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makeNode() is already a macro that has the right result pointer type, so casting it again to the same type is unnecessary.
793 lines
24 KiB
C
793 lines
24 KiB
C
/*
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* rewrite/rowsecurity.c
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* Routines to support policies for row level security (aka RLS).
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*
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* Policies in PostgreSQL provide a mechanism to limit what records are
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* returned to a user and what records a user is permitted to add to a table.
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*
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* Policies can be defined for specific roles, specific commands, or provided
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* by an extension. Row security can also be enabled for a table without any
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* policies being explicitly defined, in which case a default-deny policy is
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* applied.
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*
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* Any part of the system which is returning records back to the user, or
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* which is accepting records from the user to add to a table, needs to
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* consider the policies associated with the table (if any). For normal
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* queries, this is handled by calling get_row_security_policies() during
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* rewrite, for each RTE in the query. This returns the expressions defined
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* by the table's policies as a list that is prepended to the securityQuals
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* list for the RTE. For queries which modify the table, any WITH CHECK
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* clauses from the table's policies are also returned and prepended to the
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* list of WithCheckOptions for the Query to check each row that is being
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* added to the table. Other parts of the system (eg: COPY) simply construct
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* a normal query and use that, if RLS is to be applied.
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*
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* The check to see if RLS should be enabled is provided through
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* check_enable_rls(), which returns an enum (defined in rowsecurity.h) to
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* indicate if RLS should be enabled (RLS_ENABLED), or bypassed (RLS_NONE or
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* RLS_NONE_ENV). RLS_NONE_ENV indicates that RLS should be bypassed
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* in the current environment, but that may change if the row_security GUC or
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* the current role changes.
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*
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2016, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
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* Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
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*/
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#include "postgres.h"
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#include "access/heapam.h"
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#include "access/htup_details.h"
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#include "access/sysattr.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_class.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_inherits_fn.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_policy.h"
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#include "catalog/pg_type.h"
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#include "miscadmin.h"
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#include "nodes/makefuncs.h"
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#include "nodes/nodeFuncs.h"
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#include "nodes/pg_list.h"
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#include "nodes/plannodes.h"
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#include "parser/parsetree.h"
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#include "rewrite/rewriteHandler.h"
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#include "rewrite/rewriteManip.h"
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#include "rewrite/rowsecurity.h"
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#include "utils/acl.h"
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#include "utils/lsyscache.h"
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#include "utils/rel.h"
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#include "utils/rls.h"
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#include "utils/syscache.h"
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#include "tcop/utility.h"
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static void get_policies_for_relation(Relation relation,
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CmdType cmd, Oid user_id,
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List **permissive_policies,
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List **restrictive_policies);
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static List *sort_policies_by_name(List *policies);
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static int row_security_policy_cmp(const void *a, const void *b);
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static void add_security_quals(int rt_index,
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List *permissive_policies,
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List *restrictive_policies,
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List **securityQuals,
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bool *hasSubLinks);
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static void add_with_check_options(Relation rel,
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int rt_index,
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WCOKind kind,
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List *permissive_policies,
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List *restrictive_policies,
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List **withCheckOptions,
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bool *hasSubLinks);
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static bool check_role_for_policy(ArrayType *policy_roles, Oid user_id);
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/*
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* hooks to allow extensions to add their own security policies
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*
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* row_security_policy_hook_permissive can be used to add policies which
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* are combined with the other permissive policies, using OR.
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*
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* row_security_policy_hook_restrictive can be used to add policies which
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* are enforced, regardless of other policies (they are combined using AND).
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*/
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row_security_policy_hook_type row_security_policy_hook_permissive = NULL;
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row_security_policy_hook_type row_security_policy_hook_restrictive = NULL;
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/*
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* Get any row security quals and WithCheckOption checks that should be
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* applied to the specified RTE.
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*
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* In addition, hasRowSecurity is set to true if row level security is enabled
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* (even if this RTE doesn't have any row security quals), and hasSubLinks is
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* set to true if any of the quals returned contain sublinks.
