diff --git a/ChangeLog.d/issue488.txt b/ChangeLog.d/issue488.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77cbe2d5e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog.d/issue488.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Bugfix
+   * Prevent loading of peristent keys whose key ID belong to the volatile
+     range.
diff --git a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
index f1a651f0d9..d514d1af04 100644
--- a/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
+++ b/library/psa_crypto_slot_management.c
@@ -684,6 +684,12 @@ static psa_status_t psa_load_persistent_key_into_slot(psa_key_slot_t *slot)
     psa_status_t status = PSA_SUCCESS;
     uint8_t *key_data = NULL;
     size_t key_data_length = 0;
+    psa_key_id_t key_id = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(slot->attr.id);
+
+    /* Do not try to load a persistent key whose ID is in the volatile range. */
+    if ((key_id >= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN) && (key_id <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX)) {
+        return PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST;
+    }
 
     status = psa_load_persistent_key(&slot->attr,
                                      &key_data, &key_data_length);
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
index 133e726aec..4755ad6e29 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.data
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@ parse_storage_data_check:"505341004b45590000000000010000000170000001000000000000
 Parse storage: truncated key
 parse_storage_data_check:"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":"":PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT:PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR:0:PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION:PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN:PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID
 
+Key identifier ranges
+key_id_ranges:
+
 # Not specific to files, but only run this test in an environment where the maximum size could be reached.
 Save maximum-size persistent raw key
 depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_ITS_FILE_C
@@ -133,3 +136,150 @@ destroy_nonexistent:1:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
 
 Destroy invalid id: 0xffffffff
 destroy_nonexistent:0xffffffff:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=1, good, 1 byte
+load_primed_storage:0:1:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=2, good
+load_primed_storage:0:2:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=PSA_KEY_USER_MIN, good
+load_primed_storage:0:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=PSA_KEY_USER_MAX, good
+load_primed_storage:0:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=0 (bad id)
+load_primed_storage:0:0:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN (bad id)
+load_primed_storage:0:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX (bad id)
+load_primed_storage:0:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+# We use the numerical ID in the test data because the numerical range
+# of built-in keys is part of the interface contract between the library
+# and third-party code that provide built-in keys. We can extend this
+# range, but shrinking it would be an incompatible change.
+Load key: owner=0 id=MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN (bad id)
+load_primed_storage:0:0x7fff0000:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX (bad id)
+load_primed_storage:0:0x7fffefff:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=0x7fffffff (bad id: not in any range)
+load_primed_storage:0:KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=0xffff0000 (bad id: reserved file UID, not in use)
+load_primed_storage:0:0xffff0000:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=entropy file seed
+load_primed_storage:0:PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=0 id=0xffffffff (bad id: reserved file UID, not in use)
+load_primed_storage:0:0xffffffff:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=2, good
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:2:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=PSA_KEY_USER_MIN, good
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=PSA_KEY_USER_MAX, good
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=0 (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:0:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+# We use the numerical ID in the test data because the numerical range
+# of built-in keys is part of the interface contract between the library
+# and third-party code that provide built-in keys. We can extend this
+# range, but shrinking it would be an incompatible change.
+Load key: owner=42 id=MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:0x7fff0000:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:0x7fffefff:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=0x7fffffff (bad id: not in any range)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=0xffff0000 (bad id: reserved file UID, not in use)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:0xffff0000:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=(entropy file seed & 0xffffffff)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=42 id=0xffffffff (bad id: reserved file UID, not in use)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:42:0xffffffff:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=2, good
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:2:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=PSA_KEY_USER_MIN, good
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=PSA_KEY_USER_MAX, good
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=0 (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:0:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+# We use the numerical ID in the test data because the numerical range
+# of built-in keys is part of the interface contract between the library
+# and third-party code that provide built-in keys. We can extend this
+# range, but shrinking it would be an incompatible change.
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:0x7fff0000:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX (bad id)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:0x7fffefff:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=0x7fffffff (bad id: not in any range)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS:PSA_SUCCESS
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=0xffff0000 (bad id: reserved file UID, not in use)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:0xffff0000:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=(entropy file seed & 0xffffffff)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
+
+Load key: owner=-0x80000000 id=0xffffffff (bad id: reserved file UID, not in use)
+depends_on:MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER
+load_primed_storage:-0x80000000:0xffffffff:"505341004b455900000000000100000001100800010000000000000000000000010000004c":PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE:PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
diff --git a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
index ea8cb6bc8f..acf57e2acf 100644
--- a/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
+++ b/tests/suites/test_suite_psa_crypto_persistent_key.function
@@ -14,9 +14,32 @@
 
