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https://github.com/postgres/postgres.git
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1596 lines
39 KiB
C
1596 lines
39 KiB
C
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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* auth.c
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* Routines to handle network authentication
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2007, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
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*
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*
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* IDENTIFICATION
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* $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/auth.c,v 1.161 2007/11/28 13:30:16 petere Exp $
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*
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*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
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#include <sys/uio.h>
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#include <sys/ucred.h>
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#endif
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "libpq/auth.h"
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#include "libpq/crypt.h"
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#include "libpq/ip.h"
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#include "libpq/libpq.h"
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#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
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#include "storage/ipc.h"
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static void sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq);
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static void auth_failed(Port *port, int status);
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static char *recv_password_packet(Port *port);
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static int recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port);
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char *pg_krb_server_keyfile;
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char *pg_krb_srvnam;
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bool pg_krb_caseins_users;
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char *pg_krb_server_hostname = NULL;
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char *pg_krb_realm = NULL;
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#ifdef USE_PAM
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#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
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#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
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#include <security/pam_appl.h>
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#endif
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#define PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE "postgresql" /* Service name passed to PAM */
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static int CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password);
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static int pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
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struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr);
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static struct pam_conv pam_passw_conv = {
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&pam_passwd_conv_proc,
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NULL
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};
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static char *pam_passwd = NULL; /* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 brokenness */
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static Port *pam_port_cludge; /* Workaround for passing "Port *port" into
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* pam_passwd_conv_proc */
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#endif /* USE_PAM */
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#ifdef USE_LDAP
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#ifndef WIN32
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/* We use a deprecated function to keep the codepath the same as win32. */
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#define LDAP_DEPRECATED 1
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#include <ldap.h>
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#else
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#include <winldap.h>
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/* Correct header from the Platform SDK */
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typedef
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ULONG(*__ldap_start_tls_sA) (
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IN PLDAP ExternalHandle,
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OUT PULONG ServerReturnValue,
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OUT LDAPMessage ** result,
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IN PLDAPControlA * ServerControls,
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IN PLDAPControlA * ClientControls
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);
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#endif
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static int CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port);
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#endif
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#ifdef KRB5
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/*----------------------------------------------------------------
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* MIT Kerberos authentication system - protocol version 5
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*----------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#include <krb5.h>
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/* Some old versions of Kerberos do not include <com_err.h> in <krb5.h> */
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#if !defined(__COM_ERR_H) && !defined(__COM_ERR_H__)
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#include <com_err.h>
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#endif
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/*
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* Various krb5 state which is not connection specfic, and a flag to
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* indicate whether we have initialised it yet.
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*/
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static int pg_krb5_initialised;
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static krb5_context pg_krb5_context;
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static krb5_keytab pg_krb5_keytab;
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static krb5_principal pg_krb5_server;
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static int
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pg_krb5_init(void)
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{
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krb5_error_code retval;
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char *khostname;
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if (pg_krb5_initialised)
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return STATUS_OK;
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retval = krb5_init_context(&pg_krb5_context);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos initialization returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while initializing krb5");
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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retval = krb5_kt_resolve(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb_server_keyfile, &pg_krb5_keytab);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos keytab resolving returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while resolving keytab file \"%s\"",
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pg_krb_server_keyfile);
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krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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/*
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* If no hostname was specified, pg_krb_server_hostname is already NULL.
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* If it's set to blank, force it to NULL.
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*/
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khostname = pg_krb_server_hostname;
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if (khostname && khostname[0] == '\0')
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khostname = NULL;
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retval = krb5_sname_to_principal(pg_krb5_context,
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khostname,
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pg_krb_srvnam,
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KRB5_NT_SRV_HST,
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&pg_krb5_server);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos sname_to_principal(\"%s\", \"%s\") returned error %d",
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khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam, retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval,
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"while getting server principal for server \"%s\" for service \"%s\"",
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khostname ? khostname : "server hostname", pg_krb_srvnam);
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krb5_kt_close(pg_krb5_context, pg_krb5_keytab);
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krb5_free_context(pg_krb5_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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pg_krb5_initialised = 1;
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return STATUS_OK;
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}
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/*
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* pg_krb5_recvauth -- server routine to receive authentication information
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* from the client
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*
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* We still need to compare the username obtained from the client's setup
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* packet to the authenticated name.
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*
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* We have our own keytab file because postgres is unlikely to run as root,
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* and so cannot read the default keytab.
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*/
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static int
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pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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krb5_error_code retval;
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int ret;
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krb5_auth_context auth_context = NULL;
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krb5_ticket *ticket;
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char *kusername;
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char *cp;
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if (get_role_line(port->user_name) == NULL)
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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ret = pg_krb5_init();
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if (ret != STATUS_OK)
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return ret;
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retval = krb5_recvauth(pg_krb5_context, &auth_context,
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(krb5_pointer) & port->sock, pg_krb_srvnam,
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pg_krb5_server, 0, pg_krb5_keytab, &ticket);
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos recvauth returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "from krb5_recvauth");
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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/*
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* The "client" structure comes out of the ticket and is therefore
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* authenticated. Use it to check the username obtained from the
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* postmaster startup packet.
