getid() and putid(), which parse and deparse role names within ACL
input/output, applied isalnum() to see if a character within a role
name requires quoting. They did this even for non-ASCII characters,
which is problematic because the results would depend on encoding,
locale, and perhaps even platform. So it's possible that putid()
could elect not to quote some string that, later in some other
environment, getid() will decide is not a valid identifier, causing
dump/reload or similar failures.
To fix this in a way that won't risk interoperability problems
with unpatched versions, make getid() treat any non-ASCII as a
legitimate identifier character (hence not requiring quotes),
while making putid() treat any non-ASCII as requiring quoting.
We could remove the resulting excess quoting once we feel that
no unpatched servers remain in the wild, but that'll be years.
A lesser problem is that getid() did the wrong thing with an input
consisting of just two double quotes (""). That has to represent an
empty string, but getid() read it as a single double quote instead.
The case cannot arise in the normal course of events, since we don't
allow empty-string role names. But let's fix it while we're here.
Although we've not heard field reports of problems with non-ASCII
role names, there's clearly a hazard there, so back-patch to all
supported versions.
Reported-by: Peter Eisentraut <peter@eisentraut.org>
Author: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/3792884.1751492172@sss.pgh.pa.us
Backpatch-through: 13
Make sure that function declarations use names that exactly match the
corresponding names from function definitions in a few places. These
inconsistencies were all introduced during Postgres 18 development.
This commit was written with help from clang-tidy, by mechanically
applying the same rules as similar clean-up commits (the earliest such
commit was commit 035ce1fe).
The only caller, select_best_grantor(), can instead use
pg_popcount64(). This isn't performance-critical code, but we
might as well use the centralized implementation. While at it, add
some test coverage for this part of select_best_grantor().
Reviewed-by: Álvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/Z9GtL7Nm6hsYyJnF%40nathan
This function checks whether a user has specific privileges on a large object,
identified by OID. The user can be provided by name, OID,
or default to the current user. If the specified large object doesn't exist,
the function returns NULL. It raises an error for a non-existent user name.
This behavior is basically consistent with other privilege inquiry functions
like has_table_privilege.
Bump catalog version.
Author: Yugo Nagata
Reviewed-by: Fujii Masao
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20240702163444.ab586f6075e502eb84f11b1a@sranhm.sraoss.co.jp
The RULE privilege for tables was removed in v8.2, but for backward
compatibility, GRANT/REVOKE and privilege functions like
has_table_privilege continued to accept the RULE keyword without
any effect.
After discussions on pgsql-hackers, it was agreed that this compatibility
is no longer needed. Since it's been long enough since the deprecation,
we've decided to fully remove support for RULE privilege,
so GRANT/REVOKE and privilege functions will no longer accept it.
Author: Fujii Masao
Reviewed-by: Nathan Bossart
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/976a3581-6939-457f-b947-fc3dc836c083@oss.nttdata.com
Commit 534287403 invented SHARED_DEPENDENCY_INITACL entries in
pg_shdepend, but installed them only for non-owner roles mentioned
in a pg_init_privs entry. This turns out to be the wrong thing,
because there is nothing to cue REASSIGN OWNED to go and update
pg_init_privs entries when the object's ownership is reassigned.
That leads to leaving dangling entries in pg_init_privs, as
reported by Hannu Krosing. Instead, install INITACL entries for
all roles mentioned in pg_init_privs entries (except pinned roles),
and change ALTER OWNER to not touch them, just as it doesn't
touch pg_init_privs entries.
REASSIGN OWNED will now substitute the new owner OID for the old
in pg_init_privs entries. This feels like perhaps not quite the
right thing, since pg_init_privs ought to be a historical record
of the state of affairs just after CREATE EXTENSION. However,
it's hard to see what else to do, if we don't want to disallow
dropping the object's original owner. In any case this is
better than the previous do-nothing behavior, and we're unlikely
to come up with a superior solution in time for v17.
While here, tighten up some coding rules about how ACLs in
pg_init_privs should never be null or empty. There's not any
obvious reason to allow that, and perhaps asserting that it's
not so will catch some bugs. (We were previously inconsistent
on the point, with some code paths taking care not to store
empty ACLs and others not.)