 #include <stdint.h>
 
+#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
+#include "psa_crypto_its.h"
 #include "psa_crypto_slot_management.h"
 #include "psa_crypto_storage.h"
 
+#define KEY_ID_IN_USER_RANGE(id)                                        \
+    (PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN <= (id) && (id) <= PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX)
+
+#define KEY_ID_IN_VOLATILE_RANGE(id)                                    \
+    (PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN <= (id) && (id) <= PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX)
+
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
+#define KEY_ID_IN_BUILTIN_RANGE(id)                                     \
+    (MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN <= (id) && (id) <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX)
+#else
+#define KEY_ID_IN_BUILTIN_RANGE(id) 0
+#endif
+
+/* Range of file UIDs reserved for uses other than storing a key.
+ * Defined by the TF-PSA-Crypto storage specification
+ * docs/architecture/mbed-crypto-storage-specification.md */
+#define KEY_ID_IN_RESERVED_FILE_ID_RANGE(id) (0xffff0000 <= ((id) & 0xffffffff))
+
+/* Define a key ID that is in none of the recognized ranges and not 0 */
+#define KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES 0x7fffffffu
+
 #define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER "PSA\0KEY"
 #define PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER_LENGTH (sizeof(PSA_KEY_STORAGE_MAGIC_HEADER))
 
@@ -34,6 +57,9 @@ typedef struct {
     uint8_t key_data[];
 } psa_persistent_key_storage_format;
 
+const size_t persistent_key_payload_offset =
+    offsetof(psa_persistent_key_storage_format, key_data);
+
 /* END_HEADER */
 
