mirror of
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git
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Redo of PR#5345. Fixed spelling and typographical errors found by CodeSpell.
Signed-off-by: Shaun Case <warmsocks@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Rodgman <dave.rodgman@arm.com>
This commit is contained in:
@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@ typedef unsigned char mbedtls_be128[16];
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*
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* This function multiplies a field element by x in the polynomial field
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* representation. It uses 64-bit word operations to gain speed but compensates
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* for machine endianess and hence works correctly on both big and little
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* for machine endianness and hence works correctly on both big and little
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* endian machines.
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*/
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static void mbedtls_gf128mul_x_ble( unsigned char r[16],
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@ -1206,7 +1206,7 @@ int mbedtls_aes_crypt_xts( mbedtls_aes_xts_context *ctx,
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unsigned char *prev_output = output - 16;
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/* Copy ciphertext bytes from the previous block to our output for each
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* byte of cyphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the
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* byte of ciphertext we won't steal. At the same time, copy the
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* remainder of the input for this final round (since the loop bounds
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* are the same). */
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for( i = 0; i < leftover; i++ )
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@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ int mbedtls_mpi_gcd( mbedtls_mpi *G, const mbedtls_mpi *A, const mbedtls_mpi *B
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* TA-TB is even so the division by 2 has an integer result.
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* Invariant (I) is preserved since any odd divisor of both TA and TB
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* also divides |TA-TB|/2, and any odd divisor of both TA and |TA-TB|/2
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* also divides TB, and any odd divisior of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also
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* also divides TB, and any odd divisor of both TB and |TA-TB|/2 also
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* divides TA.
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*/
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if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &TA, &TB ) >= 0 )
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@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ cleanup:
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/*
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* Conditionally swap X and Y, without leaking information
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* about whether the swap was made or not.
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* Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which whould lead to
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* Here it is not ok to simply swap the pointers, which would lead to
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* different memory access patterns when X and Y are used afterwards.
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*/
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int mbedtls_mpi_safe_cond_swap( mbedtls_mpi *X,
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@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ cleanup:
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/*
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* Read a ECJPAKEKeyKPPairList (7.4.2.3) and check proofs
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* Ouputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb
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* Outputs: verified peer public keys Xa, Xb
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*/
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static int ecjpake_kkpp_read( const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info,
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const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
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@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ cleanup:
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* For curves in short Weierstrass form, we do all the internal operations in
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* Jacobian coordinates.
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*
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* For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with coutermeasueres against
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* For multiplication, we'll use a comb method with countermeasures against
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* SPA, hence timing attacks.
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*/
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@ -2251,7 +2251,7 @@ static unsigned char ecp_pick_window_size( const mbedtls_ecp_group *grp,
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* This function is mainly responsible for administrative work:
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* - managing the restart context if enabled
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* - managing the table of precomputed points (passed between the below two
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* functions): allocation, computation, ownership tranfer, freeing.
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* functions): allocation, computation, ownership transfer, freeing.
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*
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* It delegates the actual arithmetic work to:
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* ecp_precompute_comb() and ecp_mul_comb_with_precomp()
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@ -2422,7 +2422,7 @@ cleanup:
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/*
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* For Montgomery curves, we do all the internal arithmetic in projective
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* coordinates. Import/export of points uses only the x coordinates, which is
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* internaly represented as X / Z.
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* internally represented as X / Z.
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*
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* For scalar multiplication, we'll use a Montgomery ladder.
