In 9.6, we moved a number of functions over to using the GRANT system to
control access instead of having hard-coded superuser checks.
As it turns out, adminpack was creating another function in the catalog
for one of those backend functions where the superuser check was
removed, specifically pg_rotate_logfile(), but it didn't get the memo
about having to REVOKE EXECUTE on the alternative-name function
(pg_logfile_rotate()), meaning that in any installations with adminpack
on 9.6 and higher, any user is able to run the pg_logfile_rotate()
function, which then calls pg_rotate_logfile() and rotates the logfile.
Fix by adding a new version of adminpack (1.1) which handles the REVOKE.
As this function should have only been available to the superuser, this
is a security issue, albeit a minor one.
Security: CVE-2018-1115
Prominent binaries already had this metadata. A handful of minor
binaries, such as pg_regress.exe, still lack it; efforts to eliminate
such exceptions are welcome.
Michael Paquier, reviewed by MauMau.
From first pass of testing. Notably, there seems to be no need for
adminpack--unpackaged--1.0.sql because none of the objects that the
old module creates would ever be dumped by pg_dump anyway (they are
all in pg_catalog).
This isn't fully tested as yet, in particular I'm not sure that the
"foo--unpackaged--1.0.sql" scripts are OK. But it's time to get some
buildfarm cycles on it.
sepgsql is not converted to an extension, mainly because it seems to
require a very nonstandard installation process.
Dimitri Fontaine and Tom Lane
installations whose pg_config program does not appear first in the PATH.
Per gripe from Eddie Stanley and subsequent discussions with Fabien Coelho
and others.
