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559 lines
18 KiB
C
559 lines
18 KiB
C
/*
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* rewrite/rowsecurity.c
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* Routines to support policies for row level security (aka RLS).
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*
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* Policies in PostgreSQL provide a mechanism to limit what records are
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* returned to a user and what records a user is permitted to add to a table.
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*
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* Policies can be defined for specific roles, specific commands, or provided
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* by an extension. Row security can also be enabled for a table without any
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* policies being explicitly defined, in which case a default-deny policy is
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* applied.
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*
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* Any part of the system which is returning records back to the user, or
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* which is accepting records from the user to add to a table, needs to
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* consider the policies associated with the table (if any). For normal
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* queries, this is handled by calling prepend_row_security_policies() during
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* rewrite, which looks at each RTE and adds the expressions defined by the
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* policies to the securityQuals list for the RTE. For queries which modify
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* the relation, any WITH CHECK policies are added to the list of
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* WithCheckOptions for the Query and checked against each row which is being
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* added to the table. Other parts of the system (eg: COPY) simply construct
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* a normal query and use that, if RLS is to be applied.
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*
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* The check to see if RLS should be enabled is provided through
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* check_enable_rls(), which returns an enum (defined in rowsecurity.h) to
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* indicate if RLS should be enabled (RLS_ENABLED), or bypassed (RLS_NONE or
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* RLS_NONE_ENV). RLS_NONE_ENV indicates that RLS should be bypassed
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* in the current environment, but that may change if the row_security GUC or
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* the current role changes.
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2015, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include "access/heapam.h"
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#include "access/htup_details.h"
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#include "access/sysattr.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_class.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_inherits_fn.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_policy.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_type.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
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#include "nodes/makefuncs.h"
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#include "nodes/nodeFuncs.h"
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#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
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#include "nodes/plannodes.h"
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#include "parser/parsetree.h"
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#include "rewrite/rewriteHandler.h"
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#include "rewrite/rewriteManip.h"
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#include "rewrite/rowsecurity.h"
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#include "utils/acl.h"
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#include "utils/lsyscache.h"
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#include "utils/rel.h"
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#include "utils/syscache.h"
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#include "tcop/utility.h"
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static List *pull_row_security_policies(CmdType cmd, Relation relation,
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Oid user_id);
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static void process_policies(List *policies, int rt_index,
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Expr **final_qual,
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Expr **final_with_check_qual,
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bool *hassublinks);
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static bool check_role_for_policy(ArrayType *policy_roles, Oid user_id);
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/*
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* hook to allow extensions to apply their own security policy
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*
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* See below where the hook is called in prepend_row_security_policies for
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* insight into how to use this hook.
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*/
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row_security_policy_hook_type row_security_policy_hook = NULL;
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/*
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* Check the given RTE to see whether it's already had row security quals
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* expanded and, if not, prepend any row security rules from built-in or
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* plug-in sources to the securityQuals. The security quals are rewritten (for
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* view expansion, etc) before being added to the RTE.
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*
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* Returns true if any quals were added. Note that quals may have been found
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* but not added if user rights make the user exempt from row security.
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*/
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bool
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prepend_row_security_policies(Query* root, RangeTblEntry* rte, int rt_index)
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{
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Expr *rowsec_expr = NULL;
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Expr *rowsec_with_check_expr = NULL;
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Expr *hook_expr = NULL;
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Expr *hook_with_check_expr = NULL;
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List *rowsec_policies;
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List *hook_policies = NIL;
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Relation rel;
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Oid user_id;
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int sec_context;
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int rls_status;
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bool defaultDeny = true;
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bool hassublinks = false;
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/* This is just to get the security context */
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GetUserIdAndSecContext(&user_id, &sec_context);
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/* Switch to checkAsUser if it's set */
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user_id = rte->checkAsUser ? rte->checkAsUser : GetUserId();
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/*
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* If this is not a normal relation, or we have been told
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* to explicitly skip RLS (perhaps because this is an FK check)
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* then just return immediately.
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*/
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if (rte->relid < FirstNormalObjectId
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|| rte->relkind != RELKIND_RELATION
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|| (sec_context & SECURITY_ROW_LEVEL_DISABLED))
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return false;
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/* Determine the state of RLS for this, pass checkAsUser explicitly */
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rls_status = check_enable_rls(rte->relid, rte->checkAsUser);
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/* If there is no RLS on this table at all, nothing to do */
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if (rls_status == RLS_NONE)
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return false;
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/*
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* RLS_NONE_ENV means we are not doing any RLS now, but that may change
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* with changes to the environment, so we mark it as hasRowSecurity to
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* force a re-plan when the environment changes.