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*/
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#if defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_ENC_PART2)
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retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
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ticket->enc_part2->client, &kusername);
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#elif defined(HAVE_KRB5_TICKET_CLIENT)
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retval = krb5_unparse_name(pg_krb5_context,
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ticket->client, &kusername);
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#else
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#error "bogus configuration"
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#endif
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if (retval)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("Kerberos unparse_name returned error %d",
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retval)));
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com_err("postgres", retval, "while unparsing client name");
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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cp = strchr(kusername, '@');
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if (cp)
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{
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*cp = '\0';
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cp++;
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if (pg_krb_realm != NULL && strlen(pg_krb_realm))
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{
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/* Match realm against configured */
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if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
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ret = pg_strcasecmp(pg_krb_realm, cp);
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else
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ret = strcmp(pg_krb_realm, cp);
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if (ret)
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{
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elog(DEBUG2,
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"krb5 realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
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cp, pg_krb_realm);
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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}
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}
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else if (pg_krb_realm && strlen(pg_krb_realm))
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{
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elog(DEBUG2,
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"krb5 did not return realm but realm matching was requested");
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
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ret = pg_strncasecmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER);
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else
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ret = strncmp(port->user_name, kusername, SM_DATABASE_USER);
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if (ret)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errmsg("unexpected Kerberos user name received from client (received \"%s\", expected \"%s\")",
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port->user_name, kusername)));
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ret = STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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else
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ret = STATUS_OK;
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krb5_free_ticket(pg_krb5_context, ticket);
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krb5_auth_con_free(pg_krb5_context, auth_context);
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free(kusername);
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return ret;
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}
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#else
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static int
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pg_krb5_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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ereport(LOG,
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(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
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errmsg("Kerberos 5 not implemented on this server")));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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#endif /* KRB5 */
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#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
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/*----------------------------------------------------------------
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* GSSAPI authentication system
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*----------------------------------------------------------------
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*/
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#if defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H)
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#include <gssapi.h>
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#else
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#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
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#endif
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#if defined(WIN32) && !defined(WIN32_ONLY_COMPILER)
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/*
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* MIT Kerberos GSSAPI DLL doesn't properly export the symbols for MingW
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* that contain the OIDs required. Redefine here, values copied
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* from src/athena/auth/krb5/src/lib/gssapi/generic/gssapi_generic.c
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*/
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static const gss_OID_desc GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME_desc =
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{10, (void *) "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x01\x02"};
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static GSS_DLLIMP gss_OID GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME = &GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME_desc;
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#endif
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static void
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pg_GSS_error(int severity, char *errmsg, OM_uint32 maj_stat, OM_uint32 min_stat)
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{
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gss_buffer_desc gmsg;
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OM_uint32 lmaj_s,
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lmin_s,
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msg_ctx;
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char msg_major[128],
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msg_minor[128];
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/* Fetch major status message */
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msg_ctx = 0;
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lmaj_s = gss_display_status(&lmin_s, maj_stat, GSS_C_GSS_CODE,
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GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx, &gmsg);
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strlcpy(msg_major, gmsg.value, sizeof(msg_major));
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gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
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if (msg_ctx)
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/*
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* More than one message available. XXX: Should we loop and read all
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* messages? (same below)
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*/
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ereport(WARNING,
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(errmsg_internal("incomplete GSS error report")));
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/* Fetch mechanism minor status message */
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msg_ctx = 0;
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lmaj_s = gss_display_status(&lmin_s, min_stat, GSS_C_MECH_CODE,
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GSS_C_NO_OID, &msg_ctx, &gmsg);
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strlcpy(msg_minor, gmsg.value, sizeof(msg_minor));
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gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gmsg);
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if (msg_ctx)
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ereport(WARNING,
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(errmsg_internal("incomplete GSS minor error report")));
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/*
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* errmsg_internal, since translation of the first part must be done
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* before calling this function anyway.
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*/
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ereport(severity,
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(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
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errdetail("%s: %s", msg_major, msg_minor)));
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}
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static int
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pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
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{
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OM_uint32 maj_stat,
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min_stat,
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lmin_s,
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gflags;
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char *kt_path;
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int mtype;
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int ret;
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StringInfoData buf;
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gss_buffer_desc gbuf;
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if (pg_krb_server_keyfile && strlen(pg_krb_server_keyfile) > 0)
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{
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/*
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* Set default Kerberos keytab file for the Krb5 mechanism.
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*
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* setenv("KRB5_KTNAME", pg_krb_server_keyfile, 0); except setenv()
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* not always available.