This leaves recordExtensionInitPrivWorker not doing anything
with its ownerId argument, but we'll deal with that separately.
catversion bump forced because of change of expected contents
of pg_shdepend when pg_init_privs entries exist.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAMT0RQSVgv48G5GArUvOVhottWqZLrvC5wBzBa4HrUdXe9VRXw@mail.gmail.com
When the list of roles gathered by roles_is_member_of() grows very
large, a Bloom filter is created to help avoid some linear searches
through the list. The threshold for creating the Bloom filter is
set arbitrarily high and may require future adjustment.
Suggested-by: Tom Lane
Reviewed-by: Tom Lane
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAGvXd3OSMbJQwOSc-Tq-Ro1CAz%3DvggErdSG7pv2s6vmmTOLJSg%40mail.gmail.com
Roles with MAINTAIN on a relation may run VACUUM, ANALYZE, REINDEX,
REFRESH MATERIALIZE VIEW, CLUSTER, and LOCK TABLE on the relation.
Roles with privileges of pg_maintain may run those same commands on
all relations.
This was previously committed for v16, but it was reverted in
commit 151c22deee due to concerns about search_path tricks that
could be used to escalate privileges to the table owner. Commits
2af07e2f74, 59825d1639, and c7ea3f4229 resolved these concerns by
restricting search_path when running maintenance commands.
Bumps catversion.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Davis
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20240305161235.GA3478007%40nathanxps13
as determined by include-what-you-use (IWYU)
While IWYU also suggests to *add* a bunch of #include's (which is its
main purpose), this patch does not do that. In some cases, a more
specific #include replaces another less specific one.
Some manual adjustments of the automatic result:
- IWYU currently doesn't know about includes that provide global
variable declarations (like -Wmissing-variable-declarations), so
those includes are being kept manually.
- All includes for port(ability) headers are being kept for now, to
play it safe.
- No changes of catalog/pg_foo.h to catalog/pg_foo_d.h, to keep the
patch from exploding in size.
Note that this patch touches just *.c files, so nothing declared in
header files changes in hidden ways.
As a small example, in src/backend/access/transam/rmgr.c, some IWYU
pragma annotations are added to handle a special case there.
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/af837490-6b2f-46df-ba05-37ea6a6653fc%40eisentraut.org
The versions of these functions that accept object OIDs are supposed
to return NULL, rather than failing, if the target object has been
dropped. This makes it safe(r) to use them in queries that scan
catalogs, since the functions will be applied to objects that are
visible in the query's snapshot but might now be gone according to
the catalog snapshot. In most cases we implemented this by doing
a SearchSysCacheExists test and assuming that if that succeeds, we
can safely invoke the appropriate aclchk.c function, which will
immediately re-fetch the same syscache entry. It was argued that
if the existence test succeeds then the followup fetch must succeed
as well, for lack of any intervening AcceptInvalidationMessages call.
Alexander Lakhin demonstrated that this is not so when
CATCACHE_FORCE_RELEASE is enabled: the syscache entry will be forcibly
dropped at the end of SearchSysCacheExists, and then it is possible
for the catalog snapshot to get advanced while re-fetching the entry.
Alexander's test case requires the operation to happen inside a
parallel worker, but that seems incidental to the fundamental problem.
What remains obscure is whether there is a way for this to happen in a
non-debug build. Nonetheless, CATCACHE_FORCE_RELEASE is a very useful
test methodology, so we'd better make the code safe for it.
After some discussion we concluded that the most future-proof fix
is to give up the assumption that checking SearchSysCacheExists can
guarantee success of a later fetch. At best that assumption leads
to fragile code --- for example, has_type_privilege appears broken
for array types even if you believe the assumption holds. And it's
not even particularly efficient.
There had already been some work towards extending the aclchk.c
APIs to include "is_missing" output flags, so this patch extends
that work to cover all the aclchk.c functions that are used by the
has_xxx_privilege() functions. (This allows getting rid of some
ad-hoc decisions about not throwing errors in certain places in
aclchk.c.)
In passing, this fixes the has_sequence_privilege() functions to
provide the same guarantees as their cousins: for some reason the
SearchSysCacheExists tests never got added to those.
There is more work to do to remove the unsafe coding pattern with
SearchSysCacheExists in other places, but this is a pretty
self-contained patch so I'll commit it separately.
Per bug #18014 from Alexander Lakhin. Given the lack of hard evidence
that there's a bug in non-debug builds, I'm content to fix this only
in HEAD. (Perhaps we should clean up the has_sequence_privilege()
oversight in the back branches, but in the absence of field complaints
I'm not too excited about that either.)
