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glibc/sysdeps/unix/grantpt.c
Aurelien Jarno 77356912e8 grantpt: trust the kernel about pty group and permission mode
According to POSIX the grantpt() function does the following:

  The grantpt() function shall change the mode and ownership of the
  slave pseudo-terminal device associated with its master
  pseudo-terminal counterpart. The fildes argument is a file descriptor
  that refers to a master pseudo-terminal device. The user ID of the
  slave shall be set to the real UID of the calling process and the
  group ID shall be set to an unspecified group ID. The permission
  mode of the slave pseudo-terminal shall be set to readable and
  writable by the owner, and writable by the group.

Historically the GNU libc has been responsible to setup the permission
mode to 0620 and the group to 'tty' usually number 5, using the pt_chown
helper, badly known for its security issues. With the creation of the
devpts filesytem in the Linux kernel, this responsibility has been moved
to the Linux kernel. The system is responsible to mount the devpts
filesystem in /dev/pts with the options gid=5 and mode=0620. In that
case the GNU libc has nothing to do and pt_chown is not need anymore. So
far so good.

The problem is that by default the devpts filesystem is shared between
all mounts, and that contrary to other filesystem, the mount options are
honored at the second mount, including for the default mount options.
Given it corresponds to mode=0600 without gid parameter (that is the
filesystem GID of the creating process), it's common to see systems
where the devpts filesystem is mounted using these options. It is enough
to run a "mount -t devpts devpts /mychroot/dev/pts" to come into this
situation, and it's unfortunately wrongly used in a lot of scripts
dealing with chroots, or for creating virtual machines images.

When this happens the GNU libc tries to fix the group and permission
mode of the pty nodes, and given it fails to do so for non-root users,
grantpt() almost always fail. It means users are not able to open new
terminals.

This patch changes grantpt() to not enforce this anymore, while still
enforcing minimum security measures to the permission mode. Therefore
the responsibility to follow POSIX is now shared at the system level,
i.e. kernel + system scripts + GNU libc. It stops trying to change the
group, and makes the pty node readable and writable by the owner, and
writable by the group only when originally writable and when the group
is the tty one.

As a result, on a system wrongly mounted with gid=0 and mode=0600, the
pty nodes won't be accessible by the tty group, but the grantpt()
function will succeed and users will have a working system. The system
is not fully POSIX compliant (which might be an admin choice to default
to "mesg n" mode), but the GNU libc is not to blame here, as without the
pt_chown helper it can't do anything.

With this patch there should not be any reason left to build the GNU
libc with the --enable-pt_chown configure option on a GNU/Linux system.
2015-12-10 22:33:10 +01:00