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*/
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if (!getenv("KRB5_KTNAME"))
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{
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kt_path = palloc(MAXPGPATH + 13);
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snprintf(kt_path, MAXPGPATH + 13,
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"KRB5_KTNAME=%s", pg_krb_server_keyfile);
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putenv(kt_path);
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}
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}
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/*
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* We accept any service principal that's present in our keytab. This
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* increases interoperability between kerberos implementations that see
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* for example case sensitivity differently, while not really opening up
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* any vector of attack.
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*/
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port->gss->cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
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/*
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* Initialize sequence with an empty context
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*/
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port->gss->ctx = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
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/*
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* Loop through GSSAPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
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* multiple messags sent in both directions. First message is always from
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* the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
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* (type 'p').
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*/
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do
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{
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mtype = pq_getbyte();
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if (mtype != 'p')
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{
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/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
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if (mtype != EOF)
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ereport(COMMERROR,
|
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(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
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errmsg("expected GSS response, got message type %d",
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mtype)));
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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|
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/* Get the actual GSS token */
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initStringInfo(&buf);
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if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 2000))
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{
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/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
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pfree(buf.data);
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return STATUS_ERROR;
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}
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|
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/* Map to GSSAPI style buffer */
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gbuf.length = buf.len;
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gbuf.value = buf.data;
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|
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elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received GSS token of length %u",
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(unsigned int) gbuf.length);
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maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(
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&min_stat,
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&port->gss->ctx,
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port->gss->cred,
|
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&gbuf,
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GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
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&port->gss->name,
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NULL,
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&port->gss->outbuf,
|
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&gflags,
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NULL,
|
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NULL);
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|
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/* gbuf no longer used */
|
|
pfree(buf.data);
|
|
|
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elog(DEBUG5, "gss_accept_sec_context major: %d, "
|
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"minor: %d, outlen: %u, outflags: %x",
|
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maj_stat, min_stat,
|
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(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length, gflags);
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|
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if (port->gss->outbuf.length != 0)
|
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{
|
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/*
|
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* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
|
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*/
|
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OM_uint32 lmin_s;
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|
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elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS response token of length %u",
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(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
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|
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sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT);
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|
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gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &port->gss->outbuf);
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}
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|
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if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE && maj_stat != GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
|
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{
|
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OM_uint32 lmin_s;
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|
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gss_delete_sec_context(&lmin_s, &port->gss->ctx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
|
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pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
|
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gettext_noop("accepting GSS security context failed"),
|
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maj_stat, min_stat);
|
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}
|
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|
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if (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
|
