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mirror of https://sourceware.org/git/glibc.git synced 2025-08-08 17:42:12 +03:00

elf: Ignore GLIBC_TUNABLES for setuid/setgid binaries

The tunable privilege levels were a retrofit to try and keep the malloc
tunable environment variables' behavior unchanged across security
boundaries.  However, CVE-2023-4911 shows how tricky can be
tunable parsing in a security-sensitive environment.

Not only parsing, but the malloc tunable essentially changes some
semantics on setuid/setgid processes.  Although it is not a direct
security issue, allowing users to change setuid/setgid semantics is not
a good security practice, and requires extra code and analysis to check
if each tunable is safe to use on all security boundaries.

It also means that security opt-in features, like aarch64 MTE, would
need to be explicit enabled by an administrator with a wrapper script
or with a possible future system-wide tunable setting.

Co-authored-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar  <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
Reviewed-by: DJ Delorie <dj@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 17:25:36 -03:00
parent a72a4eb10b
commit 9c96c87d60
9 changed files with 299 additions and 161 deletions

View File

@@ -64,16 +64,6 @@ struct _tunable
tunable_val_t val; /* The value. */
bool initialized; /* Flag to indicate that the tunable is
initialized. */
tunable_seclevel_t security_level; /* Specify the security level for the
tunable with respect to AT_SECURE
programs. See description of
tunable_seclevel_t to see a
description of the values.
Note that even if the tunable is
read, it may not get used by the
target module if the value is
considered unsafe. */
/* Compatibility elements. */
const char env_alias[TUNABLE_ALIAS_MAX]; /* The compatibility environment
variable name. */