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https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git
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packet: Do not decrypt zero length rest of buffer
If we receive a packet of length exactly blocksize, then packet_decrypt gets called on a buffer of size 0. The check at the beginning of packet_decrypt indicates that the function should be called on buffers of at least one blocksize, though the check allows through zero length. As is packet_decrypt can return -1 when len is 0 because malloc can return NULL in this case: according to the ISO C standard, malloc is free to return NULL or a pointer that can be freed when size == 0, and uclibc by default will return NULL here (in "non-glibc-compatible" mode). The net result is that when using uclibc connections with libssh can anomalously fail. Alternatively, packet_decrypt (and probably packet_encrypt for consistency) could be made to always succeed on len == 0 without depending on the behavior of malloc. Thanks to Josh Berlin for bringing conneciton failures with uclibc to my attention. Signed-off-by: Alan Dunn <amdunn@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <asn@cryptomilk.org>
This commit is contained in:
committed by
Andreas Schneider
parent
4ea4e12df2
commit
e7f831f0a3
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
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const uint8_t *packet;
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int to_be_read;
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int rc;
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uint32_t len, compsize, payloadsize;
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uint32_t len, compsize, payloadsize, buffer_len;
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uint8_t padding;
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size_t processed = 0; /* number of byte processed from the callback */
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@@ -251,13 +251,18 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user)
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* Decrypt the rest of the packet (blocksize bytes already
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* have been decrypted)
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*/
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/* The following check avoids decrypting zero bytes */
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buffer_len = buffer_get_rest_len(session->in_buffer);
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if (buffer_len != blocksize) {
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rc = packet_decrypt(session,
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((uint8_t*)buffer_get_rest(session->in_buffer) + blocksize),
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buffer_get_rest_len(session->in_buffer) - blocksize);
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buffer_len - blocksize);
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if (rc < 0) {
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ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Decrypt error");
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goto error;
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}
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}
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/* copy the last part from the incoming buffer */
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packet = ((uint8_t *)data) + processed;
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@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback1(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user
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size_t processed=0;
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uint32_t padding;
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uint32_t crc;
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uint32_t len;
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uint32_t len, buffer_len;
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ssh_session session=(ssh_session)user;
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switch (session->packet_state){
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@@ -168,13 +168,18 @@ int ssh_packet_socket_callback1(const void *data, size_t receivedlen, void *user
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* We decrypt everything, missing the lenght part (which was
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* previously read, unencrypted, and is not part of the buffer
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*/
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if (packet_decrypt(session,
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buffer_len = ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer);
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if (buffer_len > 0) {
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int rc;
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rc = packet_decrypt(session,
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ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->in_buffer),
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ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer)) < 0) {
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buffer_len);
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if (rc < 0) {
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ssh_set_error(session, SSH_FATAL, "Packet decrypt error");
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goto error;
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}
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}
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}
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#ifdef DEBUG_CRYPTO
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ssh_print_hexa("read packet decrypted:", ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->in_buffer),
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ssh_buffer_get_len(session->in_buffer));
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@@ -300,6 +305,8 @@ int packet_send1(ssh_session session) {
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ssh_buffer_get_len(session->out_buffer));
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#endif
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/* session->out_buffer should have more than sizeof(uint32_t) bytes
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in it as required for packet_encrypt */
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packet_encrypt(session, (unsigned char *)ssh_buffer_get_begin(session->out_buffer) + sizeof(uint32_t),
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ssh_buffer_get_len(session->out_buffer) - sizeof(uint32_t));
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