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elog(DEBUG4, "GSS continue needed");
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|
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} while (maj_stat == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
|
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|
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if (port->gss->cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
|
|
{
|
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/*
|
|
* Release service principal credentials
|
|
*/
|
|
gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &port->gss->cred);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* GSS_S_COMPLETE indicates that authentication is now complete.
|
|
*
|
|
* Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
|
|
* username that was specified for the connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
maj_stat = gss_display_name(&min_stat, port->gss->name, &gbuf, NULL);
|
|
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
|
|
pg_GSS_error(ERROR,
|
|
gettext_noop("retrieving GSS user name failed"),
|
|
maj_stat, min_stat);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Split the username at the realm separator
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strchr(gbuf.value, '@'))
|
|
{
|
|
char *cp = strchr(gbuf.value, '@');
|
|
|
|
*cp = '\0';
|
|
cp++;
|
|
|
|
if (pg_krb_realm != NULL && strlen(pg_krb_realm))
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Match the realm part of the name first
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
|
|
ret = pg_strcasecmp(pg_krb_realm, cp);
|
|
else
|
|
ret = strcmp(pg_krb_realm, cp);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
/* GSS realm does not match */
|
|
elog(DEBUG2,
|
|
"GSSAPI realm (%s) and configured realm (%s) don't match",
|
|
cp, pg_krb_realm);
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if (pg_krb_realm && strlen(pg_krb_realm))
|
|
{
|
|
elog(DEBUG2,
|
|
"GSSAPI did not return realm but realm matching was requested");
|
|
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pg_krb_caseins_users)
|
|
ret = pg_strcasecmp(port->user_name, gbuf.value);
|
|
else
|
|
ret = strcmp(port->user_name, gbuf.value);
|
|
|
|
if (ret)
|
|
{
|
|
/* GSS name and PGUSER are not equivalent */
|
|
elog(DEBUG2,
|
|
"provided username (%s) and GSSAPI username (%s) don't match",
|
|
port->user_name, (char *) gbuf.value);
|
|
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
gss_release_buffer(&lmin_s, &gbuf);
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* no ENABLE_GSS */
|
|
static int
|
|
pg_GSS_recvauth(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
|
|
errmsg("GSSAPI not implemented on this server")));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* ENABLE_GSS */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_SSPI
|
|
static void
|
|
pg_SSPI_error(int severity, char *errmsg, SECURITY_STATUS r)
|
|
{
|
|
char sysmsg[256];
|
|
|
|
if (FormatMessage(FORMAT_MESSAGE_FROM_SYSTEM, NULL, r, 0, sysmsg, sizeof(sysmsg), NULL) == 0)
|
|
ereport(severity,
|
|
(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
|
|
errdetail("SSPI error %x", (unsigned int) r)));
|
|
else
|
|
ereport(severity,
|
|
(errmsg_internal("%s", errmsg),
|
|
errdetail("%s (%x)", sysmsg, (unsigned int) r)));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef SECURITY_STATUS
|
|
(WINAPI * QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN) (
|
|
PCtxtHandle, void **);
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
int mtype;
|
|
StringInfoData buf;
|
|
SECURITY_STATUS r;
|
|
CredHandle sspicred;
|
|
CtxtHandle *sspictx = NULL,
|
|
newctx;
|
|
TimeStamp expiry;
|
|
ULONG contextattr;
|
|
SecBufferDesc inbuf;
|
|
SecBufferDesc outbuf;
|
|
SecBuffer OutBuffers[1];
|
|
SecBuffer InBuffers[1];
|
|
HANDLE token;
|
|
TOKEN_USER *tokenuser;
|
|
DWORD retlen;
|
|
char accountname[MAXPGPATH];
|
|
char domainname[MAXPGPATH];
|
|
DWORD accountnamesize = sizeof(accountname);
|
|
DWORD domainnamesize = sizeof(domainname);
|
|
SID_NAME_USE accountnameuse;
|
|
HMODULE secur32;
|
|
QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN _QuerySecurityContextToken;
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Acquire a handle to the server credentials.
|
|
*/
|
|
r = AcquireCredentialsHandle(NULL,
|
|
"negotiate",
|
|
SECPKG_CRED_INBOUND,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
NULL,
|
|
&sspicred,
|
|
&expiry);
|
|
if (r != SEC_E_OK)
|
|
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
|
|
gettext_noop("could not acquire SSPI credentials handle"), r);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Loop through SSPI message exchange. This exchange can consist of
|
|
* multiple messags sent in both directions. First message is always from
|
|
* the client. All messages from client to server are password packets
|
|
* (type 'p').
|
|
*/
|
|
do
|
|
{
|
|
mtype = pq_getbyte();
|
|
if (mtype != 'p')
|
|
{
|
|
/* Only log error if client didn't disconnect. */
|
|
if (mtype != EOF)
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
|
errmsg("expected SSPI response, got message type %d",
|
|
mtype)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Get the actual SSPI token */
|
|
initStringInfo(&buf);
|
|
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 2000))
|
|
{
|
|
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged error */
|
|
pfree(buf.data);
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Map to SSPI style buffer */
|
|
inbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
|
|
inbuf.cBuffers = 1;
|
|
inbuf.pBuffers = InBuffers;
|
|
InBuffers[0].pvBuffer = buf.data;
|
|
InBuffers[0].cbBuffer = buf.len;
|
|
InBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare output buffer */
|
|
OutBuffers[0].pvBuffer = NULL;
|
|
OutBuffers[0].BufferType = SECBUFFER_TOKEN;
|
|
OutBuffers[0].cbBuffer = 0;
|
|
outbuf.cBuffers = 1;
|
|
outbuf.pBuffers = OutBuffers;
|
|
outbuf.ulVersion = SECBUFFER_VERSION;
|
|
|
|
|
|
elog(DEBUG4, "Processing received SSPI token of length %u",
|
|
(unsigned int) buf.len);
|
|
|
|
r = AcceptSecurityContext(&sspicred,
|
|
sspictx,
|
|
&inbuf,
|
|
ASC_REQ_ALLOCATE_MEMORY,
|
|
SECURITY_NETWORK_DREP,
|
|
&newctx,
|
|
&outbuf,
|
|
&contextattr,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* input buffer no longer used */
|
|
pfree(buf.data);
|
|
|
|
if (outbuf.cBuffers > 0 && outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Negotiation generated data to be sent to the client.
|
|
*/
|
|
elog(DEBUG4, "sending SSPI response token of length %u",
|
|
(unsigned int) outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer);
|
|
|
|
port->gss->outbuf.length = outbuf.pBuffers[0].cbBuffer;
|
|
port->gss->outbuf.value = outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer;
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT);
|
|
|
|
FreeContextBuffer(outbuf.pBuffers[0].pvBuffer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (r != SEC_E_OK && r != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
|
|
{
|
|
if (sspictx != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
|
|
free(sspictx);
|
|
}
|
|
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
|
|
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
|
|
gettext_noop("could not accept SSPI security context"), r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sspictx == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
sspictx = malloc(sizeof(CtxtHandle));
|
|
if (sspictx == NULL)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errmsg("out of memory")));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(sspictx, &newctx, sizeof(CtxtHandle));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
|
|
elog(DEBUG4, "SSPI continue needed");
|
|
|
|
} while (r == SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Release service principal credentials
|
|
*/
|
|
FreeCredentialsHandle(&sspicred);
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SEC_E_OK indicates that authentication is now complete.
