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Tom Lane ea46000a40 Arrange for client authentication to occur before we select a specific
database to connect to. This is necessary for the walsender code to work
properly (it was previously using an untenable assumption that template1 would
always be available to connect to).  This also gets rid of a small security
shortcoming that was introduced in the original patch to eliminate the flat
authentication files: before, you could find out whether or not the requested
database existed even if you couldn't pass the authentication checks.

The changes needed to support this are mainly just to treat pg_authid and
pg_auth_members as nailed relations, so that we can read them without having
to be able to locate real pg_class entries for them.  This mechanism was
already debugged for pg_database, but we hadn't recognized the value of
applying it to those catalogs too.

Since the current code doesn't have support for accessing toast tables before
we've brought up all of the relcache, remove pg_authid's toast table to ensure
that no one can store an out-of-line toasted value of rolpassword.  The case
seems quite unlikely to occur in practice, and was effectively unsupported
anyway in the old "flatfiles" implementation.

Update genbki.pl to actually implement the same rules as bootstrap.c does for
not-nullability of catalog columns.  The previous coding was a bit cheesy but
worked all right for the previous set of bootstrap catalogs.  It does not work
for pg_authid, where rolvaliduntil needs to be nullable.

Initdb forced due to minor catalog changes (mainly the toast table removal).
2010-04-20 23:48:47 +00:00

1247 lines
34 KiB
C

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* miscinit.c
* miscellaneous initialization support stuff
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2010, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/utils/init/miscinit.c,v 1.184 2010/04/20 23:48:47 tgl Exp $
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H
#include <utime.h>
#endif
#include "catalog/pg_authid.h"
#include "mb/pg_wchar.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "postmaster/autovacuum.h"
#include "storage/fd.h"
#include "storage/ipc.h"
#include "storage/pg_shmem.h"
#include "storage/proc.h"
#include "storage/procarray.h"
#include "utils/builtins.h"
#include "utils/guc.h"
#include "utils/memutils.h"
#include "utils/syscache.h"
#define DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE "postmaster.pid"
ProcessingMode Mode = InitProcessing;
/* Note: we rely on this to initialize as zeroes */
static char socketLockFile[MAXPGPATH];
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------
* ignoring system indexes support stuff
*
* NOTE: "ignoring system indexes" means we do not use the system indexes
* for lookups (either in hardwired catalog accesses or in planner-generated
* plans). We do, however, still update the indexes when a catalog
* modification is made.
* ----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
bool IgnoreSystemIndexes = false;
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------
* database path / name support stuff
* ----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
void
SetDatabasePath(const char *path)
{
/* This should happen only once per process */
Assert(!DatabasePath);
DatabasePath = MemoryContextStrdup(TopMemoryContext, path);
}
/*
* Set data directory, but make sure it's an absolute path. Use this,
* never set DataDir directly.
*/
void
SetDataDir(const char *dir)
{
char *new;
AssertArg(dir);
/* If presented path is relative, convert to absolute */
new = make_absolute_path(dir);
if (DataDir)
free(DataDir);
DataDir = new;
}
/*
* Change working directory to DataDir. Most of the postmaster and backend
* code assumes that we are in DataDir so it can use relative paths to access
* stuff in and under the data directory. For convenience during path
* setup, however, we don't force the chdir to occur during SetDataDir.
*/
void
ChangeToDataDir(void)
{
AssertState(DataDir);
if (chdir(DataDir) < 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not change directory to \"%s\": %m",
DataDir)));
}
/*
* If the given pathname isn't already absolute, make it so, interpreting
* it relative to the current working directory.
*
* Also canonicalizes the path. The result is always a malloc'd copy.
*
* Note: interpretation of relative-path arguments during postmaster startup
* should happen before doing ChangeToDataDir(), else the user will probably
* not like the results.
