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secure_open_gssapi() installed the krb_server_keyfile setting as KRB5_KTNAME unconditionally, so long as it's not empty. However, pg_GSS_recvauth() only installed it if KRB5_KTNAME wasn't set already, leading to a troubling inconsistency: in theory, clients could see different sets of server principal names depending on whether they use GSSAPI encryption. Always using krb_server_keyfile seems like the right thing, so make both places do that. Also fix up secure_open_gssapi()'s lack of a check for setenv() failure --- it's unlikely, surely, but security-critical actions are no place to be sloppy. Also improve the associated documentation. This patch does nothing about secure_open_gssapi()'s use of setenv(), and indeed causes pg_GSS_recvauth() to use it too. That's nominally against project portability rules, but since this code is only built with --with-gssapi, I do not feel a need to do something about this in the back branches. A fix will be forthcoming for HEAD though. Back-patch to v12 where GSSAPI encryption was introduced. The dubious behavior in pg_GSS_recvauth() goes back further, but it didn't have anything to be inconsistent with, so let it be. Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/2187460.1609263156@sss.pgh.pa.us
734 lines
21 KiB
C
734 lines
21 KiB
C
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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* be-secure-gssapi.c
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* GSSAPI encryption support
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 2018-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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*
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* IDENTIFICATION
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* src/backend/libpq/be-secure-gssapi.c
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*
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*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "libpq/auth.h"
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#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"
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#include "libpq/libpq.h"
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#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
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#include "pgstat.h"
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#include "utils/memutils.h"
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/*
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* Handle the encryption/decryption of data using GSSAPI.
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*
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* In the encrypted data stream on the wire, we break up the data
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* into packets where each packet starts with a uint32-size length
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* word (in network byte order), then encrypted data of that length
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* immediately following. Decryption yields the same data stream
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* that would appear when not using encryption.
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*
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* Encrypted data typically ends up being larger than the same data
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* unencrypted, so we use fixed-size buffers for handling the
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* encryption/decryption which are larger than PQComm's buffer will
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* typically be to minimize the times where we have to make multiple
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* packets (and therefore multiple recv/send calls for a single
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* read/write call to us).
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*
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* NOTE: The client and server have to agree on the max packet size,
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* because we have to pass an entire packet to GSSAPI at a time and we
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* don't want the other side to send arbitrarily huge packets as we
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* would have to allocate memory for them to then pass them to GSSAPI.
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*
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* Therefore, these two #define's are effectively part of the protocol
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* spec and can't ever be changed.
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*/
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#define PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
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#define PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
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/*
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* Since we manage at most one GSS-encrypted connection per backend,
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* we can just keep all this state in static variables. The char *
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* variables point to buffers that are allocated once and re-used.
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*/
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static char *PqGSSSendBuffer; /* Encrypted data waiting to be sent */
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static int PqGSSSendLength; /* End of data available in PqGSSSendBuffer */
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static int PqGSSSendNext; /* Next index to send a byte from
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* PqGSSSendBuffer */
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static int PqGSSSendConsumed; /* Number of *unencrypted* bytes consumed for
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* current contents of PqGSSSendBuffer */
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static char *PqGSSRecvBuffer; /* Received, encrypted data */
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static int PqGSSRecvLength; /* End of data available in PqGSSRecvBuffer */
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static char *PqGSSResultBuffer; /* Decryption of data in gss_RecvBuffer */
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static int PqGSSResultLength; /* End of data available in PqGSSResultBuffer */
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static int PqGSSResultNext; /* Next index to read a byte from
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* PqGSSResultBuffer */
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static uint32 PqGSSMaxPktSize; /* Maximum size we can encrypt and fit the
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* results into our output buffer */
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/*
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* Attempt to write len bytes of data from ptr to a GSSAPI-encrypted connection.
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*
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* The connection must be already set up for GSSAPI encryption (i.e., GSSAPI
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* transport negotiation is complete).
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*
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* On success, returns the number of data bytes consumed (possibly less than
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* len). On failure, returns -1 with errno set appropriately. For retryable
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* errors, caller should call again (passing the same data) once the socket
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* is ready.