|
|
*
|
|
* Get the name of the user that authenticated, and compare it to the pg
|
|
* username that was specified for the connection.
|
|
*
|
|
* MingW is missing the export for QuerySecurityContextToken in the
|
|
* secur32 library, so we have to load it dynamically.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
secur32 = LoadLibrary("SECUR32.DLL");
|
|
if (secur32 == NULL)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errmsg_internal("could not load secur32.dll: %d",
|
|
(int) GetLastError())));
|
|
|
|
_QuerySecurityContextToken = (QUERY_SECURITY_CONTEXT_TOKEN_FN)
|
|
GetProcAddress(secur32, "QuerySecurityContextToken");
|
|
if (_QuerySecurityContextToken == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
FreeLibrary(secur32);
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errmsg_internal("could not locate QuerySecurityContextToken in secur32.dll: %d",
|
|
(int) GetLastError())));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
r = (_QuerySecurityContextToken) (sspictx, &token);
|
|
if (r != SEC_E_OK)
|
|
{
|
|
FreeLibrary(secur32);
|
|
pg_SSPI_error(ERROR,
|
|
gettext_noop("could not get security token from context"), r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
FreeLibrary(secur32);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* No longer need the security context, everything from here on uses the
|
|
* token instead.
|
|
*/
|
|
DeleteSecurityContext(sspictx);
|
|
free(sspictx);
|
|
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, NULL, 0, &retlen) && GetLastError() != 122)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errmsg_internal("could not get token user size: error code %d",
|
|
(int) GetLastError())));
|
|
|
|
tokenuser = malloc(retlen);
|
|
if (tokenuser == NULL)
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errmsg("out of memory")));
|
|
|
|
if (!GetTokenInformation(token, TokenUser, tokenuser, retlen, &retlen))
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errmsg_internal("could not get user token: error code %d",
|
|
(int) GetLastError())));
|
|
|
|
if (!LookupAccountSid(NULL, tokenuser->User.Sid, accountname, &accountnamesize,
|
|
domainname, &domainnamesize, &accountnameuse))
|
|
ereport(ERROR,
|
|
(errmsg_internal("could not lookup acconut sid: error code %d",
|
|
(int) GetLastError())));
|
|
|
|
free(tokenuser);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compare realm/domain if requested. In SSPI, always compare case
|
|
* insensitive.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pg_krb_realm && strlen(pg_krb_realm))
|
|
{
|
|
if (pg_strcasecmp(pg_krb_realm, domainname))
|
|
{
|
|
elog(DEBUG2,
|
|
"SSPI domain (%s) and configured domain (%s) don't match",
|
|
domainname, pg_krb_realm);
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We have the username (without domain/realm) in accountname, compare to
|
|
* the supplied value. In SSPI, always compare case insensitive.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (pg_strcasecmp(port->user_name, accountname))
|
|
{
|
|
/* GSS name and PGUSER are not equivalent */
|
|
elog(DEBUG2,
|
|
"provided username (%s) and SSPI username (%s) don't match",
|
|
port->user_name, accountname);
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* no ENABLE_SSPI */
|
|
static int
|
|
pg_SSPI_recvauth(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
|
|
errmsg("SSPI not implemented on this server")));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* ENABLE_SSPI */
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Tell the user the authentication failed, but not (much about) why.
|
|
*
|
|
* There is a tradeoff here between security concerns and making life
|
|
* unnecessarily difficult for legitimate users. We would not, for example,
|
|
* want to report the password we were expecting to receive...
|
|
* But it seems useful to report the username and authorization method
|
|
* in use, and these are items that must be presumed known to an attacker
|
|
* anyway.
|
|
* Note that many sorts of failure report additional information in the
|
|
* postmaster log, which we hope is only readable by good guys.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
auth_failed(Port *port, int status)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *errstr;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we failed due to EOF from client, just quit; there's no point in
|
|
* trying to send a message to the client, and not much point in logging
|
|
* the failure in the postmaster log. (Logging the failure might be
|
|
* desirable, were it not for the fact that libpq closes the connection
|
|
* unceremoniously if challenged for a password when it hasn't got one to
|
|
* send. We'll get a useless log entry for every psql connection under
|
|
* password auth, even if it's perfectly successful, if we log STATUS_EOF
|
|
* events.)
