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misc: Add function to check username syntax
Malicious code can be injected using the username with metacharacters, therefore the username must be validated before using it with any %u. Signed-off-by: Norbert Pocs <norbertpocs0@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
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committed by
Jakub Jelen
parent
d7f7c952f2
commit
ebcd6eee3c
@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ ssize_t ssh_readn(int fd, void *buf, size_t nbytes);
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ssize_t ssh_writen(int fd, const void *buf, size_t nbytes);
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int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname);
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int ssh_check_username_syntax(const char *username);
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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32
src/misc.c
32
src/misc.c
@ -2187,4 +2187,36 @@ int ssh_check_hostname_syntax(const char *hostname)
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return SSH_OK;
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}
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/**
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* @brief Checks syntax of a username
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*
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* This check disallows metacharacters in the username
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*
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* @param username The username to be checked, has to be null terminated
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*
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* @return SSH_OK if the username passes syntax check
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* SSH_ERROR otherwise or if username is NULL or empty string
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*/
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int ssh_check_username_syntax(const char *username)
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{
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size_t username_len;
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if (username == NULL || *username == '-') {
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return SSH_ERROR;
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}
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username_len = strlen(username);
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if (username_len == 0 || username[username_len - 1] == '\\' ||
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strpbrk(username, "'`\";&<>|(){}") != NULL) {
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return SSH_ERROR;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < username_len; i++) {
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if (isspace(username[i]) != 0 && username[i + 1] == '-') {
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return SSH_ERROR;
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}
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}
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return SSH_OK;
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}
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/** @} */
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@ -1058,6 +1058,39 @@ static void torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax(void **state)
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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}
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static void torture_ssh_check_username_syntax(void **state) {
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int rc;
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(void)state;
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("username");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("Alice");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("Alice and Bob");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("n4me?");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_OK);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("alice&bob");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("backslash\\");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("&var|()us\"<ha`r{}'");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax(" -");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("me and -");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("los -santos");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("- who?");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax(NULL);
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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rc = ssh_check_username_syntax("");
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assert_int_equal(rc, SSH_ERROR);
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}
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static void torture_ssh_is_ipaddr(void **state) {
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int rc;
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char *interf = malloc(64);
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@ -1123,6 +1156,7 @@ int torture_run_tests(void) {
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cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_readn),
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cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_writen),
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cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_check_hostname_syntax),
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cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_check_username_syntax),
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cmocka_unit_test(torture_ssh_is_ipaddr),
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};
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