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*/
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void
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get_row_security_policies(Query *root, RangeTblEntry *rte, int rt_index,
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List **securityQuals, List **withCheckOptions,
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bool *hasRowSecurity, bool *hasSubLinks)
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{
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Oid user_id;
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int rls_status;
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Relation rel;
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CmdType commandType;
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List *permissive_policies;
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List *restrictive_policies;
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/* Defaults for the return values */
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*securityQuals = NIL;
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*withCheckOptions = NIL;
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*hasRowSecurity = false;
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*hasSubLinks = false;
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/* If this is not a normal relation, just return immediately */
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if (rte->relkind != RELKIND_RELATION &&
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rte->relkind != RELKIND_PARTITIONED_TABLE)
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return;
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/* Switch to checkAsUser if it's set */
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user_id = rte->checkAsUser ? rte->checkAsUser : GetUserId();
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/* Determine the state of RLS for this, pass checkAsUser explicitly */
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rls_status = check_enable_rls(rte->relid, rte->checkAsUser, false);
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/* If there is no RLS on this table at all, nothing to do */
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if (rls_status == RLS_NONE)
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return;
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/*
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* RLS_NONE_ENV means we are not doing any RLS now, but that may change
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* with changes to the environment, so we mark it as hasRowSecurity to
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* force a re-plan when the environment changes.
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*/
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if (rls_status == RLS_NONE_ENV)
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{
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/*
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* Indicate that this query may involve RLS and must therefore be
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* replanned if the environment changes (GUCs, role), but we are not
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* adding anything here.
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*/
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*hasRowSecurity = true;
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return;
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}
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/*
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* RLS is enabled for this relation.
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*
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* Get the security policies that should be applied, based on the command
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* type. Note that if this isn't the target relation, we actually want
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* the relation's SELECT policies, regardless of the query command type,
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* for example in UPDATE t1 ... FROM t2 we need to apply t1's UPDATE
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* policies and t2's SELECT policies.
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*/
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rel = heap_open(rte->relid, NoLock);
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commandType = rt_index == root->resultRelation ?
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root->commandType : CMD_SELECT;
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/*
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* In some cases, we need to apply USING policies (which control the
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* visibility of records) associated with multiple command types (see
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* specific cases below).
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*
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* When considering the order in which to apply these USING policies, we
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* prefer to apply higher privileged policies, those which allow the user
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* to lock records (UPDATE and DELETE), first, followed by policies which
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* don't (SELECT).
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*
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* Note that the optimizer is free to push down and reorder quals which
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* use leakproof functions.
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*
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* In all cases, if there are no policy clauses allowing access to rows in
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* the table for the specific type of operation, then a single
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* always-false clause (a default-deny policy) will be added (see
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* add_security_quals).
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*/
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/*
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* For a SELECT, if UPDATE privileges are required (eg: the user has
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* specified FOR [KEY] UPDATE/SHARE), then add the UPDATE USING quals
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* first.
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*
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* This way, we filter out any records from the SELECT FOR SHARE/UPDATE
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* which the user does not have access to via the UPDATE USING policies,
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* similar to how we require normal UPDATE rights for these queries.
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*/
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if (commandType == CMD_SELECT && rte->requiredPerms & ACL_UPDATE)
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{
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List *update_permissive_policies;
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List *update_restrictive_policies;
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get_policies_for_relation(rel, CMD_UPDATE, user_id,
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&update_permissive_policies,
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&update_restrictive_policies);
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add_security_quals(rt_index,
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update_permissive_policies,
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update_restrictive_policies,
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securityQuals,
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hasSubLinks);
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}
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/*
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* For SELECT, UPDATE and DELETE, add security quals to enforce the USING
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* policies. These security quals control access to existing table rows.
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* Restrictive policies are combined together using AND, and permissive
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* policies are combined together using OR.
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*/
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get_policies_for_relation(rel, commandType, user_id, &permissive_policies,
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&restrictive_policies);
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if (commandType == CMD_SELECT ||
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commandType == CMD_UPDATE ||
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commandType == CMD_DELETE)
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add_security_quals(rt_index,
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permissive_policies,
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restrictive_policies,
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securityQuals,
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hasSubLinks);
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/*
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* Similar to above, during an UPDATE or DELETE, if SELECT rights are also
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* required (eg: when a RETURNING clause exists, or the user has provided
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* a WHERE clause which involves columns from the relation), we collect up
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* CMD_SELECT policies and add them via add_security_quals first.
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*
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* This way, we filter out any records which are not visible through an
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* ALL or SELECT USING policy.
