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According to POSIX the grantpt() function does the following: The grantpt() function shall change the mode and ownership of the slave pseudo-terminal device associated with its master pseudo-terminal counterpart. The fildes argument is a file descriptor that refers to a master pseudo-terminal device. The user ID of the slave shall be set to the real UID of the calling process and the group ID shall be set to an unspecified group ID. The permission mode of the slave pseudo-terminal shall be set to readable and writable by the owner, and writable by the group. Historically the GNU libc has been responsible to setup the permission mode to 0620 and the group to 'tty' usually number 5, using the pt_chown helper, badly known for its security issues. With the creation of the devpts filesytem in the Linux kernel, this responsibility has been moved to the Linux kernel. The system is responsible to mount the devpts filesystem in /dev/pts with the options gid=5 and mode=0620. In that case the GNU libc has nothing to do and pt_chown is not need anymore. So far so good. The problem is that by default the devpts filesystem is shared between all mounts, and that contrary to other filesystem, the mount options are honored at the second mount, including for the default mount options. Given it corresponds to mode=0600 without gid parameter (that is the filesystem GID of the creating process), it's common to see systems where the devpts filesystem is mounted using these options. It is enough to run a "mount -t devpts devpts /mychroot/dev/pts" to come into this situation, and it's unfortunately wrongly used in a lot of scripts dealing with chroots, or for creating virtual machines images. When this happens the GNU libc tries to fix the group and permission mode of the pty nodes, and given it fails to do so for non-root users, grantpt() almost always fail. It means users are not able to open new terminals. This patch changes grantpt() to not enforce this anymore, while still enforcing minimum security measures to the permission mode. Therefore the responsibility to follow POSIX is now shared at the system level, i.e. kernel + system scripts + GNU libc. It stops trying to change the group, and makes the pty node readable and writable by the owner, and writable by the group only when originally writable and when the group is the tty one. As a result, on a system wrongly mounted with gid=0 and mode=0600, the pty nodes won't be accessible by the tty group, but the grantpt() function will succeed and users will have a working system. The system is not fully POSIX compliant (which might be an admin choice to default to "mesg n" mode), but the GNU libc is not to blame here, as without the pt_chown helper it can't do anything. With this patch there should not be any reason left to build the GNU libc with the --enable-pt_chown configure option on a GNU/Linux system.
261 lines
6.6 KiB
C
261 lines
6.6 KiB
C
/* Copyright (C) 1998-2015 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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This file is part of the GNU C Library.
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Contributed by Zack Weinberg <zack@rabi.phys.columbia.edu>, 1998.
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The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
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modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
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License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
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version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
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The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
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Lesser General Public License for more details.
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You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
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License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
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<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#include <grp.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sys/resource.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "pty-private.h"
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/* Return the result of ptsname_r in the buffer pointed to by PTS,
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which should be of length BUF_LEN. If it is too long to fit in
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this buffer, a sufficiently long buffer is allocated using malloc,
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and returned in PTS. 0 is returned upon success, -1 otherwise. */
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static int
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pts_name (int fd, char **pts, size_t buf_len, struct stat64 *stp)
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{
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int rv;
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char *buf = *pts;
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for (;;)
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{
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char *new_buf;
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if (buf_len)
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{
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rv = __ptsname_internal (fd, buf, buf_len, stp);
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if (rv != 0)
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{
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if (rv == ENOTTY)
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/* ptsname_r returns with ENOTTY to indicate
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a descriptor not referring to a pty master.