*/
char *
make_absolute_path(const char *path)
{
char *new;
/* Returning null for null input is convenient for some callers */
if (path == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!is_absolute_path(path))
{
char *buf;
size_t buflen;
buflen = MAXPGPATH;
for (;;)
{
buf = malloc(buflen);
if (!buf)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
errmsg("out of memory")));
if (getcwd(buf, buflen))
break;
else if (errno == ERANGE)
{
free(buf);
buflen *= 2;
continue;
}
else
{
free(buf);
elog(FATAL, "could not get current working directory: %m");
}
}
new = malloc(strlen(buf) + strlen(path) + 2);
if (!new)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
errmsg("out of memory")));
sprintf(new, "%s/%s", buf, path);
free(buf);
}
else
{
new = strdup(path);
if (!new)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
errmsg("out of memory")));
}
/* Make sure punctuation is canonical, too */
canonicalize_path(new);
return new;
}
/* ----------------------------------------------------------------
* User ID state
*
* We have to track several different values associated with the concept
* of "user ID".
*
* AuthenticatedUserId is determined at connection start and never changes.
*
* SessionUserId is initially the same as AuthenticatedUserId, but can be
* changed by SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION (if AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser).
* This is the ID reported by the SESSION_USER SQL function.
*
* OuterUserId is the current user ID in effect at the "outer level" (outside
* any transaction or function). This is initially the same as SessionUserId,
* but can be changed by SET ROLE to any role that SessionUserId is a
* member of. (XXX rename to something like CurrentRoleId?)
*
* CurrentUserId is the current effective user ID; this is the one to use
* for all normal permissions-checking purposes. At outer level this will
* be the same as OuterUserId, but it changes during calls to SECURITY
* DEFINER functions, as well as locally in some specialized commands.
*
* SecurityRestrictionContext holds flags indicating reason(s) for changing
* CurrentUserId. In some cases we need to lock down operations that are
* not directly controlled by privilege settings, and this provides a
* convenient way to do it.
* ----------------------------------------------------------------
*/
static Oid AuthenticatedUserId = InvalidOid;
static Oid SessionUserId = InvalidOid;
static Oid OuterUserId = InvalidOid;
static Oid CurrentUserId = InvalidOid;
/* We also have to remember the superuser state of some of these levels */
static bool AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser = false;
static bool SessionUserIsSuperuser = false;
static int SecurityRestrictionContext = 0;
/* We also remember if a SET ROLE is currently active */
static bool SetRoleIsActive = false;
/*
* GetUserId - get the current effective user ID.
*
* Note: there's no SetUserId() anymore; use SetUserIdAndSecContext().
*/
Oid
GetUserId(void)
{
AssertState(OidIsValid(CurrentUserId));
return CurrentUserId;
}
/*
* GetOuterUserId/SetOuterUserId - get/set the outer-level user ID.
*/
Oid
GetOuterUserId(void)
{
AssertState(OidIsValid(OuterUserId));
return OuterUserId;
}
static void
SetOuterUserId(Oid userid)
{
AssertState(SecurityRestrictionContext == 0);
AssertArg(OidIsValid(userid));
OuterUserId = userid;
/* We force the effective user ID to match, too */
CurrentUserId = userid;
}
/*
* GetSessionUserId/SetSessionUserId - get/set the session user ID.
*/
Oid
GetSessionUserId(void)
{
AssertState(OidIsValid(SessionUserId));
return SessionUserId;
}
static void
SetSessionUserId(Oid userid, bool is_superuser)
{
AssertState(SecurityRestrictionContext == 0);
AssertArg(OidIsValid(userid));
SessionUserId = userid;
SessionUserIsSuperuser = is_superuser;
SetRoleIsActive = false;
/* We force the effective user IDs to match, too */
OuterUserId = userid;
CurrentUserId = userid;
}
/*
* GetUserIdAndSecContext/SetUserIdAndSecContext - get/set the current user ID
* and the SecurityRestrictionContext flags.
*
* Currently there are two valid bits in SecurityRestrictionContext:
*
* SECURITY_LOCAL_USERID_CHANGE indicates that we are inside an operation
* that is temporarily changing CurrentUserId via these functions. This is
* needed to indicate that the actual value of CurrentUserId is not in sync
* with guc.c's internal state, so SET ROLE has to be disallowed.