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*/
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if ((commandType == CMD_UPDATE || commandType == CMD_DELETE) &&
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rte->requiredPerms & ACL_SELECT)
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{
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List *select_permissive_policies;
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List *select_restrictive_policies;
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get_policies_for_relation(rel, CMD_SELECT, user_id,
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&select_permissive_policies,
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&select_restrictive_policies);
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add_security_quals(rt_index,
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select_permissive_policies,
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select_restrictive_policies,
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securityQuals,
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hasSubLinks);
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}
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/*
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* For INSERT and UPDATE, add withCheckOptions to verify that any new
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* records added are consistent with the security policies. This will use
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* each policy's WITH CHECK clause, or its USING clause if no explicit
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* WITH CHECK clause is defined.
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*/
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if (commandType == CMD_INSERT || commandType == CMD_UPDATE)
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{
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/* This should be the target relation */
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Assert(rt_index == root->resultRelation);
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add_with_check_options(rel, rt_index,
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commandType == CMD_INSERT ?
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WCO_RLS_INSERT_CHECK : WCO_RLS_UPDATE_CHECK,
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permissive_policies,
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restrictive_policies,
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withCheckOptions,
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hasSubLinks);
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/*
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* Get and add ALL/SELECT policies, if SELECT rights are required for
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* this relation (eg: when RETURNING is used). These are added as WCO
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* policies rather than security quals to ensure that an error is
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* raised if a policy is violated; otherwise, we might end up silently
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* dropping rows to be added.
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*/
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if (rte->requiredPerms & ACL_SELECT)
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{
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List *select_permissive_policies = NIL;
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List *select_restrictive_policies = NIL;
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get_policies_for_relation(rel, CMD_SELECT, user_id,
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&select_permissive_policies,
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&select_restrictive_policies);
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add_with_check_options(rel, rt_index,
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commandType == CMD_INSERT ?
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WCO_RLS_INSERT_CHECK : WCO_RLS_UPDATE_CHECK,
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select_permissive_policies,
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select_restrictive_policies,
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withCheckOptions,
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hasSubLinks);
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}
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/*
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* For INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE we need additional policy
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* checks for the UPDATE which may be applied to the same RTE.
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*/
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if (commandType == CMD_INSERT &&
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root->onConflict && root->onConflict->action == ONCONFLICT_UPDATE)
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{
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List *conflict_permissive_policies;
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List *conflict_restrictive_policies;
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/* Get the policies that apply to the auxiliary UPDATE */
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get_policies_for_relation(rel, CMD_UPDATE, user_id,
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&conflict_permissive_policies,
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&conflict_restrictive_policies);
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/*
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* Enforce the USING clauses of the UPDATE policies using WCOs
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* rather than security quals. This ensures that an error is
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* raised if the conflicting row cannot be updated due to RLS,
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* rather than the change being silently dropped.
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*/
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add_with_check_options(rel, rt_index,
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WCO_RLS_CONFLICT_CHECK,
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conflict_permissive_policies,
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conflict_restrictive_policies,
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withCheckOptions,
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hasSubLinks);
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/*
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* Get and add ALL/SELECT policies, as WCO_RLS_CONFLICT_CHECK WCOs
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* to ensure they are considered when taking the UPDATE path of an
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* INSERT .. ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE, if SELECT rights are required
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* for this relation, also as WCO policies, again, to avoid
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* silently dropping data. See above.
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*/
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if (rte->requiredPerms & ACL_SELECT)
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{
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List *conflict_select_permissive_policies = NIL;
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List *conflict_select_restrictive_policies = NIL;
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get_policies_for_relation(rel, CMD_SELECT, user_id,
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&conflict_select_permissive_policies,
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&conflict_select_restrictive_policies);
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add_with_check_options(rel, rt_index,
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WCO_RLS_CONFLICT_CHECK,
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conflict_select_permissive_policies,
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conflict_select_restrictive_policies,
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withCheckOptions,
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hasSubLinks);
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}
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/* Enforce the WITH CHECK clauses of the UPDATE policies */
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add_with_check_options(rel, rt_index,
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WCO_RLS_UPDATE_CHECK,
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conflict_permissive_policies,
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conflict_restrictive_policies,
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withCheckOptions,
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hasSubLinks);
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}
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}
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heap_close(rel, NoLock);
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/*
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* Mark this query as having row security, so plancache can invalidate it
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* when necessary (eg: role changes)
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*/
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*hasRowSecurity = true;
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return;
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}
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/*
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* get_policies_for_relation
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*
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* Returns lists of permissive and restrictive policies to be applied to the
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* specified relation, based on the command type and role.
