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postgres/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c
Michael Paquier 87ae9691d2 Move SHA2 routines to a new generic API layer for crypto hashes
Two new routines to allocate a hash context and to free it are created,
as these become necessary for the goal behind this refactoring: switch
the all cryptohash implementations for OpenSSL to use EVP (for FIPS and
also because upstream does not recommend the use of low-level cryptohash
functions for 20 years).  Note that OpenSSL hides the internals of
cryptohash contexts since 1.1.0, so it is necessary to leave the
allocation to OpenSSL itself, explaining the need for those two new
routines.  This part is going to require more work to properly track
hash contexts with resource owners, but this not introduced here.
Still, this refactoring makes the move possible.

This reduces the number of routines for all SHA2 implementations from
twelve (SHA{224,256,386,512} with init, update and final calls) to five
(create, free, init, update and final calls) by incorporating the hash
type directly into the hash context data.

The new cryptohash routines are moved to a new file, called cryptohash.c
for the fallback implementations, with SHA2 specifics becoming a part
internal to src/common/.  OpenSSL specifics are part of
cryptohash_openssl.c.  This infrastructure is usable for more hash
types, like MD5 or HMAC.

Any code paths using the internal SHA2 routines are adapted to report
correctly errors, which are most of the changes of this commit.  The
zones mostly impacted are checksum manifests, libpq and SCRAM.

Note that e21cbb4 was a first attempt to switch SHA2 to EVP, but it
lacked the refactoring needed for libpq, as done here.

This patch has been tested on Linux and Windows, with and without
OpenSSL, and down to 1.0.1, the oldest version supported on HEAD.

Author: Michael Paquier
Reviewed-by: Daniel Gustafsson
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200924025314.GE7405@paquier.xyz
2020-12-02 10:37:20 +09:00