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*
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* Dealing with fatal errors here is a bit tricky: we can't invoke elog(FATAL)
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* since it would try to write to the client, probably resulting in infinite
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* recursion. Instead, use elog(COMMERROR) to log extra info about the
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* failure if necessary, and then return an errno indicating connection loss.
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*/
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ssize_t
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be_gssapi_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
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{
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OM_uint32 major,
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minor;
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gss_buffer_desc input,
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output;
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size_t bytes_sent = 0;
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size_t bytes_to_encrypt;
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size_t bytes_encrypted;
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gss_ctx_id_t gctx = port->gss->ctx;
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/*
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* When we get a failure, we must not tell the caller we have successfully
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* transmitted everything, else it won't retry. Hence a "success"
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* (positive) return value must only count source bytes corresponding to
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* fully-transmitted encrypted packets. The amount of source data
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* corresponding to the current partly-transmitted packet is remembered in
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* PqGSSSendConsumed. On a retry, the caller *must* be sending that data
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* again, so if it offers a len less than that, something is wrong.
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*/
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if (len < PqGSSSendConsumed)
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{
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elog(COMMERROR, "GSSAPI caller failed to retransmit all data needing to be retried");
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errno = ECONNRESET;
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return -1;
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}
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/* Discount whatever source data we already encrypted. */
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bytes_to_encrypt = len - PqGSSSendConsumed;
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bytes_encrypted = PqGSSSendConsumed;
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/*
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* Loop through encrypting data and sending it out until it's all done or
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* secure_raw_write() complains (which would likely mean that the socket
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* is non-blocking and the requested send() would block, or there was some
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* kind of actual error).
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*/
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while (bytes_to_encrypt || PqGSSSendLength)
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{
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int conf_state = 0;
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uint32 netlen;
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/*
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* Check if we have data in the encrypted output buffer that needs to
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* be sent (possibly left over from a previous call), and if so, try
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* to send it. If we aren't able to, return that fact back up to the
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* caller.
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*/
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if (PqGSSSendLength)
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{
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ssize_t ret;
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ssize_t amount = PqGSSSendLength - PqGSSSendNext;
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ret = secure_raw_write(port, PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendNext, amount);
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if (ret <= 0)
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{
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/*
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* Report any previously-sent data; if there was none, reflect
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* the secure_raw_write result up to our caller. When there
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* was some, we're effectively assuming that any interesting
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* failure condition will recur on the next try.
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*/
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if (bytes_sent)
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return bytes_sent;
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Check if this was a partial write, and if so, move forward that
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* far in our buffer and try again.
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*/
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if (ret != amount)
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{
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PqGSSSendNext += ret;
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continue;
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}
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/* We've successfully sent whatever data was in that packet. */
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bytes_sent += PqGSSSendConsumed;
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/* All encrypted data was sent, our buffer is empty now. */
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PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = PqGSSSendConsumed = 0;
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}
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/*
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* Check if there are any bytes left to encrypt. If not, we're done.
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*/
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if (!bytes_to_encrypt)
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break;
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/*
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* Check how much we are being asked to send, if it's too much, then
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* we will have to loop and possibly be called multiple times to get
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* through all the data.
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*/
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if (bytes_to_encrypt > PqGSSMaxPktSize)
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input.length = PqGSSMaxPktSize;
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else
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input.length = bytes_to_encrypt;
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input.value = (char *) ptr + bytes_encrypted;
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output.value = NULL;
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output.length = 0;
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/* Create the next encrypted packet */
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major = gss_wrap(&minor, gctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
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&input, &conf_state, &output);
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if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
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{
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pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI wrap error"), major, minor);
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errno = ECONNRESET;
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return -1;
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}
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if (conf_state == 0)
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{
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ereport(COMMERROR,
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(errmsg("outgoing GSSAPI message would not use confidentiality")));
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errno = ECONNRESET;
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return -1;
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}
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if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
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{
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ereport(COMMERROR,
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(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
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(size_t) output.length,
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PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
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errno = ECONNRESET;
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return -1;
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}
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bytes_encrypted += input.length;
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bytes_to_encrypt -= input.length;
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PqGSSSendConsumed += input.length;
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/* 4 network-order bytes of length, then payload */
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netlen = htonl(output.length);
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memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, &netlen, sizeof(uint32));
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PqGSSSendLength += sizeof(uint32);
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memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, output.value, output.length);
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PqGSSSendLength += output.length;
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/* Release buffer storage allocated by GSSAPI */
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gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
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}
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/* If we get here, our counters should all match up. */
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Assert(bytes_sent == len);
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Assert(bytes_sent == bytes_encrypted);
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return bytes_sent;
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}
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/*
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* Read up to len bytes of data into ptr from a GSSAPI-encrypted connection.