*
* SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION indicates that we are inside an operation
* that does not wish to trust called user-defined functions at all. This
* bit prevents not only SET ROLE, but various other changes of session state
* that normally is unprotected but might possibly be used to subvert the
* calling session later. An example is replacing an existing prepared
* statement with new code, which will then be executed with the outer
* session's permissions when the prepared statement is next used. Since
* these restrictions are fairly draconian, we apply them only in contexts
* where the called functions are really supposed to be side-effect-free
* anyway, such as VACUUM/ANALYZE/REINDEX.
*
* Unlike GetUserId, GetUserIdAndSecContext does *not* Assert that the current
* value of CurrentUserId is valid; nor does SetUserIdAndSecContext require
* the new value to be valid. In fact, these routines had better not
* ever throw any kind of error. This is because they are used by
* StartTransaction and AbortTransaction to save/restore the settings,
* and during the first transaction within a backend, the value to be saved
* and perhaps restored is indeed invalid. We have to be able to get
* through AbortTransaction without asserting in case InitPostgres fails.
*/
void
GetUserIdAndSecContext(Oid *userid, int *sec_context)
{
*userid = CurrentUserId;
*sec_context = SecurityRestrictionContext;
}
void
SetUserIdAndSecContext(Oid userid, int sec_context)
{
CurrentUserId = userid;
SecurityRestrictionContext = sec_context;
}
/*
* InLocalUserIdChange - are we inside a local change of CurrentUserId?
*/
bool
InLocalUserIdChange(void)
{
return (SecurityRestrictionContext & SECURITY_LOCAL_USERID_CHANGE) != 0;
}
/*
* InSecurityRestrictedOperation - are we inside a security-restricted command?
*/
bool
InSecurityRestrictedOperation(void)
{
return (SecurityRestrictionContext & SECURITY_RESTRICTED_OPERATION) != 0;
}
/*
* These are obsolete versions of Get/SetUserIdAndSecContext that are
* only provided for bug-compatibility with some rather dubious code in
* pljava. We allow the userid to be set, but only when not inside a
* security restriction context.
*/
void
GetUserIdAndContext(Oid *userid, bool *sec_def_context)
{
*userid = CurrentUserId;
*sec_def_context = InLocalUserIdChange();
}
void
SetUserIdAndContext(Oid userid, bool sec_def_context)
{
/* We throw the same error SET ROLE would. */
if (InSecurityRestrictedOperation())
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("cannot set parameter \"%s\" within security-restricted operation",
"role")));
CurrentUserId = userid;
if (sec_def_context)
SecurityRestrictionContext |= SECURITY_LOCAL_USERID_CHANGE;
else
SecurityRestrictionContext &= ~SECURITY_LOCAL_USERID_CHANGE;
}
/*
* Initialize user identity during normal backend startup
*/
void
InitializeSessionUserId(const char *rolename)
{
HeapTuple roleTup;
Form_pg_authid rform;
Oid roleid;
/*
* Don't do scans if we're bootstrapping, none of the system catalogs
* exist yet, and they should be owned by postgres anyway.
*/
AssertState(!IsBootstrapProcessingMode());
/* call only once */
AssertState(!OidIsValid(AuthenticatedUserId));
roleTup = SearchSysCache1(AUTHNAME, PointerGetDatum(rolename));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(roleTup))
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg("role \"%s\" does not exist", rolename)));
rform = (Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(roleTup);
roleid = HeapTupleGetOid(roleTup);
AuthenticatedUserId = roleid;
AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser = rform->rolsuper;
/* This sets OuterUserId/CurrentUserId too */
SetSessionUserId(roleid, AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser);
/* Also mark our PGPROC entry with the authenticated user id */
/* (We assume this is an atomic store so no lock is needed) */
MyProc->roleId = roleid;
/*
* These next checks are not enforced when in standalone mode, so that
* there is a way to recover from sillinesses like "UPDATE pg_authid SET
* rolcanlogin = false;".
*/
if (IsUnderPostmaster)
{
/*
* Is role allowed to login at all?
*/
if (!rform->rolcanlogin)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
errmsg("role \"%s\" is not permitted to log in",
rolename)));
/*
* Check connection limit for this role.
*
* There is a race condition here --- we create our PGPROC before
* checking for other PGPROCs. If two backends did this at about the
* same time, they might both think they were over the limit, while
* ideally one should succeed and one fail. Getting that to work
* exactly seems more trouble than it is worth, however; instead we
* just document that the connection limit is approximate.