881 lines
22 KiB
C

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* fe-auth-scram.c
* The front-end (client) implementation of SCRAM authentication.
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/interfaces/libpq/fe-auth-scram.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres_fe.h"
#include "common/base64.h"
#include "common/saslprep.h"
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#include "fe-auth.h"
/*
* Status of exchange messages used for SCRAM authentication via the
* SASL protocol.
*/
typedef enum
{
FE_SCRAM_INIT,
FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT,
FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT,
FE_SCRAM_FINISHED
} fe_scram_state_enum;
typedef struct
{
fe_scram_state_enum state;
/* These are supplied by the user */
PGconn *conn;
char *password;
char *sasl_mechanism;
/* We construct these */
uint8 SaltedPassword[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
char *client_nonce;
char *client_first_message_bare;
char *client_final_message_without_proof;
/* These come from the server-first message */
char *server_first_message;
char *salt;
int saltlen;
int iterations;
char *nonce;
/* These come from the server-final message */
char *server_final_message;
char ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
} fe_scram_state;
static bool read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input);
static bool read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input);
static char *build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state);
static char *build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state);
static bool verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match);
static bool calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
uint8 *result);
/*
* Initialize SCRAM exchange status.
*/
void *
pg_fe_scram_init(PGconn *conn,
const char *password,
const char *sasl_mechanism)
{
fe_scram_state *state;
char *prep_password;
pg_saslprep_rc rc;
Assert(sasl_mechanism != NULL);
state = (fe_scram_state *) malloc(sizeof(fe_scram_state));
if (!state)
return NULL;
memset(state, 0, sizeof(fe_scram_state));
state->conn = conn;
state->state = FE_SCRAM_INIT;
state->sasl_mechanism = strdup(sasl_mechanism);
if (!state->sasl_mechanism)
{
free(state);
return NULL;
}
/* Normalize the password with SASLprep, if possible */
rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
if (rc == SASLPREP_OOM)
{
free(state->sasl_mechanism);
free(state);
return NULL;
}
if (rc != SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
{
prep_password = strdup(password);
if (!prep_password)
{
free(state->sasl_mechanism);
free(state);
return NULL;
}
}
state->password = prep_password;
return state;
}
/*
* Return true if channel binding was employed and the SCRAM exchange
* completed. This should be used after a successful exchange to determine
* whether the server authenticated itself to the client.
*
* Note that the caller must also ensure that the exchange was actually
* successful.
*/
bool
pg_fe_scram_channel_bound(void *opaq)
{
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
/* no SCRAM exchange done */
if (state == NULL)
return false;
/* SCRAM exchange not completed */
if (state->state != FE_SCRAM_FINISHED)
return false;
/* channel binding mechanism not used */
if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) != 0)
return false;
/* all clear! */
return true;
}
/*
* Free SCRAM exchange status
*/
void
pg_fe_scram_free(void *opaq)
{
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
if (state->password)
free(state->password);
if (state->sasl_mechanism)
free(state->sasl_mechanism);
/* client messages */
if (state->client_nonce)
free(state->client_nonce);
if (state->client_first_message_bare)
free(state->client_first_message_bare);
if (state->client_final_message_without_proof)
free(state->client_final_message_without_proof);
/* first message from server */
if (state->server_first_message)
free(state->server_first_message);
if (state->salt)
free(state->salt);
if (state->nonce)
free(state->nonce);
/* final message from server */
if (state->server_final_message)
free(state->server_final_message);
free(state);
}
/*
* Exchange a SCRAM message with backend.
*/
void
pg_fe_scram_exchange(void *opaq, char *input, int inputlen,
char **output, int *outputlen,
bool *done, bool *success)
{
fe_scram_state *state = (fe_scram_state *) opaq;
PGconn *conn = state->conn;
*done = false;
*success = false;
*output = NULL;
*outputlen = 0;
/*
* Check that the input length agrees with the string length of the input.
* We can ignore inputlen after this.
*/
if (state->state != FE_SCRAM_INIT)
{
if (inputlen == 0)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (empty message)\n"));
goto error;
}
if (inputlen != strlen(input))
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (length mismatch)\n"));
goto error;
}
}
switch (state->state)
{
case FE_SCRAM_INIT:
/* Begin the SCRAM handshake, by sending client nonce */
*output = build_client_first_message(state);
if (*output == NULL)
goto error;
*outputlen = strlen(*output);
*done = false;
state->state = FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT;
break;
case FE_SCRAM_NONCE_SENT:
/* Receive salt and server nonce, send response. */
if (!read_server_first_message(state, input))
goto error;
*output = build_client_final_message(state);
if (*output == NULL)
goto error;
*outputlen = strlen(*output);
*done = false;
state->state = FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT;
break;
case FE_SCRAM_PROOF_SENT:
/* Receive server signature */
if (!read_server_final_message(state, input))
goto error;
/*
* Verify server signature, to make sure we're talking to the
* genuine server.
*/
if (!verify_server_signature(state, success))
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("could not verify server signature\n"));
goto error;
}
if (!*success)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("incorrect server signature\n"));
}
*done = true;
state->state = FE_SCRAM_FINISHED;
break;
default:
/* shouldn't happen */
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("invalid SCRAM exchange state\n"));
goto error;
}
return;
error:
*done = true;
*success = false;
}
/*
* Read value for an attribute part of a SCRAM message.
*/
static char *
read_attr_value(char **input, char attr, PQExpBuffer errorMessage)
{
char *begin = *input;
char *end;
if (*begin != attr)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (attribute \"%c\" expected)\n"),
attr);
return NULL;
}
begin++;
if (*begin != '=')
{
printfPQExpBuffer(errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\")\n"),
attr);
return NULL;
}
begin++;
end = begin;
while (*end && *end != ',')
end++;
if (*end)
{
*end = '\0';
*input = end + 1;
}
else
*input = end;
return begin;
}
/*
* Build the first exchange message sent by the client.
*/
static char *
build_client_first_message(fe_scram_state *state)
{
PGconn *conn = state->conn;
