Both Blowfish and DES implementations of crypt() can take arbitrarily
long time, depending on the number of rounds specified by the caller;
make sure they can be interrupted.
Author: Andreas Karlsson
Reviewer: Jeff Janes
Backpatch to 9.1.
Certain short salts crashed the backend or disclosed a few bytes of
backend memory. For existing salt-induced error conditions, emit a
message saying as much. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Josh Kupershmidt
Security: CVE-2015-5288
This has been the predominant outcome. When the output of decrypting
with a wrong key coincidentally resembled an OpenPGP packet header,
pgcrypto could instead report "Corrupt data", "Not text data" or
"Unsupported compression algorithm". The distinct "Corrupt data"
message added no value. The latter two error messages misled when the
decrypted payload also exhibited fundamental integrity problems. Worse,
error message variance in other systems has enabled cryptologic attacks;
see RFC 4880 section "14. Security Considerations". Whether these
pgcrypto behaviors are likewise exploitable is unknown.
In passing, document that pgcrypto does not resist side-channel attacks.
Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Security: CVE-2015-3167
This covers alterations to buffer sizing and zeroing made between imath
1.3 and imath 1.20. Valgrind Memcheck identified the buffer overruns
and reliance on uninitialized data; their exploit potential is unknown.
Builds specifying --with-openssl are unaffected, because they use the
OpenSSL BIGNUM facility instead of imath. Back-patch to 9.0 (all
supported versions).
Security: CVE-2015-0243
Most callers pass a stack buffer. The ensuing stack smash can crash the
server, and we have not ruled out the viability of attacks that lead to
privilege escalation. Back-patch to 9.0 (all supported versions).
Marko Tiikkaja
Security: CVE-2015-0243
Coverity points out that mdc_finish returns a pointer to a local buffer
(which of course is gone as soon as the function returns), leaving open
a risk of misbehaviors possibly as bad as a stack overwrite.
In reality, the only possible call site is in process_data_packets()
which does not examine the returned pointer at all. So there's no
live bug, but nonetheless the code is confusing and risky. Refactor
to avoid the issue by letting process_data_packets() call mdc_finish()
directly instead of going through the pullf_read() API.
Although this is only cosmetic, it seems good to back-patch so that
the logic in pgp-decrypt.c stays in sync across all branches.
Marko Kreen
This fixes a scenario in which pgp_sym_decrypt() failed with "Wrong key
or corrupt data" on messages whose length is 6 less than a power of 2.
Per bug #11905 from Connor Penhale. Fix by Marko Tiikkaja, regression
test case from Jeff Janes.
pgp_sym_encrypt's option is spelled "sess-key", not "enable-session-key".
Spotted by Jeff Janes.
In passing, improve a comment in pgp-pgsql.c to make it clearer that
the debugging options are intentionally undocumented.
Some of the many error messages introduced in 458857cc missed 'FROM
unpackaged'. Also e016b724 and 45ffeb7e forgot to quote extension
version numbers.
Backpatch to 9.1, just like 458857cc which introduced the messages. Do
so because the error messages thrown when the wrong command is copy &
pasted aren't easy to understand.
This was not changed in HEAD, but will be done later as part of a
pgindent run. Future pgindent runs will also do this.
Report by Tom Lane
Backpatch through all supported branches, but not HEAD
Specifically, on-stack memset() might be removed, so:
* Replace memset() with px_memset()
* Add px_memset to copy_crlf()
* Add px_memset to pgp-s2k.c
Patch by Marko Kreen
Report by PVS-Studio
Backpatch through 8.4.
Overly tight coding caused the password transformation loop to stop
examining input once it had processed a byte equal to 0x80. Thus, if the
given password string contained such a byte (which is possible though not
highly likely in UTF8, and perhaps also in other non-ASCII encodings), all
subsequent characters would not contribute to the hash, making the password
much weaker than it appears on the surface.
This would only affect cases where applications used DES crypt() to encode
passwords before storing them in the database. If a weak password has been
created in this fashion, the hash will stop matching after this update has
been applied, so it will be easy to tell if any passwords were unexpectedly
weak. Changing to a different password would be a good idea in such a case.
(Since DES has been considered inadequately secure for some time, changing
to a different encryption algorithm can also be recommended.)
This code, and the bug, are shared with at least PHP, FreeBSD, and OpenBSD.
Since the other projects have already published their fixes, there is no
point in trying to keep this commit private.
This bug has been assigned CVE-2012-2143, and credit for its discovery goes
to Rubin Xu and Joseph Bonneau.