*/
if (rform->rolconnlimit >= 0 &&
!AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser &&
CountUserBackends(roleid) > rform->rolconnlimit)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS),
errmsg("too many connections for role \"%s\"",
rolename)));
}
/* Record username and superuser status as GUC settings too */
SetConfigOption("session_authorization", rolename,
PGC_BACKEND, PGC_S_OVERRIDE);
SetConfigOption("is_superuser",
AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser ? "on" : "off",
PGC_INTERNAL, PGC_S_OVERRIDE);
ReleaseSysCache(roleTup);
}
/*
* Initialize user identity during special backend startup
*/
void
InitializeSessionUserIdStandalone(void)
{
/*
* This function should only be called in single-user mode and in
* autovacuum workers.
*/
AssertState(!IsUnderPostmaster || IsAutoVacuumWorkerProcess());
/* call only once */
AssertState(!OidIsValid(AuthenticatedUserId));
AuthenticatedUserId = BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID;
AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser = true;
SetSessionUserId(BOOTSTRAP_SUPERUSERID, true);
}
/*
* Change session auth ID while running
*
* Only a superuser may set auth ID to something other than himself. Note
* that in case of multiple SETs in a single session, the original userid's
* superuserness is what matters. But we set the GUC variable is_superuser
* to indicate whether the *current* session userid is a superuser.
*
* Note: this is not an especially clean place to do the permission check.
* It's OK because the check does not require catalog access and can't
* fail during an end-of-transaction GUC reversion, but we may someday
* have to push it up into assign_session_authorization.
*/
void
SetSessionAuthorization(Oid userid, bool is_superuser)
{
/* Must have authenticated already, else can't make permission check */
AssertState(OidIsValid(AuthenticatedUserId));
if (userid != AuthenticatedUserId &&
!AuthenticatedUserIsSuperuser)
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
errmsg("permission denied to set session authorization")));
SetSessionUserId(userid, is_superuser);
SetConfigOption("is_superuser",
is_superuser ? "on" : "off",
PGC_INTERNAL, PGC_S_OVERRIDE);
}
/*
* Report current role id
* This follows the semantics of SET ROLE, ie return the outer-level ID
* not the current effective ID, and return InvalidOid when the setting
* is logically SET ROLE NONE.
*/
Oid
GetCurrentRoleId(void)
{
if (SetRoleIsActive)
return OuterUserId;
else
return InvalidOid;
}
/*
* Change Role ID while running (SET ROLE)
*
* If roleid is InvalidOid, we are doing SET ROLE NONE: revert to the
* session user authorization. In this case the is_superuser argument
* is ignored.
*
* When roleid is not InvalidOid, the caller must have checked whether
* the session user has permission to become that role. (We cannot check
* here because this routine must be able to execute in a failed transaction
* to restore a prior value of the ROLE GUC variable.)
*/
void
SetCurrentRoleId(Oid roleid, bool is_superuser)
{
/*
* Get correct info if it's SET ROLE NONE
*
* If SessionUserId hasn't been set yet, just do nothing --- the eventual
* SetSessionUserId call will fix everything. This is needed since we
* will get called during GUC initialization.
*/
if (!OidIsValid(roleid))
{
if (!OidIsValid(SessionUserId))
return;
roleid = SessionUserId;
is_superuser = SessionUserIsSuperuser;
SetRoleIsActive = false;
}
else
SetRoleIsActive = true;
SetOuterUserId(roleid);
SetConfigOption("is_superuser",
is_superuser ? "on" : "off",
PGC_INTERNAL, PGC_S_OVERRIDE);
}
/*
* Get user name from user oid
*/
char *
GetUserNameFromId(Oid roleid)
{
HeapTuple tuple;
char *result;
tuple = SearchSysCache1(AUTHOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(roleid));
if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
ereport(ERROR,
(errcode(ERRCODE_UNDEFINED_OBJECT),
errmsg("invalid role OID: %u", roleid)));
result = pstrdup(NameStr(((Form_pg_authid) GETSTRUCT(tuple))->rolname));
ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
return result;
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Interlock-file support
*
* These routines are used to create both a data-directory lockfile
* ($DATADIR/postmaster.pid) and a Unix-socket-file lockfile ($SOCKFILE.lock).