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For this condition, grantpt must return EINVAL. */
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rv = EINVAL;
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errno = rv; /* Not necessarily set by __ptsname_r. */
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break;
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}
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if (memchr (buf, '\0', buf_len))
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/* We succeeded and the returned name fit in the buffer. */
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break;
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/* Try again with a longer buffer. */
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buf_len += buf_len; /* Double it */
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}
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else
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/* No initial buffer; start out by mallocing one. */
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buf_len = 128; /* First time guess. */
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if (buf != *pts)
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/* We've already malloced another buffer at least once. */
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new_buf = (char *) realloc (buf, buf_len);
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else
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new_buf = (char *) malloc (buf_len);
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if (! new_buf)
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{
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rv = -1;
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__set_errno (ENOMEM);
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break;
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}
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buf = new_buf;
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}
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if (rv == 0)
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*pts = buf; /* Return buffer to the user. */
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else if (buf != *pts)
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free (buf); /* Free what we malloced when returning an error. */
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return rv;
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}
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/* Change the ownership and access permission of the slave pseudo
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terminal associated with the master pseudo terminal specified
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by FD. */
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int
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grantpt (int fd)
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{
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int retval = -1;
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#ifdef PATH_MAX
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char _buf[PATH_MAX];
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#else
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char _buf[512];
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#endif
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char *buf = _buf;
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struct stat64 st;
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if (__glibc_unlikely (pts_name (fd, &buf, sizeof (_buf), &st)))
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{
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int save_errno = errno;
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/* Check, if the file descriptor is valid. pts_name returns the
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wrong errno number, so we cannot use that. */
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if (__libc_fcntl (fd, F_GETFD) == -1 && errno == EBADF)
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return -1;
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/* If the filedescriptor is no TTY, grantpt has to set errno
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to EINVAL. */
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if (save_errno == ENOTTY)
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__set_errno (EINVAL);
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else
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__set_errno (save_errno);
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return -1;
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}
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/* Make sure that we own the device. */
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uid_t uid = __getuid ();
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if (st.st_uid != uid)
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{
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if (__chown (buf, uid, st.st_gid) < 0)
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goto helper;
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}
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static int tty_gid = -1;
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if (__glibc_unlikely (tty_gid == -1))
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{
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char *grtmpbuf;
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struct group grbuf;
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size_t grbuflen = __sysconf (_SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX);
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struct group *p;
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/* Get the group ID of the special `tty' group. */
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if (grbuflen == (size_t) -1L)
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/* `sysconf' does not support _SC_GETGR_R_SIZE_MAX.
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Try a moderate value. */
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grbuflen = 1024;
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grtmpbuf = (char *) __alloca (grbuflen);
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__getgrnam_r (TTY_GROUP, &grbuf, grtmpbuf, grbuflen, &p);
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if (p != NULL)
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tty_gid = p->gr_gid;
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}
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gid_t gid = tty_gid == -1 ? __getgid () : tty_gid;
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#if HAVE_PT_CHOWN
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/* Make sure the group of the device is that special group. */
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if (st.st_gid != gid)
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{
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if (__chown (buf, uid, gid) < 0)
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goto helper;
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}
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/* Make sure the permission mode is set to readable and writable by
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the owner, and writable by the group. */
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mode_t mode = S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IWGRP;
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#else
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/* When built without pt_chown, we have delegated the creation of the
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pty node with the right group and permission mode to the kernel, and
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non-root users are unlikely to be able to change it. Therefore let's
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consider that POSIX enforcement is the responsibility of the whole
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system and not only the GNU libc. Thus accept different group or
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permission mode. */
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/* Make sure the permission is set to readable and writable by the
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owner. For security reasons, make it writable by the group only
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when originally writable and when the group of the device is that
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special group. */
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mode_t mode = S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|
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((st.st_gid == gid) ? (st.st_mode & S_IWGRP) : 0);
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#endif
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if ((st.st_mode & ACCESSPERMS) != mode)
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{
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if (__chmod (buf, mode) < 0)
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goto helper;
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}
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retval = 0;
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goto cleanup;
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/* We have to use the helper program if it is available. */
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helper:;
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#if HAVE_PT_CHOWN
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pid_t pid = __fork ();
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if (pid == -1)
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goto cleanup;
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else if (pid == 0)
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{
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/* Disable core dumps. */
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struct rlimit rl = { 0, 0 };
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__setrlimit (RLIMIT_CORE, &rl);
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/* We pass the master pseudo terminal as file descriptor PTY_FILENO. */
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if (fd != PTY_FILENO)
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if (__dup2 (fd, PTY_FILENO) < 0)
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_exit (FAIL_EBADF);
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# ifdef CLOSE_ALL_FDS
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CLOSE_ALL_FDS ();
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# endif
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execle (_PATH_PT_CHOWN, __basename (_PATH_PT_CHOWN), NULL, NULL);
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_exit (FAIL_EXEC);
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}
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else
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{
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int w;
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if (__waitpid (pid, &w, 0) == -1)
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goto cleanup;
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if (!WIFEXITED (w))
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__set_errno (ENOEXEC);
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else
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switch (WEXITSTATUS (w))
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{
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case 0:
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retval = 0;
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break;
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case FAIL_EBADF:
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__set_errno (EBADF);
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break;
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case FAIL_EINVAL:
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__set_errno (EINVAL);
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break;
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case FAIL_EACCES:
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__set_errno (EACCES);
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break;
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case FAIL_EXEC:
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__set_errno (ENOEXEC);
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break;
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case FAIL_ENOMEM:
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__set_errno (ENOMEM);
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break;
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default:
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assert(! "grantpt: internal error: invalid exit code from pt_chown");
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}
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}
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#endif
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cleanup:
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if (buf != _buf)
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free (buf);
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return retval;
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}
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