Due to oversights, the encrypt_iv() and decrypt_iv() functions failed to
report certain types of invalid-input errors, and would instead return
random garbage values.
Marko Kreen, per report from Stefan Kaltenbrunner
We have seen one too many reports of people trying to use 9.1 extension
files in the old-fashioned way of sourcing them in psql. Not only does
that usually not work (due to failure to substitute for MODULE_PATHNAME
and/or @extschema@), but if it did work they'd get a collection of loose
objects not an extension. To prevent this, insert an \echo ... \quit
line that prints a suitable error message into each extension script file,
and teach commands/extension.c to ignore lines starting with \echo.
That should not only prevent any adverse consequences of loading a script
file the wrong way, but make it crystal clear to users that they need to
do it differently now.
Tom Lane, following an idea of Andrew Dunstan's. Back-patch into 9.1
... there is not going to be much value in this if we wait till 9.2.
This addresses only those cases that are easy to fix by adding or
moving a const qualifier or removing an unnecessary cast. There are
many more complicated cases remaining.
Add __attribute__ decorations for printf format checking to the places that
were missing them. Fix the resulting warnings. Add
-Wmissing-format-attribute to the standard set of warnings for GCC, so these
don't happen again.
The warning fixes here are relatively harmless. The one serious problem
discovered by this was already committed earlier in
cf15fb5cabfbc71e07be23cfbc813daee6c5014f.
A password containing a character with the high bit set was misprocessed
on machines where char is signed (which is most). This could cause the
preceding one to three characters to fail to affect the hashed result,
thus weakening the password. The result was also unportable, and failed
to match some other blowfish implementations such as OpenBSD's.
Since the fix changes the output for such passwords, upstream chose
to provide a compatibility hack: password salts beginning with $2x$
(instead of the usual $2a$ for blowfish) are intentionally processed
"wrong" to give the same hash as before. Stored password hashes can
thus be modified if necessary to still match, though it'd be better
to change any affected passwords.
In passing, sync a couple other upstream changes that marginally improve
performance and/or tighten error checking.
Back-patch to all supported branches. Since this issue is already
public, no reason not to commit the fix ASAP.
Added a new option --extra-install to pg_regress to arrange installing
the respective contrib directory into the temporary installation.
This is currently not yet supported for Windows MSVC builds.
Updated the .gitignore files for contrib modules to ignore the
leftovers of a temp-install check run.
Changed the exit status of "make check" in a pgxs build (which still
does nothing) to 0 from 1.
Added "make check" in contrib to top-level "make check-world".
This warning is new in gcc 4.6 and part of -Wall. This patch cleans
up most of the noise, but there are some still warnings that are
trickier to remove.
It was never terribly consistent to use OR REPLACE (because of the lack of
comparable functionality for data types, operators, etc), and
experimentation shows that it's now positively pernicious in the extension
world. We really want a failure to occur if there are any conflicts, else
it's unclear what the extension-ownership state of the conflicted object
ought to be. Most of the time, CREATE EXTENSION will fail anyway because
of conflicts on other object types, but an extension defining only
functions can succeed, with bad results.
This isn't fully tested as yet, in particular I'm not sure that the
"foo--unpackaged--1.0.sql" scripts are OK. But it's time to get some
buildfarm cycles on it.
sepgsql is not converted to an extension, mainly because it seems to
require a very nonstandard installation process.
Dimitri Fontaine and Tom Lane
in the formerly-always-blank columns just to left and right of the data.
Different marking is used for a line break caused by a newline in the data
than for a straight wraparound. A newline break is signaled by a "+" in the
right margin column in ASCII mode, or a carriage return arrow in UNICODE mode.
Wraparound is signaled by a dot in the right margin as well as the following
left margin in ASCII mode, or an ellipsis symbol in the same places in UNICODE
mode. "\pset linestyle old-ascii" is added to make the previous behavior
available if anyone really wants it.
In passing, this commit also cleans up a few regression test files that
had unintended spacing differences from the current actual output.
Roger Leigh, reviewed by Gabrielle Roth and other members of PDXPUG.
not global variables of anonymous enum types. This didn't actually hurt
much because most linkers will just merge the duplicated definitions ...
but some will complain. Per bug #4731 from Ceriel Jacobs.
Backpatch to 8.1 --- the declarations don't exist before that.
These changes assume that the varchar and xml data types are represented
the same as text. (I did not, however, accept the portions of the proposed
patch that wanted to assume bytea is the same as text --- tgl.)
Brendan Jurd
