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postgres/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-gssapi.c
Tom Lane 46da7bf671 Fix severe memory leaks in GSSAPI encryption support.
Both the backend and libpq leaked buffers containing encrypted data
to be transmitted, so that the process size would grow roughly as
the total amount of data sent.

There were also far-less-critical leaks of the same sort in GSSAPI
session establishment.

Oversight in commit b0b39f72b, which I failed to notice while
reviewing the code in 2c0cdc818.

Per complaint from pmc@citylink.
Back-patch to v12 where this code was introduced.

Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20200504115649.GA77072@gate.oper.dinoex.org
2020-05-05 13:10:17 -04:00

680 lines
20 KiB
C

/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* be-secure-gssapi.c
* GSSAPI encryption support
*
* Portions Copyright (c) 2018-2020, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
*
* IDENTIFICATION
* src/backend/libpq/be-secure-gssapi.c
*
*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
*/
#include "postgres.h"
#include <unistd.h>
#include "libpq/auth.h"
#include "libpq/be-gssapi-common.h"
#include "libpq/libpq.h"
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"
#include "pgstat.h"
/*
* Handle the encryption/decryption of data using GSSAPI.
*
* In the encrypted data stream on the wire, we break up the data
* into packets where each packet starts with a uint32-size length
* word (in network byte order), then encrypted data of that length
* immediately following. Decryption yields the same data stream
* that would appear when not using encryption.
*
* Encrypted data typically ends up being larger than the same data
* unencrypted, so we use fixed-size buffers for handling the
* encryption/decryption which are larger than PQComm's buffer will
* typically be to minimize the times where we have to make multiple
* packets (and therefore multiple recv/send calls for a single
* read/write call to us).
*
* NOTE: The client and server have to agree on the max packet size,
* because we have to pass an entire packet to GSSAPI at a time and we
* don't want the other side to send arbitrarily huge packets as we
* would have to allocate memory for them to then pass them to GSSAPI.
*
* Therefore, these two #define's are effectively part of the protocol
* spec and can't ever be changed.
*/
#define PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
#define PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE 16384
/*
* Since we manage at most one GSS-encrypted connection per backend,
* we can just keep all this state in static variables. The char *
* variables point to buffers that are allocated once and re-used.
*/
static char *PqGSSSendBuffer; /* Encrypted data waiting to be sent */
static int PqGSSSendLength; /* End of data available in PqGSSSendBuffer */
static int PqGSSSendNext; /* Next index to send a byte from
* PqGSSSendBuffer */
static int PqGSSSendConsumed; /* Number of *unencrypted* bytes consumed for
* current contents of PqGSSSendBuffer */
static char *PqGSSRecvBuffer; /* Received, encrypted data */
static int PqGSSRecvLength; /* End of data available in PqGSSRecvBuffer */
static char *PqGSSResultBuffer; /* Decryption of data in gss_RecvBuffer */
static int PqGSSResultLength; /* End of data available in PqGSSResultBuffer */
static int PqGSSResultNext; /* Next index to read a byte from
* PqGSSResultBuffer */
static uint32 PqGSSMaxPktSize; /* Maximum size we can encrypt and fit the
* results into our output buffer */
/*
* Attempt to write len bytes of data from ptr to a GSSAPI-encrypted connection.
*
* The connection must be already set up for GSSAPI encryption (i.e., GSSAPI
* transport negotiation is complete).
*
* On success, returns the number of data bytes consumed (possibly less than
* len). On failure, returns -1 with errno set appropriately. (For fatal
* errors, we may just elog and exit, if errno wouldn't be sufficient to
* describe the error.) For retryable errors, caller should call again
* (passing the same data) once the socket is ready.
*/
ssize_t
be_gssapi_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
{
OM_uint32 major,
minor;
gss_buffer_desc input,
output;
size_t bytes_sent = 0;
size_t bytes_to_encrypt;
size_t bytes_encrypted;
gss_ctx_id_t gctx = port->gss->ctx;
/*
* When we get a failure, we must not tell the caller we have successfully
* transmitted everything, else it won't retry. Hence a "success"
* (positive) return value must only count source bytes corresponding to
* fully-transmitted encrypted packets. The amount of source data
* corresponding to the current partly-transmitted packet is remembered in
* PqGSSSendConsumed. On a retry, the caller *must* be sending that data
* again, so if it offers a len less than that, something is wrong.
*/
if (len < PqGSSSendConsumed)
elog(FATAL, "GSSAPI caller failed to retransmit all data needing to be retried");
/* Discount whatever source data we already encrypted. */
bytes_to_encrypt = len - PqGSSSendConsumed;
bytes_encrypted = PqGSSSendConsumed;
/*
* Loop through encrypting data and sending it out until it's all done or
* secure_raw_write() complains (which would likely mean that the socket
* is non-blocking and the requested send() would block, or there was some
* kind of actual error).