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*
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* This includes any policies added by extensions.
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*/
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static void
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get_policies_for_relation(Relation relation, CmdType cmd, Oid user_id,
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List **permissive_policies,
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List **restrictive_policies)
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{
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ListCell *item;
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*permissive_policies = NIL;
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*restrictive_policies = NIL;
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/*
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* First find all internal policies for the relation. CREATE POLICY does
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* not currently support defining restrictive policies, so for now all
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* internal policies are permissive.
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*/
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foreach(item, relation->rd_rsdesc->policies)
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{
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bool cmd_matches = false;
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RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
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/* Always add ALL policies, if they exist. */
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if (policy->polcmd == '*')
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cmd_matches = true;
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else
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{
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/* Check whether the policy applies to the specified command type */
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switch (cmd)
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{
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case CMD_SELECT:
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if (policy->polcmd == ACL_SELECT_CHR)
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cmd_matches = true;
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break;
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case CMD_INSERT:
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if (policy->polcmd == ACL_INSERT_CHR)
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cmd_matches = true;
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break;
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case CMD_UPDATE:
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if (policy->polcmd == ACL_UPDATE_CHR)
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cmd_matches = true;
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break;
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case CMD_DELETE:
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if (policy->polcmd == ACL_DELETE_CHR)
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cmd_matches = true;
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break;
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default:
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elog(ERROR, "unrecognized policy command type %d",
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(int) cmd);
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break;
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}
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}
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/*
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* Add this policy to the list of permissive policies if it applies to
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* the specified role.
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*/
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if (cmd_matches && check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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{
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if (policy->permissive)
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*permissive_policies = lappend(*permissive_policies, policy);
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else
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*restrictive_policies = lappend(*restrictive_policies, policy);
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}
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}
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/*
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* We sort restrictive policies by name so that any WCOs they generate are
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* checked in a well-defined order.
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*/
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*restrictive_policies = sort_policies_by_name(*restrictive_policies);
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/*
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* Then add any permissive or restrictive policies defined by extensions.
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* These are simply appended to the lists of internal policies, if they
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* apply to the specified role.
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*/
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if (row_security_policy_hook_restrictive)
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{
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List *hook_policies =
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(*row_security_policy_hook_restrictive) (cmd, relation);
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/*
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* As with built-in restrictive policies, we sort any hook-provided
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* restrictive policies by name also. Note that we also intentionally
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* always check all built-in restrictive policies, in name order,
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* before checking restrictive policies added by hooks, in name order.
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*/
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hook_policies = sort_policies_by_name(hook_policies);
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foreach(item, hook_policies)
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{
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RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
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if (check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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*restrictive_policies = lappend(*restrictive_policies, policy);
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}
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}
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if (row_security_policy_hook_permissive)
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{
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List *hook_policies =
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(*row_security_policy_hook_permissive) (cmd, relation);
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foreach(item, hook_policies)
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{
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RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
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if (check_role_for_policy(policy->roles, user_id))
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*permissive_policies = lappend(*permissive_policies, policy);
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}
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}
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}
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/*
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* sort_policies_by_name
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*
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* This is only used for restrictive policies, ensuring that any
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|
* WithCheckOptions they generate are applied in a well-defined order.
|
|
* This is not necessary for permissive policies, since they are all combined
|
|
* together using OR into a single WithCheckOption check.