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*
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* The connection must be already set up for GSSAPI encryption (i.e., GSSAPI
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* transport negotiation is complete).
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*
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* Returns the number of data bytes read, or on failure, returns -1
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* with errno set appropriately. For retryable errors, caller should call
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* again once the socket is ready.
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*
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* We treat fatal errors the same as in be_gssapi_write(), even though the
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* argument about infinite recursion doesn't apply here.
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*/
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ssize_t
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be_gssapi_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
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{
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OM_uint32 major,
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minor;
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gss_buffer_desc input,
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output;
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ssize_t ret;
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size_t bytes_returned = 0;
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gss_ctx_id_t gctx = port->gss->ctx;
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/*
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* The plan here is to read one incoming encrypted packet into
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* PqGSSRecvBuffer, decrypt it into PqGSSResultBuffer, and then dole out
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* data from there to the caller. When we exhaust the current input
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* packet, read another.
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*/
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while (bytes_returned < len)
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{
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int conf_state = 0;
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/* Check if we have data in our buffer that we can return immediately */
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if (PqGSSResultNext < PqGSSResultLength)
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{
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size_t bytes_in_buffer = PqGSSResultLength - PqGSSResultNext;
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size_t bytes_to_copy = Min(bytes_in_buffer, len - bytes_returned);
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/*
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* Copy the data from our result buffer into the caller's buffer,
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* at the point where we last left off filling their buffer.
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*/
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memcpy((char *) ptr + bytes_returned, PqGSSResultBuffer + PqGSSResultNext, bytes_to_copy);
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PqGSSResultNext += bytes_to_copy;
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bytes_returned += bytes_to_copy;
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/*
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* At this point, we've either filled the caller's buffer or
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* emptied our result buffer. Either way, return to caller. In
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* the second case, we could try to read another encrypted packet,
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* but the odds are good that there isn't one available. (If this
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* isn't true, we chose too small a max packet size.) In any
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* case, there's no harm letting the caller process the data we've
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* already returned.
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*/
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break;
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}
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/* Result buffer is empty, so reset buffer pointers */
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PqGSSResultLength = PqGSSResultNext = 0;
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/*
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* Because we chose above to return immediately as soon as we emit
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* some data, bytes_returned must be zero at this point. Therefore
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* the failure exits below can just return -1 without worrying about
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* whether we already emitted some data.
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*/
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Assert(bytes_returned == 0);
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/*
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* At this point, our result buffer is empty with more bytes being
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* requested to be read. We are now ready to load the next packet and
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* decrypt it (entirely) into our result buffer.
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*/
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/* Collect the length if we haven't already */
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if (PqGSSRecvLength < sizeof(uint32))
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{
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ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength,
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sizeof(uint32) - PqGSSRecvLength);
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/* If ret <= 0, secure_raw_read already set the correct errno */
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
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/* If we still haven't got the length, return to the caller */
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if (PqGSSRecvLength < sizeof(uint32))
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{
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errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
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return -1;
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}
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}
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/* Decode the packet length and check for overlength packet */
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input.length = ntohl(*(uint32 *) PqGSSRecvBuffer);
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if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
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{
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ereport(COMMERROR,
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(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %zu)",
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(size_t) input.length,
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PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
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errno = ECONNRESET;
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Read as much of the packet as we are able to on this call into
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* wherever we left off from the last time we were called.
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*/
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ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength,
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input.length - (PqGSSRecvLength - sizeof(uint32)));
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/* If ret <= 0, secure_raw_read already set the correct errno */
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if (ret <= 0)
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return ret;
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PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
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/* If we don't yet have the whole packet, return to the caller */
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if (PqGSSRecvLength - sizeof(uint32) < input.length)
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{
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errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* We now have the full packet and we can perform the decryption and
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* refill our result buffer, then loop back up to pass data back to
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* the caller.