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/18014-28c81cb79d44295d@postgresql.org
Based on how postgres.h foes the Oid <-> Datum conversion, there is no
existing bugs but let's be consistent. 17 spots have been noticed as
incorrectly passing down Oids rather than Datums. Aleksander got one,
Zhang two and I the rest.
Author: Michael Paquier, Aleksander Alekseev, Zhang Mingli
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/ZLUhqsqQN1MOaxdw@paquier.xyz
This fixes many spelling mistakes in comments, but a few references to
invalid parameter names, function names and option names too in comments
and also some in string constants
Also, fix an #undef that was undefining the incorrect definition
Author: Alexander Lakhin
Reviewed-by: Justin Pryzby
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/d5f68d19-c0fc-91a9-118d-7c6a5a3f5fad@gmail.com
Convert assorted internal-ish datatypes, namely aclitemin,
int2vectorin, oidin, oidvectorin, pg_lsn_in, pg_snapshot_in,
and tidin to the new style.
(Some others you might expect to find in this group, such as
cidin and xidin, need no changes because they never throw
errors at all. That seems a little cheesy ... but it is not in
the charter of this patch series to add new error conditions.)
Amul Sul, minor mods by me
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/CAAJ_b97KeDWUdpTKGOaFYPv0OicjOu6EW+QYWj-Ywrgj_aEy1g@mail.gmail.com
Currently a table can only be vacuumed or analyzed by its owner or
a superuser. This can now be extended to any user by means of an
appropriate GRANT.
Nathan Bossart
Reviewed by: Bharath Rupireddy, Kyotaro Horiguchi, Stephen Frost, Robert
Haas, Mark Dilger, Tom Lane, Corey Huinker, David G. Johnston, Michael
Paquier.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20220722203735.GB3996698@nathanxps13
Similar to how the INHERIT option controls whether or not the
permissions of the granted role are automatically available to the
grantee, the new SET permission controls whether or not the grantee
may use the SET ROLE command to assume the privileges of the granted
role.
In addition, the new SET permission controls whether or not it
is possible to transfer ownership of objects to the target role
or to create new objects owned by the target role using commands
such as CREATE DATABASE .. OWNER. We could alternatively have made
this controlled by the INHERIT option, or allow it when either
option is given. An advantage of this approach is that if you
are granted a predefined role with INHERIT TRUE, SET FALSE, you
can't go and create objects owned by that role.
The underlying theory here is that the ability to create objects
as a target role is not a privilege per se, and thus does not
depend on whether you inherit the target role's privileges. However,
it's surely something you could do anyway if you could SET ROLE
to the target role, and thus making it contingent on whether you
have that ability is reasonable.
Design review by Nathan Bossat, Wolfgang Walther, Jeff Davis,
Peter Eisentraut, and Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmob+zDSRS6JXYrgq0NWdzCXuTNzT5eK54Dn2hhgt17nm8A@mail.gmail.com
Instead of dozens of mostly-duplicate pg_foo_aclcheck() functions,
write one common function object_aclcheck() that can handle almost all
of them. We already have all the information we need, such as which
system catalog corresponds to which catalog table and which column is
the ACL column.
There are a few pg_foo_aclcheck() that don't work via the generic
function and have special APIs, so those stay as is.
I also changed most pg_foo_aclmask() functions to static functions,
since they are not used outside of aclchk.c.
Reviewed-by: Corey Huinker <corey.huinker@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/flat/95c30f96-4060-2f48-98b5-a4392d3b6066@enterprisedb.com
This prevents marking the argument string for translation for gettext,
and it also prevents the given string (which is already translated) from
being translated at runtime.
Also, mark the strings used as arguments to check_rolespec_name for
translation.
Backpatch all the way back as appropriate. None of this is caught by
any tests (necessarily so), so I verified it manually.
Commit e3ce2de09d rearranged this
function to be able to identify which inherited role had admin option
on the target role, but it got the order of operations wrong, causing
the function to return wrong answers in the presence of non-inherited
grants.
Fix that, and add a test case that verifies the correct behavior.
Patch by me, reviewed by Nathan Bossart
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoYamnu-xt-u7CqjYWnRiJ6BQaSpYOHXP=r4QGTfd1N_EA@mail.gmail.com
The GRANT statement can now specify WITH INHERIT TRUE or WITH
INHERIT FALSE to control whether the member inherits the granted
role's permissions. For symmetry, you can now likewise write
WITH ADMIN TRUE or WITH ADMIN FALSE to turn ADMIN OPTION on or off.
