lib/mbedtls
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls.git synced 2025-08-01 10:06:53 +03:00
Code Activity

Rename PSA_KDF_STEP_xxx -> PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_xxx

Browse Source 
More consistent with the new function names.
This commit is contained in:
Gilles Peskine
2019-05-16 16:05:19 +02:00
parent a99d3fbd05
commit 03410b5c5f
3 changed files with 33 additions and 33 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

14
library/psa_crypto.c
View File

@ -4914,7 +4914,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_generator_t *hkdf,
psa_status_t status;
switch( step )
{
case PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT:
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:
if( hkdf->state != HKDF_STATE_INIT )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
status = psa_hmac_setup_internal( &hkdf->hmac,
@ -4924,7 +4924,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_generator_t *hkdf,
return( status );
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_STARTED;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
case PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET:
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET:
/* If no salt was provided, use an empty salt. */
if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_INIT )
{
@ -4950,7 +4950,7 @@ static psa_status_t psa_hkdf_input( psa_hkdf_generator_t *hkdf,
hkdf->block_number = 0;
hkdf->state = HKDF_STATE_KEYED;
return( PSA_SUCCESS );
case PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO:
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:
if( hkdf->state == HKDF_STATE_OUTPUT )
return( PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE );
if( hkdf->info_set )
@ -5029,9 +5029,9 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_bytes( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *gen
{
switch( step )
{
case PSA_KDF_STEP_LABEL:
case PSA_KDF_STEP_SALT:
case PSA_KDF_STEP_INFO:
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL:
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT:
case PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO:
return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator, step,
data, data_length ) );
default:
@ -5058,7 +5058,7 @@ psa_status_t psa_key_derivation_input_key( psa_key_derivation_operation_t *gener
* the material should be dedicated to a particular input step,
* otherwise this may allow the key to be used in an unintended way
* and leak values derived from the key. So be conservative. */
if( step != PSA_KDF_STEP_SECRET )
if( step != PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET )
return( PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT );
return( psa_key_derivation_input_raw( generator,
step,