*/
while (bytes_to_encrypt || PqGSSSendLength)
{
int conf_state = 0;
uint32 netlen;
/*
* Check if we have data in the encrypted output buffer that needs to
* be sent (possibly left over from a previous call), and if so, try
* to send it. If we aren't able to, return that fact back up to the
* caller.
*/
if (PqGSSSendLength)
{
ssize_t ret;
ssize_t amount = PqGSSSendLength - PqGSSSendNext;
ret = secure_raw_write(port, PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendNext, amount);
if (ret <= 0)
{
/*
* Report any previously-sent data; if there was none, reflect
* the secure_raw_write result up to our caller. When there
* was some, we're effectively assuming that any interesting
* failure condition will recur on the next try.
*/
if (bytes_sent)
return bytes_sent;
return ret;
}
/*
* Check if this was a partial write, and if so, move forward that
* far in our buffer and try again.
*/
if (ret != amount)
{
PqGSSSendNext += ret;
continue;
}
/* We've successfully sent whatever data was in that packet. */
bytes_sent += PqGSSSendConsumed;
/* All encrypted data was sent, our buffer is empty now. */
PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = PqGSSSendConsumed = 0;
}
/*
* Check if there are any bytes left to encrypt. If not, we're done.
*/
if (!bytes_to_encrypt)
break;
/*
* Check how much we are being asked to send, if it's too much, then
* we will have to loop and possibly be called multiple times to get
* through all the data.
*/
if (bytes_to_encrypt > PqGSSMaxPktSize)
input.length = PqGSSMaxPktSize;
else
input.length = bytes_to_encrypt;
input.value = (char *) ptr + bytes_encrypted;
output.value = NULL;
output.length = 0;
/* Create the next encrypted packet */
major = gss_wrap(&minor, gctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
&input, &conf_state, &output);
if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
pg_GSS_error(FATAL, gettext_noop("GSSAPI wrap error"), major, minor);
if (conf_state == 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errmsg("outgoing GSSAPI message would not use confidentiality")));
if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
ereport(FATAL,
(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
(size_t) output.length,
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
bytes_encrypted += input.length;
bytes_to_encrypt -= input.length;
PqGSSSendConsumed += input.length;
/* 4 network-order bytes of length, then payload */
netlen = htonl(output.length);
memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, &netlen, sizeof(uint32));
PqGSSSendLength += sizeof(uint32);
memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, output.value, output.length);
PqGSSSendLength += output.length;
/* Release buffer storage allocated by GSSAPI */
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
}
/* If we get here, our counters should all match up. */
Assert(bytes_sent == len);
Assert(bytes_sent == bytes_encrypted);
return bytes_sent;
}
/*
* Read up to len bytes of data into ptr from a GSSAPI-encrypted connection.
*
* The connection must be already set up for GSSAPI encryption (i.e., GSSAPI
* transport negotiation is complete).
*
* Returns the number of data bytes read, or on failure, returns -1
* with errno set appropriately. (For fatal errors, we may just elog and
* exit, if errno wouldn't be sufficient to describe the error.) For
* retryable errors, caller should call again once the socket is ready.
*/
ssize_t
be_gssapi_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
{
OM_uint32 major,
minor;
gss_buffer_desc input,
output;
ssize_t ret;
size_t bytes_returned = 0;
gss_ctx_id_t gctx = port->gss->ctx;
/*
* The plan here is to read one incoming encrypted packet into
* PqGSSRecvBuffer, decrypt it into PqGSSResultBuffer, and then dole out
* data from there to the caller. When we exhaust the current input
* packet, read another.
*/
while (bytes_returned < len)
{
int conf_state = 0;
/* Check if we have data in our buffer that we can return immediately */
if (PqGSSResultNext < PqGSSResultLength)
{
size_t bytes_in_buffer = PqGSSResultLength - PqGSSResultNext;
size_t bytes_to_copy = Min(bytes_in_buffer, len - bytes_returned);
/*
* Copy the data from our result buffer into the caller's buffer,
* at the point where we last left off filling their buffer.
*/
memcpy((char *) ptr + bytes_returned, PqGSSResultBuffer + PqGSSResultNext, bytes_to_copy);
PqGSSResultNext += bytes_to_copy;
bytes_returned += bytes_to_copy;
/*
* At this point, we've either filled the caller's buffer or
* emptied our result buffer. Either way, return to caller. In
* the second case, we could try to read another encrypted packet,
* but the odds are good that there isn't one available. (If this
* isn't true, we chose too small a max packet size.) In any
* case, there's no harm letting the caller process the data we've
* already returned.
