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as determined by include-what-you-use (IWYU) While IWYU also suggests to *add* a bunch of #include's (which is its main purpose), this patch does not do that. In some cases, a more specific #include replaces another less specific one. Some manual adjustments of the automatic result: - IWYU currently doesn't know about includes that provide global variable declarations (like -Wmissing-variable-declarations), so those includes are being kept manually. - All includes for port(ability) headers are being kept for now, to play it safe. - No changes of catalog/pg_foo.h to catalog/pg_foo_d.h, to keep the patch from exploding in size. Note that this patch touches just *.c files, so nothing declared in header files changes in hidden ways. As a small example, in src/backend/access/transam/rmgr.c, some IWYU pragma annotations are added to handle a special case there. Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/af837490-6b2f-46df-ba05-37ea6a6653fc%40eisentraut.org
src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
SSL
===
>From the servers perspective:
Receives StartupPacket
|
|
(Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) ----------- Normal startup
| No
|
| Yes
|
|
(Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
| No |
| |
| Yes Normal startup
|
|
Send 'S'
|
|
Establish SSL
|
|
Normal startup
>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):
Connect
|
|
Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
|
|
Receive single char ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
| |
| '<else>' |
| Normal startup
|
|
Is it 'E' for error ------------------- Retry connection
| Yes without SSL
| No
|
Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
| Yes
|
Fail with unknown
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ephemeral DH
============
Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key. Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).
N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.
Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.
The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session. In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).