* Both kinds of files contain the same info:
*
* Owning process' PID
* Data directory path
*
* By convention, the owning process' PID is negated if it is a standalone
* backend rather than a postmaster. This is just for informational purposes.
* The path is also just for informational purposes (so that a socket lockfile
* can be more easily traced to the associated postmaster).
*
* A data-directory lockfile can optionally contain a third line, containing
* the key and ID for the shared memory block used by this postmaster.
*
* On successful lockfile creation, a proc_exit callback to remove the
* lockfile is automatically created.
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* proc_exit callback to remove a lockfile.
*/
static void
UnlinkLockFile(int status, Datum filename)
{
char *fname = (char *) DatumGetPointer(filename);
if (fname != NULL)
{
if (unlink(fname) != 0)
{
/* Should we complain if the unlink fails? */
}
free(fname);
}
}
/*
* Create a lockfile.
*
* filename is the name of the lockfile to create.
* amPostmaster is used to determine how to encode the output PID.
* isDDLock and refName are used to determine what error message to produce.
*/
static void
CreateLockFile(const char *filename, bool amPostmaster,
bool isDDLock, const char *refName)
{
int fd;
char buffer[MAXPGPATH + 100];
int ntries;
int len;
int encoded_pid;
pid_t other_pid;
pid_t my_pid,
my_p_pid,
my_gp_pid;
const char *envvar;
/*
* If the PID in the lockfile is our own PID or our parent's or
* grandparent's PID, then the file must be stale (probably left over from
* a previous system boot cycle). We need to check this because of the
* likelihood that a reboot will assign exactly the same PID as we had in
* the previous reboot, or one that's only one or two counts larger and
* hence the lockfile's PID now refers to an ancestor shell process. We
* allow pg_ctl to pass down its parent shell PID (our grandparent PID)
* via the environment variable PG_GRANDPARENT_PID; this is so that
* launching the postmaster via pg_ctl can be just as reliable as
* launching it directly. There is no provision for detecting
* further-removed ancestor processes, but if the init script is written
* carefully then all but the immediate parent shell will be root-owned
* processes and so the kill test will fail with EPERM. Note that we
* cannot get a false negative this way, because an existing postmaster
* would surely never launch a competing postmaster or pg_ctl process
* directly.
*/
my_pid = getpid();
#ifndef WIN32
my_p_pid = getppid();
#else
/*
* Windows hasn't got getppid(), but doesn't need it since it's not using
* real kill() either...
*/
my_p_pid = 0;
#endif
envvar = getenv("PG_GRANDPARENT_PID");
if (envvar)
my_gp_pid = atoi(envvar);
else
my_gp_pid = 0;
/*
* We need a loop here because of race conditions. But don't loop forever
* (for example, a non-writable $PGDATA directory might cause a failure
* that won't go away). 100 tries seems like plenty.
*/
for (ntries = 0;; ntries++)
{
/*
* Try to create the lock file --- O_EXCL makes this atomic.
*
* Think not to make the file protection weaker than 0600. See
* comments below.
*/
fd = open(filename, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600);
if (fd >= 0)
break; /* Success; exit the retry loop */
/*
* Couldn't create the pid file. Probably it already exists.
*/
if ((errno != EEXIST && errno != EACCES) || ntries > 100)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not create lock file \"%s\": %m",
filename)));
/*
* Read the file to get the old owner's PID. Note race condition
* here: file might have been deleted since we tried to create it.
*/
fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY, 0600);
if (fd < 0)
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
continue; /* race condition; try again */
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not open lock file \"%s\": %m",
filename)));
}
if ((len = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1)) < 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not read lock file \"%s\": %m",
filename)));
close(fd);
buffer[len] = '\0';
encoded_pid = atoi(buffer);
/* if pid < 0, the pid is for postgres, not postmaster */
other_pid = (pid_t) (encoded_pid < 0 ? -encoded_pid : encoded_pid);
if (other_pid <= 0)
elog(FATAL, "bogus data in lock file \"%s\": \"%s\"",
filename, buffer);
/*
* Check to see if the other process still exists
*
* Per discussion above, my_pid, my_p_pid, and my_gp_pid can be
* ignored as false matches.