 /* BEGIN_DEPENDENCIES
@@ -117,6 +143,48 @@ exit:
 }
 /* END_CASE */
 
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+void key_id_ranges()
+{
+    /* PSA Crypto API specification */
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_KEY_ID_NULL, 0x00000000);
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN, 0x00000001);
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX, 0x3fffffff);
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN, 0x40000000);
+    TEST_EQUAL(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX, 0x7fffffff);
+
+    /* Volatile key IDs */
+    TEST_LE_U(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN, PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN);
+    TEST_LE_U(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX, PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX);
+    TEST_LE_U(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN, PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX);
+
+    /* Built-in key IDs */
+    /* Mbed TLS 2.27 reserved  0x7fff0000..0x7fffefff for built-in keys.
+     * Integrators may have hard-coded built-in key IDs in this range,
+     * so if this range starts conflicting with something else, it's
+     * an incompatible change. */
+#if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
+    TEST_LE_U(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN, 0x7fff0000);
+    TEST_LE_U(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX, 0x7fffefff);
+    TEST_LE_U(PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN, MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN);
+    TEST_LE_U(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX, PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX);
+#endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
+    /* To avoid confusion, make sure we avoid the built-in key ID range
+     * even in builds without built-in keys.. */
+    if (PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN <= 0x7fff0000) {
+        TEST_LE_U(PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MAX + 1, 0x7fff0000);
+    } else {
+        TEST_LE_U(0x7fffefff + 1, PSA_KEY_ID_VOLATILE_MIN);
+    }
+
+    /* Sanity check on test data */
+    TEST_ASSERT(!KEY_ID_IN_USER_RANGE(KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES));
+    TEST_ASSERT(!KEY_ID_IN_VOLATILE_RANGE(KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES));
+    TEST_ASSERT(!KEY_ID_IN_BUILTIN_RANGE(KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES));
+    TEST_ASSERT(!KEY_ID_IN_RESERVED_FILE_ID_RANGE(KEY_ID_OUTSIDE_DEFINED_RANGES));
+}
+/* END_CASE */
+
 /* BEGIN_CASE */
 void save_large_persistent_key(int data_length_arg, int expected_status)
 {
@@ -338,3 +406,173 @@ exit:
     PSA_DONE();
 }
 /* END_CASE */
+
+/* BEGIN_CASE */
+/* Write content to the file that corresponds to the given key ID,
+ * then attempt to use a key with this ID.
+ * Depending on the validity of the key ID and storage content,
+ * this may or may not work.
+ */
+void load_primed_storage(int32_t owner_id,
+                         int64_t key_id_arg, /* 0..2^32-1 */
+                         data_t *content,
+                         int expected_attributes_status_arg,
+                         int expected_export_status_arg,
+                         int expected_destroy_status_arg)
+{
+    mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id = mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(owner_id, key_id_arg);
+    /* Storage UID (file name) for the given key ID, following the storage
+     * specification. */
+    psa_storage_uid_t uid = (uint64_t) owner_id << 32 | key_id_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_attributes_status = expected_attributes_status_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_export_status = expected_export_status_arg;
+    psa_status_t expected_destroy_status = expected_destroy_status_arg;
+    psa_key_attributes_t attributes = PSA_KEY_ATTRIBUTES_INIT;
+    uint8_t *key_data = NULL;
+    struct psa_storage_info_t info;
+
+    /* Sanity checks on the test data */
+    /* The test framework doesn't support unsigned types, so check that
+     * the key ID is in the actual valid range here. */
+    TEST_LE_U(0, key_id_arg);
+    TEST_LE_U(key_id_arg, 0xffffffff);
+#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
+    TEST_EQUAL(owner_id, 0);
+#endif
+
+    PSA_INIT();
+
+    /* This is the start of the test case, so normally, no key exists.
+     * The test data is based on the assumption that the key doesn't exist.
+     * However, there are some cases where a key does exist:
+     * - A volatile key used by the PSA RNG.
+     * - A built-in key provided by the platform (in our test code:
+     *   mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key() in platform_builtin_keys.c).
+     * In such cases, we'll have different expectations.
+     */
+    int key_already_existed =
+        psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &attributes) == PSA_SUCCESS;
+    if (key_already_existed) {
+        expected_attributes_status = PSA_SUCCESS;
+        expected_export_status =
+            (psa_get_key_usage_flags(&attributes) & PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT ?
+             PSA_SUCCESS :
+             PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(psa_get_key_type(&attributes)) ?
+             PSA_SUCCESS :
+             PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED);