|
|
*/
|
|
static List *
|
|
sort_policies_by_name(List *policies)
|
|
{
|
|
int npol = list_length(policies);
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *pols;
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
|
int ii = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (npol <= 1)
|
|
return policies;
|
|
|
|
pols = (RowSecurityPolicy *) palloc(sizeof(RowSecurityPolicy) * npol);
|
|
|
|
foreach(item, policies)
|
|
{
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
|
|
|
|
pols[ii++] = *policy;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
qsort(pols, npol, sizeof(RowSecurityPolicy), row_security_policy_cmp);
|
|
|
|
policies = NIL;
|
|
for (ii = 0; ii < npol; ii++)
|
|
policies = lappend(policies, &pols[ii]);
|
|
|
|
return policies;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* qsort comparator to sort RowSecurityPolicy entries by name
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
row_security_policy_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
|
|
{
|
|
const RowSecurityPolicy *pa = (const RowSecurityPolicy *) a;
|
|
const RowSecurityPolicy *pb = (const RowSecurityPolicy *) b;
|
|
|
|
/* Guard against NULL policy names from extensions */
|
|
if (pa->policy_name == NULL)
|
|
return pb->policy_name == NULL ? 0 : 1;
|
|
if (pb->policy_name == NULL)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return strcmp(pa->policy_name, pb->policy_name);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* add_security_quals
|
|
*
|
|
* Add security quals to enforce the specified RLS policies, restricting
|
|
* access to existing data in a table. If there are no policies controlling
|
|
* access to the table, then all access is prohibited --- i.e., an implicit
|
|
* default-deny policy is used.
|
|
*
|
|
* New security quals are added to securityQuals, and hasSubLinks is set to
|
|
* true if any of the quals added contain sublink subqueries.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
add_security_quals(int rt_index,
|
|
List *permissive_policies,
|
|
List *restrictive_policies,
|
|
List **securityQuals,
|
|
bool *hasSubLinks)
|
|
{
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
|
List *permissive_quals = NIL;
|
|
Expr *rowsec_expr;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First collect up the permissive quals. If we do not find any
|
|
* permissive policies then no rows are visible (this is handled below).
|
|
*/
|
|
foreach(item, permissive_policies)
|
|
{
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
|
|
|
|
if (policy->qual != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
permissive_quals = lappend(permissive_quals,
|
|
copyObject(policy->qual));
|
|
*hasSubLinks |= policy->hassublinks;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We must have permissive quals, always, or no rows are visible.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we do not, then we simply return a single 'false' qual which results
|
|
* in no rows being visible.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (permissive_quals != NIL)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* We now know that permissive policies exist, so we can now add
|
|
* security quals based on the USING clauses from the restrictive
|
|
* policies. Since these need to be combined together using AND, we
|
|
* can just add them one at a time.
|
|
*/
|
|
foreach(item, restrictive_policies)
|
|
{
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
|
|
Expr *qual;
|
|
|
|
if (policy->qual != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
qual = copyObject(policy->qual);
|
|
ChangeVarNodes((Node *) qual, 1, rt_index, 0);
|
|
|
|
*securityQuals = list_append_unique(*securityQuals, qual);
|
|
*hasSubLinks |= policy->hassublinks;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Then add a single security qual combining together the USING
|
|
* clauses from all the permissive policies using OR.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (list_length(permissive_quals) == 1)
|
|
rowsec_expr = (Expr *) linitial(permissive_quals);
|
|
else
|
|
rowsec_expr = makeBoolExpr(OR_EXPR, permissive_quals, -1);
|
|
|
|
ChangeVarNodes((Node *) rowsec_expr, 1, rt_index, 0);
|
|
*securityQuals = list_append_unique(*securityQuals, rowsec_expr);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* A permissive policy must exist for rows to be visible at all.
|
|
* Therefore, if there were no permissive policies found, return a
|
|
* single always-false clause.
|
|
*/
|
|
*securityQuals = lappend(*securityQuals,
|
|
makeConst(BOOLOID, -1, InvalidOid,
|
|
sizeof(bool), BoolGetDatum(false),
|
|
false, true));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* add_with_check_options
|
|
*
|
|
* Add WithCheckOptions of the specified kind to check that new records
|
|
* added by an INSERT or UPDATE are consistent with the specified RLS
|
|
* policies. Normally new data must satisfy the WITH CHECK clauses from the
|
|
* policies. If a policy has no explicit WITH CHECK clause, its USING clause
|
|
* is used instead. In the special case of an UPDATE arising from an
|
|
* INSERT ... ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE, existing records are first checked using
|
|
* a WCO_RLS_CONFLICT_CHECK WithCheckOption, which always uses the USING
|
|
* clauses from RLS policies.