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*/
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output.value = NULL;
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output.length = 0;
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input.value = PqGSSRecvBuffer + sizeof(uint32);
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major = gss_unwrap(&minor, gctx, &input, &output, &conf_state, NULL);
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if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
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{
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pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI unwrap error"), major, minor);
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errno = ECONNRESET;
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return -1;
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}
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if (conf_state == 0)
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{
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ereport(COMMERROR,
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(errmsg("incoming GSSAPI message did not use confidentiality")));
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errno = ECONNRESET;
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return -1;
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}
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memcpy(PqGSSResultBuffer, output.value, output.length);
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PqGSSResultLength = output.length;
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/* Our receive buffer is now empty, reset it */
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PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
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/* Release buffer storage allocated by GSSAPI */
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gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
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}
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return bytes_returned;
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}
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/*
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* Read the specified number of bytes off the wire, waiting using
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* WaitLatchOrSocket if we would block.
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*
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* Results are read into PqGSSRecvBuffer.
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*
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* Will always return either -1, to indicate a permanent error, or len.
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*/
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static ssize_t
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read_or_wait(Port *port, ssize_t len)
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{
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ssize_t ret;
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/*
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* Keep going until we either read in everything we were asked to, or we
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* error out.
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*/
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while (PqGSSRecvLength < len)
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{
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ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength, len - PqGSSRecvLength);
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/*
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* If we got back an error and it wasn't just
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* EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN/EINTR, then give up.
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*/
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if (ret < 0 &&
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!(errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
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return -1;
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/*
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* Ok, we got back either a positive value, zero, or a negative result
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* indicating we should retry.
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*
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* If it was zero or negative, then we wait on the socket to be
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* readable again.
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*/
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if (ret <= 0)
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{
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WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch,
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WL_SOCKET_READABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH,
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port->sock, 0, WAIT_EVENT_GSS_OPEN_SERVER);
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/*
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* If we got back zero bytes, and then waited on the socket to be
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* readable and got back zero bytes on a second read, then this is
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* EOF and the client hung up on us.
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*
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* If we did get data here, then we can just fall through and
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* handle it just as if we got data the first time.
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*
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* Otherwise loop back to the top and try again.
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*/
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if (ret == 0)
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{
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ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength, len - PqGSSRecvLength);
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if (ret == 0)
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return -1;
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}
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if (ret < 0)
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continue;
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}
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PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
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}
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return len;
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}
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|
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/*
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* Start up a GSSAPI-encrypted connection. This performs GSSAPI
|
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* authentication; after this function completes, it is safe to call
|
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* be_gssapi_read and be_gssapi_write. Returns -1 and logs on failure;
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* otherwise, returns 0 and marks the connection as ready for GSSAPI
|
|
* encryption.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that unlike the be_gssapi_read/be_gssapi_write functions, this
|
|
* function WILL block on the socket to be ready for read/write (using
|
|
* WaitLatchOrSocket) as appropriate while establishing the GSSAPI
|
|
* session.
|
|
*/
|
|
ssize_t
|
|
secure_open_gssapi(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
bool complete_next = false;
|
|
OM_uint32 major,
|
|
minor;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allocate subsidiary Port data for GSSAPI operations.
|
|
*/
|
|
port->gss = (pg_gssinfo *)
|
|
MemoryContextAllocZero(TopMemoryContext, sizeof(pg_gssinfo));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Allocate buffers and initialize state variables. By malloc'ing the
|
|
* buffers at this point, we avoid wasting static data space in processes
|
|
* that will never use them, and we ensure that the buffers are
|
|
* sufficiently aligned for the length-word accesses that we do in some
|
|
* places in this file.