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*/
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if (rls_status == RLS_NONE_ENV)
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{
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/*
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* Indicate that this query may involve RLS and must therefore
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* be replanned if the environment changes (GUCs, role), but we
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* are not adding anything here.
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*/
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root->hasRowSecurity = true;
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return false;
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}
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/*
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* We may end up getting called multiple times for the same RTE, so check
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* to make sure we aren't doing double-work.
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*/
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if (rte->securityQuals != NIL)
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return false;
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/* Grab the built-in policies which should be applied to this relation. */
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rel = heap_open(rte->relid, NoLock);
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rowsec_policies = pull_row_security_policies(root->commandType, rel,
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user_id);
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/*
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* Check if this is only the default-deny policy.
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*
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* Normally, if the table has row security enabled but there are
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* no policies, we use a default-deny policy and not allow anything.
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* However, when an extension uses the hook to add their own
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* policies, we don't want to include the default deny policy or
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* there won't be any way for a user to use an extension exclusively
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* for the policies to be used.
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*/
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if (((RowSecurityPolicy *) linitial(rowsec_policies))->policy_id
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== InvalidOid)
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defaultDeny = true;
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/* Now that we have our policies, build the expressions from them. */
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process_policies(rowsec_policies, rt_index, &rowsec_expr,
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&rowsec_with_check_expr, &hassublinks);
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/*
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* Also, allow extensions to add their own policies.
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*
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* Note that, as with the internal policies, if multiple policies are
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* returned then they will be combined into a single expression with
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* all of them OR'd together. However, to avoid the situation of an
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* extension granting more access to a table than the internal policies
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* would allow, the extension's policies are AND'd with the internal
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* policies. In other words - extensions can only provide further
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* filtering of the result set (or further reduce the set of records
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* allowed to be added).
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*
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* If only a USING policy is returned by the extension then it will be
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* used for WITH CHECK as well, similar to how internal policies are
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* handled.
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*
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* The only caveat to this is that if there are NO internal policies
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* defined, there ARE policies returned by the extension, and RLS is
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* enabled on the table, then we will ignore the internally-generated
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* default-deny policy and use only the policies returned by the
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* extension.
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*/
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if (row_security_policy_hook)
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{
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hook_policies = (*row_security_policy_hook)(root->commandType, rel);
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/* Build the expression from any policies returned. */
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process_policies(hook_policies, rt_index, &hook_expr,
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&hook_with_check_expr, &hassublinks);
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}
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/*
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* If the only built-in policy is the default-deny one, and hook
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* policies exist, then use the hook policies only and do not apply
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* the default-deny policy. Otherwise, apply both sets (AND'd
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* together).
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*/
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if (defaultDeny && hook_policies != NIL)
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rowsec_expr = NULL;
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/*
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* For INSERT or UPDATE, we need to add the WITH CHECK quals to
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* Query's withCheckOptions to verify that any new records pass the
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* WITH CHECK policy (this will be a copy of the USING policy, if no
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* explicit WITH CHECK policy exists).
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*/
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if (root->commandType == CMD_INSERT || root->commandType == CMD_UPDATE)
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{
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/*
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* WITH CHECK OPTIONS wants a WCO node which wraps each Expr, so
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* create them as necessary.
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*/
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if (rowsec_with_check_expr)
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{
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WithCheckOption *wco;
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wco = (WithCheckOption *) makeNode(WithCheckOption);
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wco->viewname = RelationGetRelationName(rel);
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wco->qual = (Node *) rowsec_with_check_expr;
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wco->cascaded = false;
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root->withCheckOptions = lcons(wco, root->withCheckOptions);
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}
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/*
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* Ditto for the expression, if any, returned from the extension.
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*/
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if (hook_with_check_expr)
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{
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WithCheckOption *wco;
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wco = (WithCheckOption *) makeNode(WithCheckOption);
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wco->viewname = RelationGetRelationName(rel);
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wco->qual = (Node *) hook_with_check_expr;
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wco->cascaded = false;
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root->withCheckOptions = lcons(wco, root->withCheckOptions);
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}
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}
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/* For SELECT, UPDATE, and DELETE, set the security quals */
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if (root->commandType == CMD_SELECT
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|| root->commandType == CMD_UPDATE
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|| root->commandType == CMD_DELETE)
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{
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if (rowsec_expr)
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rte->securityQuals = lcons(rowsec_expr, rte->securityQuals);
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if (hook_expr)
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rte->securityQuals = lcons(hook_expr,
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rte->securityQuals);
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}
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heap_close(rel, NoLock);
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/*
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* Mark this query as having row security, so plancache can invalidate
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* it when necessary (eg: role changes)
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*/
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root->hasRowSecurity = true;
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/*
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* If we have sublinks added because of the policies being added to the
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* query, then set hasSubLinks on the Query to force subLinks to be
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* properly expanded.