|
|
*/
|
|
if (status == STATUS_EOF)
|
|
proc_exit(0);
|
|
|
|
switch (port->auth_method)
|
|
{
|
|
case uaReject:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": host rejected");
|
|
break;
|
|
case uaKrb5:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("Kerberos 5 authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
case uaGSS:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("GSSAPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
case uaSSPI:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("SSPI authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
case uaTrust:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("\"trust\" authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
case uaIdent:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("Ident authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
case uaMD5:
|
|
case uaCrypt:
|
|
case uaPassword:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("password authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
case uaPAM:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("PAM authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
#ifdef USE_LDAP
|
|
case uaLDAP:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("LDAP authentication failed for user \"%s\"");
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
|
|
default:
|
|
errstr = gettext_noop("authentication failed for user \"%s\": invalid authentication method");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
|
|
errmsg(errstr, port->user_name)));
|
|
/* doesn't return */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Client authentication starts here. If there is an error, this
|
|
* function does not return and the backend process is terminated.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
int status = STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the authentication method to use for this frontend/database
|
|
* combination. Note: a failure return indicates a problem with the hba
|
|
* config file, not with the request. hba.c should have dropped an error
|
|
* message into the postmaster logfile if it failed.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (hba_getauthmethod(port) != STATUS_OK)
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
|
|
errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
|
|
errhint("See server log for details.")));
|
|
|
|
switch (port->auth_method)
|
|
{
|
|
case uaReject:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This could have come from an explicit "reject" entry in
|
|
* pg_hba.conf, but more likely it means there was no matching
|
|
* entry. Take pity on the poor user and issue a helpful error
|
|
* message. NOTE: this is not a security breach, because all the
|
|
* info reported here is known at the frontend and must be assumed
|
|
* known to bad guys. We're merely helping out the less clueful
|
|
* good guys.
|
|
*/
|
|
{
|
|
char hostinfo[NI_MAXHOST];
|
|
|
|
pg_getnameinfo_all(&port->raddr.addr, port->raddr.salen,
|
|
hostinfo, sizeof(hostinfo),
|
|
NULL, 0,
|
|
NI_NUMERICHOST);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_SSL
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
|
|
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\", %s",
|
|
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name,
|
|
port->ssl ? _("SSL on") : _("SSL off"))));
|
|
#else
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
|
|
errmsg("no pg_hba.conf entry for host \"%s\", user \"%s\", database \"%s\"",
|
|
hostinfo, port->user_name, port->database_name)));
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
case uaKrb5:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_KRB5);
|
|
status = pg_krb5_recvauth(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaGSS:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_GSS);
|
|
status = pg_GSS_recvauth(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaSSPI:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SSPI);
|
|
status = pg_SSPI_recvauth(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaIdent:
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If we are doing ident on unix-domain sockets, use SCM_CREDS
|
|
* only if it is defined and SO_PEERCRED isn't.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) && !defined(SO_PEERCRED) && \
|
|
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_CMSGCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || \
|
|
(defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED) && defined(LOCAL_CREDS)))
|
|
if (port->raddr.addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX)
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_FCRED) || defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKCRED)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Receive credentials on next message receipt, BSD/OS,
|
|
* NetBSD. We need to set this before the client sends the
|
|
* next packet.
|
|
*/
|
|
int on = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (setsockopt(port->sock, 0, LOCAL_CREDS, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
|
|
ereport(FATAL,
|
|
(errcode_for_socket_access(),
|
|
errmsg("could not enable credential reception: %m")));
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_SCM_CREDS);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
status = authident(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaMD5:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_MD5);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaCrypt:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_CRYPT);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case uaPassword:
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
status = recv_and_check_password_packet(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
case uaPAM:
|
|
pam_port_cludge = port;
|
|
status = CheckPAMAuth(port, port->user_name, "");
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_LDAP
|
|
case uaLDAP:
|
|
status = CheckLDAPAuth(port);
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case uaTrust:
|
|
status = STATUS_OK;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (status == STATUS_OK)
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_OK);
|
|
else
|
|
auth_failed(port, status);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Send an authentication request packet to the frontend.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
sendAuthRequest(Port *port, AuthRequest areq)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfoData buf;
|
|
|
|
pq_beginmessage(&buf, 'R');
|
|
pq_sendint(&buf, (int32) areq, sizeof(int32));
|
|
|
|
/* Add the salt for encrypted passwords. */
|
|
if (areq == AUTH_REQ_MD5)
|
|
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->md5Salt, 4);
|
|
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_CRYPT)
|
|
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->cryptSalt, 2);
|
|
|
|
#if defined(ENABLE_GSS) || defined(ENABLE_SSPI)
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add the authentication data for the next step of the GSSAPI or SSPI
|
|
* negotiation.