|
|
*
|
|
* New WCOs are added to withCheckOptions, and hasSubLinks is set to true if
|
|
* any of the check clauses added contain sublink subqueries.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
add_with_check_options(Relation rel,
|
|
int rt_index,
|
|
WCOKind kind,
|
|
List *permissive_policies,
|
|
List *restrictive_policies,
|
|
List **withCheckOptions,
|
|
bool *hasSubLinks)
|
|
{
|
|
ListCell *item;
|
|
List *permissive_quals = NIL;
|
|
|
|
#define QUAL_FOR_WCO(policy) \
|
|
( kind != WCO_RLS_CONFLICT_CHECK && \
|
|
(policy)->with_check_qual != NULL ? \
|
|
(policy)->with_check_qual : (policy)->qual )
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* First collect up the permissive policy clauses, similar to
|
|
* add_security_quals.
|
|
*/
|
|
foreach(item, permissive_policies)
|
|
{
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
|
|
Expr *qual = QUAL_FOR_WCO(policy);
|
|
|
|
if (qual != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
permissive_quals = lappend(permissive_quals, copyObject(qual));
|
|
*hasSubLinks |= policy->hassublinks;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* There must be at least one permissive qual found or no rows are allowed
|
|
* to be added. This is the same as in add_security_quals.
|
|
*
|
|
* If there are no permissive_quals then we fall through and return a
|
|
* single 'false' WCO, preventing all new rows.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (permissive_quals != NIL)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add a single WithCheckOption for all the permissive policy clauses,
|
|
* combining them together using OR. This check has no policy name,
|
|
* since if the check fails it means that no policy granted permission
|
|
* to perform the update, rather than any particular policy being
|
|
* violated.
|
|
*/
|
|
WithCheckOption *wco;
|
|
|
|
wco = makeNode(WithCheckOption);
|
|
wco->kind = kind;
|
|
wco->relname = pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel));
|
|
wco->polname = NULL;
|
|
wco->cascaded = false;
|
|
|
|
if (list_length(permissive_quals) == 1)
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) linitial(permissive_quals);
|
|
else
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) makeBoolExpr(OR_EXPR, permissive_quals, -1);
|
|
|
|
ChangeVarNodes(wco->qual, 1, rt_index, 0);
|
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = list_append_unique(*withCheckOptions, wco);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now add WithCheckOptions for each of the restrictive policy clauses
|
|
* (which will be combined together using AND). We use a separate
|
|
* WithCheckOption for each restrictive policy to allow the policy
|
|
* name to be included in error reports if the policy is violated.
|
|
*/
|
|
foreach(item, restrictive_policies)
|
|
{
|
|
RowSecurityPolicy *policy = (RowSecurityPolicy *) lfirst(item);
|
|
Expr *qual = QUAL_FOR_WCO(policy);
|
|
WithCheckOption *wco;
|
|
|
|
if (qual != NULL)
|
|
{
|
|
qual = copyObject(qual);
|
|
ChangeVarNodes((Node *) qual, 1, rt_index, 0);
|
|
|
|
wco = makeNode(WithCheckOption);
|
|
wco->kind = kind;
|
|
wco->relname = pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel));
|
|
wco->polname = pstrdup(policy->policy_name);
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) qual;
|
|
wco->cascaded = false;
|
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = list_append_unique(*withCheckOptions, wco);
|
|
*hasSubLinks |= policy->hassublinks;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If there were no policy clauses to check new data, add a single
|
|
* always-false WCO (a default-deny policy).
|
|
*/
|
|
WithCheckOption *wco;
|
|
|
|
wco = makeNode(WithCheckOption);
|
|
wco->kind = kind;
|
|
wco->relname = pstrdup(RelationGetRelationName(rel));
|
|
wco->polname = NULL;
|
|
wco->qual = (Node *) makeConst(BOOLOID, -1, InvalidOid,
|
|
sizeof(bool), BoolGetDatum(false),
|
|
false, true);
|
|
wco->cascaded = false;
|
|
|
|
*withCheckOptions = lappend(*withCheckOptions, wco);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* check_role_for_policy -
|
|
* determines if the policy should be applied for the current role
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool
|
|
check_role_for_policy(ArrayType *policy_roles, Oid user_id)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
Oid *roles = (Oid *) ARR_DATA_PTR(policy_roles);
|
|
|
|
/* Quick fall-thru for policies applied to all roles */
|
|
if (roles[0] == ACL_ID_PUBLIC)
|
|
return true;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < ARR_DIMS(policy_roles)[0]; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if (has_privs_of_role(user_id, roles[i]))
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|