|
|
*/
|
|
PqGSSSendBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
|
PqGSSRecvBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
|
PqGSSResultBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
|
if (!PqGSSSendBuffer || !PqGSSRecvBuffer || !PqGSSResultBuffer)
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
|
|
errmsg("out of memory")));
|
|
PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = PqGSSSendConsumed = 0;
|
|
PqGSSRecvLength = PqGSSResultLength = PqGSSResultNext = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Use the configured keytab, if there is one. Unfortunately, Heimdal
|
|
* doesn't support the cred store extensions, so use the env var.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pg_krb_server_keyfile != NULL && pg_krb_server_keyfile[0] != '\0')
|
|
{
|
|
if (setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 1) != 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/* The only likely failure cause is OOM, so use that errcode */
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
|
|
errmsg("could not set environment: %m")));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (true)
|
|
{
|
|
ssize_t ret;
|
|
gss_buffer_desc input,
|
|
output = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The client always sends first, so try to go ahead and read the
|
|
* length and wait on the socket to be readable again if that fails.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = read_or_wait(port, sizeof(uint32));
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the length for this packet from the length header.
|
|
*/
|
|
input.length = ntohl(*(uint32 *) PqGSSRecvBuffer);
|
|
|
|
/* Done with the length, reset our buffer */
|
|
PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* During initialization, packets are always fully consumed and
|
|
* shouldn't ever be over PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE in length.
|
|
*
|
|
* Verify on our side that the client doesn't do something funny.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %d)",
|
|
(size_t) input.length,
|
|
PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)));
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the rest of the packet so we can pass it to GSSAPI to accept
|
|
* the context.
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = read_or_wait(port, input.length);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
input.value = PqGSSRecvBuffer;
|
|
|
|
/* Process incoming data. (The client sends first.) */
|
|
major = gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, &port->gss->ctx,
|
|
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &input,
|
|
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
|
|
&port->gss->name, NULL, &output, NULL,
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
|
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
|
|
{
|
|
pg_GSS_error(_("could not accept GSSAPI security context"),
|
|
major, minor);
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if (!(major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* rfc2744 technically permits context negotiation to be complete
|
|
* both with and without a packet to be sent.
|
|
*/
|
|
complete_next = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Done handling the incoming packet, reset our buffer */
|
|
PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if we have data to send and, if we do, make sure to send it
|
|
* all
|
|
*/
|
|
if (output.length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32 netlen = htonl(output.length);
|
|
|
|
if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
|
|
(size_t) output.length,
|
|
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer, (char *) &netlen, sizeof(uint32));
|
|
PqGSSSendLength += sizeof(uint32);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, output.value, output.length);
|
|
PqGSSSendLength += output.length;
|
|
|
|
/* we don't bother with PqGSSSendConsumed here */
|
|
|
|
while (PqGSSSendNext < PqGSSSendLength)
|
|
{
|
|
ret = secure_raw_write(port, PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendNext,
|
|
PqGSSSendLength - PqGSSSendNext);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we got back an error and it wasn't just
|
|
* EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN/EINTR, then give up.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (ret < 0 &&
|
|
!(errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
|
|
{
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Wait and retry if we couldn't write yet */
|
|
if (ret <= 0)
|
|
{
|
|
WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch,
|
|
WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH,
|
|
port->sock, 0, WAIT_EVENT_GSS_OPEN_SERVER);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PqGSSSendNext += ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Done sending the packet, reset our buffer */
|
|
PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = 0;
|
|
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we got back that the connection is finished being set up, now
|
|
* that we've sent the last packet, exit our loop.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (complete_next)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Determine the max packet size which will fit in our buffer, after
|
|
* accounting for the length. be_gssapi_write will need this.
|
|
*/
|
|
major = gss_wrap_size_limit(&minor, port->gss->ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
|
|
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32),
|
|
&PqGSSMaxPktSize);
|
|
|
|
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
|
|
{
|
|
pg_GSS_error(_("GSSAPI size check error"), major, minor);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
port->gss->enc = true;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return if GSSAPI authentication was used on this connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool
|
|
be_gssapi_get_auth(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!port || !port->gss)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return port->gss->auth;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return if GSSAPI encryption is enabled and being used on this connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
bool
|
|
be_gssapi_get_enc(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!port || !port->gss)
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
return port->gss->enc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return the GSSAPI principal used for authentication on this connection
|
|
* (NULL if we did not perform GSSAPI authentication).
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *
|
|
be_gssapi_get_princ(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!port || !port->gss)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
return port->gss->princ;
|
|
}
|