*/
break;
}
/* Result buffer is empty, so reset buffer pointers */
PqGSSResultLength = PqGSSResultNext = 0;
/*
* Because we chose above to return immediately as soon as we emit
* some data, bytes_returned must be zero at this point. Therefore
* the failure exits below can just return -1 without worrying about
* whether we already emitted some data.
*/
Assert(bytes_returned == 0);
/*
* At this point, our result buffer is empty with more bytes being
* requested to be read. We are now ready to load the next packet and
* decrypt it (entirely) into our result buffer.
*/
/* Collect the length if we haven't already */
if (PqGSSRecvLength < sizeof(uint32))
{
ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength,
sizeof(uint32) - PqGSSRecvLength);
/* If ret <= 0, secure_raw_read already set the correct errno */
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
/* If we still haven't got the length, return to the caller */
if (PqGSSRecvLength < sizeof(uint32))
{
errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
return -1;
}
}
/* Decode the packet length and check for overlength packet */
input.length = ntohl(*(uint32 *) PqGSSRecvBuffer);
if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
ereport(FATAL,
(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %zu)",
(size_t) input.length,
PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
/*
* Read as much of the packet as we are able to on this call into
* wherever we left off from the last time we were called.
*/
ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength,
input.length - (PqGSSRecvLength - sizeof(uint32)));
/* If ret <= 0, secure_raw_read already set the correct errno */
if (ret <= 0)
return ret;
PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
/* If we don't yet have the whole packet, return to the caller */
if (PqGSSRecvLength - sizeof(uint32) < input.length)
{
errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
return -1;
}
/*
* We now have the full packet and we can perform the decryption and
* refill our result buffer, then loop back up to pass data back to
* the caller.
*/
output.value = NULL;
output.length = 0;
input.value = PqGSSRecvBuffer + sizeof(uint32);
major = gss_unwrap(&minor, gctx, &input, &output, &conf_state, NULL);
if (major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
pg_GSS_error(FATAL, gettext_noop("GSSAPI unwrap error"),
major, minor);
if (conf_state == 0)
ereport(FATAL,
(errmsg("incoming GSSAPI message did not use confidentiality")));
memcpy(PqGSSResultBuffer, output.value, output.length);
PqGSSResultLength = output.length;
/* Our receive buffer is now empty, reset it */
PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
/* Release buffer storage allocated by GSSAPI */
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
}
return bytes_returned;
}
/*
* Read the specified number of bytes off the wire, waiting using
* WaitLatchOrSocket if we would block.
*
* Results are read into PqGSSRecvBuffer.
*
* Will always return either -1, to indicate a permanent error, or len.
*/
static ssize_t
read_or_wait(Port *port, ssize_t len)
{
ssize_t ret;
/*
* Keep going until we either read in everything we were asked to, or we
* error out.
*/
while (PqGSSRecvLength < len)
{
ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength, len - PqGSSRecvLength);
/*
* If we got back an error and it wasn't just
* EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN/EINTR, then give up.
*/
if (ret < 0 &&
!(errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
return -1;
/*
* Ok, we got back either a positive value, zero, or a negative result
* indicating we should retry.
*
* If it was zero or negative, then we wait on the socket to be
* readable again.
*/
if (ret <= 0)
{
WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch,
WL_SOCKET_READABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH,
port->sock, 0, WAIT_EVENT_GSS_OPEN_SERVER);
/*
* If we got back zero bytes, and then waited on the socket to be
* readable and got back zero bytes on a second read, then this is
* EOF and the client hung up on us.
*
* If we did get data here, then we can just fall through and
* handle it just as if we got data the first time.
*
* Otherwise loop back to the top and try again.
*/
if (ret == 0)
{
ret = secure_raw_read(port, PqGSSRecvBuffer + PqGSSRecvLength, len - PqGSSRecvLength);
if (ret == 0)
return -1;
}
if (ret < 0)
continue;
}
PqGSSRecvLength += ret;
}
return len;
}
/*
* Start up a GSSAPI-encrypted connection. This performs GSSAPI
* authentication; after this function completes, it is safe to call
* be_gssapi_read and be_gssapi_write. Returns -1 and logs on failure;
* otherwise, returns 0 and marks the connection as ready for GSSAPI
* encryption.
*
* Note that unlike the be_gssapi_read/be_gssapi_write functions, this
* function WILL block on the socket to be ready for read/write (using
* WaitLatchOrSocket) as appropriate while establishing the GSSAPI
* session.
*/
ssize_t
secure_open_gssapi(Port *port)
{
bool complete_next = false;
OM_uint32 major,
minor;
/*
* Allocate buffers and initialize state variables. By malloc'ing the
* buffers at this point, we avoid wasting static data space in processes
* that will never use them, and we ensure that the buffers are
* sufficiently aligned for the length-word accesses that we do in some
* places in this file.