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*/
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@ -2592,7 +2592,7 @@ static int ecp_mul_mxz( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, mbedtls_ecp_point *R,
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MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &R->Z, 0 ) );
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mbedtls_mpi_free( &R->Y );
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/* RP.X might be sligtly larger than P, so reduce it */
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/* RP.X might be slightly larger than P, so reduce it */
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MOD_ADD( RP.X );
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/* Randomize coordinates of the starting point */
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@ -555,8 +555,8 @@ static void *buffer_alloc_calloc_mutexed( size_t n, size_t size )
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static void buffer_alloc_free_mutexed( void *ptr )
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{
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/* We have to good option here, but corrupting the heap seems
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* worse than loosing memory. */
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/* We have no good option here, but corrupting the heap seems
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* worse than losing memory. */
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if( mbedtls_mutex_lock( &heap.mutex ) )
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return;
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buffer_alloc_free( ptr );
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@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ static int pk_use_ecparams( const mbedtls_asn1_buf *params, mbedtls_ecp_group *g
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}
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/*
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* grp may already be initilialized; if so, make sure IDs match
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* grp may already be initialized; if so, make sure IDs match
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*/
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if( grp->id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE && grp->id != grp_id )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_KEY_INVALID_FORMAT );
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@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static int pk_parse_key_pkcs1_der( mbedtls_rsa_context *rsa,
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goto cleanup;
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#else
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/* Verify existance of the CRT params */
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/* Verify existence of the CRT params */
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if( ( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
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( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 ||
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( ret = asn1_get_nonzero_mpi( &p, end, &T ) ) != 0 )
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@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_get_and_lock_key_slot_with_policy(
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goto error;
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}
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/* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algortihm. */
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/* Enforce that the usage policy permits the requested algorithm. */
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if( alg != 0 )
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{
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status = psa_key_policy_permits( &slot->attr.policy,
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@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_hash_update(
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* This function calculates the hash of the message formed by concatenating
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* the inputs passed to preceding calls to mbedtls_psa_hash_update().
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*
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* When this function returns successfuly, the operation becomes inactive.
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* When this function returns successfully, the operation becomes inactive.
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* If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
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* state and must be aborted by calling mbedtls_psa_hash_abort().
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*
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@ -832,10 +832,10 @@ cleanup:
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* the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3].
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*
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* Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n)
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* observations on avarage.
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* observations on average.
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*
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* For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has
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* to make 2^112 observations on avarage.
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* to make 2^112 observations on average.
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*
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* (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048
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* bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys.
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@ -3151,7 +3151,7 @@ start_processing:
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MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
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}
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} /* FALLTROUGH */
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} /* FALLTHROUGH */
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
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@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
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/*
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* Cookies are formed of a 4-bytes timestamp (or serial number) and
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* an HMAC of timestemp and client ID.
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* an HMAC of timestamp and client ID.
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*/
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#define COOKIE_LEN ( 4 + COOKIE_HMAC_LEN )
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@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ int mbedtls_ssl_decrypt_buf( mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
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add_data, add_data_len );
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/* Because of the check above, we know that there are
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* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceeding data, and taglen
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* explicit_iv_len Bytes preceding data, and taglen
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* bytes following data + data_len. This justifies
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* the debug message and the invocation of
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* mbedtls_cipher_auth_decrypt() below. */
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@ -1583,7 +1583,7 @@ read_record_header:
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* Handshake layer:
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* 0 . 0 handshake type
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* 1 . 3 handshake length
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* 4 . 5 DTLS only: message seqence number
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* 4 . 5 DTLS only: message sequence number
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* 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset
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* 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length
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*/
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@ -4208,7 +4208,7 @@ static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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/* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation atomatically
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/* For opaque PSKs, we perform the PSK-to-MS derivation automatically
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* and skip the intermediate PMS. */
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if( ssl_use_opaque_psk( ssl ) == 1 )
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) );
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@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
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#include <string.h>
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/*
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* Initialze context
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* Initialize context
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*/
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void mbedtls_ssl_ticket_init( mbedtls_ssl_ticket_context *ctx )
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{
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@ -3429,7 +3429,7 @@ void mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup_free_hs_transform( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
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ssl->handshake = NULL;
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/*
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* Free the previous transform and swith in the current one
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* Free the previous transform and switch in the current one
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*/
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if( ssl->transform )
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{
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