char raw_nonce[SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN + 1];
char *result;
int channel_info_len;
int encoded_len;
PQExpBufferData buf;
/*
* Generate a "raw" nonce. This is converted to ASCII-printable form by
* base64-encoding it.
*/
if (!pg_strong_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN))
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("could not generate nonce\n"));
return NULL;
}
encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN);
/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
state->client_nonce = malloc(encoded_len + 1);
if (state->client_nonce == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return NULL;
}
encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN,
state->client_nonce, encoded_len);
if (encoded_len < 0)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("could not encode nonce\n"));
return NULL;
}
state->client_nonce[encoded_len] = '\0';
/*
* Generate message. The username is left empty as the backend uses the
* value provided by the startup packet. Also, as this username is not
* prepared with SASLprep, the message parsing would fail if it includes
* '=' or ',' characters.
*/
initPQExpBuffer(&buf);
/*
* First build the gs2-header with channel binding information.
*/
if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0)
{
Assert(conn->ssl_in_use);
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "p=tls-server-end-point");
}
#ifdef HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
else if (conn->channel_binding[0] != 'd' && /* disable */
conn->ssl_in_use)
{
/*
* Client supports channel binding, but thinks the server does not.
*/
appendPQExpBufferChar(&buf, 'y');
}
#endif
else
{
/*
* Client does not support channel binding, or has disabled it.
*/
appendPQExpBufferChar(&buf, 'n');
}
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
goto oom_error;
channel_info_len = buf.len;
appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, ",,n=,r=%s", state->client_nonce);
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
goto oom_error;
/*
* The first message content needs to be saved without channel binding
* information.
*/
state->client_first_message_bare = strdup(buf.data + channel_info_len + 2);
if (!state->client_first_message_bare)
goto oom_error;
result = strdup(buf.data);
if (result == NULL)
goto oom_error;
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
return result;
oom_error:
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return NULL;
}
/*
* Build the final exchange message sent from the client.
*/
static char *
build_client_final_message(fe_scram_state *state)
{
PQExpBufferData buf;
PGconn *conn = state->conn;
uint8 client_proof[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
char *result;
int encoded_len;
initPQExpBuffer(&buf);
/*
* Construct client-final-message-without-proof. We need to remember it
* for verifying the server proof in the final step of authentication.
*
* The channel binding flag handling (p/y/n) must be consistent with
* build_client_first_message(), because the server will check that it's
* the same flag both times.
*/
if (strcmp(state->sasl_mechanism, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0)
{
#ifdef HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
char *cbind_data = NULL;
size_t cbind_data_len = 0;
size_t cbind_header_len;
char *cbind_input;
size_t cbind_input_len;
int encoded_cbind_len;
/* Fetch hash data of server's SSL certificate */
cbind_data =
pgtls_get_peer_certificate_hash(state->conn,
&cbind_data_len);
if (cbind_data == NULL)
{
/* error message is already set on error */
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
return NULL;
}
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=");
/* p=type,, */
cbind_header_len = strlen("p=tls-server-end-point,,");
cbind_input_len = cbind_header_len + cbind_data_len;
cbind_input = malloc(cbind_input_len);
if (!cbind_input)
{
free(cbind_data);
goto oom_error;
}
memcpy(cbind_input, "p=tls-server-end-point,,", cbind_header_len);
memcpy(cbind_input + cbind_header_len, cbind_data, cbind_data_len);
encoded_cbind_len = pg_b64_enc_len(cbind_input_len);
if (!enlargePQExpBuffer(&buf, encoded_cbind_len))
{
free(cbind_data);
free(cbind_input);
goto oom_error;
}
encoded_cbind_len = pg_b64_encode(cbind_input, cbind_input_len,
buf.data + buf.len,
encoded_cbind_len);
if (encoded_cbind_len < 0)
{
free(cbind_data);
free(cbind_input);
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
"could not encode cbind data for channel binding\n");
return NULL;
}
buf.len += encoded_cbind_len;
buf.data[buf.len] = '\0';
free(cbind_data);
free(cbind_input);
#else
/*
* Chose channel binding, but the SSL library doesn't support it.
* Shouldn't happen.
*/
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
"channel binding not supported by this build\n");
return NULL;
#endif /* HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH */
}
#ifdef HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
else if (conn->channel_binding[0] != 'd' && /* disable */
conn->ssl_in_use)
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=eSws"); /* base64 of "y,," */
#endif
else
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, "c=biws"); /* base64 of "n,," */
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
goto oom_error;
appendPQExpBuffer(&buf, ",r=%s", state->nonce);
if (PQExpBufferDataBroken(buf))
goto oom_error;
state->client_final_message_without_proof = strdup(buf.data);
if (state->client_final_message_without_proof == NULL)
goto oom_error;
/* Append proof to it, to form client-final-message. */
if (!calculate_client_proof(state,
state->client_final_message_without_proof,
client_proof))
{
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("could not calculate client proof\n"));
return NULL;
}
appendPQExpBufferStr(&buf, ",p=");
encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
if (!enlargePQExpBuffer(&buf, encoded_len))
goto oom_error;
encoded_len = pg_b64_encode((char *) client_proof,
SCRAM_KEY_LEN,
buf.data + buf.len,
encoded_len);
if (encoded_len < 0)
{
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("could not encode client proof\n"));
return NULL;
}
buf.len += encoded_len;
buf.data[buf.len] = '\0';
result = strdup(buf.data);
if (result == NULL)
goto oom_error;
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
return result;
oom_error:
termPQExpBuffer(&buf);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return NULL;
}
/*
* Read the first exchange message coming from the server.
*/
static bool
read_server_first_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input)
{
PGconn *conn = state->conn;
char *iterations_str;
char *endptr;
char *encoded_salt;
char *nonce;
int decoded_salt_len;
state->server_first_message = strdup(input);
if (state->server_first_message == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
/* parse the message */
nonce = read_attr_value(&input, 'r',
&conn->errorMessage);