|
|
*/
|
|
else if (areq == AUTH_REQ_GSS_CONT)
|
|
{
|
|
if (port->gss->outbuf.length > 0)
|
|
{
|
|
elog(DEBUG4, "sending GSS token of length %u",
|
|
(unsigned int) port->gss->outbuf.length);
|
|
|
|
pq_sendbytes(&buf, port->gss->outbuf.value, port->gss->outbuf.length);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
pq_endmessage(&buf);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Flush message so client will see it, except for AUTH_REQ_OK, which need
|
|
* not be sent until we are ready for queries.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (areq != AUTH_REQ_OK)
|
|
pq_flush();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_PAM
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PAM conversation function
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
pam_passwd_conv_proc(int num_msg, const struct pam_message ** msg,
|
|
struct pam_response ** resp, void *appdata_ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (num_msg != 1 || msg[0]->msg_style != PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (msg[0]->msg_style)
|
|
{
|
|
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("error from underlying PAM layer: %s",
|
|
msg[0]->msg)));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
default:
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("unsupported PAM conversation %d/%s",
|
|
msg[0]->msg_style, msg[0]->msg)));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!appdata_ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Workaround for Solaris 2.6 where the PAM library is broken and does
|
|
* not pass appdata_ptr to the conversation routine
|
|
*/
|
|
appdata_ptr = pam_passwd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Password wasn't passed to PAM the first time around - let's go ask the
|
|
* client to send a password, which we then stuff into PAM.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strlen(appdata_ptr) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(pam_port_cludge, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(pam_port_cludge);
|
|
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR; /* client didn't want to send password */
|
|
|
|
if (strlen(passwd) == 0)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("empty password returned by client")));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
appdata_ptr = passwd;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Explicitly not using palloc here - PAM will free this memory in
|
|
* pam_end()
|
|
*/
|
|
*resp = calloc(num_msg, sizeof(struct pam_response));
|
|
if (!*resp)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_OUT_OF_MEMORY),
|
|
errmsg("out of memory")));
|
|
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(*resp)[0].resp = strdup((char *) appdata_ptr);
|
|
(*resp)[0].resp_retcode = 0;
|
|
|
|
return ((*resp)[0].resp ? PAM_SUCCESS : PAM_CONV_ERR);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check authentication against PAM.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
CheckPAMAuth(Port *port, char *user, char *password)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval;
|
|
pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apparently, Solaris 2.6 is broken, and needs ugly static variable
|
|
* workaround
|
|
*/
|
|
pam_passwd = password;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set the application data portion of the conversation struct This is
|
|
* later used inside the PAM conversation to pass the password to the
|
|
* authentication module.
|
|
*/
|
|
pam_passw_conv.appdata_ptr = (char *) password; /* from password above,
|
|
* not allocated */
|
|
|
|
/* Optionally, one can set the service name in pg_hba.conf */
|
|
if (port->auth_arg && port->auth_arg[0] != '\0')
|
|
retval = pam_start(port->auth_arg, "pgsql@",
|
|
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
|
|
else
|
|
retval = pam_start(PGSQL_PAM_SERVICE, "pgsql@",
|
|
&pam_passw_conv, &pamh);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not create PAM authenticator: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, user);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_USER) failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_CONV, &pam_passw_conv);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_set_item(PAM_CONV) failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_authenticate failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("pam_acct_mgmt failed: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
retval = pam_end(pamh, retval);
|
|
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not release PAM authenticator: %s",
|
|
pam_strerror(pamh, retval))));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pam_passwd = NULL; /* Unset pam_passwd */
|
|
|
|
return (retval == PAM_SUCCESS ? STATUS_OK : STATUS_ERROR);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* USE_PAM */
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_LDAP
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
CheckLDAPAuth(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
char server[128];
|
|
char basedn[128];
|
|
char prefix[128];
|
|
char suffix[128];
|
|
LDAP *ldap;
|
|
bool ssl = false;
|
|
int r;
|
|
int ldapversion = LDAP_VERSION3;
|
|
int ldapport = LDAP_PORT;
|
|
char fulluser[NAMEDATALEN + 256 + 1];
|
|
|
|
if (!port->auth_arg || port->auth_arg[0] == '\0')
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("LDAP configuration URL not specified")));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Crack the LDAP url. We do a very trivial parse..
