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This commit moves authn_id into a new global structure called ClientConnectionInfo (mapping to a MyClientConnectionInfo for each backend) which is intended to hold all the client information that should be shared between the backend and any of its parallel workers, access for extensions and triggers being the primary use case. There is no need to push all the data of Port to the workers, and authn_id is quite a generic concept so using a separate structure provides the best balance (the name of the structure has been suggested by Robert Haas). While on it, and per discussion as this would be useful for a potential SYSTEM_USER that can be accessed through parallel workers, a second field is added for the authentication method, copied directly from Port. ClientConnectionInfo is serialized and restored using a new parallel key and a structure tracks the length of the authn_id, making the addition of more fields straight-forward. Author: Jacob Champion Reviewed-by: Bertrand Drouvot, Stephen Frost, Robert Haas, Tom Lane, Michael Paquier, Julien Rouhaud Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/793d990837ae5c06a558d58d62de9378ab525d83.camel@vmware.com
src/backend/libpq/README.SSL
SSL
===
>From the servers perspective:
Receives StartupPacket
|
|
(Is SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE?) ----------- Normal startup
| No
|
| Yes
|
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(Server compiled with USE_SSL?) ------- Send 'N'
| No |
| |
| Yes Normal startup
|
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Send 'S'
|
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Establish SSL
|
|
Normal startup
>From the clients perspective (v6.6 client _with_ SSL):
Connect
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Send packet with SSL_NEGOTIATE_CODE
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Receive single char ------- 'S' -------- Establish SSL
| |
| '<else>' |
| Normal startup
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Is it 'E' for error ------------------- Retry connection
| Yes without SSL
| No
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Is it 'N' for normal ------------------- Normal startup
| Yes
|
Fail with unknown
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ephemeral DH
============
Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key) will
normally be stored unencrypted so that the database backend can
restart automatically, it is important that we select an algorithm
that continues to provide confidentiality even if the attacker has the
server's private key. Ephemeral DH (EDH) keys provide this and more
(Perfect Forward Secrecy aka PFS).
N.B., the static private key should still be protected to the largest
extent possible, to minimize the risk of impersonations.
Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and clients to
use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital signatures, not
encryption, and are often acceptable in jurisdictions where RSA keys
are unacceptable.
The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to use ssldump(1)
if there's a problem establishing an SSL session. In this case you'll
need to temporarily disable EDH (see initialize_dh()).