*
* Normally kill() will fail with ESRCH if the given PID doesn't
* exist.
*
* We can treat the EPERM-error case as okay because that error
* implies that the existing process has a different userid than we
* do, which means it cannot be a competing postmaster. A postmaster
* cannot successfully attach to a data directory owned by a userid
* other than its own. (This is now checked directly in
* checkDataDir(), but has been true for a long time because of the
* restriction that the data directory isn't group- or
* world-accessible.) Also, since we create the lockfiles mode 600,
* we'd have failed above if the lockfile belonged to another userid
* --- which means that whatever process kill() is reporting about
* isn't the one that made the lockfile. (NOTE: this last
* consideration is the only one that keeps us from blowing away a
* Unix socket file belonging to an instance of Postgres being run by
* someone else, at least on machines where /tmp hasn't got a
* stickybit.)
*/
if (other_pid != my_pid && other_pid != my_p_pid &&
other_pid != my_gp_pid)
{
if (kill(other_pid, 0) == 0 ||
(errno != ESRCH && errno != EPERM))
{
/* lockfile belongs to a live process */
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_LOCK_FILE_EXISTS),
errmsg("lock file \"%s\" already exists",
filename),
isDDLock ?
(encoded_pid < 0 ?
errhint("Is another postgres (PID %d) running in data directory \"%s\"?",
(int) other_pid, refName) :
errhint("Is another postmaster (PID %d) running in data directory \"%s\"?",
(int) other_pid, refName)) :
(encoded_pid < 0 ?
errhint("Is another postgres (PID %d) using socket file \"%s\"?",
(int) other_pid, refName) :
errhint("Is another postmaster (PID %d) using socket file \"%s\"?",
(int) other_pid, refName))));
}
}
/*
* No, the creating process did not exist. However, it could be that
* the postmaster crashed (or more likely was kill -9'd by a clueless
* admin) but has left orphan backends behind. Check for this by
* looking to see if there is an associated shmem segment that is
* still in use.
*/
if (isDDLock)
{
char *ptr;
unsigned long id1,
id2;
ptr = strchr(buffer, '\n');
if (ptr != NULL &&
(ptr = strchr(ptr + 1, '\n')) != NULL)
{
ptr++;
if (sscanf(ptr, "%lu %lu", &id1, &id2) == 2)
{
if (PGSharedMemoryIsInUse(id1, id2))
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_LOCK_FILE_EXISTS),
errmsg("pre-existing shared memory block "
"(key %lu, ID %lu) is still in use",
id1, id2),
errhint("If you're sure there are no old "
"server processes still running, remove "
"the shared memory block "
"or just delete the file \"%s\".",
filename)));
}
}
}
/*
* Looks like nobody's home. Unlink the file and try again to create
* it. Need a loop because of possible race condition against other
* would-be creators.
*/
if (unlink(filename) < 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not remove old lock file \"%s\": %m",
filename),
errhint("The file seems accidentally left over, but "
"it could not be removed. Please remove the file "
"by hand and try again.")));
}
/*
* Successfully created the file, now fill it.
*/
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d\n%s\n",
amPostmaster ? (int) my_pid : -((int) my_pid),
DataDir);
errno = 0;
if (write(fd, buffer, strlen(buffer)) != strlen(buffer))
{
int save_errno = errno;
close(fd);
unlink(filename);
/* if write didn't set errno, assume problem is no disk space */
errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOSPC;
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not write lock file \"%s\": %m", filename)));
}
if (close(fd))
{
int save_errno = errno;
unlink(filename);
errno = save_errno;
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not write lock file \"%s\": %m", filename)));
}
/*
* Arrange for automatic removal of lockfile at proc_exit.
*/
on_proc_exit(UnlinkLockFile, PointerGetDatum(strdup(filename)));
}
/*
* Create the data directory lockfile.
*
* When this is called, we must have already switched the working
* directory to DataDir, so we can just use a relative path. This
* helps ensure that we are locking the directory we should be.