+    }
+    /* In case this is a built-in key, psa_get_key_attributes()
+     * loads it into the cache. Purge the cache to make sure the loading
+     * code gets triggered. */
+    psa_purge_key(key_id);
+
+    /* Prime the storage. */
+    psa_status_t file_status = psa_its_get_info(uid, &info);
+    if (uid == 0) {
+        /* 0 is not a valid file ID, according to the PSA secure storage
+         * API specification. */
+        if (file_status == PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST) {
+            /* Our own partial storage implementation (psa_its_file.c)
+             * is not compliant, it returns the wrong error code here.
+             * That's not a problem, just let it go. */
+        } else {
+            TEST_EQUAL(file_status, PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+        }
+    } else if (KEY_ID_IN_RESERVED_FILE_ID_RANGE(key_id_arg) &&
+               file_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        /* The key ID corresponds to a reserved file (e.g. transaction
+         * log or entropy seed). Don't corrupt that file. */
+    } else {
+        TEST_EQUAL(file_status, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST);
+        TEST_EQUAL(psa_its_set(uid, content->len, content->x, 0), PSA_SUCCESS);
+    }
+
+    /* Reading attributes should work for any valid key. */
+    TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_attributes(key_id, &attributes),
+               expected_attributes_status);
+    if (expected_attributes_status == PSA_SUCCESS && !key_already_existed) {
+        /* It's not our job here to validate the attributes, but do
+         * sanity-check the attributes related to persistence. */
+        TEST_ASSERT(mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(key_id,
+                                             psa_get_key_id(&attributes)));
+        TEST_EQUAL(psa_get_key_lifetime(&attributes),
+                   PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT);
+    }
+
+    /* Extract the key material from the file.
+     * We assume that the file uses the standard key representation in
+     * storage, which is always the case at the time of writing.
+     * If the file is truncated, there is no key material, and we just
+     * declare an empty buffer here.
+     */
+    const uint8_t *payload = NULL;
+    size_t payload_length = 0;
+    if (content->len >= persistent_key_payload_offset) {
+        payload = content->x + persistent_key_payload_offset;
+        payload_length = content->len - persistent_key_payload_offset;
+    }
+
+    /* Exporting should work for a valid key that has export permission. */
+    /* Allocate enough memory for the key data (assuming the key
+     * representation in storage is not compressed compared to the
+     * export format). */
+    size_t key_data_size = content->len;
+    size_t key_data_length = SIZE_MAX;
+    TEST_CALLOC(key_data, key_data_size);
+    TEST_EQUAL(psa_export_key(key_id,
+                              key_data, key_data_size, &key_data_length),
+               expected_export_status);
+    if (expected_export_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+        if (key_already_existed) {
+            /* The key already existed. We don't know what it is,
+             * but check that it is not what we put in storage. */
+            TEST_ASSERT(key_data_length != payload_length ||
+                        memcmp(key_data, payload, payload_length));
+        } else {
+            TEST_MEMORY_COMPARE(key_data, key_data_length,
+                                payload, payload_length);
+        }
+    }
+    /* Assert that the data length is sensible even if export failed.
+     * This reduces the risk of memory corruption if an application
+     * doesn't check the return status of export(). */
+    TEST_LE_U(key_data_length, key_data_size);
+
+    if (key_already_existed) {
+        /* There was a key with the key ID under test, for example a key
+         * used by the PSA RNG. Don't disrupt whatever is using that key.
+         * Pure the key cache: this is necessary if the key was a built-in
+         * key which got loaded into the cache by the get_attributes and
+         * export calls above, otherwise PSA_DONE() would legitimately
+         * complain about a non-empty cache.
+         */
+        psa_purge_key(key_id);
+    } else {
+        /* Destroying the key should work even for malformed content.
+         * But it should not work for reserved file IDs. */
+        TEST_EQUAL(psa_destroy_key(key_id), expected_destroy_status);
+        if (uid == 0) {
+            /* Invalid file UID. No point in asserting anything about the file. */
+        } else if (expected_destroy_status == PSA_SUCCESS) {
+            file_status = psa_its_get_info(uid, &info);
+            if (key_id_arg == 0) {
+                /* psa_destroy_key(0) is defined as a no-op, so it should not
+                 * affect the file. */
+                TEST_EQUAL(file_status, PSA_SUCCESS);
+            } else {
+                TEST_EQUAL(file_status, PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+exit:
+    psa_reset_key_attributes(&attributes);
+    PSA_DONE();
+    if (!KEY_ID_IN_RESERVED_FILE_ID_RANGE(key_id_arg)) {
+        /* The key ID corresponds to a reserved file (e.g. transaction
+         * log or entropy seed). Don't corrupt that file. */
+        psa_its_remove(uid);
+    }
+    mbedtls_free(key_data);
+}
+/* END_CASE */