If a GRANT does not specify WITH INHERIT, the behavior based on
whether the member role is marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT. This means
that if all roles are marked INHERIT or NOINHERIT before any role
grants are performed, the behavior is identical to what we had before;
otherwise, it's different, because ALTER ROLE [NO]INHERIT now only
changes the default behavior of future grants, and has no effect on
existing ones.
Patch by me. Reviewed and testing by Nathan Bossart and Tushar Ahuja,
with design-level comments from various others.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmoa5Sf4PiWrfxA=sGzDKg0Ojo3dADw=wAHOhR9dggV=RmQ@mail.gmail.com
Previously, membership of role A in role B could be recorded in the
catalog tables only once. This meant that a new grant of role A to
role B would overwrite the previous grant. For other object types, a
new grant of permission on an object - in this case role A - exists
along side the existing grant provided that the grantor is different.
Either grant can be revoked independently of the other, and
permissions remain so long as at least one grant remains. Make role
grants work similarly.
Previously, when granting membership in a role, the superuser could
specify any role whatsoever as the grantor, but for other object types,
the grantor of record must be either the owner of the object, or a
role that currently has privileges to perform a similar GRANT.
Implement the same scheme for role grants, treating the bootstrap
superuser as the role owner since roles do not have owners. This means
that attempting to revoke a grant, or admin option on a grant, can now
fail if there are dependent privileges, and that CASCADE can be used
to revoke these. It also means that you can't grant ADMIN OPTION on
a role back to a user who granted it directly or indirectly to you,
similar to how you can't give WITH GRANT OPTION on a privilege back
to a role which granted it directly or indirectly to you.
Previously, only the superuser could specify GRANTED BY with a user
other than the current user. Relax that rule to allow the grantor
to be any role whose privileges the current user posseses. This
doesn't improve compatibility with what we do for other object types,
where support for GRANTED BY is entirely vestigial, but it makes this
feature more usable and seems to make sense to change at the same time
we're changing related behaviors.
Along the way, fix "ALTER GROUP group_name ADD USER user_name" to
require the same privileges as "GRANT group_name TO user_name".
Previously, CREATEROLE privileges were sufficient for either, but
only the former form was permissible with ADMIN OPTION on the role.
Now, either CREATEROLE or ADMIN OPTION on the role suffices for
either spelling.
Patch by me, reviewed by Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaFr-RZeQ+WoQ5nKPv97oT9+aDgK_a5+qWHSgbDsMp1Vg@mail.gmail.com
This replaces all MemSet() calls with struct initialization where that
is easily and obviously possible. (For example, some cases have to
worry about padding bits, so I left those.)
(The same could be done with appropriate memset() calls, but this
patch is part of an effort to phase out MemSet(), so it doesn't touch
memset() calls.)
Reviewed-by: Ranier Vilela <ranier.vf@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Alvaro Herrera <alvherre@alvh.no-ip.org>
Discussion: https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/9847b13c-b785-f4e2-75c3-12ec77a3b05c@enterprisedb.com
Interpret its privileges argument as a comma-separated list of
privilege names, as in has_table_privilege and other functions.
This is actually net less code, since the support routine to
parse that already exists, and we can drop convert_priv_string()
which had no other use-case.
Robins Tharakan
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/e5a05dc54ba64408b3dd260171c1abaf@EX13D05UWC001.ant.amazon.com
This patch allows "PGC_SUSET" parameters to be set by non-superusers
if they have been explicitly granted the privilege to do so.
The privilege to perform ALTER SYSTEM SET/RESET on a specific parameter
can also be granted.
Such privileges are cluster-wide, not per database. They are tracked
in a new shared catalog, pg_parameter_acl.
Granting and revoking these new privileges works as one would expect.
One caveat is that PGC_USERSET GUCs are unaffected by the SET privilege
--- one could wish that those were handled by a revocable grant to
PUBLIC, but they are not, because we couldn't make it robust enough
for GUCs defined by extensions.
Mark Dilger, reviewed at various times by Andrew Dunstan, Robert Haas,
Joshua Brindle, and myself
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/3D691E20-C1D5-4B80-8BA5-6BEB63AF3029@enterprisedb.com
Generally if a role is granted membership to another role with NOINHERIT
they must use SET ROLE to access the privileges of that role, however
with predefined roles the membership and privilege is conflated. Fix that
by replacing is_member_of_role with has_privs_for_role for predefined
roles. Patch does not remove is_member_of_role from acl.h, but it does
add a warning not to use that function for privilege checking. Not
backpatched based on hackers list discussion.
