secret,
|
||||
size_t secret_length,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
|
||||
const uint8_t *salt,
|
||||
size_t salt_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t *label,
|
||||
size_t label_length )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
|
||||
salt, salt_length,
|
||||
hash_alg );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
status = psa_hash_update( &hkdf->hmac.hash_ctx, secret, secret_length );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
status = psa_hmac_finish_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
|
||||
hkdf->prk,
|
||||
sizeof( hkdf->prk ) );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
hkdf->offset_in_block = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
|
||||
hkdf->block_number = 0;
|
||||
hkdf->info_length = label_length;
|
||||
if( label_length != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
hkdf->info = mbedtls_calloc( 1, label_length );
|
||||
if( hkdf->info == NULL )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
|
||||
memcpy( hkdf->info, label, label_length );
|
||||
}
|
||||
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED;
|
||||
hkdf->info_set = 1;
|
||||
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
/* Set up a TLS-1.2-prf-based operation (see RFC 5246, Section 5).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort()
|
||||
* to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup(
|
||||
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
|
||||
const uint8_t *key,
|
||||
size_t key_len,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
|
||||
const uint8_t *salt,
|
||||
size_t salt_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t *label,
|
||||
size_t label_length )
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint8_t hash_length = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
|
||||
size_t Ai_with_seed_len = hash_length + salt_length + label_length;
|
||||
int overflow;
|
||||
|
||||
tls12_prf->key = mbedtls_calloc( 1, key_len );
|
||||
if( tls12_prf->key == NULL )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
|
||||
tls12_prf->key_len = key_len;
|
||||
memcpy( tls12_prf->key, key, key_len );
|
||||
|
||||
overflow = ( salt_length + label_length < salt_length ) ||
|
||||
( salt_length + label_length + hash_length < hash_length );
|
||||
if( overflow )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
|
||||
|
||||
tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed = mbedtls_calloc( 1, Ai_with_seed_len );
|
||||
if( tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed == NULL )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY );
|
||||
tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed_len = Ai_with_seed_len;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Write `label + seed' at the end of the `A(i) + seed` buffer,
|
||||
* leaving the initial `hash_length` bytes unspecified for now. */
|
||||
if( label_length != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
memcpy( tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed + hash_length,
|
||||
label, label_length );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( salt_length != 0 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
memcpy( tls12_prf->Ai_with_seed + hash_length + label_length,
|
||||
salt, salt_length );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The first block gets generated when
|
||||
* psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() is called. */
|
||||
tls12_prf->block_number = 0;
|
||||
tls12_prf->offset_in_block = hash_length;
|
||||
|
||||
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
/* Set up a TLS-1.2-PSK-to-MS-based operation. */
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_tls12_psk_to_ms_setup(
|
||||
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *tls12_prf,
|
||||
const uint8_t *psk,
|
||||
size_t psk_len,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
|
||||
const uint8_t *salt,
|
||||
size_t salt_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t *label,
|
||||
size_t label_length )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
uint8_t pms[ 4 + 2 * PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN ];
|
||||
|
||||
if( psk_len > PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_MAX_PSK_LEN )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
|
||||
|
||||
/* Quoting RFC 4279, Section 2:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets
|
||||
* long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second
|
||||
* uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
pms[0] = ( psk_len >> 8 ) & 0xff;
|
||||
pms[1] = ( psk_len >> 0 ) & 0xff;
|
||||
memset( pms + 2, 0, psk_len );
|
||||
pms[2 + psk_len + 0] = pms[0];
|
||||
pms[2 + psk_len + 1] = pms[1];
|
||||
memcpy( pms + 4 + psk_len, psk, psk_len );
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup( tls12_prf,
|
||||
pms, 4 + 2 * psk_len,
|
||||
hash_alg,
|
||||
salt, salt_length,
|
||||
label, label_length );
|
||||
|
||||
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( pms, sizeof( pms ) );
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
/* Note that if this function fails, you must call psa_key_derivation_abort()
|
||||
* to potentially free embedded data structures and wipe confidential data.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_internal(
|
||||
psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
|
||||
const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_length,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t alg,
|
||||
const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t *label, size_t label_length,
|
||||
size_t capacity )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
size_t max_capacity;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set operation->alg even on failure so that abort knows what to do. */
|
||||
operation->alg = alg;
