Reportedly, some compilers warn about tests like "c < 0" if c is unsigned,
and hence complain about the character range checks I added in commit
3bb3f42f37. This is a bit of a pain since
the regex library doesn't really want to assume that chr is unsigned.
However, since any such reconfiguration would involve manual edits of
regcustom.h anyway, we can put it on the shoulders of whoever wants to
do that to adjust this new range-checking macro correctly.
Per gripes from Coverity and Andres.
Previously, our regex code defined CHR_MAX as 0xfffffffe, which is a
bad choice because it is outside the range of type "celt" (int32).
Characters approaching that limit could lead to infinite loops in logic
such as "for (c = a; c <= b; c++)" where c is of type celt but the
range bounds are chr. Such loops will work safely only if CHR_MAX+1
is representable in celt, since c must advance to beyond b before the
loop will exit.
Fortunately, there seems no reason not to restrict CHR_MAX to 0x7ffffffe.
It's highly unlikely that Unicode will ever assign codes that high, and
none of our other backend encodings need characters beyond that either.
In addition to modifying the macro, we have to explicitly enforce character
range restrictions on the values of \u, \U, and \x escape sequences, else
the limit is trivially bypassed.
Also, the code for expanding case-independent character ranges in bracket
expressions had a potential integer overflow in its calculation of the
number of characters it could generate, which could lead to allocating too
small a character vector and then overwriting memory. An attacker with the
ability to supply arbitrary regex patterns could easily cause transient DOS
via server crashes, and the possibility for privilege escalation has not
been ruled out.
Quite aside from the integer-overflow problem, the range expansion code was
unnecessarily inefficient in that it always produced a result consisting of
individual characters, abandoning the knowledge that we had a range to
start with. If the input range is large, this requires excessive memory.
Change it so that the original range is reported as-is, and then we add on
any case-equivalent characters that are outside that range. With this
approach, we can bound the number of individual characters allowed without
sacrificing much. This patch allows at most 100000 individual characters,
which I believe to be more than the number of case pairs existing in
Unicode, so that the restriction will never be hit in practice.
It's still possible for range() to take awhile given a large character code
range, so also add statement-cancel detection to its loop. The downstream
function dovec() also lacked cancel detection, and could take a long time
given a large output from range().
Per fuzz testing by Greg Stark. Back-patch to all supported branches.
Security: CVE-2016-0773
This was not changed in HEAD, but will be done later as part of a
pgindent run. Future pgindent runs will also do this.
Report by Tom Lane
Backpatch through all supported branches, but not HEAD
Per C standard, these are semantically the same thing; but saying NULL
when you mean NULL is good for readability.
Marti Raudsepp, per results of INRIA's Coccinelle.
was Tcl 8.4.8. The main changes are to remove the never-fully-implemented
code for multi-character collating elements, and to const-ify some stuff a
bit more fully. In combination with the recent security patch, this commit
brings us into line with Tcl 8.5.0.
Note that I didn't make any effort to duplicate a lot of cosmetic changes
that they made to bring their copy into line with their own style
guidelines, such as adding braces around single-line IF bodies. Most of
those we either had done already (such as ANSI-fication of function headers)
or there is no point because pgindent would undo the change anyway.
are shared with Tcl, since it's their code to begin with, and the patches
have been copied from Tcl 8.5.0. Problems:
CVE-2007-4769: Inadequate check on the range of backref numbers allows
crash due to out-of-bounds read.
CVE-2007-4772: Infinite loop in regex optimizer for pattern '($|^)*'.
CVE-2007-6067: Very slow optimizer cleanup for regex with a large NFA
representation, as well as crash if we encounter an out-of-memory condition
during NFA construction.
Part of the response to CVE-2007-6067 is to put a limit on the number of
states in the NFA representation of a regex. This seems needed even though
the within-the-code problems have been corrected, since otherwise the code
could try to use very large amounts of memory for a suitably-crafted regex,
leading to potential DOS by driving the system into swap, activating a kernel
OOM killer, etc.
Although there are certainly plenty of ways to drive the system into effective
DOS with poorly-written SQL queries, these problems seem worth treating as
security issues because many applications might accept regex search patterns
from untrustworthy sources.
Thanks to Will Drewry of Google for reporting these problems. Patches by Will
Drewry and Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2007-4769, CVE-2007-4772, CVE-2007-6067
versions of gcc (I'm seeing it with Apple's gcc 4.0.1). I think the
reason we did not see this before was that the assert() macros in the
regex code were all no-ops till recently.
(extracted from Tcl 8.4.1 release, as Henry still hasn't got round to
making it a separate library). This solves a performance problem for
multibyte, as well as upgrading our regexp support to match recent Tcl
and nearly match recent Perl.