Author: Joshua Brindle
Reviewed-by: Stephen Frost, Nathan Bossart, Joe Conway
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/flat/CAGB+Vh4Zv_TvKt2tv3QNS6tUM_F_9icmuj0zjywwcgVi4PAhFA@mail.gmail.com
Commit f9fd176461 effectively gave
every role ADMIN OPTION on itself. However, this appears to be
something that happened accidentally as a result of refactoring
work rather than an intentional decision. Almost a decade later,
it was discovered that this was a security vulnerability. As a
result, commit fea164a72a restricted
this implicit ADMIN OPTION privilege to be exercisable only when
the role being administered is the same as the session user and
when no security-restricted operation is in progress. That
commit also documented the existence of this implicit privilege
for what seems to be the first time.
The effect of the privilege is to allow a login role to grant
the privileges of that role, and optionally ADMIN OPTION on it,
to some other role. That's an unusual thing to do, because generally
membership is granted in roles used as groups, rather than roles
used as users. Therefore, it does not seem likely that removing
the privilege will break things for many PostgreSQL users.
However, it will make it easier to reason about the permissions
system. This is the only case where a user who has not been given any
special permission (superuser, or ADMIN OPTION on some role) can
modify role membership, so removing it makes things more consistent.
For example, if a superuser sets up role A and B and grants A to B
but no other privileges to anyone, she can now be sure that no one
else will be able to revoke that grant. Without this change, that
would have been true only if A was a non-login role.
Patch by me. Reviewed by Tom Lane and Stephen Frost.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+Tgmoawdt03kbA+dNyBcNWJpRxu0f4X=69Y3+DkXXZqmwMDLg@mail.gmail.com
Also "make reformat-dat-files".
The only change worthy of note is that pgindent messed up the formatting
of launcher.c's struct LogicalRepWorkerId, which led me to notice that
that struct wasn't used at all anymore, so I just took it out.
Commit c9c41c7a33 used two different
naming patterns. Standardize on the majority pattern, which was the
only pattern in the last reviewed version of that commit.
According to the comments, when an invalid or dropped column oid is passed
to has_column_privilege(), the intention has always been to return NULL.
However, when the caller had table level privilege the invalid/missing
column was never discovered, because table permissions were checked first.
Fix that by introducing extended versions of pg_attribute_acl(check|mask)
and pg_class_acl(check|mask) which take a new argument, is_missing. When
is_missing is NULL, the old behavior is preserved. But when is_missing is
passed by the caller, no ERROR is thrown for dropped or missing
columns/relations, and is_missing is flipped to true. This in turn allows
has_column_privilege to check for column privileges first, providing the
desired semantics.
Not backpatched since it is a user visible behavioral change with no previous
complaints, and the fix is a bit on the invasive side.
Author: Joe Conway
Reviewed-By: Tom Lane
Reported by: Ian Barwick
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/flat/9b5f4311-157b-4164-7fe7-077b4fe8ed84%40joeconway.com
Membership consists, implicitly, of the current database owner. Expect
use in template databases. Once pg_database_owner has rights within a
template, each owner of a database instantiated from that template will
exercise those rights.
Reviewed by John Naylor.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201228043148.GA1053024@rfd.leadboat.com
This makes existing sessions reflect "ALTER ROLE ... [NO]INHERIT" as
quickly as they have been reflecting "GRANT role_name". Back-patch to
9.5 (all supported versions).
Reviewed by Nathan Bossart.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/20201221095028.GB3777719@rfd.leadboat.com
In the footsteps of aaf069aa3, remove ACLDEBUG, which was the only
other remaining undocumented symbol in pg_config_manual.h. The fact
that nobody had bothered to document it in seventeen years is a good
clue to its usefulness. In practice, none of the tracing logic it
enabled would be of any value without additional effort.
Discussion: https://postgr.es/m/6631.1587565046@sss.pgh.pa.us
This also involves renaming src/include/utils/hashutils.h, which
becomes src/include/common/hashfn.h. Perhaps an argument can be
made for keeping the hashutils.h name, but it seemed more
consistent to make it match the name of the file, and also more
descriptive of what is actually going on here.
Patch by me, reviewed by Suraj Kharage and Mark Dilger. Off-list
advice on how not to break the Windows build from Davinder Singh
and Amit Kapila.
Discussion: http://postgr.es/m/CA+TgmoaRiG4TXND8QuM6JXFRkM_1wL2ZNhzaUKsuec9-4yrkgw@mail.gmail.com