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
|
||||
if( PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF( alg ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( alg );
|
||||
size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
|
||||
if( hash_size == 0 )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
|
||||
max_capacity = 255 * hash_size;
|
||||
status = psa_key_derivation_hkdf_setup( &operation->ctx.hkdf,
|
||||
secret, secret_length,
|
||||
hash_alg,
|
||||
salt, salt_length,
|
||||
label, label_length );
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* TLS-1.2 PRF and TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MS are very similar, so share code. */
|
||||
else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) ||
|
||||
PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS( alg ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg = PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH( alg );
|
||||
size_t hash_size = PSA_HASH_SIZE( hash_alg );
|
||||
|
||||
/* TLS-1.2 PRF supports only SHA-256 and SHA-384. */
|
||||
if( hash_alg != PSA_ALG_SHA_256 &&
|
||||
hash_alg != PSA_ALG_SHA_384 )
|
||||
{
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
max_capacity = 255 * hash_size;
|
||||
|
||||
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( alg ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_prf_setup( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
|
||||
secret, secret_length,
|
||||
hash_alg, salt, salt_length,
|
||||
label, label_length );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
status = psa_key_derivation_tls12_psk_to_ms_setup(
|
||||
&operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
|
||||
secret, secret_length,
|
||||
hash_alg, salt, salt_length,
|
||||
label, label_length );
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
|
||||
if( capacity <= max_capacity )
|
||||
operation->capacity = capacity;
|
||||
else if( capacity == PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_UNLIMITED_CAPACITY )
|
||||
operation->capacity = max_capacity;
|
||||
else
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
|
||||
|
||||
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
psa_status_t psa_key_derivation( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
|
||||
psa_key_handle_t handle,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t alg,
|
||||
const uint8_t *salt,
|
||||
size_t salt_length,
|
||||
const uint8_t *label,
|
||||
size_t label_length,
|
||||
size_t capacity )
|
||||
{
|
||||
psa_key_slot_t *slot;
|
||||
psa_status_t status;
|
||||
|
||||
if( operation->alg != 0 )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
|
||||
|
||||
/* Make sure that alg is a key derivation algorithm. This prevents
|
||||
* key selection algorithms, which psa_key_derivation_internal
|
||||
* accepts for the sake of key agreement. */
|
||||
if( ! PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION( alg ) )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_get_transparent_key( handle, &slot, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE, alg );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
|
||||
if( slot->attr.type != PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE )
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
|
||||
|
||||
status = psa_key_derivation_internal( operation,
|
||||
slot->data.raw.data,
|
||||
slot->data.raw.bytes,
|
||||
alg,
|
||||
salt, salt_length,
|
||||
label, label_length,
|
||||
capacity );
|
||||
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
||||
psa_key_derivation_abort( operation );
|
||||
return( status );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_setup_kdf(
|
||||
psa_key_derivation_operation_t *operation,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t kdf_alg )
|
||||
@ -5390,38 +4932,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_key_derivation_t *hkdf,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION)
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_input( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
|
||||
psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
|
||||
const uint8_t *data,
|
||||
size_t data_length )
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) prf;
|
||||
(void) hash_alg;
|
||||
(void) step;
|
||||
(void) data;
|
||||
(void) data_length;
|
||||
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(
|
||||
psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
|
||||
psa_algorithm_t hash_alg,
|
||||
psa_key_derivation_step_t step,
|
||||
const uint8_t *data,
|
||||
size_t data_length )
|
||||
{
|
||||
(void) prf;
|
||||
(void) hash_alg;
|
||||
(void) step;
|
||||
(void) data;
|
||||
(void) data_length;
|
||||
|
||||
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_set_seed( psa_tls12_prf_key_derivation_t *prf,
|
||||
const uint8_t *data,
|
||||
size_t data_length )
|
||||
@ -5553,7 +5063,6 @@ static psa_status_t psa_tls12_prf_psk_to_ms_input(
|
||||
|
||||
return( psa_tls12_prf_input( prf, hash_alg, step, data, data_length ) );
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* PSA_PRE_1_0_KEY_DERIVATION */
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
|
||||
|
||||
static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal(
|
||||
@ -5572,10 +5081,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_internal(
|
||||
PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
|
||||
step, data, data_length );
|
||||
}
|
||||
else
|
||||
#endif /* MBEDTLS_MD_C */
|
||||
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_C)
|
||||
if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) )
|
||||
else if( PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF( kdf_alg ) )
|
||||
{
|
||||
status = psa_tls12_prf_input( &operation->ctx.tls12_prf,
|
||||
PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH( kdf_alg ),
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user