|
|
* ldap[s]://<server>[:<port>]/<basedn>[;prefix[;suffix]]
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
server[0] = '\0';
|
|
basedn[0] = '\0';
|
|
prefix[0] = '\0';
|
|
suffix[0] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
/* ldap, including port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldap://%127[^:]:%d/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, &ldapport, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
if (r < 3)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ldaps, including port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldaps://%127[^:]:%d/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, &ldapport, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
if (r >= 3)
|
|
ssl = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r < 3)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ldap, no port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldap://%127[^/]/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
}
|
|
if (r < 2)
|
|
{
|
|
/* ldaps, no port number */
|
|
r = sscanf(port->auth_arg,
|
|
"ldaps://%127[^/]/%127[^;];%127[^;];%127s",
|
|
server, basedn, prefix, suffix);
|
|
if (r >= 2)
|
|
ssl = true;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r < 2)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("invalid LDAP URL: \"%s\"",
|
|
port->auth_arg)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sendAuthRequest(port, AUTH_REQ_PASSWORD);
|
|
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
|
|
|
|
ldap = ldap_init(server, ldapport);
|
|
if (!ldap)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef WIN32
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: error code %d",
|
|
errno)));
|
|
#else
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not initialize LDAP: error code %d",
|
|
(int) LdapGetLastError())));
|
|
#endif
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((r = ldap_set_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldapversion)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ldap_unbind(ldap);
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not set LDAP protocol version: error code %d", r)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ssl)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef WIN32
|
|
if ((r = ldap_start_tls_s(ldap, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
#else
|
|
static __ldap_start_tls_sA _ldap_start_tls_sA = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (_ldap_start_tls_sA == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Need to load this function dynamically because it does not
|
|
* exist on Windows 2000, and causes a load error for the whole
|
|
* exe if referenced.
|
|
*/
|
|
HANDLE ldaphandle;
|
|
|
|
ldaphandle = LoadLibrary("WLDAP32.DLL");
|
|
if (ldaphandle == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* should never happen since we import other files from
|
|
* wldap32, but check anyway
|
|
*/
|
|
ldap_unbind(ldap);
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not load wldap32.dll")));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
_ldap_start_tls_sA = (__ldap_start_tls_sA) GetProcAddress(ldaphandle, "ldap_start_tls_sA");
|
|
if (_ldap_start_tls_sA == NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
ldap_unbind(ldap);
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not load function _ldap_start_tls_sA in wldap32.dll"),
|
|
errdetail("LDAP over SSL is not supported on this platform.")));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Leak LDAP handle on purpose, because we need the library to
|
|
* stay open. This is ok because it will only ever be leaked once
|
|
* per process and is automatically cleaned up on process exit.
|
|
*/
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = _ldap_start_tls_sA(ldap, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
ldap_unbind(ldap);
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("could not start LDAP TLS session: error code %d", r)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
snprintf(fulluser, sizeof(fulluser), "%s%s%s",
|
|
prefix, port->user_name, suffix);
|
|
fulluser[sizeof(fulluser) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
r = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, fulluser, passwd);
|
|
ldap_unbind(ldap);
|
|
|
|
if (r != LDAP_SUCCESS)
|
|
{
|
|
ereport(LOG,
|
|
(errmsg("LDAP login failed for user \"%s\" on server \"%s\": error code %d",
|
|
fulluser, server, r)));
|
|
return STATUS_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return STATUS_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* USE_LDAP */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Collect password response packet from frontend.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns NULL if couldn't get password, else palloc'd string.
|
|
*/
|
|
static char *
|
|
recv_password_packet(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
StringInfoData buf;
|
|
|
|
if (PG_PROTOCOL_MAJOR(port->proto) >= 3)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Expect 'p' message type */
|
|
int mtype;
|
|
|
|
mtype = pq_getbyte();
|
|
if (mtype != 'p')
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the client just disconnects without offering a password,
|
|
* don't make a log entry. This is legal per protocol spec and in
|
|
* fact commonly done by psql, so complaining just clutters the
|
|
* log.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (mtype != EOF)
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
|
errmsg("expected password response, got message type %d",
|
|
mtype)));
|
|
return NULL; /* EOF or bad message type */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* For pre-3.0 clients, avoid log entry if they just disconnect */
|
|
if (pq_peekbyte() == EOF)
|
|
return NULL; /* EOF */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
initStringInfo(&buf);
|
|
if (pq_getmessage(&buf, 1000)) /* receive password */
|
|
{
|
|
/* EOF - pq_getmessage already logged a suitable message */
|
|
pfree(buf.data);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Apply sanity check: password packet length should agree with length of
|
|
* contained string. Note it is safe to use strlen here because
|
|
* StringInfo is guaranteed to have an appended '\0'.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strlen(buf.data) + 1 != buf.len)
|
|
ereport(COMMERROR,
|
|
(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
|
|
errmsg("invalid password packet size")));
|
|
|
|
/* Do not echo password to logs, for security. */
|
|
ereport(DEBUG5,
|
|
(errmsg("received password packet")));
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Return the received string. Note we do not attempt to do any
|
|
* character-set conversion on it; since we don't yet know the client's
|
|
* encoding, there wouldn't be much point.
|
|
*/
|
|
return buf.data;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Called when we have sent an authorization request for a password.
|
|
* Get the response and check it.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
recv_and_check_password_packet(Port *port)
|
|
{
|
|
char *passwd;
|
|
int result;
|
|
|
|
passwd = recv_password_packet(port);
|
|
|
|
if (passwd == NULL)
|
|
return STATUS_EOF; /* client wouldn't send password */
|
|
|
|
result = md5_crypt_verify(port, port->user_name, passwd);
|
|
|
|
pfree(passwd);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|