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*/
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if (hassublinks)
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root->hasSubLinks = hassublinks;
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/* If we got this far, we must have added quals */
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return true;
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}
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/*
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* pull_row_security_policies
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*
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* Returns the list of policies to be added for this relation, based on the
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* type of command and the roles to which it applies, from the relation cache.
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*
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*/
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static List *
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pull_row_security_policies(CmdType cmd, Relation relation, Oid user_id)
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{
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List *policies = NIL;
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ListCell *item;
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RowSecurityPolicy *policy;
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/*
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* Row security is enabled for the relation and the row security GUC is
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* either 'on' or 'force' here, so find the policies to apply to the table.
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* There must always be at least one policy defined (may be the simple
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* 'default-deny' policy, if none are explicitly defined on the table).
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*/
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foreach(item, relation->rd_rsdesc->policies)
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{
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policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
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/* Always add ALL policies, if they exist. */
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if (policy->cmd == '\0' &&
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check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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policies = lcons(policy, policies);
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/* Build the list of policies to return. */
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switch(cmd)
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{
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case CMD_SELECT:
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if (policy->cmd == ACL_SELECT_CHR
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&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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policies = lcons(policy, policies);
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break;
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case CMD_INSERT:
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/* If INSERT then only need to add the WITH CHECK qual */
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if (policy->cmd == ACL_INSERT_CHR
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&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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policies = lcons(policy, policies);
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break;
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case CMD_UPDATE:
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if (policy->cmd == ACL_UPDATE_CHR
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&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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policies = lcons(policy, policies);
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break;
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case CMD_DELETE:
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if (policy->cmd == ACL_DELETE_CHR
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&& check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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policies = lcons(policy, policies);
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break;
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default:
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elog(ERROR, "unrecognized command type.");
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break;
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}
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}
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/*
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* There should always be a policy applied. If there are none found then
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* create a simply defauly-deny policy (might be that policies exist but
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* that none of them apply to the role which is querying the table).
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*/
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if (policies == NIL)
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{
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RowSecurityPolicy *policy = NULL;
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Datum role;
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role = ObjectIdGetDatum(ACL_ID_PUBLIC);
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policy = palloc0(sizeof(RowSecurityPolicy));
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policy->policy_name = pstrdup("default-deny policy");
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policy->policy_id = InvalidOid;
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policy->cmd = '\0';
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policy->roles = construct_array(&role, 1, OIDOID, sizeof(Oid), true,
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'i');
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policy->qual = (Expr *) makeConst(BOOLOID, -1, InvalidOid,
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sizeof(bool), BoolGetDatum(false),
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false, true);
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policy->with_check_qual = copyObject(policy->qual);
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policy->hassublinks = false;
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policies = list_make1(policy);
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}
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Assert(policies != NIL);
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return policies;
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}
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/*
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* process_policies
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*
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* This will step through the policies which are passed in (which would come
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* from either the built-in ones created on a table, or from policies provided
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* by an extension through the hook provided), work out how to combine them,
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* rewrite them as necessary, and produce an Expr for the normal security
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* quals and an Expr for the with check quals.
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*
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* qual_eval, with_check_eval, and hassublinks are output variables
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*/
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static void
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process_policies(List *policies, int rt_index, Expr **qual_eval,
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Expr **with_check_eval, bool *hassublinks)
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{
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ListCell *item;
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List *quals = NIL;
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List *with_check_quals = NIL;
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/*
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* Extract the USING and WITH CHECK quals from each of the policies
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* and add them to our lists.
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*/
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foreach(item, policies)
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{
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RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
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if (policy->qual != NULL)
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quals = lcons(copyObject(policy->qual), quals);
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if (policy->with_check_qual != NULL)
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with_check_quals = lcons(copyObject(policy->with_check_qual),
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with_check_quals);
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if (policy->hassublinks)
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*hassublinks = true;
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}
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/*
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* If we end up without any normal quals (perhaps the only policy matched
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* was for INSERT), then create a single all-false one.