261 lines
6.6 KiB
C

/* Copyright (C) 1998-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This file is part of the GNU C Library.
Contributed by Zack Weinberg <zack@rabi.phys.columbia.edu>, 1998.
The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "pty-private.h"
/* Return the result of ptsname_r in the buffer pointed to by PTS,
which should be of length BUF_LEN. If it is too long to fit in
this buffer, a sufficiently long buffer is allocated using malloc,
and returned in PTS. 0 is returned upon success, -1 otherwise. */
static int
pts_name (int fd, char **pts, size_t buf_len, struct stat64 *stp)
{
int rv;
char *buf = *pts;
for (;;)
{
char *new_buf;
if (buf_len)
{
rv = __ptsname_internal (fd, buf, buf_len, stp);
if (rv != 0)
{
if (rv == ENOTTY)
/* ptsname_r returns with ENOTTY to indicate
a descriptor not referring to a pty master.
For this condition, grantpt must return EINVAL. */
rv = EINVAL;
errno = rv; /* Not necessarily set by __ptsname_r. */
break;
}
if (memchr (buf, '\0', buf_len))
/* We succeeded and the returned name fit in the buffer. */
break;
/* Try again with a longer buffer. */
buf_len += buf_len; /* Double it */
}
else
/* No initial buffer; start out by mallocing one. */
buf_len = 128; /* First time guess. */
if (buf != *pts)
/* We've already malloced another buffer at least once. */
new_buf = (char *) realloc (buf, buf_len);
else
new_buf = (char *) malloc (buf_len);
if (! new_buf)
{
rv = -1;
__set_errno (ENOMEM);
break;
}
buf = new_buf;
}
if (rv == 0)
*pts = buf; /* Return buffer to the user. */
else if (buf != *pts)
free (buf); /* Free what we malloced when returning an error. */
return rv;
}
/* Change the ownership and access permission of the slave pseudo
terminal associated with the master pseudo terminal specified
by FD. */
int
grantpt (int fd)
{
int retval = -1;
#ifdef PATH_MAX
char _buf[PATH_MAX];
#else
char _buf[512];
#endif
char *buf = _buf;
struct stat64 st;
if (__glibc_unlikely (pts_name (fd, &buf, sizeof (_buf), &st)))
{
int save_errno = errno;
/* Check, if the file descriptor is valid. pts_name returns the
wrong errno number, so we cannot use that. */
if (__libc_fcntl (fd, F_GETFD) == -1 && errno == EBADF)
return -1;
/* If the filedescriptor is no TTY, grantpt has to set errno
to EINVAL. */
if (save_errno == ENOTTY)
__set_errno (EINVAL);
else
__set_errno (save_errno);
return -1;
}
/* Make sure that we own the device. */
uid_t uid = __getuid ();
if (st.st_uid != uid)
{
if (__chown (buf, uid, st.st_gid) < 0)
goto helper;
}
static int tty_gid = -1;
if (__glibc_unlikely (tty_gid == -1))
{
char *grtmpbuf;
struct group grbuf;
size_t grbuflen = __sysconf (_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);
struct group *p;
/* Get the group ID of the special `tty' group. */
if (grbuflen == (size_t) -1L)
/* `sysconf' does not support _SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX.
Try a moderate value. */
grbuflen = 1024;
grtmpbuf = (char *) __alloca (grbuflen);
__getgrnam_r (TTY_GROUP, &grbuf, grtmpbuf, grbuflen, &p);
if (p != NULL)
tty_gid = p->gr_gid;
}
gid_t gid = tty_gid == -1 ? __getgid () : tty_gid;
#if HAVE_PT_CHOWN
/* Make sure the group of the device is that special group. */
if (st.st_gid != gid)
{
if (__chown (buf, uid, gid) < 0)
goto helper;
}
/* Make sure the permission mode is set to readable and writable by
the owner, and writable by the group. */
mode_t mode = S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IWGRP;
#else
/* When built without pt_chown, we have delegated the creation of the
pty node with the right group and permission mode to the kernel, and
non-root users are unlikely to be able to change it. Therefore let's
consider that POSIX enforcement is the responsibility of the whole
system and not only the GNU libc. Thus accept different group or
permission mode. */
/* Make sure the permission is set to readable and writable by the
owner. For security reasons, make it writable by the group only
when originally writable and when the group of the device is that
special group. */
mode_t mode = S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|
((st.st_gid == gid) ? (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP) : 0);
#endif
if ((st.st_mode & ACCESSPERMS) != mode)
{
if (__chmod (buf, mode) < 0)
goto helper;
}
retval = 0;
goto cleanup;
/* We have to use the helper program if it is available. */
helper:;
#if HAVE_PT_CHOWN
pid_t pid = __fork ();
if (pid == -1)
goto cleanup;
else if (pid == 0)
{
/* Disable core dumps. */
struct rlimit rl = { 0, 0 };
__setrlimit (RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
/* We pass the master pseudo terminal as file descriptor PTY_FILENO. */
if (fd != PTY_FILENO)
if (__dup2 (fd, PTY_FILENO) < 0)
_exit (FAIL_EBADF);
# ifdef CLOSE_ALL_FDS
CLOSE_ALL_FDS ();
# endif
execle (_PATH_PT_CHOWN, __basename (_PATH_PT_CHOWN), NULL, NULL);
_exit (FAIL_EXEC);
}
else
{
int w;
if (__waitpid (pid, &w, 0) == -1)
goto cleanup;
if (!WIFEXITED (w))
__set_errno (ENOEXEC);
else
switch (WEXITSTATUS (w))
{
case 0:
retval = 0;
break;
case FAIL_EBADF:
__set_errno (EBADF);
break;
case FAIL_EINVAL:
__set_errno (EINVAL);
break;
case FAIL_EACCES:
__set_errno (EACCES);
break;
case FAIL_EXEC:
__set_errno (ENOEXEC);
break;
case FAIL_ENOMEM:
__set_errno (ENOMEM);
break;
default:
assert(! "grantpt: internal error: invalid exit code from pt_chown");
}
}
#endif
cleanup:
if (buf != _buf)
free (buf);
return retval;
}