if (nonce == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error string */
return false;
}
/* Verify immediately that the server used our part of the nonce */
if (strlen(nonce) < strlen(state->client_nonce) ||
memcmp(nonce, state->client_nonce, strlen(state->client_nonce)) != 0)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("invalid SCRAM response (nonce mismatch)\n"));
return false;
}
state->nonce = strdup(nonce);
if (state->nonce == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
encoded_salt = read_attr_value(&input, 's', &conn->errorMessage);
if (encoded_salt == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error string */
return false;
}
decoded_salt_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_salt));
state->salt = malloc(decoded_salt_len);
if (state->salt == NULL)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
state->saltlen = pg_b64_decode(encoded_salt,
strlen(encoded_salt),
state->salt,
decoded_salt_len);
if (state->saltlen < 0)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid salt)\n"));
return false;
}
iterations_str = read_attr_value(&input, 'i', &conn->errorMessage);
if (iterations_str == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error string */
return false;
}
state->iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &endptr, 10);
if (*endptr != '\0' || state->iterations < 1)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid iteration count)\n"));
return false;
}
if (*input != '\0')
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-first-message)\n"));
return true;
}
/*
* Read the final exchange message coming from the server.
*/
static bool
read_server_final_message(fe_scram_state *state, char *input)
{
PGconn *conn = state->conn;
char *encoded_server_signature;
char *decoded_server_signature;
int server_signature_len;
state->server_final_message = strdup(input);
if (!state->server_final_message)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
/* Check for error result. */
if (*input == 'e')
{
char *errmsg = read_attr_value(&input, 'e',
&conn->errorMessage);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("error received from server in SCRAM exchange: %s\n"),
errmsg);
return false;
}
/* Parse the message. */
encoded_server_signature = read_attr_value(&input, 'v',
&conn->errorMessage);
if (encoded_server_signature == NULL)
{
/* read_attr_value() has generated an error message */
return false;
}
if (*input != '\0')
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (garbage at end of server-final-message)\n"));
server_signature_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_server_signature));
decoded_server_signature = malloc(server_signature_len);
if (!decoded_server_signature)
{
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("out of memory\n"));
return false;
}
server_signature_len = pg_b64_decode(encoded_server_signature,
strlen(encoded_server_signature),
decoded_server_signature,
server_signature_len);
if (server_signature_len != SCRAM_KEY_LEN)
{
free(decoded_server_signature);
printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
libpq_gettext("malformed SCRAM message (invalid server signature)\n"));
return false;
}
memcpy(state->ServerSignature, decoded_server_signature, SCRAM_KEY_LEN);
free(decoded_server_signature);
return true;
}
/*
* Calculate the client proof, part of the final exchange message sent
* by the client. Returns true on success, false on failure.
*/
static bool
calculate_client_proof(fe_scram_state *state,
const char *client_final_message_without_proof,
uint8 *result)
{
uint8 StoredKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ClientKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ClientSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
int i;
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
/*
* Calculate SaltedPassword, and store it in 'state' so that we can reuse
* it later in verify_server_signature.
*/
if (scram_SaltedPassword(state->password, state->salt, state->saltlen,
state->iterations, state->SaltedPassword) < 0 ||
scram_ClientKey(state->SaltedPassword, ClientKey) < 0 ||
scram_H(ClientKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN, StoredKey) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, StoredKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->client_first_message_bare,
strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->server_first_message,
strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
client_final_message_without_proof,
strlen(client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_final(ClientSignature, &ctx) < 0)
{
return false;
}
for (i = 0; i < SCRAM_KEY_LEN; i++)
result[i] = ClientKey[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];
return true;
}
/*
* Validate the server signature, received as part of the final exchange
* message received from the server. *match tracks if the server signature
* matched or not. Returns true if the server signature got verified, and
* false for a processing error.
*/
static bool
verify_server_signature(fe_scram_state *state, bool *match)
{
uint8 expected_ServerSignature[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
uint8 ServerKey[SCRAM_KEY_LEN];
scram_HMAC_ctx ctx;
if (scram_ServerKey(state->SaltedPassword, ServerKey) < 0 ||
/* calculate ServerSignature */
scram_HMAC_init(&ctx, ServerKey, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->client_first_message_bare,
strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->server_first_message,
strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx, ",", 1) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_update(&ctx,
state->client_final_message_without_proof,
strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
scram_HMAC_final(expected_ServerSignature, &ctx) < 0)
{
return false;
}
/* signature processed, so now check after it */
if (memcmp(expected_ServerSignature, state->ServerSignature, SCRAM_KEY_LEN) != 0)
*match = false;
else
*match = true;
return true;
}
/*
* Build a new SCRAM secret.
*/
char *
pg_fe_scram_build_secret(const char *password)
{
char *prep_password;
pg_saslprep_rc rc;
char saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN];
char *result;
/*
* Normalize the password with SASLprep. If that doesn't work, because
* the password isn't valid UTF-8 or contains prohibited characters, just
* proceed with the original password. (See comments at top of file.)
*/
rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
if (rc == SASLPREP_OOM)
return NULL;
if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
password = (const char *) prep_password;
/* Generate a random salt */
if (!pg_strong_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN))
{
if (prep_password)
free(prep_password);
return NULL;
}
result = scram_build_secret(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
SCRAM_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS, password);
if (prep_password)
free(prep_password);
return result;
}