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*/
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if (quals == NIL)
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quals = lcons(makeConst(BOOLOID, -1, InvalidOid, sizeof(bool),
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BoolGetDatum(false), false, true), quals);
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/*
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* If we end up with only USING quals, then use those as
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* WITH CHECK quals also.
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*/
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if (with_check_quals == NIL)
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with_check_quals = copyObject(quals);
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/*
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* Row security quals always have the target table as varno 1, as no
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* joins are permitted in row security expressions. We must walk the
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* expression, updating any references to varno 1 to the varno
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* the table has in the outer query.
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*
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* We rewrite the expression in-place.
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*/
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ChangeVarNodes((Node *) quals, 1, rt_index, 0);
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ChangeVarNodes((Node *) with_check_quals, 1, rt_index, 0);
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/*
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* If more than one security qual is returned, then they need to be
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* OR'ed together.
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*/
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if (list_length(quals) > 1)
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*qual_eval = makeBoolExpr(OR_EXPR, quals, -1);
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else
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*qual_eval = (Expr*) linitial(quals);
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/*
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* If more than one WITH CHECK qual is returned, then they need to
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* be OR'ed together.
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*/
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if (list_length(with_check_quals) > 1)
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*with_check_eval = makeBoolExpr(OR_EXPR, with_check_quals, -1);
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else
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*with_check_eval = (Expr*) linitial(with_check_quals);
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return;
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}
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/*
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* check_enable_rls
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*
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* Determine, based on the relation, row_security setting, and current role,
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* if RLS is applicable to this query. RLS_NONE_ENV indicates that, while
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* RLS is not to be added for this query, a change in the environment may change
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* that. RLS_NONE means that RLS is not on the relation at all and therefore
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* we don't need to worry about it. RLS_ENABLED means RLS should be implemented
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* for the table and the plan cache needs to be invalidated if the environment
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* changes.
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*
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* Handle checking as another role via checkAsUser (for views, etc).
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*/
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int
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check_enable_rls(Oid relid, Oid checkAsUser)
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{
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HeapTuple tuple;
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Form_pg_class classform;
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bool relrowsecurity;
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Oid user_id = checkAsUser ? checkAsUser : GetUserId();
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tuple = SearchSysCache1(RELOID, ObjectIdGetDatum(relid));
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if (!HeapTupleIsValid(tuple))
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return RLS_NONE;
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classform = (Form_pg_class) GETSTRUCT(tuple);
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relrowsecurity = classform->relrowsecurity;
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ReleaseSysCache(tuple);
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/* Nothing to do if the relation does not have RLS */
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if (!relrowsecurity)
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return RLS_NONE;
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/*
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* Check permissions
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*
|
|
* If the relation has row level security enabled and the row_security GUC
|
|
* is off, then check if the user has rights to bypass RLS for this
|
|
* relation. Table owners can always bypass, as can any role with the
|
|
* BYPASSRLS capability.
|
|
*
|
|
* If the role is the table owner, then we bypass RLS unless row_security
|
|
* is set to 'force'. Note that superuser is always considered an owner.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return RLS_NONE_ENV to indicate that this decision depends on the
|
|
* environment (in this case, what the current values of user_id and
|
|
* row_security are).
|
|
*/
|
|
if (row_security != ROW_SECURITY_FORCE
|
|
&& (pg_class_ownercheck(relid, user_id)))
|
|
return RLS_NONE_ENV;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the row_security GUC is 'off' then check if the user has permission
|
|
* to bypass it. Note that we have already handled the case where the user
|
|
* is the table owner above.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that row_security is always considered 'on' when querying
|
|
* through a view or other cases where checkAsUser is true, so skip this
|
|
* if checkAsUser is in use.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!checkAsUser && row_security == ROW_SECURITY_OFF)
|
|
{
|
|
if (has_bypassrls_privilege(user_id))
|
|
/* OK to bypass */
|
|
return RLS_NONE_ENV;
|
|
else
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INSUFFICIENT_PRIVILEGE),
|
|
errmsg("insufficient privilege to bypass row security.")));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RLS should be fully enabled for this relation. */
|
|
return RLS_ENABLED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* check_role_for_policy -
|
|
* determines if the policy should be applied for the current role
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool
|
|
check_role_for_policy(ArrayType *policy_roles, Oid user_id)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
Oid *roles = (Oid *) ARR_DATA_PTR(policy_roles);
|
|
|
|
/* Quick fall-thru for policies applied to all roles */
|
|
if (roles[0] == ACL_ID_PUBLIC)
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARR_DIMS(policy_roles)[0]; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (has_privs_of_role(user_id, roles[i]))
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|