*/
void
CreateDataDirLockFile(bool amPostmaster)
{
CreateLockFile(DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE, amPostmaster, true, DataDir);
}
/*
* Create a lockfile for the specified Unix socket file.
*/
void
CreateSocketLockFile(const char *socketfile, bool amPostmaster)
{
char lockfile[MAXPGPATH];
snprintf(lockfile, sizeof(lockfile), "%s.lock", socketfile);
CreateLockFile(lockfile, amPostmaster, false, socketfile);
/* Save name of lockfile for TouchSocketLockFile */
strcpy(socketLockFile, lockfile);
}
/*
* TouchSocketLockFile -- mark socket lock file as recently accessed
*
* This routine should be called every so often to ensure that the lock file
* has a recent mod or access date. That saves it
* from being removed by overenthusiastic /tmp-directory-cleaner daemons.
* (Another reason we should never have put the socket file in /tmp...)
*/
void
TouchSocketLockFile(void)
{
/* Do nothing if we did not create a socket... */
if (socketLockFile[0] != '\0')
{
/*
* utime() is POSIX standard, utimes() is a common alternative; if we
* have neither, fall back to actually reading the file (which only
* sets the access time not mod time, but that should be enough in
* most cases). In all paths, we ignore errors.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_UTIME
utime(socketLockFile, NULL);
#else /* !HAVE_UTIME */
#ifdef HAVE_UTIMES
utimes(socketLockFile, NULL);
#else /* !HAVE_UTIMES */
int fd;
char buffer[1];
fd = open(socketLockFile, O_RDONLY | PG_BINARY, 0);
if (fd >= 0)
{
read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
close(fd);
}
#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
#endif /* HAVE_UTIME */
}
}
/*
* Append information about a shared memory segment to the data directory
* lock file.
*
* This may be called multiple times in the life of a postmaster, if we
* delete and recreate shmem due to backend crash. Therefore, be prepared
* to overwrite existing information. (As of 7.1, a postmaster only creates
* one shm seg at a time; but for the purposes here, if we did have more than
* one then any one of them would do anyway.)
*/
void
RecordSharedMemoryInLockFile(unsigned long id1, unsigned long id2)
{
int fd;
int len;
char *ptr;
char buffer[BLCKSZ];
fd = open(DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE, O_RDWR | PG_BINARY, 0);
if (fd < 0)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not open file \"%s\": %m",
DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE)));
return;
}
len = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 100);
if (len < 0)
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not read from file \"%s\": %m",
DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE)));
close(fd);
return;
}
buffer[len] = '\0';
/*
* Skip over first two lines (PID and path).
*/
ptr = strchr(buffer, '\n');
if (ptr == NULL ||
(ptr = strchr(ptr + 1, '\n')) == NULL)
{
elog(LOG, "bogus data in \"%s\"", DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE);
close(fd);
return;
}
ptr++;
/*
* Append key information. Format to try to keep it the same length
* always (trailing junk won't hurt, but might confuse humans).
*/
sprintf(ptr, "%9lu %9lu\n", id1, id2);
/*
* And rewrite the data. Since we write in a single kernel call, this
* update should appear atomic to onlookers.
*/
len = strlen(buffer);
errno = 0;
if (lseek(fd, (off_t) 0, SEEK_SET) != 0 ||
(int) write(fd, buffer, len) != len)
{
/* if write didn't set errno, assume problem is no disk space */
if (errno == 0)
errno = ENOSPC;
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not write to file \"%s\": %m",
DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE)));
close(fd);
return;
}
if (close(fd))
{
ereport(LOG,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not write to file \"%s\": %m",
DIRECTORY_LOCK_FILE)));
}
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Version checking support
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* Determine whether the PG_VERSION file in directory `path' indicates
* a data version compatible with the version of this program.
*
* If compatible, return. Otherwise, ereport(FATAL).