*/
PqGSSSendBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE);
PqGSSRecvBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
PqGSSResultBuffer = malloc(PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE);
if (!PqGSSSendBuffer || !PqGSSRecvBuffer || !PqGSSResultBuffer)
ereport(FATAL,
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
errmsg("out of memory")));
PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = PqGSSSendConsumed = 0;
PqGSSRecvLength = PqGSSResultLength = PqGSSResultNext = 0;
/*
* Use the configured keytab, if there is one. Unfortunately, Heimdal
* doesn't support the cred store extensions, so use the env var.
*/
if (pg_krb_server_keyfile != NULL && strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) > 0)
setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 1);
while (true)
{
ssize_t ret;
gss_buffer_desc input,
output = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
/*
* The client always sends first, so try to go ahead and read the
* length and wait on the socket to be readable again if that fails.
*/
ret = read_or_wait(port, sizeof(uint32));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
/*
* Get the length for this packet from the length header.
*/
input.length = ntohl(*(uint32 *) PqGSSRecvBuffer);
/* Done with the length, reset our buffer */
PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
/*
* During initialization, packets are always fully consumed and
* shouldn't ever be over PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE in length.
*
* Verify on our side that the client doesn't do something funny.
*/
if (input.length > PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)
ereport(FATAL,
(errmsg("oversize GSSAPI packet sent by the client (%zu > %d)",
(size_t) input.length,
PQ_GSS_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE)));
/*
* Get the rest of the packet so we can pass it to GSSAPI to accept
* the context.
*/
ret = read_or_wait(port, input.length);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
input.value = PqGSSRecvBuffer;
/* Process incoming data. (The client sends first.) */
major = gss_accept_sec_context(&minor, &port->gss->ctx,
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &input,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&port->gss->name, NULL, &output, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
{
pg_GSS_error(ERROR, gettext_noop("could not accept GSSAPI security context"),
major, minor);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
return -1;
}
else if (!(major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
{
/*
* rfc2744 technically permits context negotiation to be complete
* both with and without a packet to be sent.
*/
complete_next = true;
}
/* Done handling the incoming packet, reset our buffer */
PqGSSRecvLength = 0;
/*
* Check if we have data to send and, if we do, make sure to send it
* all
*/
if (output.length > 0)
{
uint32 netlen = htonl(output.length);
if (output.length > PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))
ereport(FATAL,
(errmsg("server tried to send oversize GSSAPI packet (%zu > %zu)",
(size_t) output.length,
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32))));
memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer, (char *) &netlen, sizeof(uint32));
PqGSSSendLength += sizeof(uint32);
memcpy(PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendLength, output.value, output.length);
PqGSSSendLength += output.length;
/* we don't bother with PqGSSSendConsumed here */
while (PqGSSSendNext < PqGSSSendLength)
{
ret = secure_raw_write(port, PqGSSSendBuffer + PqGSSSendNext,
PqGSSSendLength - PqGSSSendNext);
/*
* If we got back an error and it wasn't just
* EWOULDBLOCK/EAGAIN/EINTR, then give up.
*/
if (ret < 0 &&
!(errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
{
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
return -1;
}
/* Wait and retry if we couldn't write yet */
if (ret <= 0)
{
WaitLatchOrSocket(MyLatch,
WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE | WL_EXIT_ON_PM_DEATH,
port->sock, 0, WAIT_EVENT_GSS_OPEN_SERVER);
continue;
}
PqGSSSendNext += ret;
}
/* Done sending the packet, reset our buffer */
PqGSSSendLength = PqGSSSendNext = 0;
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &output);
}
/*
* If we got back that the connection is finished being set up, now
* that we've sent the last packet, exit our loop.
*/
if (complete_next)
break;
}
/*
* Determine the max packet size which will fit in our buffer, after
* accounting for the length. be_gssapi_write will need this.
*/
major = gss_wrap_size_limit(&minor, port->gss->ctx, 1, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
PQ_GSS_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE - sizeof(uint32),
&PqGSSMaxPktSize);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
pg_GSS_error(FATAL, gettext_noop("GSSAPI size check error"),
major, minor);
port->gss->enc = true;
return 0;
}
/*
* Return if GSSAPI authentication was used on this connection.
*/
bool
be_gssapi_get_auth(Port *port)
{
if (!port || !port->gss)
return false;
return port->gss->auth;
}
/*
* Return if GSSAPI encryption is enabled and being used on this connection.
*/
bool
be_gssapi_get_enc(Port *port)
{
if (!port || !port->gss)
return false;
return port->gss->enc;
}
/*
* Return the GSSAPI principal used for authentication on this connection.
*/
const char *
be_gssapi_get_princ(Port *port)
{
if (!port || !port->gss->auth)
return NULL;
return port->gss->princ;
}