*/
void
ValidatePgVersion(const char *path)
{
char full_path[MAXPGPATH];
FILE *file;
int ret;
long file_major,
file_minor;
long my_major = 0,
my_minor = 0;
char *endptr;
const char *version_string = PG_VERSION;
my_major = strtol(version_string, &endptr, 10);
if (*endptr == '.')
my_minor = strtol(endptr + 1, NULL, 10);
snprintf(full_path, sizeof(full_path), "%s/PG_VERSION", path);
file = AllocateFile(full_path, "r");
if (!file)
{
if (errno == ENOENT)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("\"%s\" is not a valid data directory",
path),
errdetail("File \"%s\" is missing.", full_path)));
else
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode_for_file_access(),
errmsg("could not open file \"%s\": %m", full_path)));
}
ret = fscanf(file, "%ld.%ld", &file_major, &file_minor);
if (ret != 2)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("\"%s\" is not a valid data directory",
path),
errdetail("File \"%s\" does not contain valid data.",
full_path),
errhint("You might need to initdb.")));
FreeFile(file);
if (my_major != file_major || my_minor != file_minor)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_PARAMETER_VALUE),
errmsg("database files are incompatible with server"),
errdetail("The data directory was initialized by PostgreSQL version %ld.%ld, "
"which is not compatible with this version %s.",
file_major, file_minor, version_string)));
}
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Library preload support
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
/*
* GUC variables: lists of library names to be preloaded at postmaster
* start and at backend start
*/
char *shared_preload_libraries_string = NULL;
char *local_preload_libraries_string = NULL;
/* Flag telling that we are loading shared_preload_libraries */
bool process_shared_preload_libraries_in_progress = false;
/*
* load the shared libraries listed in 'libraries'
*
* 'gucname': name of GUC variable, for error reports
* 'restricted': if true, force libraries to be in $libdir/plugins/
*/
static void
load_libraries(const char *libraries, const char *gucname, bool restricted)
{
char *rawstring;
List *elemlist;
int elevel;
ListCell *l;
if (libraries == NULL || libraries[0] == '\0')
return; /* nothing to do */
/* Need a modifiable copy of string */
rawstring = pstrdup(libraries);
/* Parse string into list of identifiers */
if (!SplitIdentifierString(rawstring, ',', &elemlist))
{
/* syntax error in list */
pfree(rawstring);
list_free(elemlist);
ereport(LOG,
(errcode(ERRCODE_SYNTAX_ERROR),
errmsg("invalid list syntax in parameter \"%s\"",
gucname)));
return;
}
/*
* Choose notice level: avoid repeat messages when re-loading a library
* that was preloaded into the postmaster. (Only possible in EXEC_BACKEND
* configurations)
*/
#ifdef EXEC_BACKEND
if (IsUnderPostmaster && process_shared_preload_libraries_in_progress)
elevel = DEBUG2;
else
#endif
elevel = LOG;
foreach(l, elemlist)
{
char *tok = (char *) lfirst(l);
char *filename;
filename = pstrdup(tok);
canonicalize_path(filename);
/* If restricting, insert $libdir/plugins if not mentioned already */
if (restricted && first_dir_separator(filename) == NULL)
{
char *expanded;
expanded = palloc(strlen("$libdir/plugins/") + strlen(filename) + 1);
strcpy(expanded, "$libdir/plugins/");
strcat(expanded, filename);
pfree(filename);
filename = expanded;
}
load_file(filename, restricted);
ereport(elevel,
(errmsg("loaded library \"%s\"", filename)));
pfree(filename);
}
pfree(rawstring);
list_free(elemlist);
}
/*
* process any libraries that should be preloaded at postmaster start
*/
void
process_shared_preload_libraries(void)
{
process_shared_preload_libraries_in_progress = true;
load_libraries(shared_preload_libraries_string,
"shared_preload_libraries",
false);
process_shared_preload_libraries_in_progress = false;
}
/*
* process any libraries that should be preloaded at backend start
*/
void
process_local_preload_libraries(void)
{
load_libraries(local_preload_libraries_string,
"local_preload_libraries",
true);
}
void
pg_bindtextdomain(const char *domain)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_NLS
if (my_exec_path[0] != '\0')
{
char locale_path[MAXPGPATH];
get_locale_path(my_exec_path, locale_path);
bindtextdomain(domain, locale_path);
pg_bind_textdomain_codeset(domain);
}
#endif
}